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2 ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL SCHOOLS |
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As a philosophical attitude, skepticism
is the doubting of knowledge claims set forth in various areas. Skeptics have
challenged the adequacy or reliability of these claims by asking what they are
based upon or what they actually establish. They have raised the question
whether such claims about the world are either indubitable or necessarily true,
and they have challenged the alleged grounds of accepted assumptions.
Practically everyone is skeptical about some knowledge claims; but the Skeptics
have raised doubts about any knowledge beyond the contents of directly felt
experience. The original Greek meaning of skeptikos
was "an inquirer," someone who was unsatisfied and still looking
for truth. |
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From ancient times onward Skeptics have
developed arguments to undermine the contentions of dogmatic philosophers,
scientists, and theologians. The Skeptical arguments and their employment
against various forms of dogmatism have played an important role in shaping both
the problems and the solutions offered in the course of Western philosophy. As
ancient philosophy and science developed, doubts arose about basic accepted
views of the world. In ancient times Skeptics challenged the claims of
Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism, and in the Renaissance those of
Scholasticism and Calvinism. After Descartes, Skeptics attacked Cartesianism and
other theories justifying the "new science." Later, a Skeptical
offensive was levelled against Kantianism and then against Hegelianism. Each
Skeptical challenge led to new attempts to resolve the difficulties. Skepticism,
especially since the Enlightenment, has come to mean disbelief -- primarily
religious disbelief--and the Skeptic has often been likened to the village
atheist. (see also atheism) |
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Skepticism developed with regard to
various disciplines in which men claimed to have knowledge. It was questioned,
for example, whether one could gain any certain knowledge in metaphysics
(the study of the nature and significance of being as such) or in the sciences.
In ancient times a chief form was medical Skepticism, which questioned whether
one could know with certainty either the causes or cures of diseases. In the
area of ethics doubts were raised about
accepting various mores and customs and about claiming any objective basis for
making value distinctions. Skepticisms about religion have questioned the
doctrines of different traditions. Certain philosophies, like those of Hume
and Kant, have seemed to show that no knowledge
can be gained beyond the world of experience and that one cannot discover the
causes of phenomena. Any attempt to do so, as Kant argued, leads to antinomies,
contradictory knowledge claims. A dominant form of Skepticism, the subject of
this article, concerns knowledge in general, questioning whether anything
actually can be known with complete or adequate certainty. This type is called epistemological
Skepticism. |
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Kinds of epistemological Skepticism can
be distinguished in terms of the areas in which doubts are raised; that is,
whether they be directed toward reason, toward the senses, or toward knowledge
of things-in-themselves. They can also be distinguished in terms of the
motivation of the Skeptic--whether he is challenging views for ideological
reasons or for pragmatic or practical ones to attain certain psychological
goals. Among the chief ideological motives have been religious or antireligious
concerns. Some Skeptics have challenged knowledge claims so that religious ones
could be substituted--on faith. Others have challenged religious knowledge
claims in order to overthrow some orthodoxy. Kinds of Skepticism also can be
distinguished in terms of how restricted or how thoroughgoing they are--whether
they apply only to certain areas and to certain kinds of knowledge claims or
whether they are more general and universal. |
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Historically, skeptical philosophical
attitudes began to appear in pre-Socratic thought. In the 5th century BC, the
Eleatic philosophers, known for reducing reality
to a static One, questioned the reality of the sensory world, of change and
plurality, and denied that reality could be described in the categories of
ordinary experience. On the other hand, the Ephesian philosopher of change Heracleitus
and his pupil Cratylus thought that the world was in such a state of flux that
no permanent, unchangeable truth about it could be found; and Xenophanes,
a wandering poet and philosopher, doubted whether man could distinguish true
from false knowledge. (see also Eleaticism) |
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A more developed Skepticism appeared in
some of Socrates' views and in a couple of the Sophists
(see below Sophists ). Socrates,
in the early Platonic dialogues, was always questioning the knowledge claims of
others; and in the Apology,
he said that all that he really knew was that he knew nothing. Socrates'
enemy, the Sophist Protagoras, contended that
man is the measure of all things. This thesis was taken as a kind of skeptical
relativism: no views are ultimately true, but each is merely one man's opinion.
