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War
전쟁(戰爭)
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The Theory and Conduct of War
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2 THE INSTITUTION OF WAR
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In all ages war has been an important
topic of analysis. In the latter part of the 20th century, in the aftermath of
two world wars and in the shadow of nuclear, biological, and chemical holocaust,
more has been written on the subject than ever before. Endeavours to understand
the nature of war, to formulate some theory of its causes, conduct, and
prevention, are of great importance, for theory shapes human expectations and
determines human behaviour. The various schools of theorists are generally aware
of the profound influence they can exercise upon life, and their writings
usually include a strong normative element, for, when accepted by politicians,
their ideas can assume the characteristics of self-fulfilling prophecies. |
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The analysis of war may be divided into
several categories. Philosophical, political, economic, technological, legal,
sociological, and psychological approaches are frequently distinguished. These
distinctions indicate the varying focuses of interest and the different
analytical categories employed by the theoretician, but most of the actual
theories are mixed because war is an extremely complex social phenomenon that
cannot be explained by any single factor or through any single approach. |
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Reflecting changes in the international
system, theories of war have passed through several phases in the course of the
past three centuries. After the ending of the wars of religion, about the middle
of the 17th century, wars were fought for the interests of individual sovereigns
and were limited both in their objectives and in their scope. The art of
maneuver became decisive, and analysis of war was couched accordingly in terms
of strategies. The situation changed fundamentally with the outbreak of the French
Revolution, which increased the size of forces from small professional to
large conscript armies and broadened the objectives of war to the ideals of the
revolution, ideals that appealed to the masses who were subject to conscription.
In the relative order of post-Napoleonic Europe
the mainstream of theory returned to the idea of war as a rational, limited
instrument of national policy. This approach was best articulated by the
Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz
in his famous classic On
War (1832-37). |
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World War I,
which was "total" in character because it resulted in the mobilization
of entire populations and economies for a prolonged period of time, did not fit
into the Clausewitzian pattern of limited conflict, and it led to a renewal of
other theories. These no longer regarded war as a rational instrument of state
policy. The theorists held that war, in its modern, total form, if still
conceived as a national state instrument, should be undertaken only if the most
vital interests of the state, touching upon its very survival, are concerned.
Otherwise, warfare serves broad ideologies and not the more narrowly defined
interests of a sovereign or a nation. Like the religious wars of the 17th
century, war becomes part of "grand designs," such as the rising of
the proletariat in communist eschatology or the Nazi doctrine of a master race. |
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Some theoreticians have gone even
further, denying war any rational character whatsoever. To them war is a
calamity and a social disaster, whether it is afflicted by one nation upon
another or conceived of as afflicting humanity as a whole. The idea is not
new--in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars it was articulated, for example, by
Tolstoy in the concluding chapter of War
and Peace (1865-69). In the second half of the 20th century it gained
new currency in peace research, a contemporary form of theorizing that combines
analysis of the origins of warfare with a strong normative element aiming at its
prevention. Peace research concentrates on two areas: the analysis of the
international system and the empirical study of the phenomenon of war. |
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World War II
and the subsequent evolution of weapons of mass destruction made the task of
understanding the nature of war even more urgent. On the one hand, war has
become an intractable social phenomenon, the elimination of which seems to be an
essential precondition for the survival of mankind. On the other hand, the use
of war as an instrument of policy is calculated in an unprecedented manner by
the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. War also
remains a stark but rational instrumentality in certain more limited conflicts,
such as those between Israel and the Arab nations. Thinking about war is,
consequently, becoming increasingly more differentiated because it has to answer
questions related to very different types of conflict. (see also military
technology) |
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Clausewitz cogently defines war as a
rational instrument of foreign policy: "an act of violence intended to
compel our opponent to fulfill our will." Modern definitions of war, such
as "armed conflict between political units," generally disregard the
