|
An ideology
is a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as
prominent as theoretical ones; it is a system of ideas that aspires both to
explain the world and to change it.
This article describes the nature,
history, and significance of ideologies in terms of the philosophical,
political, and international contexts in which they have arisen. For
discussions of particular categories of ideology, see the articles SOCIALISM
, COMMUNISM , ANARCHISM
, FASCISM , NATIONALISM
, LIBERALISM , and CONSERVATISM
.
The word first made its appearance in
French as idéologie at the
time of the French Revolution, when it was introduced by a philosopher, A.-L.-C.
Destutt de Tracy, as a short name for what he called his "science
of ideas," which he claimed to have adapted from the epistemology of the
philosophers John Locke and Étienne
Bonnot de Condillac, for whom all human knowledge was knowledge of
ideas. The fact is, however, that he owed rather more to the English
philosopher Francis Bacon, whom he revered no
less than did the earlier French philosophers of the Enlightenment. It was
Bacon who had proclaimed that the destiny of science was not only to enlarge
man's knowledge but also to "improve the life of men on earth," and
it was this same union of the programmatic with the intellectual that
distinguished Destutt de Tracy's idéologie from those theories, systems, or philosophies that
were essentially explanatory. The science of ideas was a science with a
mission; it aimed at serving men, even saving them, by ridding their minds of
prejudice and preparing them for the sovereignty of reason.
Destutt de Tracy and his fellow idéologues
devised a system of national education that they believed would transform
France into a rational and scientific society. Their teaching combined a
fervent belief in individual liberty with an elaborate program of state
planning, and for a short time under the Directory (1795-99) it became the
official doctrine of the French Republic. Napoleon at first supported Destutt
de Tracy and his friends, but he soon turned against them, and in December
1812 he even went so far as to attribute blame for France's military defeats
to the influence of the idéologues,
of whom he spoke with scorn.
Thus ideology
has been from its inception a word with a marked emotive content, though
Destutt de Tracy presumably had intended it to be a dry, technical term. Such
was his own passionate attachment to the science of ideas, and such was the
high moral worth and purpose he assigned to it, that the word idéologie
was bound to possess for him a strongly laudatory character. And equally, when
Napoleon linked the name of idéologie
with what he had come to regard as the most detestable elements in
Revolutionary thought, he invested the same word with all of his feelings of
disapprobation and mistrust. Ideology was, from this time on, to play this
double role of a term both laudatory and abusive not only in French but also
in German, English, Italian, and all the other languages of the world into
which it was either translated or transliterated.
Some historians of philosophy have
called the 19th century the age of ideology, not because the word itself was
then so widely used, but because so much of the thought of the time can be
distinguished from that prevailing in the previous centuries by features that
would now be called ideological. Even so, there is a limit to the extent to
which one can speak today of an agreed use of the word. The subject of
ideology is a controversial one, and it is arguable that at least some part of
this controversy derives from disagreement as to the definition of the word ideology.
One can, however, discern both a strict and a loose way of using it. In the
loose sense of the word, ideology may mean any kind of action-oriented theory
or any attempt to approach politics in the light of a system of ideas.
Ideology in the stricter sense stays fairly close to Destutt de Tracy's
original conception and may be identified by five characteristics: (1) it
contains an explanatory theory of a more or less comprehensive kind about
human experience and the external world; (2) it sets out a program, in
generalized and abstract terms, of social and political organization; (3) it
conceives the realization of this program as entailing a struggle; (4) it
seeks not merely to persuade but to recruit loyal adherents, demanding what is
sometimes called commitment; (5) it addresses a wide public but may tend to
confer some special role of leadership on intellectuals. In this article the
noun ideology is used only in its
strict sense; the adjective ideological is used to refer to ideology as broadly defined.
On the basis of the five features
above, then, one can recognize as ideologies systems as diverse as Destutt de
Tracy's own science of ideas, the Positivism of the French philosopher Auguste
Comte, Communism and several other types of Socialism, Fascism, Nazism, and
certain kinds of nationalism. That all these "-isms" belong to the
19th or 20th century may suggest that ideologies are no older than the word
itself--that they belong essentially to a period in which secular belief has
increasingly replaced traditional religious faith.
Ideologies, in fact, are sometimes
spoken of as if they belonged to the same logical category as religions.
Both are assuredly in a certain sense "total" systems, concerned at
the same time with questions of truth and questions of conduct; but the
differences between ideologies and religions are perhaps more important than
the similarities. A religious theory of reality is constructed in terms of a
divine order and is seldom, like that of the ideologist, centred on this world
alone. A religion may present a vision of a just society, but it cannot easily
have a practical political program. The emphasis of religion is on faith and
worship; its appeal is to inwardness and its aim the redemption or
purification of the human spirit. An ideology speaks to the group, the nation,
or the class. Some religions acknowledge their debt to revelation, whereas
ideology always believes, however mistakenly, that it lives by reason alone.
Both, it may be said, demand commitment, but it may be doubted whether
commitment has ever been a marked feature of those religions into which a
believer is inducted in infancy.
Even so, it is in certain religious
movements that the first ideological elements in the modern world can be seen.
The city of Florence, which in so many fields witnessed the birth of
modernity, produced perhaps the first "ideological" Christian. The
attempt of Girolamo Savonarola to construct a
puritan utopia was marked by several of the qualities by which one recognizes
a modern ideology: Savonarola treated the vision of a Christian community as a
model that men should actually seek to realize in the here and now. His method
was to dominate the state through an appeal to the populace, and then to use
the powers of the state to control both the economy and the private lives of
the citizens. The enterprise was given a militant spirit; it was presented by
Savonarola as being at one and the same time an outward struggle against papal
corruption, the commercial ethos, and Renaissance Humanism, and an inward
struggle against worldly ambitions and carnal desires.
Savonarola had numerous followers in
his attempt to give Christianity an ideological dimension: he inspired
Calvin's Geneva and the Puritan communities of the New World. Indeed, in both
the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, when Christianity was invested
with a new militancy and a new intolerance, when a new emphasis was placed on
creeds and conversion, religion itself moved that much nearer to ideology.
The Italian political
philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli
was one of Savonarola's sharpest critics, but he was also, like him, a
precursor of modern ideologists. Historians who speak of him only as an
immoralist overlook the extent to which Machiavelli was a man with an ideal--a
republican ideal. Rousseau recognized this when he spoke of The
Prince as a "handbook for republicans." Machiavelli's dream was
to see revived in modern Italy a republic as glorious as that of ancient Rome,
and he suggested that it could be achieved only by means of a revolution that
had the strength of will to liquidate its enemies. Machiavelli was the first
to link ideology with terror, but he was too much of a political scientist to
enact the role of the ideologue.
Seventeenth-century England occupies
an important place in the history of ideology. Although there were then no
fully fledged ideologies in the strict sense of the term, political theory,
like politics itself, began to acquire certain ideological characteristics.
The swift movement of revolutionary forces throughout the 17th century created
a demand for theories to explain and justify the radical action that was often
taken. Locke's Two
Treatises of Government is an outstanding example of literature
written to justify the rights of man against absolutism. This growth of
abstract theory in the 17th century, this increasing tendency to construct
systems and discuss politics in terms of principles, marks the emergence of
the ideological style. In political conversation generally it was accompanied
by a growing use of concepts such as right and liberty--ideals in terms of
which actual policies were judged.
Although the word ideology in the sense derived from Destutt de Tracy's understanding
has passed into modern usage, it is important to notice the particular sense
that ideology is given in Hegelian
and Marxist philosophy, where it is used in a pejorative way. Ideology
there becomes a word for what these philosophers also call "false
consciousness." G.W.F. Hegel argued that people were instruments of
history; they enacted roles that were assigned to them by forces they did not
understand; the meaning of history was hidden from them. Only the philosopher
could expect to understand things as they were. This Hegelian enterprise of
interpreting reality and reconciling the world to itself was condemned by
certain critics as an attempt to provide an ideology of the status quo, in
that if individuals were indeed mere ciphers whose actions were determined by
external forces, then there was little point in trying to change or improve
political and other circumstances. This is a criticism Karl
Marx took up, and it is the argument he developed in The
German Ideology and other earlier writings. Ideology in this sense is a
set of beliefs with which people deceive themselves; it is theory that
expresses what they are led to think, as opposed to that which is true; it is
false consciousness.
Marx, however, was not consistent in
his use of the word ideology, for he
did not always use the term pejoratively, and some of his references to it
clearly imply the possibility of an ideology being true. Twentieth-century
Marxists, who have frequently discarded the pejorative sense of ideology
altogether, have been content to speak of Marxism as being itself an ideology.
In certain Communist countries "ideological institutes" have been
established, and party philosophers are commonly spoken of as party
ideologists. Marxism is an excellent example, a paradigm, of an ideology.
