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Philosophy 

철학 - 지혜의 탐구

Communism

공산주의

 

1 Introduction

The word communism, a term of ancient origin, originally meant a system of society in which property was owned by the community and all citizens shared in the enjoyment of the common wealth, more or less according to their need. Many small communist communities have existed at one time or another, most of them on a religious basis, generally under the inspiration of a literal interpretation of Scripture. The "utopian" socialists of the 19th century also founded communities, though they replaced the religious emphasis with a rational and philanthropic idealism. Best known among them were Robert Owen, who founded New Harmony in Indiana (1825), and Charles Fourier, whose disciples organized other settlements in the United States such as Brook Farm (1841-47). In 1848 the word communism acquired a new meaning when it was used as identical with socialism by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their famous Communist Manifesto. They, and later their followers, used the term to mean a late stage of socialism in which goods would become so abundant that they would be distributed on the basis of need rather than of endeavour. The Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which took power in Russia in 1917, adopted the name All-Russian Communist Party in 1918, and some of its allied parties in other countries also adopted the term Communist. Consequently, the former Soviet Union and other states that were governed by Soviet-type parties were commonly referred to as "Communist" and their official doctrines were called "Communism," although in none of these countries had a communist society fully been established. The word communism is also applied to the doctrines of Communist parties operating within states where they are not in power. (For the ideological basis of Communism, see MARXISM, MARX AND.)

 

2 THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

Communism as it had evolved by 1917 was an amalgam of 19th-century European Marxism, indigenous Russian revolutionary tradition, and the organizational and revolutionary ideas of the Bolshevik leader Lenin. Marxism held that history was propelled by class struggles. Social classes were determined by their relationship to the means of production; feudal society, with its lords and vassals, had been succeeded in western Europe by bourgeois society with its capitalists and workers. But bourgeois society, according to Marxism, contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction: the number of capitalists would diminish, while the ranks of the impoverished proletariat would grow until finally there would be a breakdown and a Socialist revolution in which the overwhelming majority, the proletariat, would dispossess the small minority of capitalist exploiters. (see also  Leninism)

Marxism had been known and studied in Russia for at least 30 years before Lenin took it up at the end of the 19th century. The first intellectual leader of the Russian Marxists was G.V. Plekhanov. Implicit in the teachings of Plekhanov was an acceptance of the fact that Russia had a long way to go before it would reach the stage at which a proletarian revolution could occur, and a preliminary stage would inevitably be a bourgeois democratic regime that would replace the autocratic system of Tsarism.

Plekhanov, like most of the early Russian Marxist leaders, had been reared in the traditional Russian revolutionary movement broadly known as Populism, a basic tenet of which was that the social revolution must be the work of the people themselves, and the task of the revolutionaries was only to prepare them for it. But there were more impatient elements within the movement, and it was under their influence that a group called "People's Will" broke off from the Populist organization "Land and Freedom" in 1879. Both groups were characterized by strict discipline and highly conspiratorial organization; "People's Will," however, refused to share the Populist aversion to political action, and in 1881 some of its members succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II.

 

2.1 Lenin and Russian Populism.

During the period of reaction and repression that followed, revolutionary activity virtually came to an end. By the time Lenin emerged into revolutionary life in Kazan at the age of 17, small revolutionary circles were beginning to form again. Lenin was a revolutionary in the Russian tradition for some time before he was converted to Marxism (through the study of the works of Marx) before he was yet 19. From the doctrines of the Populists, notably P.N. Tkachev, he drew the idea of a strictly disciplined, conspiratorial organization of full-time revolutionaries who would work among important sections of the population to win support for the seizure of power when the moment was ripe; this revolutionary organization would take over the state and use it to introduce Socialism. Lenin added two Marxist elements that were totally absent in Populist theory: the notion of the class struggle and the acceptance of the need for Russia to pass through a stage of capitalism.

Lenin's most distinctive contributions to Communist theory as formulated in What Is To Be Done? (1902) and the articles that preceded it were, first, that the workers have no revolutionary consciousness and that their spontaneous actions will lead only to "trade union" demands and not to revolution; second, the corollary that revolutionary consciousness must be brought to them from outside by their intellectual leaders; and third, the conviction that the party must consist of full-time, disciplined, centrally directed professionals, capable of acting as one man.

Lenin's tactics led in 1903 to a split in the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. With his left-wing faction, called the Bolsheviks, he strove to build a disciplined party and to outwit and discredit his Social-Democratic opponents. After the collapse of tsarism in February 1917, he pursued a policy of radical opposition to the Socialists and Liberals who had come to power in the provisional government, and he eventually succeeded in seizing power in October 1917. Thereafter he eliminated both the opposition of other parties and his critics among the Bolsheviks, so that by the 10th party congress in March 1921 the Bolsheviks (or Communists) had become a monolithic, disciplined party controlling all aspects of Russian life. It was this machine that Stalin inherited when he became general secretary of the party in 1922. (see also  social democracy)

 

3 THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia gave a new impetus to the more extreme left wings of the Socialist parties in Europe. Lenin's relations with the European Socialist parties had been hostile even before World War I. During the war he had endeavoured to assert his influence over the dissident left wings of the Socialist parties of the belligerent powers, and at two conferences in Switzerland, in 1915 and in 1916, he had rallied these dissident groups to a policy of radical opposition to the war efforts of their governments and to an effort to turn the war into a civil war. He had already decided by 1914 that, after the war, a Third International must be formed to take the place of the Second International of Socialist parties, which had failed to oppose the war despite its strong antiwar tradition. By 1919, when the new Soviet regime in Russia was fighting for its survival, the intervention on the anti-Soviet side by Britain, France, and the U.S. was a powerful and practical argument to be used by Soviet Russia in its appeals for revolution in capitalist countries. It early became clear the Third International would reflect the influence of Soviet Russia and that it was likely to become subordinate to Soviet aims and needs.

 

3.1 Lenin's 21 conditions.

The Third International, or Comintern, had its first congress in 1919. This gathering of a very few parties in Moscow was more symbolic than real; the main structure of the new International was not hammered out until the second congress in July 1920, also in Moscow. Hopes of world revolution ran high; the prestige of the new Soviet state was in the ascendant, and the resolutions adopted at this congress reflected in the fullest possible way Lenin's idea of what a Communist party should be. It was to be the "main instrument for the liberation of the working class," highly centralized and disciplined according to the formula of "democratic centralism" on which the Bolshevik Party had been founded. Twenty-one conditions were laid down by the congress as prerequisites for parties affiliating with the Comintern. These conditions were designed to ensure a complete break with the older Social Democratic parties from which the Communist parties were splitting off. The new parties were required to adopt the name Communist in their title, to urge open and persistent warfare against reformist Social Democracy and the Second International, to maintain a centralized and disciplined party press, to conduct periodic purges of their ranks, and to carry on continuous and systematic propaganda in the army and among the workers and peasants. Each constituent party was to support in every possible way the struggle of "every Soviet republic" against counterrevolution. Decisions of the Comintern and of its executive committee were to be binding on all members, and the breach of any of these conditions was to be ground for expelling individual members from their parties--a provision that in future years was to be interpreted very broadly. (see also  political party)

 

3.2 The New Economic Policy.

The prestige of Soviet Russia, the rigid discipline imposed by the 21 conditions, and certain other factors ensured the predominance of Russian control and Russian interests over the Comintern. Though the predominance increased during Stalin's time, it was clearly evident while Lenin was still alive. At the third world congress in June and July 1921, the Comintern was confronted by Lenin with his New Economic Policy--a program encouraging small private enterprise, which several months earlier he had put into effect inside Russia. Lenin wanted a temporary halt to the revolutionary upsurge in Europe to give him time to develop stable trade relations with capitalist countries, to whom the Soviet state was preparing to grant trading and industrial concessions. Comintern members were required to support this policy, and the expulsion of the German Communist leader Paul Levi after the failure of a Communist uprising in Germany in March 1921 showed how determined the leaders of the Comintern were to put down inconvenient left-wing "adventures." It was with the requirements of the New Economic Policy in mind that the Comintern executive committee in December 1921 launched the turnaround policy of the United Front and of trade union unity. This policy of rapprochement with Socialists and liberals was likewise designed to gain support for Lenin's policy of consolidation at home by appealing to a broader spectrum of opinion in the capitalist countries.