narrow, legalistic definitions characteristic of the 19th century, which limited
the concept to formally declared war between states. Such a definition includes
civil wars but at the same time excludes such phenomena as insurrections,
banditry, or piracy. Finally, war is generally understood to embrace only armed
conflicts on a fairly large scale, usually excluding conflicts in which fewer
than 50,000 combatants are involved. |
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Contemporary theories of the causes of
war divide roughly into two major schools. One attributes war to certain innate
biological and psychological factors or drives, the other attributes it to
certain social relations and institutions. Both schools include optimists and
pessimists concerning the preventability of war. |
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Theories centring upon man's innate
drives are developed by ethologists, who draw analogies from animal behaviour,
and also by psychologists and psychoanalysts. |
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Ethologists start with the persuasive
argument that study of animal warfare may contribute toward an understanding of
war as employed by man. The behaviour of monkeys and apes in captivity and of
young children, for example, shows basic similarities. In both cases it is
possible to observe that aggressive behaviour
usually arises from several drives: rivalry for possession, the intrusion of a
stranger, or frustration of an activity. The major conflict situations leading
to aggression among animals, especially those concerning access of males to
females and control of a territory for feeding and breeding, are usually
associated with patterns of dominance. (see also animal behaviour) |
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The analogies of animal to human
behaviour drawn by many ethologists, however, are severely questioned by
their more restrained colleagues as well as by many social scientists. The term
aggression, for example, is imprecisely and inconsistently used, often referring
merely to the largely symbolic behaviour of animals involving such signals as
grimaces. |
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Observed animal behaviour can be
regarded as a possible important source of inspiration for hypotheses, but these
must then be checked through the study of actual human behaviour. As this has
not yet been adequately done, the hypotheses advanced have little foundation and
are merely interesting ideas to be investigated. Further, human behaviour is not
fixed to the extent that animal behaviour is, partly because man rapidly evolves
different patterns of behaviour in response to environmental factors, such as
geography, climate, and contact with other social groups. The variety of these
behaviour patterns is such that they can be used on both sides of an argument
concerning, for example, whether or not men have an innate tendency to be
aggressive. |
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Two particularly interesting subjects
studied by ethologists are the effects of overcrowding
on animals and animal behaviour regarding territory. The study of overcrowding
is incomplete, and the findings that normal behaviour patterns tend to break
down in such conditions and that aggressive behaviour often becomes prominent
are subject to the qualification that animal and human reactions to overcrowding
may be different. Ethologists have also advanced plausible hypotheses concerning
biological means of population control through reduced fertility that occurs
when animal populations increase beyond the capacity of their environment.
Whether such biological control mechanisms operate in human society, however,
requires further investigation. |
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Findings concerning the
"territorial imperative" in animals--that is, the demarcation and
defense against intrusion of a fixed area for feeding and breeding--are even
more subject to qualification when an analogy is drawn from them to human
behaviour. The analogy between an animal territory and a territorial state is
obviously extremely tenuous. In nature the territories of members of a species
differ in extent but usually seem to be provided with adequate resources, and
use of force in their defense is rarely necessary, as the customary menacing
signals generally lead to the withdrawal of potential rivals. This scarcely
compares with the sometimes catastrophic defense of the territory of a national
state. (see also territorial
behaviour) |
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One school of theorists has postulated
that the major causes of war can be found in man's psychological nature. Such
psychological approaches range from very general, often merely intuitive
assertions regarding human nature, to complex analyses utilizing the concepts
and techniques of modern psychology. The former category includes a wide range
of ethical and philosophical teaching and insights, including the works of such
figures as St. Augustine and the 17th-century Dutch philosopher Spinoza. |
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Modern writers utilizing psychological
approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or
complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other
countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness
in man. Others concentrate upon public opinion and its influence, particularly