Another Sophist, Gorgias, advanced the
skeptical-nihilist thesis that nothing exists; and if something did exist, it
could not be known; and if it could be known, it could not be communicated. |
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The putative father of Greek Skepticism
is Pyrrhon of Elis (c.
360-c. 272 BC), who tried to be a
living Skeptic. He avoided committing himself to any views about what was
actually going on and acted only according to appearances. In this way he sought
happiness or at least mental peace. |
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The first school of Skeptical philosophy
developed in Plato's Academy (see above
Platonism ) in the 3rd century
BC and was thus called "Academic" Skepticism. Starting from the
skeptical side of Socrates, its leaders, Arcesilaus
(316/315-c. 241 BC) and Carneades
(214/213-129/128 BC), set forth a series of epistemological arguments to show
that nothing could be known, challenging primarily the two foremost schools,
those of the Stoics and Epicureans. They denied that any criteria could be found
for distinguishing the true from the false; instead, only reasonable or probable
standards could be established for knowledge. This limited or probabilistic
Skepticism was the view of the Academy until the 1st century BC, when Cicero
was a student there. His Academica and
De natura deorum are the main sources for knowledge of this
movement. (St. Augustine's Contra
academicos is an answer to Cicero's views.) |
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The other major form of ancient
Skepticism was Pyrrhonism, apparently developed
by medical Skeptics in Alexandria. Beginning with Aenesidemus
(1st century BC), this movement, named after Pyrrhon, criticized the Academic
Skeptics because they claimed to know too much, namely, that nothing could be
known and that some things are more probable than others. The Pyrrhonians
advanced a series of tropes, or ways of opposing
various kinds of knowledge claims, in order to bring about epoche
(suspense of judgment). The Pyrrhonian attitude is preserved in the writings
of one of its last leaders, Sextus Empiricus
(2nd or 3rd century AD). In his Outlines
of Pyrrhonism and Adversus
mathematicos, Sextus presented the tropes developed by previous Pyrrhonists.
The 10 tropes attributed to Aenesidemus showed the difficulties to be
encountered in ascertaining the truth or reliability of judgments based on sense
information, owing to the variability and differences of human and animal
perceptions. Other arguments raised difficulties in determining whether there
are any reliable criteria or standards--logical, rational, or otherwise--for
judging whether anything is true or false. To settle any disagreement, a
criterion seems to be required. Any purported criterion, however, would appear
to be based on another criterion, thus requiring an infinite regress of
criteria, or else it would be based upon itself, which would be circular. Sextus
offered arguments to challenge any claims of dogmatic philosophers to know more
than what is evident; and in so doing he presented in one form or another
practically all of the skeptical arguments that have ever appeared in subsequent
philosophy. |
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Sextus said that his arguments were
aimed at leading people to a state of ataraxia
(unperturbability). People who thought that they could know reality were
constantly disturbed and frustrated. If they could be led to suspend judgment,
however, they would find peace of mind. In this state of suspension they would
neither affirm nor deny the possibility of knowledge but would remain peaceful,
still waiting to see what might develop. The Pyrrhonist did not become inactive
in this state of suspense but lived undogmatically according to appearances,
customs, and natural inclinations. |
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Pyrrhonism ended as a philosophical
movement in the late Roman Empire, as religious concerns became paramount. In
the Christian Middle Ages the main surviving
form of Skepticism was the Academic, described in St.
Augustine's Contra
academicos. Augustine, before his conversion, had found Cicero's
views attractive and had overcome them only through revelation. With faith, he
could seek understanding. Augustine's account of Skepticism and his answer to it
provided the basis for medieval discussions. |
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In Islamic Spain, where there was
more contact with ancient learning, a form of antirational Skepticism developed
among Muslim and Jewish theologians. Al-Ghazali,
an Arab theologian of the 11th and early 12th centuries, and his Jewish
contemporary Judah ha-Levi (c.