 

4 STALINISM

 

4.1 Socialism in one country.

Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, always claimed to be his faithful follower, and this was to some extent true. Stalin's doctrine that Socialism could be constructed in one country, the Soviet Union, without waiting for revolution to occur in the main capitalist countries (a position he had developed as an integral part of his struggle against Trotsky) was not far removed from the line pursued by Lenin in 1921 when he introduced the New Economic Policy. Both Lenin and Stalin accepted the primary importance of the survival and strengthening of the Soviet state as the main bastion of the future world revolution; both accepted the need for a period of coexistence and trade with the capitalist countries as a means of strengthening socialism in Soviet Russia. Nor did Stalin's later policy of industrialization and collectivization, in theory at least, represent a departure from Lenin's doctrine. Industrialization was central to Lenin's plans, though he did not live to put them into practice. Stalin's view, however, that the construction of socialism led inevitably to an intensification of the class struggle, which in turn required a policy of internal repression and terror, is nowhere to be found in Lenin's writings. On the contrary, Lenin repeatedly emphasized in 1922 and 1923 the necessity of bringing about a reconciliation of the classes and especially of the peasants and workers.

Stalin's internal policy was to have wide repercussions in the Comintern and on Communism generally. From 1924 until 1928 his first concern was to defeat his main rival, Trotsky, and this seems to have been one of the main factors determining his policy at this time. As against the more internationalist and doctrinaire Trotsky, Stalin pursued "socialism in one country" and continued to implement Lenin's New Economic Policy with its limited freedom for business enterprise and peasant individualism. In this he could still claim to be following Lenin's wishes. But Stalin also worked with great skill to ensure his control over the party. By 1927 when Trotsky was expelled from the party, Stalin already controlled both the network of party officials (the apparat) and the delegates to congresses and conferences. Debate had been replaced by ritualized unanimity; dissent was permitted only when it served the purposes of the leadership.

When Trotsky was exiled from the country in 1929, he became the focal point for opposition to Stalin among dissident Communists all over the world, although he was to be more a symbol than an active political force. Having defeated Trotsky and his allies, Stalin next switched policies, abandoning the New Economic Policy in favour of rapid industrialization along with the collectivization of agriculture. The collectivization policy ultimately produced a famine, costing the lives of millions of peasants. The reversal of the New Economic Policy and of Lenin's policy necessarily involved eliminating from the political scene Stalin's former allies, headed by Nikolay Bukharin, who wanted to go slower with industrialization and to cultivate support among the peasants. The protracted conflict, first with Trotsky and his ally G.Y. Zinovyev and then with Bukharin, was reflected in the Comintern and in the world Communist movement, which became increasingly subordinated to Stalin's policy concerns inside the Soviet Union.

 

4.2 Stalin and the Comintern.

The regimentation of the Comintern and of the parties represented in it began at the fifth world congress in June 1924, immediately after Lenin's death. The elimination of Trotsky and his supporters within the Soviet party was followed by widespread expulsions of the "left" from the other world parties. The control of the Soviet-dominated Comintern apparatus was increasingly asserted over the tightly disciplined governing bodies of the foreign parties, which in turn ruled over their members with the instrument of the purge. Ideologically, this procedure was carried out at first under the screen of the United Front, which called for cooperation with Social Democrats and other moderate leftists. At the sixth world congress in 1928, however, a further switch in policy was dictated by Stalin's internal conflict: the United Front tactic was abandoned, and the Social Democrats now became enemies along with Fascists. The sixth congress also declared the main duty of the international working-class movement to be the support of the U.S.S.R. by every means. The united front tactic was revived in 1935 at the seventh (and last) world congress of the Comintern under the name of the Popular Front, calling for united action by Communists and Socialists together against Fascism.

Comintern policy changed again in August 1939 when the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a 10-year treaty of nonaggression. This had the effect of freeing Hitler to fight a war against Britain and France. Anti-Fascism was now jettisoned, and the Communist parties were required, up to the moment when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, to denounce the allied war against Hitler and to recognize Nazism as "the lesser evil" in comparison with Western imperialism. The Soviet alliance with Germany is usually seen as proof that Stalin was primarily concerned with what he considered to be the interests of the Soviet Union. A secret protocol annexed to the treaty assigned the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), about half of Poland, and Bessarabia to the Soviet sphere of influence. The evidence suggests that Stalin considered the deal with Hitler to be based on mutual interests; the German invasion in 1941 took him by surprise. After the defeat of Hitler, Soviet territorial demands were again advanced. (see also  German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact)

 

4.3 Stalin's method of rule.

The Communist parties of the world were also called on to adopt official Soviet justifications for Stalin's internal purges, which involved the extermination of a large proportion of the Soviet party membership, including most of the leading cadres. The subservience of some Communist parties to official assertions made by the Soviet authorities sometimes earned them the reputation of being little more than agents of the Soviet Union inside their own countries, though this did not necessarily diminish their influence or importance in several countries of Europe or in the United States. They found much support among sympathizers with Marxism, who were prepared to overlook Soviet realities in the service of their ideals or of what they considered to be the historical destiny of mankind--in which they saw Stalinism as merely a transitory stage. The Communists and their parties and their contacts provided a valuable recruiting ground for intelligence agents of all kinds prepared to act against their own countries in the interests of Soviet Russia. The effects of Stalin's internal policy on the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union are of vital importance in understanding the attitude adopted by these parties after 1956, when much of Stalin's policy was officially repudiated. (see also  purge trials)

Stalin's method of rule came, by imitation, to be the standard in all other parties. It hinged primarily upon the dominance of his own personality. He ruled over the country in large measure not through the party, as Lenin had, but through personal agents (like Lavrenty Beria, Andrey Vyshinsky, or Georgy Malenkov) and also through the security police (NKVD). The party as an institution declined under Stalin, and between 1934 and 1952 there was only one party congress, in 1939. The general secretaries of the Communist parties abroad imitated Stalin, and strict hierarchical subordination became the way of party life.

 

5 GROWTH OF COMMUNISM DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II

The undeclared assault by Hitler on the Soviet Union provoked a wave of sympathy for that country among both the open and secret enemies of Hitler in Europe. The Soviet pact with Hitler, and even the manifest blemishes of Stalin's regime, were forgotten: sympathy with the newly emerged force of resistance to the Nazi scourge far outweighed past memories. Many, it is true, expected the immediate defeat of the Soviet Union. As time went on, however, and the Soviet struggle continued with enormous sacrifice of life and with courage and skill that none could help but applaud, admiration for Soviet military achievements grew even among those who had been most critical and apprehensive of the Soviet political role before the war. The Communists of other countries shared in the prestige won by Soviet military prowess. This was particularly the case in occupied France and Italy where the underground Communist parties played a vital role in the resistance movements. In Yugoslavia, too, the Communist partisan movement led by Tito (Josip Broz) outstripped the nationalist guerrillas in effectiveness and won the material support of Britain.