in times of tension; others stress the importance of decision makers and the
need for their careful selection and training. Most believe that an improved
social adjustment of individuals would decrease
frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the likelihood of war. All of
them believe in the importance of research and education. Still, the limitations
of such approaches derive from their very generality. Also, whether the
psychological premises are optimistic or pessimistic about the nature of man,
one cannot ignore the impact upon human behaviour of social and political
institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil
propensities and to impose restraints upon him. |
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Whereas psychological explanations of
war contain much that seems to be valid, they are insufficient because man
behaves differently in different social contexts. Hence many thinkers have
sought their explanations in these contexts, focusing either on the internal
organization of states or on the international system within which these
operate. (see also social
behaviour) |
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The most voluminous and influential
theories attributing war to the nature of the state
fall into two broad streams, which can be loosely called liberal and socialist. |
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The early or classical liberals
of the 18th and 19th centuries distinguished three basic elements in their
analysis--individuals, society, and the state--and regarded the state as the
outcome of the interaction of the former two. They assumed that society is
self-regulating and that the socioeconomic system is able to run smoothly with
little interference from the government. Economy, decentralization, and freedom
from governmental control were the classical liberal's main concerns, as shown
particularly clearly in the writings of John Stuart Mill. They accepted the
necessity of maintaining defense but postulated the existence of a basic harmony
of interests among states, which would minimize the incidence of wars. Economic
cooperation based upon an international division of labour and upon free trade
would be in the interests of everybody--commerce would be the great panacea, the
rational substitute for war. |
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In explanation of wars that did occur,
however, liberals emphasized a variety of factors. First, they focused on
autocratic governments, which were presumed to wage war against the wishes of
peacefully inclined people. It thus became a major tenet of liberal political
philosophy that war could be eliminated by introducing universal suffrage
because the people would surely vote out of office any belligerently inclined
government. From the early American pamphleteer Thomas
Paine onward, a major school of liberals supported republicanism and
stressed the peaceful impact of public opinion. Although they could not agree
about actual policies, they stressed certain general ideas concerning relations
between states, paralleling their laissez-faire ideas of the internal
organization of the state with ideas of a minimum amount of international
organization, use of force strictly limited to repelling aggression, the
importance of public opinion and of democratically elected governments, and
rational resolution of conflicts and disputes. Later in the course of the 19th
century, however, and especially after World War I, liberals began to accept the
conclusion that an unregulated international society did not automatically tend
toward peace and advocated international organization as a corrective. |
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Whereas liberals concentrated on
political structures, regarding them as of primary importance in determining the
propensity of states to engage in war, socialists turned to the socioeconomic
system of states as the primary factor. Early in the 20th century the two
streams did, to some extent, converge, as evidenced by the fact that the English
radical liberal John Hobson explained wars in terms later adopted by Lenin. |
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Karl Marx
attributed war not to the behaviour of states but to the class structure of
society. To him wars occurred not as an often voluntary instrument of state
policy but as the result of a clash of social forces. To Marx the state was
merely a political superstructure; the primary, determining factor lies in the
capitalist mode of production, which leads to the development of two
antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The bourgeoisie controls governmental machinery in its own interests. In its
international relations, the capitalist state
engages in wars because it is driven by the dynamism of its system--the
constantly growing need for raw materials, markets, and supplies of cheap
labour. The only way to avoid war is to remove its basic cause, by replacing
capitalism with socialism, thus abolishing both class struggle and states. The
Marxist doctrine, however, gave no clear guidance about the interim period
before the millennium is reached; and the international solidarity of the
proletariat proved a myth when war broke out in 1914, facing the European Social
Democratic parties with the problem of adopting an attitude to the outbreak of
the war. The Second International of
working-class parties had repeatedly passed resolutions urging the working
classes to bring pressure upon their respective governments to prevent war, but,