The use of the word ideology in the pejorative sense of false consciousness is found not
only in the writings of Marx himself but in those of other exponents of what
has come to be known as the sociology of knowledge, including the German
sociologists Max Weber and Karl
Mannheim, and numerous lesser figures. Few such writers are wholly
consistent in their use of the term, but what is characteristic of their
approach is their method of regarding idea systems as the outcome or
expression of certain interests. In calling such idea systems ideologies, they
are treating them as things whose true nature is concealed; they consider the
task of sociological research to be the unveiling of what Mannheim called the
"life conditions which produce ideologies."
From this perspective, the economic
science of Adam Smith, for example, is not to
be understood as an independent intellectual construction or to be judged in
terms of its truth, consistency, or clarity; rather, it is to be seen as the
expression of bourgeois interests, as part of the ideology of capitalism.
The sociology of knowledge in its more
recent formulations has sought support in Freudian
psychology (notably in borrowing from Freud the concepts of the unconscious
and of rationalization), in order to suggest that ideologies are the
unconscious rationalizations of class interests. This refinement has enabled
sociologists of knowledge to rid their theory of the disagreeable and
unscientific element of bald accusation; they no longer have to brand Adam
Smith as a deliberate champion of the bourgeois ethos but can see him now as
simply the unconscious spokesman of capitalism. At the same time, these
sociologists of knowledge have argued that Freudian psychology is itself no
less a form of ideology than is Adam Smith's economics, for Freud's method of
psychoanalysis is essentially a technique for adjusting rebellious minds to
the demands and constraints of bourgeois society.
Critics of the sociology of knowledge
have argued that if all philosophy is ideology, then the sociology of
knowledge must itself be an ideology like any other idea system and equally
devoid of independent validity; that if all seeming truth is veiled
rationalization of interest, then the sociology of knowledge cannot be true.
It has been suggested that although Weber and Mannheim inspired most of the
work that has been done by sociologists of knowledge their own writings may
perhaps be exempted from this criticism, if only on the ground that neither of
them put forward a consistent or unambiguous theory of ideology. Both used the
word ideology in different ways at
different times. Weber was in part concerned to reverse Marx's theory that all
idea systems are products of economic structures, by demonstrating conversely
that some economic structures are the product of idea systems (that
Protestantism, for example, generated capitalism and not capitalism
Protestantism). Mannheim, on the other hand, tried to restore in a more
elaborate form Marx's suggestion that ideologies are the product of the social
structure. But Mannheim's analysis may have been obscured by his proposal that
the word ideology should be reserved
for idea systems that are more or less conservative, and the word utopia for idea systems of a more revolutionary or millenarian
nature. Mannheim did not, however, remain faithful to this stipulative
definition, even in his book entitled Ideology
and Utopia.
On the other hand, Mannheim was well
aware of the implication of the doctrine that all idea systems have a class
basis and a class bias. As a way out of the dilemma he envisaged the
possibility of a classless class of intellectuals, a "socially unattached
intelligentsia," as he put it, capable of thinking independently by
virtue of its independence from any class interest or affiliation. Such a
detached group might hope to acquire knowledge that was not ideology. This vision of a small elite of superior minds rising
above the myths of ordinary society seemed to some readers to put Mannheim
closer to Plato than to Marx and to cast new doubts on the claim of the
sociology of knowledge to be a science.
If some theorists emphasize the
kinship between ideology and various forms of religious enthusiasm, others
stress the connection between ideology and what they call rationalism, or the
attempt to understand politics in terms of abstract ideas rather than of lived
experience. Like Napoleon, who held that ideology is par excellence the work
of intellectuals, some theorists are suspicious of those who think they know
about politics because they have read many books; they believe that politics
can be learned only by an apprenticeship to politics itself.
Such people are not unsympathetic to
political theories, such as Locke's, but they argue that their value resides
in the facts that are derived from experience. Michael Oakeshott in England
has described Locke's theory of political liberty as an "abridgment"
of the Englishman's traditional understanding of liberty, and has suggested
that once such a conception is uprooted from the tradition that has given it
meaning it becomes a rationalistic doctrine or metaphysical abstraction, like
those liberties contained in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which were
so much talked about after the French Revolution but rarely actually enjoyed,
in France or elsewhere.
Whereas Oakeshott has seen ideology as
a form of rationalism, Edward Shils, a U.S.
political scientist, has seen it more as a product of, among other things,
romanticism with an extremist character. His argument is that romanticism has
fed into and swelled the seas of ideological politics by its cult of the ideal
and by its scorn for the actual, especially its scorn for what is mediated by
calculation and compromise. Since civil politics demands both compromise and
contrivance and calls for a prudent self-restraint and responsible caution, he
suggests that civil politics is bound to be repugnant to romanticism. Hence
Shils concludes that the romantic spirit is naturally driven toward
ideological politics.
The "total" character of
ideology, its extremism and violence, have
been analyzed by other critics, among whom the French philosopher-writer Albert
Camus and the Austrian-born British philosopher Sir
Karl Popper merit particular attention. Beginning as an Existentialist
who subscribed to the view that "the universe is absurd," Camus
passed to a personal affirmation of justice and human decency as compelling
values to be realized in conduct. An Algerian by birth, Camus also appealed to
what he believed to be the "Mediterranean" tradition of moderation
and human warmth and joy in living as opposed to the "northern"
Germanic tradition of fanatical, puritan devotion to metaphysical
abstractions. In his book The Rebel (L'Homme
révolté), he argued that the true rebel is not the man who
conforms to the orthodoxy of some revolutionary ideology, but a man who could
say "no" to injustice. He suggested that the true rebel would prefer
the politics of reform, such as that of modern trade-union socialism, to the
totalitarian politics of Marxism or similar movements. The systematic violence
of ideology--the crimes de logique that were committed in its name--appeared to Camus
to be wholly unjustifiable. Hating cruelty, he believed that the rise of
ideology in the modern world had added enormously to human suffering. Though
he was willing to admit that the ultimate aim of most ideologies was to
diminish human suffering, he argued that good ends did not authorize the use
of evil means.
A somewhat similar plea for what he
called "piecemeal social engineering" was put forward by Popper, who
argued that ideology rests on a logical mistake: namely the notion that
history can be transformed into science. In The
Logic of Scientific Discovery (Logik
der Forschung), Popper suggested that the true method of science was not
one of observation, hypothesis, and confirmation but one of conjecture and
experiment, in which the concept of falsification played a crucial role. By
this concept he meant that in science there is a continuing process of trial
and error; conjectures are put to the test of experiment, and those that are
not falsified are provisionally accepted; thus there is no definitive
knowledge but only provisional knowledge that is constantly being corrected.
Popper saw in the enterprise of ideology an attempt to find certainty in
history and to produce predictions on the model of what were supposed to be
scientific predictions. Ideologists, he argued, because they have a false
notion of what science is, can produce only prophecies, which are quite
distinct from scientific predictions and which have no scientific validity
whatever. Though Popper was well disposed toward the idea of a
"scientific" approach to politics and ethics, he suggested that a
full awareness of the importance of trial and error in science would prompt
one to look for similar forms of "negative judgment" elsewhere.
By no means are all ideologists
explicit champions of violence, but it is characteristic of ideology both to
exalt action and to regard action in terms of a military analogy. Some
observers have pointed out that one has only to consider the prose style of
the founders of most ideologies to be struck by the military and warlike
language that they habitually use, including words like struggle,
resist, march, victory, and overcome;
the literature of ideology is replete with martial expressions. In such a
view, commitment to an ideology becomes a form of enlistment so that to become
the adherent of an ideology is to become a combatant or partisan.
In the years that followed World War
II, a number of ideological writers went beyond the mere use of military
language and made frank avowals of their desire for violence--not that it was
a new thing to praise violence. The French political philosopher Georges
Sorel, for example, had done so before World War I in his book Reflections
on Violence. Sorel was usually regarded as being more a Fascist
than a Socialist. He also used the word violence
in his own special way; by violence Sorel meant passion, not the throwing of
bombs and the burning of buildings.
Violence found eloquent champions in
several black militant writers of the 1960s, notably the Martinican theorist
Frantz Fanon. Moreover, several of the French philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre's dramatic writings turn on the theme that "dirty
hands" are necessary in politics and that a man with so-called bourgeois
inhibitions about bloodshed cannot usefully serve a revolutionary cause.
Sartre's attachment to the ideal of revolution tended to increase as he grew
older, and in some of his later writings he suggested that violence might even
be a good thing in itself.
In considering Sartre's views on the
subject of ideology it must be noted that Sartre sometimes used the word ideology
in a sense peculiarly his own. In an early section of his Search
for a Method (Critique de la raison
dialectique), Sartre drew a distinction between philosophies and
ideologies in which he reserved the term philosophy
for those major systems of thought, such as the Rationalism of Descartes or
the Idealism of Hegel, which dominate men's minds at a certain moment in
history. He defined an ideology as a minor system of ideas, living on the
margin of the genuine philosophy and exploiting the domain of the greater
system. What Sartre proposed in this work was a revitalization and
modernization of the "major philosophy" of Marxism through the
integration of elements drawn from the "ideology," or minor system,
of Existentialism. What emerged from the book was a theory in which the
Existentialist elements are more conspicuous than the Marxist.