 

5.1 Russian nationalism.

The policy pursued by Stalin accentuated the nationalist side of the war and attempted in every way to play down the Communist element. At home, tsarist history and the rituals of the Eastern Orthodox Church were invoked in efforts to raise patriotic sentiments to the highest possible pitch. Abroad, Communist aims and ideals were replaced by anti-Nazi, liberal-democratic slogans. The dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was in line with this policy. It had long ceased to be necessary as an instrument of Soviet control over the foreign Communist parties, which was carried on through other channels; but the publicizing of its dissolution added force to the growing persuasion abroad that the Soviet Union had left its revolutionary past behind it and was now a great power with traditional nationalist and security aims. Stalin himself emphasized that the dissolution of the Comintern would "put an end to the lies spread by Hitler that the Soviet Union wished to Bolshevize other countries" and that Communist parties "followed foreign directives." Still another factor promoting the influence of Communism during World War II was the enhanced prestige of Stalin himself and the extent to which his personality influenced the allied leaders Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

 

5.2 Stalin and eastern Europe.

His growing military and political prestige in turn influenced Stalin's policy towards his allies and determined the future course of Communism after victory was won in 1945. Two main lines of Soviet policy can be discerned in the wartime conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and elsewhere: first, a determination by the Soviet Union that friendly political regimes should be established in the countries on Russia's borders, and second, that the Soviet Union's hard-won status as a great power should be fully recognized in the postwar settlements. These demands were not in themselves unreasonable, considering the enormous price that the Soviet people had paid for victory. In pursuing the creation of a solid Soviet-dominated bloc of Communist states in east-central Europe, Stalin was able to take advantage of the presence of a victorious Soviet army in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and East Germany. The cases of Yugoslavia and Albania were different, but the regimes that emerged in all these countries were broadly similar forms of Communist party domination based on the Soviet model, even though the ways in which the Communists achieved power varied.

Broadly speaking, three phases could be distinguished. In the first phase there was a genuine coalition of Communist and Socialist parties. This lasted until the spring of 1945 in Romania and Bulgaria, until the spring of 1947 in Hungary, and until February 1948 in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland, and East Germany never knew this phase: the former two started as "monolithic," while the latter two began their postwar history in the second phase, an alleged coalition in which the Socialist parties were nominally independent and had some share in power but in which their leaders and policies were largely determined by the Communists. In the third phase, the "monolithic" phase, the nominally independent Socialist parties were required to fuse with the Communists, political opposition was largely suppressed, and Socialist leaders went into exile or were dealt with by staged treason trials. In Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania the third phase began in the autumn of 1947; in Hungary, in the spring of 1948. In East Germany the third phase was complete by 1949.

In his policy toward the countries which were destined to form the Soviet bloc, Stalin was aided in part by the inability or unwillingness of the Western allied powers to take steps during the first or second phases described above to prevent the beginning of the third phase and in part by the skillful infiltration of local Communists into key positions. The peasant and Socialist parties, which had substantial support in their countries, were attacked in various ways and demolished as independent political bodies.

Yugoslavia was an exception. There the Communists under the leadership of Tito enjoyed a considerable measure of mass support because of their wartime role as partisan fighters. The People's Democracy they instituted in Yugoslavia was for some years little different in character from that of other Communist-party-dominated states of eastern Europe. An attempt to set up a People's Democracy in Greece failed after three years of civil war, in which the Greek Communists were supported by Yugoslav aid.

In the countries of Europe outside the Soviet bloc, Communist parties proved unable to exploit the prestige that they had acquired during the war. Both in France and in Italy they enjoyed considerable support: in the parliamentary election of 1945 in France the Communists received 26 percent of the vote, and in the general elections to the Constituent Assembly in Italy in June 1946 they received 19 percent. Both parties, however, failed to achieve real national power in the postwar period; their role was confined to fomenting strikes and disorder in the interests of Soviet policy. The detailed story of the Italian and French Communist parties during the period 1945 to 1949 is complex, but, broadly speaking, their attempts at insurrection foundered against the facts of the power of the army and the police and a lack of revolutionary zeal among their worker supporters. On the other hand, their attempts to win power by parliamentary means were frustrated by the distrust that the Socialists felt for them as colleagues in Parliament or in government and by their own evident lack of interest in a viable parliamentary system. (see also  Democratic Party of the Left)

 

5.3 Communism's growth in Asia.

Powerful Communist parties emerged after the war in various parts of Asia, in many cases largely as a result of the resistance of the Western powers to growing nationalist movements. Communist-led insurrections, allegedly coordinated by Moscow, broke out in the summer of 1948 in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. In Indochina, after the surrender of Japan, the Communists under Ho Chi Minh seized power in the three northern provinces of the country. French colonial policy helped drive the nationalists into the arms of Ho Chi Minh, and by the end of 1946 a guerrilla war had broken out in the country that was to last for nearly three decades before the Communist victory of 1975. In Japan democratic legislation imposed by the United States after its victory permitted the Communists to operate legally. In the succeeding few years they made little progress toward governmental power but won considerable gains in the trade unions and an important measure of influence among university students. In India the Communist Party supported the British war effort after June 1941 and gained ground as a result; it switched to violent insurrection after Indian independence but abandoned this policy in 1950. (see also  Vietnam)

The most significant factor in the postwar history of Communism in Asia may have been the victory in 1949 of the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. China, rather than the Soviet Union, seemed destined to play the leading role in Asian Communism. The victory of the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, like that of Tito's forces in Yugoslavia, owed little if anything to Soviet aid--save that the Russians had handed over to the Chinese Communists the military stores captured from the Japanese during the very short period when the U.S.S.R. was at war with Japan in 1945. Although the Chinese Communist Party had developed under the aegis of the Comintern and acknowledged the doctrinal authority of Lenin and Stalin, its experience had been very different. Its victory had been preceded by long guerrilla warfare. Mao's rise to power had, moreover, been achieved by ignoring Soviet advice as much as by following it. Stalin showed quite clearly from the outset that he intended to keep China in a position of subordination not unlike that which he had successfully marked out for most of eastern Europe--a status the Chinese Communist leaders were not likely to accept. Culturally, economically, and geographically, China was in a strong position to become the model for Communist revolution in Asia and to wrest the leadership of Asian Communism from the Soviet Union. These and other factors were to produce signs of a possible breach between China and the U.S.S.R. within less than 10 years of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949.