once war had broken out, each individual party chose to regard it as defensive
for its own state and to participate in the war effort. This was explained by
Lenin as being due to a split in the organization of the proletariat that could
be overcome only through the activity of a rigidly organized revolutionary
vanguard. (see also social
differentiation, class struggle) |
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Socialists in the West turned
increasingly, although in varying degrees, to revisionist
interpretations of Marxism and returned to their attempts to revise
socioeconomic structures through evolutionary constitutional processes, seeing
this as the only possible means of preventing wars. In the Soviet
Union the socialist theory of war changed as the new communist
regime responded to changes in circumstances. Soviet theoreticians have
distinguished three major types of war: between capitalist states, between
capitalist and socialist states, and colonial wars of liberation. The
internecine wars among capitalist states are supposed to arise from capitalist
competition and imperialist rivalries, such as those that led to the two world
wars. They are desirable, for they weaken the capitalist camp. A war between
capitalist and socialist states is one that clearly expresses the basic
principle of class struggle and is, therefore, one for which the socialist
states must prepare. Finally, wars of colonial liberation can be expected
between subjugated people and their colonial masters. |
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The weakness of the theory is that the
two major expected types of war, the intracapitalist and the
capitalist-socialist, have not materialized as frequently as Soviet
theoreticians predicted. Further, the theory failed to analyze adequately the
situation in the Soviet Union and in the socialist camp. Even in communist
countries, nationalism seems to have proved more powerful than socialism: "national
liberation" movements have appeared and have had to be forcibly
subdued in the Soviet Union, despite its communist regime. Also, war between
socialist states is not unthinkable, as the doctrine indicates: only the
colossal preponderance of Soviet forces prevented a full-scale war in 1956
against Hungary and in 1968 against Czechoslovakia; war between the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China was a serious possibility for two decades
after the Sino-Soviet split in 1962; and armed conflict erupted between China
and Vietnam after the latter country became the most powerful in Southeast Asia.
Finally, the theory does not provide for wars of liberation against socialist
states, such as that conducted by the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union
from 1979 to 1989. |
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Many theories claim or imply that wars
result ultimately from the allegiance of men to nations and from the intimate
connection between the nation and a state. This link between the nation and the
state is firmly established by the doctrine of national self-determination, which has become in the eyes of many the major
basis of the legitimacy of states and the major factor in their establishment
and breakup. It was the principle on which the political boundaries of eastern
Europe and the Balkans were arranged after World War I and has been the
principal slogan of the anticolonial movement of the 20th century, finding
expression in Chapter I, article 1, of the Charter of the United Nations in the
objective of "self-determination of peoples," as well as in the more
specific provisions of Chapters XI and XII. It is this intimate link between
nationalism and statehood that renders them both so dangerous. The rulers of a
state are ultimately governed in their behaviour by what is loosely summed up as
the "national interest," which occasionally clashes directly with the
national interests of other states. (see also colonialism) |
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The ideal of the nation-state
is never fully achieved. In no historical case does one find all members of a
particular nation gathered within one state's boundaries. Conversely, many
states contain sizable national minorities. This lack of full correlation has
frequently given rise to dangerous tensions that can ultimately lead to war. A
government inspired by nationalism may conduct a policy aiming at the
assimilation of national minorities, as was the general tendency of central and
eastern European governments in the interwar period; it may also attempt to
reunite the members of the nation living outside its boundaries, as Adolf Hitler
did. National groups that are not in control of a state may feel dissatisfied
with its regime and claim self-determination in a separate state, as
demonstrated in the attempt to carve Biafra out
of Nigeria and the separation of Bangladesh from
Pakistan. (see also minority) |
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There is no rational basis for deciding
on the extent to which the self-determination principle should be applied in
allowing national minorities to break away. As a rule, the majority group
violently opposes the breakaway movement. Violent conflicts can ensue and,
through foreign involvement, turn into international wars. No suitable method
has been found for divorcing nationalism from the state and for meeting national
demands through adequate social and cultural provisions within a larger unit.