A distinction is often drawn between
the ideological and the pragmatic approach to
politics, the latter being understood as the approach that treats particular
issues and problems purely on their merits and does not attempt to apply
doctrinal, preconceived remedies. Theorists have debated whether or not
politics has become less ideological and whether a pragmatic approach can be
shown to be better than an ideological one.
On the first question, there seemed to
be good reason for thinking that after the death of Stalin and the repudiation
of Stalinism by the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, at least, was becoming
more interested in the "pragmatic" concerns of national security and
the balance of power and less interested in the ideological aim of fostering
universal Communism. This in turn seemed to many to have resulted--in both the
United States and the Soviet Union--in a shift toward a pragmatic policy of
coexistence and a peaceful division of spheres of influence. There were
indications in many countries that the old antagonisms between capitalist and
socialist ideologies were giving way to a search for techniques for making a
mixed economy work more effectively for the good of all.
But while many observers believed that
there was much evidence of a decline of ideology in the latter 1950s, others
believed that there were equally manifest signs in the following decade of a
revival of ideology, if not within the major political parties, then at least
among the public generally. Throughout the world various left-wing movements
emerged to challenge the whole ethos on which pragmatic politics was based.
Not all these ideologies were coherent, and none possessed the elaborate
intellectual structure of the 19th-century ideologies; but together they
served to demonstrate that the end of ideology was not yet at hand.
As suggested earlier, certain
controversies about ideology have to some extent been rooted in the ambiguity
of the word itself, and this is perhaps especially relevant to the
confrontation between ideology and pragmatism, since the word pragmatism
raises problems no less intractable than those involved in connection with the
word ideology. In the senses
outlined at the beginning of this article, ideology is manifestly not the only
alternative to pragmatism in politics, and to reject ideology would not
necessarily be to adopt pragmatism. Ordinary language does not yet yield as
many words as political science needs to clarify the question, and it becomes
necessary to introduce such expressions as belief system, or to name the
relevant distinctions, to further the analysis.
Almost any approach to politics
constitutes a belief system of one kind or another. Some such belief systems
are more structured, more ordered, and generally systematic than others.
Though an ideology is a type of belief system, not all belief systems are
ideologies. One man's belief system may consist of a congeries of ill-assorted
prejudices and inarticulate assumptions. Another's may be the result of deep
reflection and careful study. It is sometimes felt to be convenient to speak
of a belief system of this latter type as a philosophy or, better, to
distinguish it from philosophy in the technical or academic sense, as a Weltanschauung (literally, a "view of the world").
The confrontation between ideology and
pragmatism may be more instructive if it is translated into a distinction
between the ideological and the pragmatic, taking these two adjectives as
extremes on a sliding scale. From this perspective, it becomes possible to
speak of differences of degree, to speak of an approach to politics as being
more or less ideological, more or less pragmatic. At the same time it becomes
possible to speak of a belief system such as liberalism as lending itself to a
variety of forms, tending at the one extreme toward the ideological, and at
the other toward the pragmatic.
It has been said that ideology has
transformed international relationships in the 20th century--in appearance at
least. Earlier centuries experienced dynastic wars, national, civil, and
imperial wars, and diplomacy designed to further national security or national
expansion or to promote mutual advantages and general peace. Such factors,
indeed, appeared to govern international relations until recent times.
International relations today are seemingly dominated more often than not by
the exigencies of "-isms": wars are fought, alliances are made, and
treaties are signed because of ideological considerations. The balance of
power in the contemporary world is a balance weighted by ideological
commitment. "The Communist bloc" confronts "the Free
peoples," and in the "Third World" emergent nations cultivate a
nationalist, anticolonialist ideology in their search for identity and their
efforts to achieve modernity.
But this is not to assert that
ideological wars, or ideological diplomacy, are entirely new. What has become
the most conspicuous element in contemporary international relations--so
conspicuous that other elements are often entirely ignored--was present, to a
lesser degree, in earlier international relations. It is necessary here to
distinguish between the actual events of history and the interpretations that
are put on history, for some events lend themselves more readily than others
to an ideological interpretation. The ideological perspective has become
increasingly significant as the general public has come to play a role in
considering questions of war and peace. When questions of defense and
diplomacy were settled by kings and their ministers and wars were fought by
professional soldiers and sailors, the public was not expected to have any
opinion about international relations, and in such a situation there was
little place for ideology.
In the course of World
War I, however, a new element appeared to have been introduced. The war
was seen by those who experienced it as being in its early stages a national
war of the traditional kind, and as such it was not at first expected to
assume any profoundly disturbing form. Each combatant people viewed itself as
fighting for king and country in a just war. But by 1916 the Allies were being
urged to think of their endeavour as a war "to make the world safe for
democracy," and the Germans, on their side, were correspondingly
encouraged to visualize the war as a struggle of "culture" against
"barbarism." On both sides, the casualties were far more terrible
than anyone had foreseen, and the need to sustain the will to war by an appeal
to ideology was plainly felt by all the nations involved. Whether such
"war aims" were really the main objectives of the governments
concerned is another question; what is important is that, as the need was
increasingly felt for a justification of war, the justification took an
ideological form. Whether or not World War I changed its real nature between
1914 and 1918, the prevailing conception of it underwent significant
alteration. This became more marked after the Russian Revolution of 1917, when
the Bolsheviks submitted to harsh German peace terms for reasons thatwere not
only practical but ideological--namely, the preservation and promotion of
Communism. Pres. Woodrow Wilson took the United States into the war on the
Allied side with an alternative ideological vision--that of ensuring permanent
peace through the League of Nations and of establishing democratic governments
in all the conquered countries.
The rise of Communism clearly marked a
corresponding increase in the role of ideology in international relations.
Fascism helped to speed the process. The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s was an
almost clear-cut confrontation between the ideologies of left and right (not
entirely clear-cut because of the ambiguous relationship between Communism and
anarchism).
The precise extent of ideological
commitment in World War II is a matter of some
controversy. At one level, the 1939 war is seen as a continuation of the war
of 1914. Two of the leading protagonists--Great Britain and the United
States--agreed more in their anti-ideological stance and their hostility to
Nazism than in promoting an alternative ideology. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, suspicious of British and French imperialism
and eager to cultivate a progressive ideological outlook, was critical of
Prime Minister Winston Churchill's politics, hostile toward Charles de
Gaulle's, but surprisingly tolerant of Joseph Stalin's. The revival of
Wilson's idealistic war aims in the Atlantic Charter
provided a basis for a kind of general ideological union of the Allies. But
such formulations proved to be of small significance compared to the profound
ideological commitment of the Soviet Union to Communism, and that of the
United States to an international position more ideologically anti-Communist
than pro anything.
What came to be called the Cold
War in the 1950s must be understood, to a large extent, as an
ideological confrontation, and, whereas Communism
is manifestly an ideology, the "non-Communism," or even the
"anti-Communism," of the West is negatively ideological. To oppose
one ideology is not necessarily to subscribe to another, although there is a
strong body of opinion in the West that feels that the free world needs a
coherent ideology if it is to resist successfully an opposing ideology.
The connection between international wars
and ideology can be better expressed in terms of a difference of degree rather
than of kind: some wars are more ideological than others, although there is no
clear boundary between an ideological and nonideological war. An analogy with
the religious wars of the past is evident, and there is indeed some historical
continuity between the two types of war. The Christian Crusades against the
Turks and the wars between Catholics and Protestants in early modern Europe
have much in common with the ideological conflicts of the contemporary period.
Religious wars are often communal wars, as witness those between Hindus and
Muslims in India; but an "ideological" element of a kind can be
discovered in many religious wars, even those narrated in the Old Testament,
in which the people of Israel are described as fighting for the cause of
righteousness--fighting, in other words, for a universal abstraction as
distinct from a local and practical aim. In the past this
"ideological" element has in the main been subsidiary; what is
characteristic of the modern period is that the ideological element has become
increasingly dominant, first in the religious wars (and the related diplomacy)
that followed the Reformation and then in the political wars and diplomacy of
recent times. (M.C.)
¡¡
|
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â (idéologie). À̷аú ½ÇõÀÇ ¾ç Ãø¸é¿¡¼ Áß¿äÇÑ Àǹ̸¦ °®´Â »çȸ¡¤Á¤Ä¡
öÇÐÀÇ ÇÑ ÇüÅÂ. ¼¼°è¸¦ ¼³¸íÇÏ°í º¯È½ÃŰ´Â °ÍÀ» µÞ¹ÞħÇÏ´Â
°ü³äü°èÀÌ´Ù.