 

6 THE WORLD MOVEMENT UP TO STALIN'S DEATH

The wartime alliance had given rise to some hopes that Soviet-Western amity would continue. Stalin's relentless pursuit of security through the domination of neighbouring countries shattered this hope. At home Stalin returned to his prewar tactics: widespread arrests and deportations occurred in the newly incorporated or reincorporated territories of the Soviet Union; the restriction of cultural life was intensified; the straitjacket was reimposed on the party, on the peasants, and on the industrial workers. There is some evidence to suggest that at the time of his death in March 1953 Stalin was planning a new purge on the scale of the 1936-38 purges. (see also  Cold War)

 

6.1 The struggle with the West.

Soviet expansion into eastern Europe led to counteractions by the Western powers that Moscow interpreted as part of a master plan to encircle and subjugate the Soviet Union. These included the Truman Doctrine of containment of Soviet expansion proclaimed in March 1947; the offer in June of that year by United States Secretary of State George Marshall to underwrite the economic recovery of Europe; and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, which established a permanent defense force for western Europe, including in its orbit West Germany. Another factor that affected Soviet policy was the monopoly of the atomic bomb enjoyed by the United States from 1945 until 1949. The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan put forward by the U.S. for the international control of atomic weapons and made every effort to produce its own, succeeding in September 1949. The "Cold War" was on. (see also  Marshall Plan)

 

6.2 The defection of Yugoslavia.

In September of 1947 a new international organization, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), was established. Unlike the old Third International (Comintern), the Cominform was limited in membership to the Communist parties of the Soviet-dominated countries of east-central Europe and to the French and Italian Communist parties. The aim of the Cominform was to consolidate and expand Communist rule in Europe. Plans for the establishment of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia were discussed, and the French and Italian parties were reproved for their failure to win power in their own countries.

The Cominform did not prove a success. Certainly one of its purposes was to hold Yugoslavia more securely within the Communist fold, and for this reason Belgrade was chosen as the seat of the new organization. But within a few months a quarrel broke out between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties, and when the Cominform held its second meeting in June 1948, it was for the purpose of denouncing the Yugoslav Communist Party and expelling it from the organization. The quarrel with Yugoslavia resulted largely from Tito's refusal to submit to domination by the Soviet Union; there was also some suspicion on the Soviet side, possibly well founded, that the Yugoslav party leader hoped to build up a bloc of Communist states in southeastern Europe that would not be totally dependent on the Soviet Union.

The effect of the Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel, which has never completely healed, was momentous. First, it shattered the doctrine that the Communist movement must be monolithic, since a Communist party had challenged Moscow and survived. Second, Yugoslavia, having broken with the U.S.S.R., was in a position to assume a role of considerable influence in the world, especially toward states formed in formerly colonial territories. The Yugoslavs could speak as Communists who, while opposed to the policy of the imperialist powers, were no mere agents of Soviet policy. This position carried a particularly strong appeal in India, but the impact of the Soviet quarrel with Tito was much wider.

A third effect of the Yugoslav defection was a tightening of the Soviet hold over the remaining members of the Communist bloc. In Soviet-dominated lands "Titoism" became synonymous with treason, much as "Trotskyism" had been in the '30s. Purges and public trials ensued throughout eastern Europe. In some cases, like that of Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland (who was left alive), or Koci Xoxe in Albania, the charge of sympathy with Yugoslavia may have been true; in others, like those of László Rajk in Hungary or Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, the offense may have been only an attempt to resist Soviet domination; in the trial of Rudolf Slánský; in Czechoslovakia in 1952, a strong anti-Semitic element played a part. Countries of the Communist bloc were seething with anti-Soviet and nationalist feeling by the time Stalin died. Though Stalin's postwar policy was successful in extending the boundaries of Soviet military and political control well into eastern and central Europe, Communism did not win out in France or in Italy, where its chances had appeared strongest. The policy of expansionism and of intransigence founded on suspicion of the United States led to a kind of consolidation of the West against the Soviet Union. In the Far East the Korean War was probably not a success from the Communist point of view. Korea had been divided after the defeat of Japan: in the northern part a Communist government came to power in elections held in November 1946, and in the south a non-Communist government was established. Each claimed to be the legal government of the whole country. Invasion of the south by the north in June 1950 was condemned by the Security Council of the United Nations as aggression, and the Security Council approved military assistance to South Korea under a unified American command. (The absence of the Soviet representative from the Security Council prevented the U.S.S.R. from vetoing this resolution.) The long war, in which China intervened on the side of North Korea, brought heavy burdens and few, if any, advantages, and the conflict between the major powers that it involved led them in the fears of many to the verge of world war. In June 1951 the Soviet Union proposed discussions for an armistice, to which the Western powers agreed. The negotiations were protracted and did not result in an armistice until after Stalin's death in 1953.

 

7 THE BREAKUP OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MONOLITH

 

7.1 The Khrushchev era.

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. For a short time, until the beginning of 1955, power was nominally divided between Georgy Malenkov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party. Almost from the beginning, Khrushchev was the dominant of the two; his victory over his rival was only a matter of time. Malenkov, it would seem, decided quite early that the Soviet Union could not maintain its hold over the Eastern bloc without substantial economic relaxation. The difficulties that always beset the reform of an oppressive regime were soon illustrated in East Germany. Within a week of the announcement by East German leaders that "aberrations" of the past would be rectified and some of the hardships of life alleviated, there was an uprising in the streets of East Berlin; it spread to other parts of East Germany and was quelled only by the use of Soviet armed forces. The blame for this was laid on Lavrenty Beria (the Soviet security chief, shortly to be deposed and executed) and by implication on Malenkov. The new relaxed policy continued, however, in most of the Soviet-bloc countries. Economic reforms were initiated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but the system of political rule remained unchanged.

Khrushchev, who by the beginning of 1955 had ousted Malenkov, had a comprehensive vision of how the Eastern bloc should be run. He was determined to find a way out of the straitjacket in which Stalin had confined Soviet life; the outcome was to have momentous consequences for Soviet dependencies abroad, which Khrushchev probably did not at the time foresee. His policy toward the Communist satellite countries may be summarized as one of cooperative integration instead of exploitation, with some degree of economic and political autonomy (under Communist Party leadership). A political and military convention between the European Communist states and the U.S.S.R. (the Warsaw Pact) was signed in May 1955. Khrushchev also sought to redesign the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Communist counterpart of western Europe's Common Market, which Stalin had set up in January 1949: he tried (though with indifferent success) to transform the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance into a device for promoting the division of labour, economic specialization, and technical and financial cooperation among the countries of the bloc.

 

7.2 The crises of 1956.

In order to demonstrate that Stalin's policy was a thing of the past, Khrushchev made substantial efforts to effect a reconciliation with Tito and the Yugoslav Communists (against the opposition of some of his colleagues, including Vyacheslav Molotov). An agreement with Yugoslavia in June 1956 recognized that "the conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries" and stated that no Socialist country should impose its views on another. This was a momentous change in policy, since it meant that a country could be described as "Socialist" without being obliged to follow all the practices adopted by the Soviet Union or every Soviet turn in foreign relations.

The reconciliation with Yugoslavia was only one of several important events that made the year 1956 a watershed in the history of Communism. In February, at the 20th congress of the Communist Party, Khrushchev delivered a speech in secret session in which he attacked the period of Stalin's rule in most forthright terms. The speech was not published within the Soviet Union, but its text was widely circulated among Communists both within and outside the Soviet Union and was published by the U.S. State Department. Its effect was enormous. Although the disclosures were neither complete nor entirely new, the fact that Khrushchev had uttered them caused a ferment in the Communist movement that was to prove irreversible. It inaugurated a period of freedom of debate and criticism that had been unknown for a quarter of a century; despite efforts both by Khrushchev and by his successors to keep criticism of the "cult of personality" (the accepted euphemism for Stalin's misdeeds) within bounds, the ferment could not be contained. (see also  secret speech, de-Stalinization)

 

7.2.1 The Hungarian Revolution.

In the European Communist countries, Khrushchev's disclosures opened the floodgates of pent-up criticism and resentment against the local Stalin-type leaders. In Hungary, Mátyás Rákosi was ousted as party leader in July 1956 and replaced by Erno Gero. But Gero was unable to contain the rising tide of unrest and discontent, which broke out into active fighting late in October, and appealed for Soviet help. The first phase of the Hungarian Revolution ended in victory for the rebels: Imre Nagy became premier and agreed, in response to popular demands, to establish a multiparty system; on November 1 he declared Hungarian neutrality and appealed to the United Nations. On November 4 the Soviet Union, profiting from the lack of response to Nagy from the Western powers, and from the British and French involvement in action against Egypt, invaded Hungary in force and stopped the revolution. In Poland, where the ferment was also reaching dangerous intensity, the Soviet Union accepted a new party leadership headed by the more moderate Wladyslaw Gomulka. There are believed to have been two reasons for this difference in Soviet policy. One was that in Poland the Communist Party remained in control of the situation. The other was that the invasion and subjugation of Poland would have required a military force several times that required in Hungary.