1075/c. 1085-c. 1141), who was
a poet and physician as well as a philosopher, offered skeptical challenges
(much like those later employed by the occasionalist Nicolas Malebranche and by
David Hume) against the contemporary Aristotelians in order to lead people to
accept religious truths in mystical faith. This kind of fideism also appears in
the late Middle Ages in the German cardinal and philosopher Nicolaus of Cusa's
advocacy of learned ignorance as the way to religious knowledge. |
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Modern Skepticism emerged in the 16th
century, not from medieval views but from the intellectual crises of the Renaissance
and Reformation and from the rediscovery of the Skeptical classics. The voyages
of exploration; the humanistic rediscovery of the learning of ancient Greece,
Rome, and Palestine; and the new science--all combined to undermine confidence
in man's accepted picture of the world. The religious controversy between the
Protestants and Catholics raised fundamental epistemological issues about the
bases and criteria of religious knowledge. At the same time the texts of Cicero
and Sextus became available again. (Sextus' Outlines
of Pyrrhonism [Hypotyposeis] was
published in Latin in 1562, his Adversus
matematicos in 1569, and the Greek texts of both in 1621.) |
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The fundamental skeptical issues raised
by the Reformation appeared in the debate
between the outstanding humanist scholar Erasmus
and Luther. Erasmus, using Academic skeptical
materials, insisted that the issues in dispute could not be resolved, that one
should therefore suspend judgment and remain with the church. Luther insisted,
on the other hand, that true and certain religious knowledge could and must be
gained through conscience. Erasmus' view developed into a Christian Skepticism,
accepting traditional Christianity on faith after seeing that no adequate
evidence existed. Luther's view, and later that of Calvin,
proposed a new criterion--that of inner experience--while the Catholics of the Counter-Reformation
employed Pyrrhonian and Academic arguments to undermine the criterion. |
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Following after Erasmus, another
humanist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola II
(nephew of the famous count of the same name) and H.C.
Agrippa von Nettesheim, a stormy occult philosopher and physician,
employed the skeptical arguments against Scholasticism, Renaissance Naturalism,
and many other views to win people to the "true religion." The
Catholic scholar Gentian Hervet, in the preface to his 1569 edition of Sextus,
saw the Skeptical arguments as the definitive answer to Calvinism and the way to
true Christianity. |
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The new concern with Skepticism was
given a general philosophical formulation by Michel de
Montaigne and his cousin Francisco Sanches.
Montaigne in Apology for Raimond Sebond and
Sanches in Quod
nihil scitur, both written in 1576, explored the human
epistemological situation and showed that man's knowledge claims in all areas
were extremely dubious. Montaigne recommended living according to nature and
custom and accepting whatever God reveals, and Sanches advocated recognizing
that nothing can be known and then trying to gain what limited information one
can through empirical scientific means. |
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Montaigne's Skepticism was extremely
influential in the early 17th century. His followers, Pierre Charron, J.-P.
Camus, La Mothe Le Vayer, and others, further popularized his views. Various
French Counter-Reformers used the arguments of Montaigne and Sextus to undermine
Calvinism. Montaigne's Skepticism opposed all sorts of disciplines, including
the new science, and was coupled with a fideism that many suspected to be
insincere. |
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In the 1620s efforts to refute or
mitigate this new Skepticism appeared. A Christian Epicurean, Pierre
Gassendi, himself originally a Skeptic, and Marin
Mersenne, one of the most influential figures in the intellectual
revolution of the times, while retaining epistemological doubts about knowledge
of reality yet recognized that science provided useful and important information
about the world. The constructive Skepticisms of Gassendi and Mersenne, and
later of members of the Royal Society of England
like Bishop John Wilkins and Joseph Glanvill, developed the attitude of Sanches
into a hypothetical, empirical interpretation of the new science. |
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René Descartes
offered a fundamental refutation of the new Skepticism, contending that, by
applying the skeptical method of doubting all beliefs that could possibly be
false (due to suffering illusions or being misled by some power), one would