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ±â¿ø°ú Ư¡
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â(idéologie)¶ó´Â ¸»Àº ÇÁ¶û½º Çõ¸í±â¿¡
öÇÐÀÚ A. L. C. µ¥½ºÆ¢Æ®
µå Æ®¶ó½Ã°¡ ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ '°ü³äÀÇ °úÇÐ'ÀÇ ¾àĪÀ¸·Î
µµÀÔÇÏ¸é¼ Ã³À½ µîÀåÇß´Ù. ±×´Â °ü³äÀÇ °úÇÐÀÌ ¸ðµç
Àΰ£Áö½ÄÀ» °ü³ä¿¡ °üÇÑ Áö½ÄÀ¸·Î º» öÇÐÀÚ Á¸ ·ÎÅ©¿Í
¿¡Æ¼¿£ º¸³ë µå Äáµð¾ßÅ©ÀÇ ÀνķÐÀ» °¢»öÇÑ °ÍÀ̶ó°í
¼³¸íÇßÀ¸³ª, »ç½ÇÀº ¿µ±¹ÀÇ Ã¶ÇÐÀÚ ÇÁ·£½Ã½º º£ÀÌÄÁ¿¡°Ô ´õ
¸¹Àº ºúÀ» Áö°í ÀÖ´Ù. º£ÀÌÄÁÀº °úÇÐÀÇ ¿î¸íÀº Àΰ£ Áö½ÄÀÇ
È®´ë»Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó 'Áö±¸ À§ÀÇ Àΰ£ÀÇ »îÀ» °³¼±ÇÏ´Â ÀÏ'À̶ó°í
¼±¾ðÇß´Ù. º£ÀÌÄÁó·³ Áö½Ä°ú ½Ç¿ëÀ» °áÇÕÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ̾߸»·Î
¼³¸íÀ» º»Áú·Î ÇÏ´Â À̷С¤Ã¶Çаú µ¥½ºÆ¢Æ® µå Æ®¶ó½ÃÀÇ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ ±¸º°Áþ´Â Ư¡ÀÌ´Ù. °ü³äÀÇ °úÇÐÀº
Àΰ£Á¤½Å¿¡¼ Æí°ßÀ» ¸ô¾Æ³»°í À̼ºÀ» º¹±ÇÇÔÀ¸·Î½á Àΰ£¿¡
ºÀ»çÇÏ°í ±¸¿øÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» ¸ñÇ¥·Î »ï¾Ò´Ù. ÇÁ¶û½º¸¦ ÇÕ¸®Àû¡¤°úÇÐÀû
»çȸ·Î º¯ÇõÇϸ®¶ó ¹Ï°í ±¹¹Î±³À°Ã¼°è¸¦ °í¾ÈÇÑ µ¥½ºÆ¢Æ®
µå Æ®¶ó½Ã¿Í µ¿·á À̵¥¿Ã·Î±×(idéologue)µéÀÇ °¡¸£Ä§Àº
1795~99³â ÇÁ¶û½º ÃÑÀçÁ¤ºÎÀÇ °øÀÎÇм³ÀÌ µÇ¾ú´Ù. ±×·±µ¥
óÀ½¿¡´Â ±×µéÀ» ÁöÁöÇß´ø ³ªÆú·¹¿ËÀÌ °ð µîÀ» µ¹·È°í 1812³â
12¿ù ÇÁ¶û½º±ºÀÇ ÆÐ¹è¸¦ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±×µéÀÇ Å¿À¸·Î µ¹¸®±â±îÁö
Çß´Ù. À̸®ÇÏ¿© À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ½ÃÀÛºÎÅÍ ¶Ñ·ÇÇÑ °¨Á¤Àû
ÇÔÃàÀ» Áö´Ñ ¿ë¾î°¡ µÇ¾î ¹ö·È´Ù. À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â µ¥½ºÆ¢Æ® µå
Æ®¶ó½Ã°¡ °ü³äÀÇ °úÇп¡ Á¤¿ÀûÀ¸·Î ¾ÖÁ¤À» ½ñ°í ¼þ°íÇÑ
µµ´öÀû °¡Ä¡¸¦ ºÎ¿©ÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ÁÁÀº Àǹ̸¦ °¡Á³´Ù°¡ ±×ÈÄ
³ªÆú·¹¿ËÀÌ Çõ¸í»ç»óÀÇ Çø¿À½º·± ¿ä¼ÒµéÀ» ÀÌ ³¹¸»°ú
°áÇÕÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ¿Â°® ºñ³°ú ºÒ½ÅÀÇ ´À³¦À¸·Î ä¿öÁ³´Ù.
À̶§ºÎÅÍ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ÇÁ¶û½º¾î»Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó Àü¼¼°è ¾ð¾î·Î
¹ø¿ªµÉ ¶§ ĪÂù°ú ¿å¼³ÀÇ ÀÌÁß¼ºÀ» ¶ì°Ô µÇ¾ú´Ù.
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¶ó´Â ¸»Àº ÇùÀÇ¿Í ±¤ÀÇ·Î ±¸º°ÇÒ ¼ö Àִµ¥
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ µÑ·¯½Ñ ³íÀïÀÌ Àû¾îµµ ¾î¶² ºÎºÐÀº ¿ë¾îÀÇ
Á¤Àǰ¡ ÀÏÄ¡ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â µ¥¼ ºñ·ÔµÇ±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ±¤ÀÇÀÇ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ü°èÀûÀÎ °ü³äÀÇ Àεµ¸¦ ¹Þ´Â ¸ðµç Á¾·ùÀÇ
ÇൿÁöÇâÀû ÀÌ·ÐÀ̳ª °ü³ä ü°è¿¡ ºñÃß¾î Á¤Ä¡¿¡ Á¢±ÙÇÏ´Â
¸ðµç ½Ãµµ¸¦ ¶æÇÑ´Ù. ÇùÀÇÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ´ÙÀ½ÀÇ 5°¡Áö
Ư¡À¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³¾ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, µ¥½ºÆ¢Æ® µå Æ®¶ó½ÃÀÇ ¿ø·¡
°ßÇØ¿¡ ¸Å¿ì °¡±õ´Ù. ¨ç À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â Àΰ£°æÇè°ú
¿ÜºÎ¼¼°è¿¡ °üÇÑ Æ÷°ýÀûÀÎ ¼³¸íÀÌ·ÐÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ´Ù. ¨è
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ÀϹÝÀû¡¤Ãß»óÀû ¿ë¾î·Î »çȸ¡¤Á¤Ä¡¸¦ Á¶Á÷ÇÏ´Â
ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» Á¦½ÃÇÑ´Ù. ¨é À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ÀÌ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥ÀÇ
½ÇÇö¿¡´Â ÅõÀïÀÌ µÚµû¸¦ °ÍÀ̶ó°í º»´Ù. ¨ê À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â
¶§¶§·Î ¼¾àÀ» ¿ä±¸ÇÏ¸é¼ Ãæ½ÇÇÑ ÁöÁöÀÚ¸¦ ¸ðÀ¸·Á ÇÑ´Ù. ¨ë
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ±¤¹üÇÑ ´ëÁßÀ» ÇâÇϸç Áö½ÄÀο¡°Ô Ưº°ÇÑ
Áöµµ¿ªÇÒÀ» ºÎ¿©ÇÏ´Â °æÇâÀ» ¶í´Ù.