 

7.2.2 Polycentrism.

Inside the Communist states, the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution had a restraining effect. There was, nevertheless, no return to the Stalinist type of domination and exploitation; a slow evolution followed toward a degree of internal autonomy, even in Hungary. The events of 1956 also had profound effects upon Communists outside the Soviet bloc. There were many resignations after the Hungarian Revolution, and those who remained in the fold began to question both Soviet leadership and the nature of a system that had made the ascendancy of Stalin possible. The most trenchant questioning came from the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, who concluded that the Soviet pattern could no longer be the model for all other countries and called in June 1956 for decentralization of the Communist movement, a view that became known as "polycentrism." "The whole system becomes polycentric, and . . . we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different." Although the Italian Communist Party, or segments of it, were still prepared to support the Soviet Union at times of crisis, at other times it took positions different from those of the Soviet Union.

 

7.3 The Sino-Soviet dispute.

A gathering of Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, in which China played a leading role, attempted to reassert a common doctrine while recognizing the need for differences in national practice. At Chinese insistence it also retained the Stalinist emphasis on the leadership of the Soviet Union. For a short time relations between the Soviet Union and China were harmonious: after 1955 Khrushchev had put an end to the humiliating terms that Stalin had imposed on China and inaugurated a policy of substantial economic aid.

The differences between China and the Soviet Union, which were to erupt into an open campaign of mutual abuse by 1962, were discernible to most observers by 1959, when the Soviet Union failed to give immediate political backing to Chinese military action against India and when China, at the same time, showed suspicion of Soviet talks with the United States in pursuit of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence." In 1960 the differences widened, though they were still unpublicized. The Soviet Union withdrew its technical advisers from China as a preliminary to what was to prove an almost complete severing of economic relations. A facade of agreement was maintained, and at a conference of Communist parties held in Moscow in 1960 a series of resolutions was put forth to show that unity prevailed as ever in the ranks of the world Communist movement. News of serious disagreements, however, soon leaked out, for the increasing number of dissident groups within the several parties had by now rendered the maintenance of secrecy impossible. In the following year, 1961, the Soviet Union began a public polemic against the Chinese viewpoint. This was disguised as an attack on Albania, since 1959 a client of China and increasingly critical of Khrushchev's foreign policy. By 1962 the quarrel had become open and very bitter. It was conducted as a dispute over doctrine, but the practical issue underlying it was a basic rivalry for leadership of the world revolutionary movement.

The Sino-Soviet dispute had three major effects on this movement. It shattered the pretension that Marxism-Leninism offered a single world view, since at least two radically different ways of interpreting Marxism-Leninism were presented to Communists throughout the world, each backed by a Communist party in power with the prestige of a victorious revolution behind it. Second, it seriously impaired, if it did not destroy, the Soviet claim to be the leader of the world revolutionary movement. Since 1960 nearly all Communist parties have split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese portions, though outside Asia the Soviet portion has usually retained predominance. In the important parts of Asia, with the possible exception of India, where the party is divided into several warring factions, China has become the predominant influence upon Communist parties. Third, the mere fact of the dispute tended to create greater flexibility for individual parties within the Communist movement as a whole, even in the case of parties that nominally accepted Soviet leadership. The Romanians, for example, were able to follow a nationalistic course by which they successfully resisted Soviet attempts to integrate the Romanian economy into the bloc pattern. The Romanians also took an independent line in their trade relations with other countries, in refusing to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in their policy toward Israel.

After the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, his successors made efforts to reunite the world movement. They were only moderately successful. Seventy-five parties met in Moscow in June 1969, but of 14 parties in power five did not attend, and Cuba sent only an observer; Asia and Africa, the main areas of Chinese influence, were very poorly represented. Little unity emerged from the conference; in particular, the efforts of the Soviet Union to secure condemnation of China were unsuccessful. The resolution finally adopted was couched in such general terms as scarcely to conceal that the cracks had been merely pasted over. In the course of the 1970s, the hold of the Soviet Communist party over Communist parties outside the bloc seemed for a time to become weaker, with several parties (notably of France, Spain, and Italy) asserting independence from Moscow and the right to criticize Soviet policy. This movement, nicknamed "Eurocommunism," had lost much of its force by the end of the decade, however.

 

8 PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL REFORM

A continuing problem in the history of Communist countries after the death of Stalin was the reform of their overcentralized political and economic structures. The only country that may be said to have achieved success was Yugoslavia, which had since 1948 asserted and maintained its independence from Soviet interference. After initially collectivizing much of its agriculture, Yugoslavia allowed the collective farms to dissolve. It also established Workers' Councils in the factories and publicized them in its foreign propaganda despite Soviet disapproval. The Yugoslav party program of 1958 contained three points in particular that were diametrically opposed to Soviet theory: that Socialism can be achieved without a revolution, that the Communist Party need not have a monopoly of leadership, and that danger of war arises from the existence of two power blocs in the world and not (as the Soviet Union contended) from the aggressive intentions of the United States. In January 1974, a new constitution was adopted that, apart from making changes in the representational system, provided for a collective presidency consisting of one member from each republic and autonomous province. Tito was elected president for life; after his death in 1980 this office rotated among the several members of the collective presidency.

 

8.1 Suppression of reform in Czechoslovakia.

The most dramatic failure of an attempt at reform was in Czechoslovakia. The resignation of the old Stalinist party leader Antonín Novotný and his replacement by Alexander Dubcek in January 1968 inaugurated a process of liberalization. The reformers hoped to humanize Communist rule by introducing basic civil freedoms, an independent judiciary, and other democratic institutions. The support of leading economists for this program was particularly significant since it indicated that they realized that the already accepted policy of economic decentralization (which included giving a measure of initiative to individual enterprises) would fail unless accompanied by political changes.

While the Czechoslovak Communists had repeatedly declared their intention to remain within the existing system, Moscow, possibly fearing that the developments they had set under way would ultimately endanger the stability of eastern Europe, endeavoured to induce the Czechoslovak party leaders to abandon their course. The Soviet effort failed, possibly because there were no Czechoslovak Communist leaders prepared, with Soviet help, to oust Dubcek. Finally a group of Warsaw Pact forces--predominantly Soviet, but with token contributions from the other Warsaw Pact members except Romania--invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20-21, 1968, effectively killing the momentum of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. A Soviet-controlled security service was installed, and the Dubcek leadership was gradually forced out of top posts and eventually expelled from the party. Although the repression was thorough, there was no mass terror.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia came as a greater shock to many Communists than the invasion of Hungary because it was directed against Communist leaders who strongly asserted their loyalty to Moscow. The motives that prompted Soviet action were probably two: one was the fear that the Soviet defense area created by Stalin after World War II might be endangered if the Dubcek regime were allowed to continue; the other was the fear that the entrenched and conservative Communist parties in other European Communist countries, and in the Soviet Union itself, might not be equal to the challenge posed by a reformed Communism in Czechoslovakia.