Such an attempt in the Austro-Hungarian Empire before its dissolution in World
War I failed. Whether the Soviet Union will be permanently successful in
containing its large proportion of national minorities remains to be seen. |
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Nationalism not only induces wars but,
through the severity of its influence, makes compromise and acceptance of defeat
more difficult. It thus tends to prolong the duration and to increase the
severity of wars. Possibly, however, this is the characteristic only of new,
immature nationalisms, for nationalism has ceased to be a major cause of
conflict and war among the nations of western Europe. |
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Nationalism is but one form of ideology:
in all ages people seem to develop beliefs and try to proselytize others. Even
within particular ideological groups schisms result in conflicts as violent as
those between totally opposed creeds, and heretics are often regarded as more
dangerous and hostile than opponents. As long as individual states can identify
themselves with explosive differences in beliefs, the probability of a war
between states is increased, and its intensity is likely to be greater. |
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Whereas some theories of war regard the
state as an undifferentiated whole and generalize about its behaviour, other
theorists are more sociologically oriented and focus on the roles played within
the state by various special-interest groups. |
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A distinction is made by these theorists
between the great mass of people and those groupings directly involved or
influential with government. The people, about
whose attitudes adequate knowledge is lacking, are generally assumed to be taken
up with their daily lives and to be in favour of peace. The influential groups,
who are directly involved in external affairs and, hence, in wars, are the main
subject of analysis. Warlike governments dragging peace-loving people into
international conflict is a recurrent theme both of liberal and socialist
analyses of war. Some writers have gone to the length of postulating a
continuous conspiracy of the rulers against the ruled that can be traced to
prehistoric times, when priests and warriors combined in the first state
structures. Most writers, however, narrow the field and seek an answer to the
question of why some governments are more prone to engage in war than others;
and they generally find the answer in the influence of important interest groups
that pursue particular and selfish ends. (see also militarism) |
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The chief and most obvious of such
groups is the military. Military prowess was a major qualification for political
leadership in primitive societies; the search
for military glory as well as for the spoils of victory seems to have been one
of the major motivations for war. Once the military function became
differentiated and separated from civilian ones, a tension between the two
became one of the most important issues of politics. The plausible view has
generally been held that the military strive for war, in which they attain
greater resources and can satisfy their status seeking and sometimes, also, an
aspiration for direct and full political power. In peacetime, the military are
obviously less important, are denied resources, and are less likely to influence
or attain political power directly. At the same time, a second, although usually
subsidiary, consideration of the military as a causal agent in war holds that an
officer corps is directly responsible for any fighting and is thus more aware of
its potential dangers for its members and for the state as well. Although intent
on keeping the state in a high state of preparedness, the military may be more
cautious than civilians about engaging in war. It is often held, however, that
increased military preparedness may result in increased tensions and thus
indirectly lead to the outbreak of war. (see also armed force) |
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Closely allied are theories about groups
that profit from wars economically--capitalists and the financiers, especially
those involved in industries catering to war.
All of these play a central part as the villains of the piece in socialist and
the liberal theories of war, and even those not subscribing to such theories do
not deny the importance of military-industrial
complexes in countries in which large sectors of the economy specialize
in war supplies. But, although industrialists in all of the technologically
advanced systems are undoubtedly influential in determining such factors as the
level of armaments to be maintained, it is difficult to assume that their
influence is or could be decisive when actual questions concerning war or peace
are being decided by politicians. |
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Finally, some scientists and
technologists constitute a new, much smaller, but important group with special
interests in war. To some extent one can generalize about them, although the
group is heterogeneous, embracing as it does nuclear scientists, space
researchers, biologists and geneticists, chemists, and engineers. If they are
involved in defense work, they all share the interest of the military in
securing more resources for their research: without their military applications,
for example, neither nuclear nor space research would have gone ahead nearly as
fast as it has. War, however, does not enhance the status and standing of
scientists; on the contrary, they come under the close control of the military.