discover a truth that is genuinely indubitable, viz., "I think, therefore I
am" (cogito
ergo sum), and that from this truth one could discover the criterion
of true knowledge, viz., that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is
true. Using this criterion, one could then establish: God's existence, that he
is not a deceiver, that he guarantees our clear and distinct ideas, and that an
external world exists that can be known through mathematical physics. Descartes,
starting from Skepticism, claimed to have found a new basis for certitude and
for knowledge of reality. Throughout the 17th century Skeptical
critics--Mersenne, Gassendi, the reviver of Academic philosophy Simon Foucher,
and Pierre-Daniel Huet, one of the most learned men of the age--sought to show
that Descartes had not succeeded, and that, if he sincerely followed his
skeptical method, his new system could only lead to complete Skepticism. They
challenged whether the cogito proved anything, or whether it was indubitable; whether
Descartes' method could be successfully applied, or whether it was certain; and
whether any of the knowledge claims of Cartesianism were really true. Nicolas Malebranche,
the developer of occasionalism, revised the Cartesian system to meet the
Skeptical attacks only to find his efforts challenged by the new Skeptical
criticisms of Foucher and by the contention of the Jansenist philosopher Antoine
Arnauld that Malebranchism led to a most dangerous Pyrrhonism. (see also clarity
and distinctness) |
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Various English philosophers culminating
in Locke tried to blunt the force of Skepticism
by appealing to common sense and to the "reasonable" man's inability
to doubt everything. They admitted that there might not be sufficient evidence
to support the knowledge claims extending beyond immediate experience. But this
did not actually require that everything be doubted; by using standards of
common sense, an adequate basis for many beliefs could be found. Blaise
Pascal, who presented the case for Skepticism most forcefully in his Pensées,
still denied that there can be a complete Skepticism; for nature prevents
it. Lacking rational answers to complete Skepticism, man's only recourse lies in
turning to God for help in overcoming doubts. |
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The culmination of 17th-century
Skepticism appears in the writings of Pierre Bayle,
especially in his monumental Dictionnaire
historique et critique (1697-1702). Bayle, a superb dialectician,
challenged philosophical, scientific, and theological theories, both ancient and
modern, showing that they all led to perplexities, paradoxes, and
contradictions. He argued that the theories of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and
Malebranche, when skeptically analyzed, cast in doubt all information about the
world, even whether a world exists. Bayle skillfully employed Skeptical
arguments about such things as sense information, human judgments, logical
explanations, and the criteria of knowledge in order to undermine confidence in
human intellectual activity in all areas. Bayle suggested that man should
abandon rational activity and turn blindly to faith and revelation; he can
therefore only follow his conscience without any criterion for determining true
faith. Bayle showed that the interpretations of religious knowledge were so
implausible that even the most heretical views, like Manichaeism, known for its
cosmic dualism of good and evil, and Atheism, made more sense. As a result
Bayle's work became "the arsenal of the Enlightenment," and he was
regarded as a major enemy of religion. |
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Most 18th-century thinkers gave up the
quest for metaphysical knowledge after imbibing Bayle's arguments. George
Berkeley, an Empiricist and Idealist, fought Skeptical doubts by
identifying appearance and reality and offering a spiritualistic metaphysics. He
was immediately seen as just another Skeptic since he was denying the world
beyond experience. |
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Bayle's chief 18th-century successor was
David Hume. Combining empirical and skeptical arguments, Hume charged that
neither inductive nor deductive evidence could establish the truth of any matter
of fact. Knowledge could only consist of intuitively obvious matters or
demonstrable relations of ideas but not of anything beyond experience; the mind
can discover no necessary connections within experience nor any root causes of
experience. Beliefs about the world are based not upon reason or evidence nor
even upon appeal to the uniformity of nature but only on habit and custom.
Beliefs cannot be justified. Belief that there is an external world, a self, a
God is common; but there is no adequate evidence for it. Although it is natural
to hold these convictions, they are inconsistent and epistemologically dubious.
"Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not Nature too strong
for it." The beliefs that a man is forced to hold enable him to describe
the world scientifically, but when he tries to justify them he is led to
complete Skepticism. Before he goes mad with doubts, however, Nature brings him
back to common sense, to unjustifiable beliefs. Hume's fideism was a natural
rather than a religious one; it is only animal faith that provides relief from
complete doubt. The religious context of Skepticism from Montaigne to Bayle had
been removed, and man was left with only his natural beliefs, which might be
meaningless or valueless. |
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The central themes in Hume's Skeptical
analysis--the basis of induction and causality, knowledge of the external world
and the self, proofs of the existence of God--became the key issues of later
philosophy. Hume's contemporary Thomas Reid
hoped to rebut Hume's Skepticism by exposing it as the logical conclusion of the
basic assumptions of modern philosophy from Descartes onward. Such disastrous
assumptions should be abandoned for commonsensical principles that have to be
believed. As Hume and Kant saw, Reid had not answered Hume's Skepticism but had
only sidestepped the issue by appealing to commonsensical living. This provided,
however, neither a theoretical basis for beliefs nor a refutation of the
arguments that questioned them. |
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Kant
saw that Hume had posed a most fundamental challenge to all human knowledge
claims. To answer him, it had to be shown not that knowledge is possible but how
it is possible. Kant combined a Skepticism toward metaphysical knowledge
with the contention that certain universal and necessary conditions are involved
in having experience and describing it. In terms of these it is possible to have
genuine knowledge about the forms of all possible experience, space and time,
and about the categories in which all experience is described. Any effort to
apply this beyond all possible experience, however, leads into contradictions
and Skepticism. It is not possible to know about things-in-themselves nor about
the causes of experience. (see also thing-in-itself) |
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Though Kant thought that he had resolved
the Skeptical problems, some of his contemporaries saw his philosophy as
commencing a new Skeptical era. G.E. Schulze (or
Schulze-Aenesidemus) a notable critic of Kantianism, insisted that, on Kant's
theory, no one could know any objective truths about anything; he could only
know the subjective necessity of his views. The Jewish critic Salomon
Maimon contended that, though there are such things as a priori concepts,
their application to experience is always problematical, and whether they apply
can only be found through experience. Hence, the possibility of knowledge can
never be established with certainty. Assured truth on the basis of concepts is
possible only of human creations, like mathematical ideas, and it is
questionable whether these have any objective truth. The thesis that human
creativity is the basis of truth, however, was soon to be developed by Johann
G. Fichte, a leading German Idealist, as a new way of transcending
Skepticism. |
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Another Skeptical critic of Kant, J.G.
Hamann, saw in Hume's and Kant's work a new basis for fideism. If
knowledge of reality cannot be gained by rational means, then one must turn to
faith. Based on Hume's efforts, Hamann advanced an antirational Skepticism in an
effort to convince Kant to become a fideistic Christian. Hamann's kind of
fideism was also developed in France by Catholic opponents of the French
Revolution and liberalism--like Joseph de Maistre and H.-F.-R. de Lamennais. |
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Irrational Skepticism was developed into
Existentialism by Søren Kierkegaard in the 19th
century. Using traditional Skeptical themes to attack Hegelianism and liberal
Christianity, Kierkegaard stressed the need for faith. Only by an unjustified
and unjustifiable "leap into faith" could certainty be found--which
would then be entirely subjective rather than objective. Modern neo-orthodox and
Existentialist theologians have argued that
Skepticism highlights man's inability to find any ultimate truth except through
faith and commitment. Nonreligious forms of this view have been developed by
Existentialist writers like Albert Camus,
combining the epistemological Skepticism of Kierkegaard with the religious and
value Skepticism of Nietzsche. The rational and
scientific examination of the world shows it to be unintelligible and absurd;
and if God is dead, as Nietzsche proclaimed, then the world is ultimately
meaningless. But it is necessary to struggle with it. It is thus through action
and commitment that one finds whatever personal meaning one can, though it has
no objective significance. |
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Other kinds of Skepticism appear in
various forms of recent and contemporary philosophy. The English Idealist F.H.