 

8.2 Khrushchev's reforms.

This concern that the power of the Communist party might be diminished may also have acted as a brake on internal reform. The reforms carried out by Khrushchev between 1953 and 1964 had been extensive. The arbitrary powers of the security police were brought under control; there were widespread reviews and rehabilitations (often posthumously) of the sentences of those sent to labour camps under Stalin; and reforms (in 1958) removed the worst anomalies of Soviet criminal law and procedure. The stringent controls over the lives of workers and farmers were relaxed. Discussion and debate were tolerated among writers and intellectuals to a degree that would have been inconceivable under Stalin. The whole system of agricultural management was considerably relaxed, and a system of incentives for the collective farmers was introduced. The limit of reform, as Khrushchev saw it, was the point at which any threat appeared to the party's control over all aspects of life. Under his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, the brake on reform was applied more heavily. Criticism of Stalin decreased. Freedom of opinion was considerably restricted by the introduction of penal provisions against "slandering" the Soviet system: for the first time since Stalin's death, there were trials of writers, and the courts ceased to show any inclination to assert their independence as they had under Khrushchev. The numbers of political prisoners steadily increased, although the Brezhnev regime could not be compared to Stalin's. A movement toward economic reform had started under Khrushchev, aiming at some decentralization of economic control through greater freedom for enterprises to plan their own operations and through more influence for market forces. This was continued and officially encouraged after 1964 by Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin, but it made little headway and was abandoned. The period of the 1970s was one of economic stagnation and conservatism at home, coupled with expansion of military power abroad.

 

9 COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AFTER STALIN

 

9.1 The errors of "revisionism" and "dogmatism."

The most far-reaching innovation in Communist doctrine during the period 1953-70 was the Chinese interpretation of Marxism-Leninism known as Maoism. In the Soviet sphere several profound changes in doctrine took place after the death of Stalin. One change was the rise of ideological dispute for the first time since the early 1920s. The Yugoslav ideas were denounced as "revisionism," a term that harked back to the turn of the century when it had been used to characterize the views of Eduard Bernstein, who had argued that Socialism could be achieved without a revolution. After 1957 the terms "revisionism" and "dogmatism" became an integral part of Communist discourse. They were applied in a variety of meanings. By the Chinese, "revisionism" was used to mean, in effect, Khrushchevism--i.e., the policies that Khrushchev had introduced in both domestic and international relations and that the Chinese opposed. On the Soviet side, "revisionism" became a catchphrase to designate any political reform that appeared to endanger the dominance of the Communist Party. As defined at the Moscow conference of 1957 (with Chinese approval then), it was applied to all reform movements within the Communist system that denied "the historical necessity of the proletarian revolution," or the "Leninist principles for the construction of the party." The term "dogmatism," in Soviet usage, means a doctrinal conservatism that ignores changing realities, a clinging to received ideas in a way "calculated to alienate the party from the masses." In practice the Soviets have sought a course between revisionism and dogmatism.

 

9.2 Different roads to Socialism.

Important new elements in Soviet doctrine were set out in the party program adopted by the 22nd congress in October 1961 (which were, to some extent, embodied in the declarations of the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960). First, there was the concession that there are different roads to Socialism. This may have been no more than a practical recognition of the fact that since the breach with Yugoslavia and the death of Stalin it had no longer been possible for the Soviet Union to impose its own pattern on all Communist states. The invasion of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979 were not, according to Moscow, inconsistent with this doctrine, since in each case the Soviet Union acted out of a duty to assist a fraternal Socialist state in putting down a counterrevolution. In the case of Czechoslovakia, which had not asked for such assistance, a new tenet was added by Brezhnev in November 1968. He contended that, when "internal and external" forces hostile to Socialism attempted to restore capitalism in a Socialist country, it became a matter of concern to the whole Socialist community. This tenet was used to justify the action of the Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 and of the Soviet forces in December 1979.

 

9.3 Peaceful coexistence.

The second change in Soviet doctrine was the view that war between the capitalist and Socialist powers was no longer inevitable, as had always been asserted by both Lenin and Stalin. This was a practical recognition of the fact that a war waged with nuclear weapons would be more likely to lead to mutual annihilation than to victory. Khrushchev emphasized the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between different social systems and the achievement of Socialism by peaceful means. In the 1970s, "peaceful coexistence" became known as "détente." This doctrine raised hopes of real peace between Communist and non-Communist states, but the Soviet leaders made it clear that détente would not affect either political warfare against the West or military support for wars of liberation. The massive invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979 left détente seriously impaired.

The third doctrinal change after 1953 was also dictated by practical reality. The Comintern had rigidly applied concepts drawn from Western history to revolutions in Africa and Asia: industrialization, the emergence of a proletariat, and a Socialist revolution carried out under the leadership of a Communist party. This Marxist analysis proved to be totally unrealistic in the case of underdeveloped countries in which the predominant force was nationalism. This was increasingly recognized, after 1956, in Soviet doctrine that declared the proper revolutionary aim in the developing countries to be "national democracy." In Khrushchev's words this meant accepting a "noncapitalist path of development," which would be in the interests "not only of one class but of the broad strata of the people." (see also  Marxism)

In the late 20th century the Soviet leadership faced two main problems: a slowing down in the rate of economic growth, to which the party had tied its promises of an improved standard of living, and a ferment of criticism among an intellectual minority, which included an influential component of leading scientists. Two alternatives seemed the most likely: either a return to more repressive measures or a reform of the Soviet system. (L.B.S.)

Following the death of Brezhnev in 1982, a new generation of less dogmatic party technocrats chose reform. Led by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who became general secretary in 1985 and president in 1988, Soviet leaders spoke of basic structural reform (perestroika) and more openness (glasnost) in Soviet society and in foreign policy. In what amounted to a fourth doctrinal change, Soviet leaders declared that Communist revolution was no longer the mission of the Soviet Union, nor would the country continue to serve as the ideological model for world Communism. Underscoring this doctrinal reversal, the Communist Party officially gave up its administrative monopoly at the 28th party conference in 1990. The more relaxed attitude in Soviet society subsequently encouraged Soviet-bloc countries in eastern Europe and Africa to develop a more independent stance, and in fact many of them cast out their Communist leaders altogether. The dramatic turnaround of the Polish trade-union movement, called Solidarity, was a prime example. In the early 1980s, Solidarity had briefly challenged the Communist Party's power and subsequently had been outlawed; but by 1990 its leader, Lech Walesa, had become president of Poland.

As Communist parties in eastern Europe and Africa were falling, those in Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and China seemed all the more firmly entrenched. In China especially, the violence with which the student-led "pro-democracy" demonstrations were crushed in May and June 1989 seemed more a desperate attempt of party leaders to hold on to power than a means of preventing anarchy in the midst of an overall economic breakdown. China, like the Soviet Union, however, also had undergone fundamental shifts in policy. Following the failures of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), it adopted a plan for modernization that included attracting foreign investment, adopting the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense) of Deng Xiaoping, reducing collectivization of agriculture, allowing greater individual choice, and restricting political dogmatism to the realm of politics. In 1989 China took a major step when it normalized relations with the Soviet Union. Although the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party had called Gorbachev a "traitor" to Communism, both groups recognized the importance of developing economic ties and, furthermore, could agree that no longer did there exist "compulsory models or stereotypes for realizing socialist ideas and principles." (Ed.)