They also usually have peaceful alternatives to military research, although
these may not be very satisfactory or ample. Consequently, although modern war
technology depends heavily upon scientists, and although many of them are
employed by governments in work directly or indirectly concerned with this
technology, scientists as a group are far from being wedded to war. On the
contrary, many of them are deeply concerned with the mass destruction made
possible by science and participate in
international pacifist movements. |
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The international environment within
which states and the people within them operate is regarded by many theorists as
the major factor determining the occurrence and the nature of wars. War remains
possible as long as individual states seek to ensure self-preservation and to
promote their individual interests and--in the absence of a reliable
international agency to control the actions of other states--rely on their own
efforts. It is no accident that reforms of the international system figure
prominently in many prescriptions for the prevention of war. Whereas the reform
of human propensities or of the state is bound to be a long, drawn-out affair,
if it is at all possible, relatively straightforward partial reforms of the
international system may produce significant restraints upon resorting to war,
and a thorough reform could make war impossible. (see also international
relations) |
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Some theorists, being more optimistic
about the nature of states, concentrate upon the removal of the fear and
suspicion of other states, which is characteristic of the present as well as of
all historical political systems; others, being less optimistic, think mainly of
possible controls and restraints upon the behaviour of states. The underlying
reasoning of both parties is generally similar. If individual states in
competitive situations are governed by a short-term conception of their
interests, acute conflicts between them will occur and will show a strong
tendency to escalate. Thus, one state erects a tariff barrier to protect its
industry against the competition of a trade partner, and the partner retaliates,
the retaliatory interaction being repeated until the two countries find
themselves in a trade war. Armaments races show a similar tendency to escalate,
particularly so in an age of rapid technological change. The economic and the
scientific efforts necessary to avoid falling behind rivals in the invention and
development of rapidly improving weapons of mass destruction have already
reached unprecedented heights. |
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And yet, neither trade wars nor arms
races necessarily end in violent conflict; there seem to be operating some
restraining and inhibiting factors that prevent an automatic escalation. Much of
the theory of war concerns itself with the identification, improvement, and
development of these restraining factors. |
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The outcome of starkly competitive
behaviour leading to wars is clearly against the interests of states, and it is
rational for them to seek more desirable outcomes. If competitive behaviour is
dangerous, theorists seek for alternative methods of cooperative behaviour that
would not jeopardize the interests of the state through exposing it to the
possibly less cooperative behaviour of others. Some theorists concentrate upon
improving the rationality of the decision-making of individual states through a
better understanding of the international environment, through eliminating
misperceptions and irrational fears, and through making clear the full possible
costs of engaging in war and the full destructiveness of an all-out war,
possible in our age. |
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The relative paucity of wars and their
limited nature throughout the century following the Napoleonic Wars (1815-1914)
have stirred great theoretical interest in the nature of the balance-of-power
system of that period--that is, in the process by which the power of competing
groups of states tended toward a condition of equilibrium. Contributing to the
successful operation of the balance-of-power system of the 19th century were
relatively slow technological change, great diversionary opportunities for
industrial and colonial expansion, and the ideological and cultural homogeneity
of Europe. Pursuit of a balance of power is a way of conducting foreign policy
that is perhaps less prone to war than other types of policy because, instead of
indiscriminately increasing their power, states increase it only moderately, so
as not to provoke others; and instead of joining the strongest, they join the
weaker side in order to ensure balance. States in a balance-of-power system
must, however, be ready to abide by constraints upon their behaviour in order to
ensure stability of the system. (see also limited
warfare) |
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The application to international
relations of a branch of mathematics-- game
theory--that analyzes the strategy of conflict situations has provided a
new tool of analysis. In state interaction, as in any game situation, one side's
strategy generally depends upon that side's expectations of the other side's
strategy. If all sides in a game are to maximize their chances of a satisfactory
outcome, it is necessary that some rational rules of behaviour be conceptualized
and agreed upon, and this idea of a set of rational rules can be applied to
competing states in the international system. Game theorists distinguish
antagonistic situations called zero-sum games in
which one state's gain can be only at the expense of another state because the
"payoff" is fixed. Even then a mutually acceptable distribution of
gains can be rationally reached on the basis of the "minimax"
principle--the party in a position of advantage satisfies itself with the
minimum acceptable gain because it realizes that the other party, in a position
of disadvantage, would yield on the basis of its possible minimum loss but would
violently oppose a distribution even more to its detriment. In other situations
called non-zero-sum games, the payoff is not
constant but can be increased by a cooperative approach; the gain of one
participant is not at the cost of another. The contestants, however, have to
agree about the distribution of the gain, which is the product of their
cooperation. (see also minimax theorem) |
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The theory of games is the foundation of
theories of bargaining that analyze the behaviour of individual states in
interaction. Diplomacy based upon such theories is less likely to lead to war.