öÇÐÀû ¸Æ¶ô
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿Í Á¾±³
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â Á¾Á¾ Á¾±³¿Í
µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ¹üÁÖ¿¡ ¼ÓÇÑ´Ù°í À̾߱âµÈ´Ù. 2°¡Áö ¸ðµÎ ÃÑüÀû
ü°èÀ̸ç Áø¸® ¹× ÇàÀ§ ¹®Á¦¿Í °ü·ÃÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ±×º¸´Ù
Áß¿äÇÑ °ÍÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿Í Á¾±³ÀÇ Â÷ÀÌÀÌ´Ù. Á¾±³ÀÌ·ÐÀº
½ÅÀû Áú¼¿¡ µû¶ó ¼¼¿öÁö¸ç À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âó·³ Çö½Ç¼¼°è¿¡¸¸
°ü½ÉÀ» ÁýÁßÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù. Á¾±³´Â Á¤ÀÇ·Î¿î »çȸÀÇ ÀÌ»óÇâÀ»
Á¦½ÃÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÁö¸¸ Á¤Ä¡Àû ½Çõ ÇÁ·Î±×·¥À» °¡Áö±â ¾î·Á¿ì¸ç,
¹ÏÀ½¡¤¿¹¹è¸¦ °Á¶ÇÏ°í ¿µ¼º(çÏàõ)¿¡ È£¼ÒÇϸç Àΰ£Á¤½ÅÀÇ
±¸¿ø¡¤Á¤È¸¦ ¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î ÇÑ´Ù. À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â Áý´Ü¡¤¹ÎÁ·¡¤°è±ÞÀ»
ÇâÇØ ¸»Çϸç, °è½Ã¿¡ ÀÇÁöÇÏ´Â Á¾±³¿¡ ¹ÝÇØ ÆÇ´ÜÀ» ±×¸£Ä¡´Â
ÀÏÀÌ ÀÖ´õ¶óµµ À̼º¿¡¸¸ ÀÇÁöÇÑ´Ù°í ¹Ï´Â´Ù. ±Ù´ë ¼¼°è
ÃÖÃÊÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ¿ä¼Ò´Â ¸î¸î Á¾±³¿îµ¿¿¡¼ ã¾Æº¼ ¼ö
ÀÖ´Ù. Áö·Ñ¶ó¸ð »çº¸³ª·Ñ¶ó´Â
ÃÖÃÊÀÇ 'À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû'ÀÎ ±×¸®½ºµµ±³µµ¿´À¸¸ç,
ÇÁ·ÎÅ×½ºÅºÆ®Àû À¯ÅäÇǾƸ¦ °Ç¼³ÇÏ·Á Çß´Ù. ±×´Â
±×¸®½ºµµ±³ °øµ¿Ã¼ÀÇ ÀÌ»óÇâÀ» Áö±Ý ¿ì¸®°¡ ½ÇÇöÇØ¾ß ÇÒ
¸ðµ¨·Î ¿©°å°í, ½ÇÇö¹æ¹ýÀ¸·Î¼ ÇÏÃþ¹Î¿¡ È£¼ÒÇØ ±¹°¡¸¦
Áö¹èÇÏ°í °æÁ¦¿Í ½Ã¹ÎÀÇ »ç»ýȰÀ» °¨µ¶Çϱâ À§ÇØ
±¹°¡±Ç·ÂÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏÀÚ°í ÁÖÀåÇß´Ù. ±×´Â ±×¸®½ºµµ±³¿¡
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû Â÷¿øÀ» ºÎ¿©ÇÑ ½Ãµµ ¶§¹®¿¡ ¼ö¸¹Àº ÃßÁ¾ÀÚ¸¦
¾ò¾úÀ¸¸ç, Ä®¹ðÀÇ Á¦³×¹Ù ¹× ½Å´ë·úÀÇ Ã»±³µµ °øµ¿Ã¼¿¡
¿µ°¨À» ÁÖ¾ú´Ù.
Ãʱâ Á¤Ä¡Ã¶Çп¡¼ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â
ÀÌÅ»¸®¾ÆÀÇ Á¤Ä¡Ã¶ÇÐÀÚ ´ÏÄÝ·Î ¸¶Å°¾Æº§¸®´Â
»çº¸³ª·Ñ¶ó¿Í ÇÔ²² ±Ù´ë À̵¥¿Ã·Î±×ÀÇ ¼±±¸ÀÚ¿´´Ù.
¸¶Å°¾Æº§¸®ÀÇ ²ÞÀº ±Ù´ë ÀÌÅ»¸®¾Æ¿¡¼ °í´ë ·Î¸¶¿Í °°Àº
Âù¶õÇÑ °øÈÁ¦°¡ ºÎȰÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» º¸´Â °ÍÀ̾ú´Âµ¥, ÀÌ´Â
Çõ¸íÀ» ÅëÇØ¼¸¸ ´Þ¼ºµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇß´Ù. ¶Ç
¸¶Å°¾Æº§¸®´Â ÃÖÃÊ·Î À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ Å×·¯¿Í °áÇÕÇßÀ¸³ª
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±× ¿ªÇÒÀ» Çϱ⿡´Â Áö³ªÄ¡°Ô Á¤Ä¡ÇÐÀÚÀÇ ¼º°ÝÀÌ
°Çß´Ù. 17¼¼±â ¿µ±¹Àº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â ¿ª»ç¿¡¼ Áß¿äÇÑ À§Ä¡¸¦
Â÷ÁöÇÑ´Ù. ´ç½Ã ¿µ±¹¿¡¼ Çõ¸í¼¼·ÂÀÇ ½Å¼ÓÇÑ ¿òÁ÷ÀÓÀº
±ÞÁøÀû ÇൿÀ» ¼³¸íÇϰí Á¤´çÈÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀÌ·ÐÀ»
¿ä±¸ÇßÀ¸¸ç, µû¶ó¼ Á¤Ä¡ÀÌ·ÐÀº Á¤Ä¡ ÀÚü¿Í ¸¶Âù°¡Áö·Î
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ¼º°ÝÀ» ¶ì°Ô µÇ¾ú´Ù. Á¸ ·ÎÅ©ÀÇ ¡´ÅëÄ¡·Ð 2Æí
Two Treatises of Government¡µ(1690)Àº Àý´ëÁÖÀÇ¿¡ ´ëÇ×ÇÏ´Â
Àΰ£±Ç¸®¸¦ Á¤´çÈÇϱâ À§ÇØ ¾´ ´ëÇ¥Àû ¹®ÇåÀÌ´Ù. 17¼¼±â¿¡
Ãß»óÀû ÀÌ·ÐÀÌ ¼ºÀåÇϰí ÀÌ·Ðü°èÀÇ È®¸³°ú Á¤Ä¡¸¦ ¿ø¸®¿¡
µû¶ó ³íÀÇÇÏ´Â °æÇâÀÌ Áõ°¡ÇÑ °ÍÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ¾ç½ÄÀÇ
ÃâÇöÀ» µÎµå·¯Áö°Ô º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù.
Çì°Ö°ú
¸¶¸£Å©½º
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â°¡ Çì°Ö°ú ¸¶¸£Å©½ºÀÇ Ã¶Çп¡¼ ºÎ¿©¹ÞÀº
Ư¼öÇÑ Àǹ̸¦ ÁÖ¸ñÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº Áß¿äÇÑ ÀÏÀÌ´Ù. ¿©±â¼
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¶õ 'ÇãÀ§ÀǽÄ'À» ³ªÅ¸³»´Â ºñ³Á¶ÀÇ Àǹ̸¦
Áö´Ñ´Ù. Çì°Ö¿¡ µû¸£¸é ÀιÎÀº ¿ª»çÀÇ µµ±¸·Î¼ Àڽŵµ ¾ËÁö
¸øÇÏ´Â ¿ÜÀûÀÎ ÈûÀÌ Àڽſ¡°Ô ºÎ¿©ÇÑ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ¼öÇàÇϸç,
±×¸®ÇÏ¿© ¿ª»çÀÇ Àǹ̴ ÀιÎÀÇ ¹èÈÄ¿¡ ¼û¾î ÀÖ´Ù. Çö½ÇÀ»
ÀÌ·¸°Ô ÇØ¼®Çؼ Çö½Ç°ú ŸÇùÇÏ·Á´Â Çì°ÖÀÇ ½Ãµµ´Â
Çö»óÀ¯Áö À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ Á¦°øÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇÏ¸é ¸¸ÀÏ
°³ÀÎÀÌ ¿ÜÀû Èû¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ÇൿÀ» °áÁ¤ÇÏ´Â º¸À߰;ø´Â
Á¸Àç¶ó¸é »óȲÀ» ¹Ù²Ù°Å³ª °³¼±ÇÏ·Á´Â ³ë·ÂÀº °ÅÀÇ Àǹ̰¡
¾ø±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ù·Î À̰ÍÀÌ Çì°Ö¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ä«¸¦ ¸¶¸£Å©½ºÀÇ
ºñÆÇÀ̸ç, ¡´µ¶ÀÏ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â Die Deutsche Ideologie¡µ¿Í ±×¹ÛÀÇ
ÃʱâÀúÀÛ¿¡¼ Àü°³ÇÑ ÁÖÀåÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ·± ÀǹÌÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â
ÀÚ±â ÀÚ½ÅÀ» ¼ÓÀÌ´Â ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ ¹ÏÀ½À» ¶æÇÑ´Ù. ¸¶¸£Å©½º¿¡
µû¸£¸é Áø¸®¿Í ¹Ý´ëµÇ´Â °ÍÀ» »ý°¢Çϵµ·Ï À̲ô´Â ÀÌ·ÐÀÌ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÌÀÚ ÇãÀ§ÀǽÄÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¸¶¸£Å©½º´Â ÀÌ
¿ë¾î¸¦ ÀϰüµÇ°Ô ºñ³Á¶·Î¸¸ »ç¿ëÇÑ °ÍÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ÂüµÈ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ °¡´É¼ºÀ» ³»Æ÷ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Îµµ »ç¿ëÇß´Ù. Á¾Á¾
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ °æ¸êÀû Àǹ̸¦ ¹«½ÃÇß´ø 20¼¼±â
¸¶¸£Å©½ºÁÖÀÇÀÚ´Â ¸¶¸£Å©½ºÁÖÀÇ ÀÚü°¡ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â·Î
ÀÏÄþîÁö´Â µ¥ ¸¸Á·Çß´Ù. ¸î¸î °ø»êÁÖÀÇ ³ª¶ó¿¡¼ ´ç
öÇÐÀÚ´Â º¸Åë ´ç À̵¥¿Ã·Î±×¶ó ºÒ¸°´Ù. ¸¶¸£Å©½ºÁÖÀÇ´Â
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ÈǸ¢ÇÑ ÀüÇüÀÌ´Ù.
Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐ
µ¶ÀÏÀÇ »çȸÇÐÀÚ ¸·½º º£¹ö¿Í
Ä«¸¦ ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀ» ÇʵηΠÇÏ´Â Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚÀÇ ÀúÀÛ ¼Ó¿¡¼µµ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â ÇãÀ§ÀǽÄÀ̶ó´Â ºñ³Àû Àǹ̷Π»ç¿ëµÈ´Ù.
À̵éÀÇ Á¢±Ù¹æ¹ýÀÇ Æ¯Â¡Àº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ ƯÁ¤ ÀÌÇØ°ü°èÀÇ
°á°ú³ª Ç¥ÇöÀ¸·Î ¿©±â°í ÀÌ·± À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ ÁøÂ¥ ¼º°ÝÀ»
°¨Ãá ¾î¶² °ÍÀ¸·Î ´Ù·é´Ù´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¡¼
Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚµéÀº ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀÌ ¸»ÇÑ 'À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ »êÃâÇÏ´Â
»ýȰÁ¶°Ç'ÀÇ º£ÀÏÀ» ¹þ±â´Â ÀÏÀ» »çȸÇÐÀÇ ÀÓ¹«¶ó°í
»ý°¢ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ·± °üÁ¡¿¡¼ º¸¸é ¿¹ÄÁ´ë ¾Ö´ý ½º¹Ì½ºÀÇ
°æÁ¦ÇÐÀº µ¶¸³µÈ Áö½Ä ±¸¼º¹°·Î ÀÎÁ¤ÇÒ ¼ö ¾øÀ¸¸ç ±× ÀÚüÀÇ
Áø¸® ¹× Àϰü¼º¿¡ µû¶ó Æò°¡ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø°í, ¿ÀÈ÷·Á ÀÚº»ÁÖÀÇ
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â·Î½á ºÎ¸£ÁÖ¾ÆÀÇ ÀÌÇØ°ü°è¸¦ Ç¥ÇöÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î
º¸¾Æ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
ÃÖ±ÙÀÇ Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â°¡ °è±ÞÀÌÀÍÀÇ ¹«ÀǽÄÀû
ÇÕ¸®ÈÀÓÀ» ÁÖÀåÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÇÁ·ÎÀÌÆ® ½É¸®ÇÐÀ» ÁöÁöÇØ¿Ô´Ù.
À̶§¹®¿¡ Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚµéÀº Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐ À̷п¡¼
ºñ°úÇÐÀûÀ̶ó°í ³ë°ñÀûÀ¸·Î ºñ³¹Þ´Â ¿ä¼Ò¸¦ Á¦°ÅÇÒ ¼ö
ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé ÇÁ·ÎÀÌÆ® ½É¸®ÇÐÀ» µµÀÔÇϸé
Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚµéÀº ¾Ö´ý ½º¹Ì½º¸¦ ºÎ¸£ÁÖ¾Æ Æ¯ÁúÀ» °¡Áø
°íÀÇÀû Åõ»ç·Î ´õÀÌ»ó ³«ÀÎÂïÁö ¾Ê°í ±×Àú ÀÚº»ÁÖÀÇÀÇ
¹«ÀǽÄÀû ´ëº¯ÀÎÀ¸·Î º¼ ¼ö Àֱ⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ¿Í µ¿½Ã¿¡
Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚµéÀº ÇÁ·ÎÀÌÆ® ½É¸®ÇÐÀÌ ¾Ö´ý ½º¹Ì½ºÀÇ °æÁ¦ÇÐ
¸øÁö ¾Ê°Ô À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ÇÑ ÇüÅÂÀÓÀ» ÁÖÀåÇØ¿Ô´Ù.
º»ÁúÀûÀ¸·Î ÇÁ·ÎÀÌÆ®ÀÇ Á¤½ÅºÐ¼®¹æ¹ýÀº ¹ÝÇ×Àû ¼º°ÝÀÇ
¼ÒÀ¯ÀÚ¸¦ ºÎ¸£ÁÖ¾Æ »çȸÀÇ ¿ä±¸¿Í ¼Ó¹Ú¿¡ ÀûÀÀ½ÃŰ´Â
±â¼úÀ̱⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. Áö½Ä»çȸÇп¡ ´ëÇÑ ºñÆÇÀÚµéÀº ¸ðµç
öÇÐÀÌ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¶ó¸é Áö½Ä»çȸÇеµ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÓ¿¡
Ʋ¸²¾ø´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇÑ´Ù. ÇÑÆí ºñ·Ï º£¹ö¿Í ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀÌ
Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÚµéÀÇ °ßÇØ¿¡ °ÇÑ ¾Ï½Ã¸¦ ÁÖ±â´Â ÇßÁö¸¸, µÎ
»ç¶÷ Áß ´©±¸µµ ÀϰüµÈ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â·ÐÀ» ³»³õÁö ¾Ê¾Ò±â
¶§¹®¿¡ ±×µéÀº À§ÀÇ ºñÆÇ¿¡¼ ¹þ¾î³¯ ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù. º£¹ö¿Í
¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¶ó´Â ³¹¸»À» ¼·Î ´Ù¸£°Ô »ç¿ëÇß´Ù.
º£¹ö´Â °æÁ¦±¸Á¶°¡ À̳äü°èÀÇ »ê¹°À̶ó´Â Á¡(¿¹¸¦ µé¸é
ÇÁ·ÎÅ×½ºÅºÆ®ÁÖÀǰ¡ ÀÚº»ÁÖÀǸ¦ ³º¾ÒÁö ±× ¹Ý´ë°¡ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó´Â
°Í)À» ³íÁõÇÔÀ¸·Î½á À̳äü°è°¡ °æÁ¦±¸Á¶ÀÇ »ê¹°À̶ó´Â
¸¶¸£Å©½ºÀÇ ÀÌ·ÐÀ» µÚÁý´Â µ¥ °ü½ÉÀ» °¡Á³´Ù. ¹Ý¸é ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀº
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â°¡ »çȸ±¸Á¶ÀÇ »ê¹°À̶ó´Â ¸¶¸£Å©½ºÀÇ Á¦¾ÈÀ»
Á»´õ Á¤±³ÇÑ ÇüÅ·ΠµÇ»ì¸®·Á°í ³ë·ÂÇß´Ù. ±×·¯³ª
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¶ó´Â ³¹¸»Àº ´Ù¼Ò º¸¼öÀûÀÎ °ü³äü°è¿¡¼,
À¯ÅäÇǾƶó´Â ³¹¸»Àº Á»´õ Çõ¸íÀûÀÎ ¶Ç´Â õ³â¿Õ±¹Àû
¼º°ÝÀ» °¡Áø °ü³äü°è¿¡¼ »ç¿ëÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¦¾È ¶§¹®¿¡
¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀÇ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ³ë·ÂÀº ºûÀ» ÀÒÀº °Í °°´Ù. ±×´Â
¡´À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿Í À¯ÅäÇÇ¾Æ Ideologie und Utopie¡µ¿¡¼Á¶Â÷ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ
¾àÁ¤Àû Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ Ãæ½ÇÇÏÁö ¸øÇß´Ù. ÇÑÆí ¸ðµç °ü³äü°è°¡ °è±Þ
±â¹Ý°ú °è±Þ Æí°ßÀ» °¡Áø´Ù´Â ¿ø¸®°¡ ÇÔÃàÇϰí ÀÖ´Â
µô·¹¸¶¿¡¼ ºüÁ®³ª¿À´Â ±æ·Î¼ ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀÌ ¼³Á¤ÇÑ °è±Þ ¾Æ´Ñ
°è±ÞÀÎ Áö½ÄÀÎ, Áï '»çȸÀû Á߸³À» ÁöŰ´Â ÀÎÅÚ¸®°ÕÄ¡¾Æ'ÀÇ
°¡´É¼ºÀº °è±Þ ÀÌÇØ³ª Á¦ÈÞ¿¡¼ ¹þ¾î³¯ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¸é »ý°¢Çغ¼
¸¸ÇÑ ¹®Á¦ÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¶Ù¾î³ Á¤½ÅÀ» Áö´Ñ ¼Ò¼ö ¿¤¸®Æ®¸¦
ÀÌ»óÀ¸·Î Á¦½ÃÇÑ °ÍÀº ¸¸ÇÏÀÓÀÌ ¸¶¸£Å©½ºº¸´Ù ÇöóÅæ¿¡ ´õ
°¡±õ´Ù´Â ÀλóÀ» ÁÖ°í Áö½Ä»çȸÇÐÀÌ °úÇÐÀ̶ó´Â ÁÖÀå¿¡
»õ·Î¿î Àǹ®À» ´øÁø °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸ÀδÙ.
Á¤Ä¡Àû ¸Æ¶ô
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¡¤ÇÕ¸®ÁÖÀÇ¡¤³¶¸¸ÁÖÀÇ
¾î¶² À̷а¡µéÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿Í Á¾±³Àû ¿±¤ »çÀÌÀÇ
À¯»ç¼ºÀ» °Á¶ÇÏ´Â ¹Ý¸é ´Ù¸¥ À̷а¡µéÀº À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿Í
ÇÕ¸®ÁÖÀÇÀÇ ¿¬°ü, »ê °æÇ躸´Ù Ãß»óÀû À̳信 µû¶ó Á¤Ä¡¸¦
ÀÌÇØÇÏ·Á´Â ½Ãµµ¿Í À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ¿¬°üÀ» °Á¶ÇÑ´Ù. ¶Ç Ã¥À»
ÅëÇØ Á¤Ä¡¿¡ °üÇØ ¾È´Ù°í »ý°¢ÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷À» ¹ÏÁö ¸øÇϰí
µµÁ¦»ìÀÌÇÔÀ¸·Î½á¸¸ Á¤Ä¡¸¦ ¹è¿ï ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ¹Ï´Â À̷а¡µµ
ÀÖ´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé Á¤Ä¡ÀÌ·ÐÀÇ °¡Ä¡´Â °æÇè¿¡¼ ³ª¿Â´Ù°í
¿©±â±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ ÇÕ¸®ÁÖÀÇÀÇ ÇÑ ÇüÅ·Πº»
¿µ±¹ÀÇ ¸¶ÀÌŬ ¿ÀÅ©¼îÆ®´Â ·ÎÅ©ÀÇ Á¤Ä¡Àû ÀÚÀ¯ ÀÌ·ÐÀ»
¿µ±¹ÀÎÀÇ ÀÚÀ¯¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀüÅëÀûÀÎ ÀÌÇØÀÇ ÇϳªÀÇ '¿ä¾à'À̶ó
º¸°í, À̰°Àº °³³äÀ» ±× ÀüÅë°ú ¿¬°üÁþÁö ¾ÊÀ¸¸é ÇÁ¶û½º
ÀαǼ±¾ð ¼ÓÀÇ ¿©·¯ ÀÚÀ¯°³³äó·³ ÇÕ¸®ÁÖÀÇÀû ¿ø¸®³ª
ÇüÀÌ»óÇÐÀû Ãß»óÀÌ µÈ´Ù°í Çß´Ù. ¹Ý¸é¿¡ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦
±Ø´ÜÀû ³¶¸¸ÁÖÀÇÀÇ »ê¹°·Î º» ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Á¤Ä¡ÇÐÀÚ ¿¡µå¿öµå
½Ç½º´Â ³¶¸¸ÁÖÀǰ¡ ÀÌ»óÀ» ¿¹ÂùÇϰí Çö½ÇÀûÀÎ °Í, ƯÈ÷
Ÿ»ê°ú ŸÇùÀ» °æ¸êÇÔÀ¸·Î½á À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû Á¤Ä¡¶ó´Â ÆÄµµ¿¡
ÈÛ¾µ¸®°Ô µÈ´Ù°í º¸¾Ò´Ù. ½Ã¹ÎÁ¤Ä¡´Â ŸÇù¡¤Ã¥·«¡¤ÀÚÁ¦¡¤½ÅÁßÇÔÀ»
¿ä±¸ÇϹǷΠ³¶¸¸ÁÖÀǿʹ ´Ù¸£¸ç, µû¶ó¼ ³¶¸¸ÁÖÀÇ Á¤½ÅÀº
ÀÚ¿¬½º·´°Ô À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû Á¤Ä¡·Î ÁúÁÖÇÑ´Ù°í °á·ÐÁö¾ú´Ù.
±¹Á¦°ü°èÀÇ ¸Æ¶ô
¼¼°èÀüÀï¿¡¼ÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â´Â 20¼¼±â ±¹Á¦°ü°è¸¦ µÚ¹Ù²Ù¾î³õÀº °ÍÀ¸·Î
Æò°¡µÈ´Ù. À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû °í·Á ¶§¹®¿¡ ÀüÀïÀÌ ÀϾ°í
µ¿¸ÍÀ» ¸Î°í Á¶¾àÀ» ü°áÇÏ´Â ÀÏÀÌ ¸¹¾Ò´Ù. °ø»êÁÖÀÇ Áø¿µÀº
ÀÚÀ¯ÁÖÀÇ Áø¿µ°ú ´ë°áÇϰí, Á¦3¼¼°èÀÇ ½Å»ý±¹°¡µéÀº
¹ÎÁ·ÁÖÀÇ¡¤¹Ý½Ä¹ÎÁÖÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¸¦ ¹è¾çÇÏ¿© Á¤Ã¼¼ºÀ»
È®¸³ÇÏ°í ±Ù´ëȸ¦ ÀÌ·èÇÏ·Á Çß´Ù. ±×·¯³ª À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â ÀüÀï,
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â ¿Ü±³°¡ ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ »õ·Î¿î Çö»óÀº ¾Æ´Ï´Ù. ÃʱâÀÇ
±¹Á¦°ü°è¿¡¼´Â ¾àÇß´ø À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ¿ä¼Ò°¡ Çö´ë¿¡ ¿Í¼
°¡Àå µÎµå·¯Áø ¿ä¼Ò°¡ µÇ¾ú´Ù´Â Á¡¸¸ »õ·Î¿ï »ÓÀÌ´Ù. ƯÈ÷
¼¼°è´ëÀü¿¡¼ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â°¡ ÇÑÃþ µ¸º¸ÀÎ °ÍÀº ¿¹Àü°ú´Â
´Þ¸® ÀϹݴëÁßÀÌ ÀüÀï°ú ÆòÈÀÇ ¹®Á¦¸¦ Á÷Á¢ °í·ÁÇÏ´Â
¿ªÇÒÀ» ¼öÇàÇÔ¿¡ µû¶ó À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû Àü¸ÁÀÌ Á¡Â÷ Áß¿äÇϰÔ
µÇ¾ú±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. °¡·É 1916³â ¿¬ÇÕ±¹ÀÌ ÀüÀïÀ» '¹ÎÁÖÁÖÀǸ¦
À§ÇØ ¼¼°è¸¦ º¸È£ÇÏ´Â' ÅõÀïÀ¸·Î »ý°¢ÇÏÀÚ°í Ã˱¸ÇÑ µ¥ ¹ÝÇØ
µ¶ÀÏÀº ¾ß¸¸¿¡ ´ëÇÑ '¹®È' ÅõÀïÀ¸·Î ¿©±âµµ·Ï ºÎÃß°å´Ù.
À̰°Àº ÀüÀïÀǵµ°¡ ÇØ´çÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä¸ñÇ¥¿´´ÂÁö´Â º°°³ÀÇ
¹®Á¦À̸ç, Áß¿äÇÑ °ÍÀº ÀüÀïÀ» Á¤´çÈÇÒ Çʿ伺ÀÌ Ä¿Áü¿¡
µû¶ó ÀÌ Á¤´çȰ¡ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ÇüŸ¦ ÃëÇß´Ù´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù.
³ÃÀü À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â
1950³â´ëÀÇ ³ÃÀüÀº ´ë±Ô¸ðÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ´ë°á·Î
ÀÌÇØÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. °ø»êÁÖÀÇ´Â ºÐ¸í À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÌÁö¸¸, ¼±¸ÀÇ
ºñ°ø»êÁÖÀdzª ¹Ý°ø»êÁÖÀǵµ ¼Ò±ØÀûÀ¸·Î´Â À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÌ´Ù.