 

공산주의 (共産主義, communism)

사유재산제(私有財産制) 대신에 재산의 공유를 실현시킴으로써 계급없는 평등사회를 이룩하려는 사상 및 운동. 

어원인 '콤무네'(commune)는 다른 사람과의 나눔, 사귐을 뜻하는 라틴어로서 공동체의 재산이 구성원들 모두에게 속하는 사회제도를 일컬었다. 재산의 사유가 빚어내는 도덕성의 흠결(欠缺)을 간파하고 공유재산제를 바탕으로 보다 합리적이고 정의로운 사회공동체를 일구려는 소박한 공산주의의 이상은 인간이 정치적·사회적 사색을 시작한 때부터 싹튼 것으로 볼 수 있다. 공산주의 사상의 기원은 플라톤의 〈국가 The Republic〉, 고대 유대인들의 에세네파(派), 초대교회의 교리, 근대 초 토머스 모어의 〈유토피아 Utopia〉, 요한 안드레에의 〈그리스도의 도시 Christianopolis〉 등에까지 소급된다.

공산주의 개념이 가지는 다양한 용법은 대체로 다음과 같이 분류될 수 있다. 첫째, 19세기 초반 '사회주의' 개념이 등장할 때까지 공산주의는 고대 이래 맥을 이어온 재산공유제 원칙을 가리켰으며 이는 곧 사유재산제도의 비판을 의미했다. 둘째, 마르크스주의에 따르면 공산주의란 인류 역사 최후의 단계인데, 민중들은 계급이 소멸하고 생산력이 극도로 확대된 이상사회에서 의욕에 따라 일하고 필요한 만큼 소비할 수 있게 된다. 셋째, 20세기에 새로이 첨가된 의미 내용으로 수정주의적 마르크스주의 내지 페이비언 사회주의에 대하여 특히 '혁명적' 마르크스주의 또는 마르크스-레닌주의를 공산주의라고 한다. 넷째, 마르크스 이전의 프루동주의처럼 혁명적 성격이 미미한 것을 사회주의라 하고 블랑키주의 등 정치적·혁명적 성향이 짙은 사상을 공산주의로 부르기도 한다.

공산주의 이론

현대의 공산주의는 카를 마르크스와 프리드리히 엥겔스에 의하여 체계화되고 블라디미르 일리치 레닌, 요시프 스탈린등이 계승한 '프롤레타리아 혁명이론'을 가리키지만 처음부터 유물론(唯物論)이나 무신론(無神論)의 토양에서 발아한 것은 아니었다 (→ 색인 : 마르크스). 오히려 인류사의 곳곳에서 나타나는 공산주의적 공동체는 성서의 영감을 받아 이루어진 예가 많았고 다분히 종교적인 특성을 지니고 있었다. 현대 공산주의는 시민혁명과 산업혁명의 여파가 정치·사회를 통하여 격심한 파동을 일으키고 있던 변혁기의 산물이었다. 프랑스 혁명은 봉건적 전제군주제를 무너뜨리고 시민적 자유와 권리를 천명하는 데는 성공했으나 천명된 자유를 제도화하지는 못했으며 결국 나폴레옹 보나파르트의 제정(帝政)을 초래함으로써 '부르주아 민주주의혁명'으로 남게 되었다. 프랑스 혁명을 배태시킨 사회사상 속에는 계몽주의와 더불어 법 앞에서의 평등뿐 아니라 경제·사회적 평등을 부르짖는 혁명적 공산주의 및 사회주의적 제반 경향도 포함되어 있었다. 이들은 정치상의 모순이나 산업혁명 이후 노정된 여러 사회악의 원인이 궁극적인 진리와 자연법칙에 반하는 사회제도에 있다고 보고 이상사회가 도래하려면 인간의 도의심(道義心)에 각성이 이루어져야 한다고 생각했다. 고전적 공산주의의 신앙적 영적(靈的) 색채는 여기서 이성적·인류애적 이상주의로 대체되었으며, 가브리엘 보노 드 마블리, 프랑수아 노엘 바뵈프, 오귀스트 블랑키 등의 공산주의자와 생 시몽, 푸리에, 로버트 오언등 이른바 공상적 사회주의자들은 모두 프랑스 혁명의 평등사상에 힘입은 사람들이었다.

1848년 2월혁명 직후 마르크스와 엥겔스가 발표한 〈공산당 선언 Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei〉으로 공산주의는 새로운 차원을 맞이하게 된다. 마르크스주의는 19세기 중반 서유럽에 만연된 인간소외현상(人間疏外現象)을 극복하여 인간의 해방을 성취하려는 의도에서 출발했으므로 크게는 사회주의와 같은 범주에 드는 것이었다. G.W.F. 헤겔의 관념론적 변증법(辨證法)과 L .A. 포이어바흐의 인간학적 유물론을 비판 수용하는 과정에서 공산주의 이론을 발전시킨 마르크스는, 1845년 엥겔스와 〈신성가족(神性家族) Die heilige Familie〉을 공동집필한 이래 죽을 때까지 친분관계를 유지했고, 엥겔스는 유물변증법과 프롤레타리아의 세계사적 사명에 이르는 공산주의 이론 전반에 대하여 과학성과 체계성을 부여했다.

마르크스주의는 인식론(認識論)에 있어서 일체의 선험적(先驗的) 관념을 거부하고 감각과 경험에 의존했다. 이와 같은 유물론적 인식에 따르면 인간이란 온전히 자연의 일부이며 행위는 외부의 자극에 반응함으로써 이루어진다. 행위에는 물론 정신의 작용이 주요한 역할을 담당하지만, 1차적으로 정신을 좌우하는 것은 감각을 통한 외계(外界)의 인식이며 이러한 인식의 축적으로부터 더욱 복잡하고 추상적인 언표(言表)나 개념들이 형성된다. 유물론의 시각으로 사회구성체를 조명할 때, 그 하부구조(下部構造)를 이루는 것은 생산력과 생산관계라는 경제적인 요인이고 정치제도·법률·종교·사상·문화 등은 경제적 토대 위에서 상부구조를 구축한다. 인간·사회공동체·자연의 변화와 운동은 변증법 원리에 따라 이행된다. 정(正 These)·반(反 Antithese)·합(合 Synthese)의 변증법 도식은 혼돈과 투쟁의 기제인 동시에 발전의 기제이기도 한데 예컨대 '정'의 내면에는 '반'을 싹트게 할 모순의 씨가 들어 있다. 어떤 사회의 생산력은 정지해 있는 것이 아니라 인간의 지능, 과학 기술의 진보에 따라 증가한다. 그때 새로운 생산력과 낡은 생산관계 사이에는 양립할 수 없는 모순이 일어나며 이 모순은 계급관계로 전이된다. 다시 말해서 낡은 생산관계를 유지함으로써 이득을 보는 유산계급(지배계급, 자본가계급)과 새로운 생산관계의 정립을 통하여 이득을 보게 될 무산계급(피지배계급, 프롤레타리아트) 사이에는 투쟁이 불가피하다. 새로운 생산관계는 정치제도를 비롯한 상부구조의 변화를 이끌어낸다.