Policymakers pursuing such strategies will conduct conflicts of the zero-sum
type so that war is avoided. More than that, with some skill, such situations
can be transformed into the non-zero-sum type by introducing additional benefits
accruing from cooperation in other interactions and also, more generally, by
eliminating the likelihood of war and, consequently, by reducing the costs of
preparing for one. |
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Because wars within states have been
eliminated through the establishment of suitable political structures, such as
central governments that hold a monopoly of coercive power, many theories
concentrate upon the establishment of parallel structures within the
international context. Regional integration (cooperation in economic, social,
and political affairs, as, for example, within the European
Economic Community) and the establishment of security communities, such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have
made much greater advances than attempts at the reform of the entire, global
international system. (see also international
organization, international agreement) |
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Because conflicts among neighbours tend
to be frequent, regional integration is an important advance toward reducing the
incidence of war. Even if it were to become generally successful, however,
regional integration would simply shift the problem of war to a different level:
there would be fewer possibilities of war because intraregional conflicts would
be contained, but interregional conflicts could still give rise to wars of much
greater scope and severity. The phenomenon of war must, therefore, be analyzed
at the universal level. |
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Some of the most influential thinking
about war and the international system has come from specialists in
international law. All of them postulate that there exists an international
society of states that accepts the binding force of some norms of international
behaviour. These norms are referred to as international law, although they
differ fundamentally from municipal law because no sovereign exists who can
enforce them. Most international lawyers realistically accept that international
law is, consequently, among rather than above states. It is, according to legal
doctrine, binding on states, but unenforceable. (see also war,
law of) |
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International law concerns itself
largely with two aspects of war: its legality and its regulation. (For the
regulation of warfare, see below Law
of war .)
As far as the legality of war is concerned, there has arisen in the 20th century
a general consensus among states, expressed in several international treaties,
including the Covenant of the League of Nations,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and the Charter
of the United Nations, that resort to armed force, except in certain
circumstances, such as self-defense, is illegal. Such a legalistic approach to
the prevention of war, however, remains futile in the absence of a means of
enforcement. The enforcement provisions of the Covenant of the League
of Nations and those of the United Nations Charter, which entail the
application of military and economic sanctions, have never been applied
successfully, owing to political disagreement among the major powers. This
underlines the fact that legal norms, to be effective, must reflect an
underlying political reality. (see also just
war) |
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The United Nations is charged with the
maintenance of international peace and security. The several approaches to peace
outlined in its Charter and developed in its practice are based upon and clearly
reflect the cumulative development of the relevant theories of war. |
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Drawing heavily upon the experience of
the League of Nations, the Charter develops three interrelated approaches:
first, pacific settlement of disputes, which would leave nations with nothing to
fight about; second, collective security, which would confront aggressors with
too much to fight against; and third, disarmament, which would deprive them of
anything substantial with which to fight. |
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Pacific settlement of disputes is based
upon the assumption that war is primarily a technique for settling disputes,
although it can, of course, also serve other purposes, such as allaying fears
and seeking status. Further assumptions are that war frequently comes about
because of the unawareness of decision makers of the possibility of settling
disputes peacefully to the mutual advantage of both sides--an unawareness due to
mere ignorance, pride, lack of imagination, or selfish and cynical leadership.