±×·¯³ª ÇϳªÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ý´ë°¡ ¹Ýµå½Ã ´Ù¸¥
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±â¿¡ ¼ÓÇÔÀ» ÀǹÌÇÏÁö´Â ¾Ê´Â´Ù. ±¹Á¦ÀüÀï°ú
À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ¿¬°ü¼ºÀº Á¾·ù Â÷À̺¸´Ù´Â ¿ÀÈ÷·Á Á¤µµ
Â÷ÀÌ·Î ´õ Àß ³ªÅ¸³¾ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ÀüÀï°ú
ºñÀ̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ÀüÀï »çÀÌ¿¡ ºÐ¸íÇÑ °æ°è´Â ¾øÀ¸¸ç ¾î¶²
ÀüÀïÀÌ ´Ù¸¥ ÀüÀﺸ´Ù ´õ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀûÀÏ »ÓÀÌ´Ù. °ú°ÅÀÇ
Á¾±³ÀüÀïÀ» ¶°¿Ã·Áº¸¸é ¸í¹éÇÏ´Ù. Åõ¸£Å©¿¡ ´ëÇÑ
±×¸®½ºµµ±³ ½ÊÀÚ±º ¿øÁ¤, °¡Å縯°ú ÇÁ·ÎÅ×½ºÅºÆ® »çÀÌÀÇ
Á¾±³Àû °¥µîÀº ¿À´Ã³¯ÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû °¥µî°ú ¸Å¿ì Å«
°øÅ뼺À» °®´Â´Ù. ±×·¯³ª °ú°ÅÀÇ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀû ¿ä¼Ò´Â
ºÎÂ÷ÀûÀ̾ú´ø ¹Ý¸é Çö´ëÀÇ Æ¯Â¡Àº Á¾±³ÀüÀï°ú Á¤Ä¡ÀüÀï,
¿Ü±³¿¡¼ À̵¥¿Ã·Î±âÀÇ ¿ä¼Ò°¡ Áö¹èÀûÀÎ °ÍÀÌ µÇ¾ú´Ù´Â
Á¡ÀÌ´Ù.
M. Cranston ±Û
¡¡ |
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY. A useful introduction is
M. SELIGER, Ideology and Politics
(1976), which works from a broad definition of the concept of ideology. JOHN
PLAMENATZ, Ideology (1970), is a
clear and uncomplicated study by a distinguished Oxford philosopher. JEAN
BAECHLER, Qu'est-ce que l'idéologie?
(1976), is characteristically French in its approach and affords an
equally lucid introduction to both the sociological and the historical aspects
of the problem. Other books written at a fairly popular level include PATRICK
CORBETT, Ideologies (1966); ROY C.
MACRIDIS, Contemporary Political
Ideologies: Movements and Regimes, 5th ed. (1992); and LEON P. BARADAT, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact, 5th ed. (1993).
Few of the works of the original
French idéologues are
available in modern editions and even fewer in English translations. However,
RICHARD H. COX (ed.), Ideology,
Politics, and Political Theory (1969), contains short translated excerpts
from Destutt de Tracy and his contemporaries as well as from more recent
works. A.L.C. DESTUTT DE TRACY, A
Treatise on Political Economy, trans. from French, rev. by THOMAS
JEFFERSON (1817, reprinted 1973), is his major work in the field; and the
expository study by FRANÇOIS JOSEPH PICAVET, Les
Idéologues (1891, reprinted 1975), remains a classic. The life of
Destutt de Tracy and his role in the origins of ideology are traced in EMMET
KENNEDY, A Philosophe in the Age of
Revolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of "Ideology" (1978).
GEORGE LICHTHEIM, The Concept of Ideology (1967), contains a short but well-informed
and sympathetic analysis of ideology as it figures in Hegelian and Marxist
thought. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Politics and
History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx, trans. from French (1972,
reissued as both Politics and History:
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Marx and Montesquieu,
Rousseau, Marx: Politics and History, 1982), traces the relationship
between Hegelian and Marxist thought. G.W.F. HEGEL, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1857, reissued 1956;
originally published in German, 3rd ed., 1848), shows relevant elements in his
philosophy. Valuable commentaries are provided by ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, Introduction
to the Reading of Hegel (1969, reissued 1980; originally published in
French, 1947); CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel
(1975); and JEAN HYPPOLITE, Studies on
Marx and Hegel (1969, reissued 1973; originally published in French,
1955). For Marxist philosophy, KARL MARX and FRIEDRICH ENGELS, The
German Ideology, rev. ed., 2 vol. in 1 (1976; originally published in
German, 1932), is the fundamental text. Recent treatments of ideology in the
Marxist tradition include ALVIN W. GOULDNER, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976, reissued 1982);
JORGE LARRAIN, The Concept of Ideology
(1979, reprinted 1992), and Marxism and
Ideology (1983, reprinted 1991); COLIN SUMNER, Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology
and Law (1979); and JOE McCARNEY, The Real World of Ideology (1980). More advanced students will find
useful WALTER CARLSNAES, The Concept of
Ideology and Political Analysis (1981).
Writers who have attempted to
formulate a neo-Marxist theory of ideology, drawing in part on Hegelian
philosophy, include HERBERT MARCUSE, One
Dimensional Man (1964, reissued
1991); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Toward a
Rational Society (1971); and KARL MANNHEIM, Ideology
and Utopia, new ed. (1991; originally published in German, 1929). Also
worthy of attention are LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Essays
on Ideology (1984); and RAYMOND BOUDON, The
Analysis of Ideology (1989; originally published in French, 1986).
Interpretations of ideology that are
directly opposed to Marxist theory include JAMES R. FLYNN, Humanism and Ideology (1973); LEWIS S. FEUER, Ideology and the Ideologists (1975); MARTIN SELIGER, The
Marxist Conception of Ideology (1977); and D.J. MANNING (ed.), The
Form of Ideology (1980). JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, Critique
of Dialectical Reason (1976; originally published in French, 1960),
constructs a theory of ideology as a "marginal system of ideas" that
is consciously designed as an alternative to Marxist theory.
Historical studies that take a
relatively extensive view of the impact of ideology as a revolutionary force
in the modern world are JAMES H. BILLINGTON, Fire
in the Minds of Men (1980); MELVIN J. LASKY, Utopia and Revolution (1976); and JEANNE HERSCH, Idéologies
et réalité (1956). HANS KOHN, Political
Ideologies of the Twentieth Century, 3rd ed. rev. (1966); ISAAC KRAMNICK
and FREDERICK M. WATKINS, The Age of
Ideology: Political Thought, 1750 to the Present, 2nd ed. (1979); and
TRYGVE R. THOLFSEN, Ideology and
Revolution in Modern Europe: An Essay on the Role of Ideas in History (1984),
treat ideology as the dominant characteristic of modern political thinking.
More polemical commentaries on the development of ideology include ALBERT
CAMUS, The Rebel (1953, reissued
1991; originally published in French, 1951); JEAN FRANÇOIS REVEL, Pourquoi
des philosophes? (1957, reissued 1976); and KARL POPPER, The
Poverty of Historicism (1957, reissued 1986). A systematic critique of the
whole notion of ideological politics may be found in MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, On
Human Conduct (1975, reissued 1991), On
History and Other Essays (1983), and Rationalism
in Politics, new and expanded ed. (1991).
RAYMOND ARON, The Opium of the Intellectuals (1957, reprinted 1985; originally
published in French, 1955), points to a decline in ideological politics in the
West; as does DANIEL BELL, The End of
Ideology, rev. ed. (1962, reissued 1988). Less confident views are
advanced in DAVID E. APTER (ed.), Ideology
and Discontent (1964); and SIDNEY HOOK, Pragmatism
and the Tragic Sense of Life (1975). An excellent compilation of the
contrasting positions in the "End of Ideology" debate is CHAIM I.
WAXMAN (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate
(1968). FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, The End of
History and the Last Man (1992), asserts that all ideological alternatives
to liberal democracy have been discredited.
Sociological aspects of ideology are
explored in DONALD G. MacRAE, Ideology
and Society (1961); NORMAN BIRNBAUM, The
Sociological Study of Ideology (1940-1960) (1962); ERIC CARLTON, Ideology
and Social Order (1977); FRANÇOIS BOURRICAUD, Le
Bricolage idéologique (1980); and GRAHAM C. KINLOCH, Ideology and Contemporary Sociological Theory (1981).
The relationship between ideology and
political domination is examined in QUINTIN HOARE and GEOFFREY NOWELL SMITH
(eds. and trans.), Selections from the
Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1971, reissued 1987). ARNE NAESS, Democracy,
Ideology, and Objectivity (1956), written from the perspective of
political philosophy, was the first of a series of works that investigate the
relationship between ideology and liberty. Others worthy of mention are Z.A.
JORDAN, Philosophy and Ideology (1963); JUDITH N. SHKLAR (ed.), Political
Theory and Ideology (1966); DANTE GERMINO, Beyond
Ideology (1967, reprinted 1976); and MAURICE CRANSTON and PETER MAIR
(eds.), Ideology and Politics
(1980). KENNETH MINOGUE, Alien Powers:
The Pure Theory of Ideology (1985), uses both a philosophical and a
historical approach to provide a far-reaching survey of the subject. Among
books that stay close to the main tradition of American political science, the
following are notable: ROBERT E. LANE, Political
Ideology (1962); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, Political
Science & Ideology (1967); and ROBERT A. DAHL, After the Revolution?, rev. ed. (1990). ANDREW GYORGY and GEORGE D.
BLACKWOOD, Ideologies in World Affairs
(1967), analyzes the emergence of ideology as a decisive factor in
international relations. Students interested in such modern ideologies as
environmentalism and animal rights should consult IAN ADAMS, Political
Ideology Today (1993). (M.C./Ed.)
¡¡
|
|