Bradley used classical Skeptical arguments in his Appearance
and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay to contend that the world could not
be understood empirically or materialistically; true knowledge could be reached
only by transcending the world of appearance. |
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George Santayana,
an American critical Realist, in Scepticism and Animal Faith, presented
a naturalistic Skepticism. Any interpretation of immediate or intuited
experience is open to question. To make life meaningful, however, men make
interpretations by "animal faith," according to biological and social
factors. The resulting beliefs, though unjustified and perhaps illusory, enable
them to persevere and find the richness of life. |
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Types of Skepticism also appear in Logical
Positivism (see below Positivism and Logical Empiricism
) and various forms of linguistic philosophy
(see below Analytic
and Linguistic Philosophy ). The
attack on speculative metaphysics developed by the physicist and early
Positivist Ernst Mach, by Bertrand
Russell, and by Rudolf Carnap, a leader
in the Vienna Circle, where Logical Positivism was nourished, incorporated a
Skepticism about the possibility of gaining knowledge beyond experience or
logical tautologies. Russell and the important philosopher of science Karl
Popper have further stressed the unjustifiability of the principle of
induction, and Popper has criticized theories of knowledge based upon empirical
verification. A founder of linguistic analysis, Fritz Mauthner, has set forth a
Skepticism in which any language is merely relative to its users and thus
subjective. Every attempt to tell what is true just leads one back to linguistic
formulations, not to objective states of affairs. The result is a complete
Skepticism about reality--a reality that cannot even be expressed except in
terms of what he called godless mystical contemplation. Mauthner's linguistic
Skepticism bears some affinities to the views expressed in Ludwig Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. |
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In Western thought Skepticism has raised
basic epistemological issues. In view of the varieties of human experience, it
has questioned whether it is possible to tell which are veridical. The
variations that occur in different perceptions of what is presumed to be one
object raise the question of which is the correct view. The occurrence of
illusory experiences raises the question of whether it is really possible to
distinguish illusions and dreams from reality. The criteria employed can be
questioned and require justification. On what basis does one tell whether one
has the right criteria? By other criteria? Then, are these correct? On what
standards? The attempt to justify criteria seems either to lead to an infinite
regress or to just stop arbitrarily. If an attempt is made to justify knowledge
claims by starting with first principles, what are these based upon? Can it be
established that these principles cannot possibly be false? If so, is the proof
itself such that it cannot be questioned? If it is claimed that the principles
are self-evident, can one be sure of this, sure that one is not deceived? And
can one be sure that one can recognize and apply the principles correctly?
Through such questioning, Skeptics have indicated the basic problems that an
investigator would have to resolve before he could be certain of possessing
knowledge; i.e., information that
could not possibly be false. |
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Critics have contended that Skepticism
is both a logically and a humanly untenable view. Any attempt to formulate the
position will be self-refuting since it will assert at least some knowledge
claims about what is supposed to be dubious. Montaigne
suggested that the Skeptics needed a nonassertive language, reflecting the claim
of Sextus that the Skeptic does not make assertions but only chronicles his
feelings. The strength of Skepticism lies not in whether it can be stated
consistently but upon the effects of its arguments on dogmatic philosophers. As
Hume said, Skepticism may be self-refuting, but in the process of refuting
itself it undermines dogmatism. Skepticism, Sextus said, is like a purge that
eliminates itself as well as everything else. |
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Critics have claimed that anyone who
tried to be a complete Skeptic, denying or suspending all judgments about
ordinary beliefs, would soon be driven insane. Even Hume thought that the
complete Skeptic would have to starve to death and would walk into walls or out
of windows. Hume, therefore, separated the
doubting activity from natural practical activities in the world. Skeptical
philosophizing went on in theory, while believing occurred in practice. Sextus
and the contemporary Norwegian Skeptic Arne Naess have said, on the other hand,
that Skepticism is a form of mental health. Instead of going mad, the
Skeptic--without commitment to fixed positions--can function better than the
dogmatist. |
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Some recent thinkers like A.J.
Ayer and John Austin have contended that
Skepticism is unnecessary. If knowledge is defined in terms of satisfying
meaningful criteria, then knowledge is open to all. The Skeptics have raised
false problems, because it is, as a matter of fact, possible to tell that some
experiences are illusory since we have criteria for distinguishing them from
actual events. We do resolve doubts and reach a state of knowledge through
various verification procedures, after which doubt is meaningless. Naess, in his
book Scepticism, has sought to show,
however, that, on the standards offered by Ayer and Austin, one can still ask if
knowledge claims may not turn out to be false and hence that Skepticism has
still to be overcome. |
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Skepticism throughout history has played
a dynamic role in forcing dogmatic philosophers to find better or stronger bases
for their views and to find answers to the Skeptical attacks. It has forced a
continued reexamination of previous knowledge claims and has stimulated creative
thinkers to work out new theories to meet the Skeptical problems. The history of
philosophy can be seen, in part, as a struggle with Skepticism. The attacks of
the Skeptics also have served as a check on rash speculation; the various forms
of modern Skepticism have gradually eroded the metaphysical and theological
bases of European thought. Most contemporary thinkers have been sufficiently
affected by Skepticism to abandon the search for certain and indubitable
foundations of human knowledge. Instead, they have sought ways of living with
the unresolved Skeptical problems through various forms of naturalistic,
scientific, or religious faiths. ( R.H.P.) |
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