It is thus possible that international organizations can contribute to the
prevention of wars by devising and institutionalizing alternative, peaceful
techniques for the settlement of disputes and by persuading the states to use
them. |
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The scope of this approach is limited,
for states are notoriously reluctant to abide by impartial findings on matters
they regard as being of vital importance. Hence, what the procedures really
offer is a means of slowing down the progression of a dispute toward war, giving
reason a chance to prevail. |
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Collective security is an approach to
peace involving an agreement by which states agree to take collective action
against any state defined as an aggressor. Leaving aside the problems of
settling disputes or enforcing law or satisfying justice, it concentrates upon
forestalling violence by bringing to bear an overwhelmingly superior
international force against any aggressor. Although collective security, in
somewhat different forms, played a prominent part in the League of Nations
Covenant and is embodied in the United Nations Charter, it has completely failed
in both cases. Failing an international government capable of ultimately
determining the issues, nations have not managed to agree on an unequivocal
definition of aggression, have not in practice accepted the principle that
aggression must be acted against independently of the identity of the
perpetrator, and, therefore, have not established the international collective
security force envisaged in the Charter. |
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Disarmament and limitation of armaments
are based upon the theory that states are inclined to strive for dominance in
arms over any potential rivals, and that this leads to arms
races that tend to end in war. The major besetting sin of this theory is
that it often tends to confuse cause with effect. Although arms races develop
momentum of their own, they are themselves the result of political tensions
leading to war. In short, it is the tensions that cause war, not the arms races.
To hold otherwise is to mistake a symptom for a cause. Hence, reducing the
levels of armaments does not necessarily reduce these tensions. Furthermore, it
is the instability of strategic balances, rather than their level, that leads to
war; agreements about disarmament or limitation of armaments may easily disturb
the existing precarious balance and, therefore, be actually conducive to war.
(see also arms
control ) |
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As these major approaches to peace
envisaged in its Charter have not proved very fruitful, the United Nations has
developed two new procedures aiming at the limitation of wars. First,
"preventive diplomacy," largely comprising the diplomatic initiatives
of the secretary-general and the stationing of peacekeeping forces, has served
to contain local conflicts and to prevent escalation, especially the involvement
of the superpowers. Second, although the General
Assembly's recommendations have no legal binding force, they have become
increasingly influential, for by the mid-1970s the assembly was becoming an
important agency for what has been called the collective legitimization of state
policies. Resort to war becomes more costly when a state is faced with the
prospects of a collective condemnation. This new restraint upon war does not,
however, act upon conflicts that the assembly may favourably regard as wars of
colonial liberation. Nor could the assembly's disapproval be relied upon to
deter states from waging war in pursuit of an interest they deemed to be truly
vital. |
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Both the shortcomings and the limited
practicability of all the approaches to the elimination of war through the
reform of the international system have driven many thinkers to accept the idea
that war can only be abolished by a full-scale world government. No midway
solution between the relative anarchy of independent, individual states and a
world government with the full paraphernalia of legislative powers and of an
overwhelming military force would provide a sufficiently stable international
framework for the nations to feel that wars would not break out and thus stop
them from behaviour that is often conducive to wars. In an age faced with the
danger of a war escalating into a general extermination of mankind, the central
importance of preserving peace is obvious and is generally accepted. But here
the thinkers divide. Some press on from this analysis to the logical conclusion
that mankind must, and, therefore, will establish a world government, and they
advance ideas how best to proceed in this direction. Others regard the world
government as completely utopian, no matter how logical and desirable it may be.
Yet, in terms of actual policies, the adherents of the two schools do not
necessarily divide. Whether they do or do not believe that world government is
attainable, they do agree that the complex phenomenon of war represents a
potential calamity of such a magnitude that all theorists must endeavour to
understand it and to apply their understanding to the prevention and mitigation
of war with all the means at their disposal. |
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(J.Fr./Ed.) |
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