〈공산당 선언〉에서 마르크스와 엥겔스는 인류역사를 원시 공산주의 사회, 고대 노예제 사회, 중세 봉건사회, 근대 자본주의 사회로 설명한 뒤, 프롤레타리아 혁명과 공산주의 사회의 도래를 예언했다. 계급투쟁은 자본주의가 무르익어감에 따라 중대한 국면으로 접어든다. 자본주의는 세계 전역의 경제체제를 서로 의존하게 만들어 노동자들의 공동이해를 깨닫게 하기 때문에 프롤레타리아 계급을 결속시키는 결과를 낳고, 인간과 사회에 대한 환상을 제거하여 노동자계급으로 하여금 자본가들에게 억압당하고 있다는 사실을 깨닫게 한다. 한편 자본가계급은 치열한 경쟁과 시장의 고갈로 인하여 점차 약화되어 간다.

마르크스는 이 무렵까지만 해도 자본주의 경제체제의 모순과 붕괴 원인에 관하여 충분한 이론적 근거를 갖추지는 못했는데, 1867년에 제1권의 출간을 본 〈자본론 Das Kapital〉은 이러한 의미에서 쓰여진 비판 경제학 이론서였다. 애덤 스미스, 데이비드 리카도 등 고전경제학의 여러 분야를 검토한 마르크스는 노동가치설에 기초하여 ' 잉여가치이론'(剩餘價値理論)을 도출해냈다. 사회적 약자인 노동자는 자기의 노동력을 재생산하는 데 필요한 시간 이상의 노동을 하게 되고 이 지불받지 못하는 잉여노동시간에 창출된 가치, 곧 잉여가치는 자본가의 수중에 들어가 이윤(利潤)을 형성한다. 이윤은 곧 노동력 착취의 결과이다. 그런데 자본가들이 자유경쟁에서 살아남기 위해서는 노동자계급에 대한 착취를 강화해야만 하기 때문에 여기서 부르주아지(자본가계급)와 프롤레타리아트는 이해의 근원적인 대립으로 말미암아 투쟁이 불가피해진다. 프리드리히 엥겔스는 사회주의가 역사적 유물론과 잉여가치이론으로 인하여 하나의 과학으로 정초되었다고 평가했으며, 마르크스주의를 '과학적 사회주의'로 명명한 반면 생 시몽, 푸리에, 오언 등 선대의 사회주의에는 '공상적 사회주의'라는 딱지를 붙였다.

1848년 2월혁명이 실패로 끝나고 노동자계급이 마르크스가 예견한 역사발전 과정에 충심으로 참여하기를 망설이자 사회주의자들은 자신들의 입장을 재검토하게 되었다. 마르크스는 〈고타 강령 비판 Kritik des Gothaer Programms〉(1875)에서 혁명이 이상사회를 당장 가져다주지는 않는다고 전제한 뒤, 자본주의 사회로부터 공산사회가 잉태되려면 기나긴 진통이 수반되며 그 과도기에는 '프롤레타리아 독재'가 필요하다고 역설했다. 마르크스는 이 과도기를 공산사회의 제1단계라고 말했지만 다른 저서에서는 대개 사회주의라는 용어를 구사하고 사회주의가 무르익어 사유재산과 계급 및 국가가 완전히 소멸된 보다 높은 단계에 도달한 경우에만 공산주의라는 용어를 사용한다. 사회주의의 제2단계, 즉 보다 높은 단계는 고도의 생산력을 기반으로 한다. 여기서는 분업체계에 노예처럼 예속되는 상태가 불식되며 육체노동과 정신노동의 차이가 없어지고 노동이 단지 생활의 방편이 아니라 생활의 제1욕구로 되어 개인은 능력에 따라 일하고 필요에 따라 분배받게 된다.

'공산주의'라는 어휘의 사용법은 일찍부터 혼선을 빚기 시작했다. 1847년 '공산주의자 동맹'을 직접 창설한 바 있는 카를 마르크스는 기존의 정당들이 사회주의라는 명칭을 붙일 자격도 없으면서 그렇게 자처하고 있기 때문에 공산주의라는 용어를 채택한 것이라고 설명했다. 그후 공산주의는 그 궁극적인 목표가 아니라 특정한 강령을 가진 특정 정당을 지칭하게 된다. 공산주의 정당을 통합하고 공산당의 강령을 세우는 데 크게 이바지한 인물은 러시아의 마르크스주의자 블라디미르 일리치 레닌이었다.

소련의 공산주의

공산주의가 마르크스에 의하여 전혀 새로운 해석을 얻게 되자 '공산주의'라는 용어는 다양한 정치조직의 이름으로 널리 유포되었다. 특히 1917년 레닌의 지도 아래 러시아 제정을 전복시킨 사회민주노동당 다수파(볼셰비키)는 이듬해 '러시아공산당'이라는 당 명칭을 채택했다.

러시아의 마르크스주의는 레닌과 볼셰비키 이전에 이미 30년의 전통을 가지고 있었다. 그 가운데 러시아 마르크스주의의 아버지라 불리는 G.V. 플레하노프는 '인민주의'로 알려진 토착 혁명운동 속에서 성장한 인물이었는데, 차르 체제를 대체하는 부르주아 민주정권이 프롤레타리아 혁명의 전(前)단계를 이루어야 한다고 믿고 있었다 (→ 색인 : 플레하노프).

블라디미르 일리치 레닌 역시 카잔에서 혁명가 생활을 시작할 때까지는 인민주의의 영향을 입고 있었다. 1889년 마르크스주의로 전향한 그는 P.N. 트카체프 등의 인민주의 이론으로부터 규율잡힌 직업혁명가 조직의 필요성을 느끼게 되었다. 프롤레타리아트에 혁명적 계급의식을 고취하고 이들을 선도하는 공산당은 국가를 전복하고 사회주의를 정착시키는 과정에서 주어진 몫을 다할 것으로 기대되었다.

농노해방(1861) 이후 자치공동체에 의하여 생산이 이루어지는 당시 사정과 농업사회의 전통에 근거하여 인민주의자(나로드니키)들이 프롤레타리아 계급의 존재성을 부인했고, 플레하노프가 산업발전의 추세를 들어 노동자계급의 성장에 주목했다면, 레닌은 자치공동체의 급속한 와해로 말미암아 러시아 농민계급의 상당 부분이 새로운 프롤레타리아트로 개편되고 있음을 지적했다. 레닌은 부르주아 민주주의혁명과 프롤레타리아 혁명의 2단계를 설정하고 있던 플레하노프 등과는 달리 부르주아 혁명을 뛰어넘어 곧바로 프롤레타리아 혁명을 수행해야 한다고 주장했다. 1903년 이와 같은 전술적 차이에 따라서 사회민주노동당은 볼셰비키와 멘셰비키로 분열되었고, 레닌은 인민주의자 및 사회주의자들에 대항하면서 볼셰비키를 프롤레타리아 전위대(前衛隊)로 키워나갔다.

1917년 2월 페트로그라드의 노동자와 군인들이 차르 니콜라이 2세를 축출했다. 사회주의 성향의 케렌스키임시정부와 레닌의 혁명노선 사이에는 타협의 여지가 없었고 10월이 되자 볼셰비키 적위대는 임시정부를 타도, 프롤레타리아 혁명을 완수했다. 레닌의 교조주의는 소비에트 정부가 구성된 이후에도 견지되었다. 사회혁명당 우파세력과 멘셰비키는 비난을 면치 못했고 볼셰비키 내부에서도 이설(異說)은 금지되었다. 1921년 3월의 전국공산당대회에서 볼셰비키(공산당)는 '소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방'의 생활 전반을 통제할 일사불란한 단일정당으로 확립되었다.

레닌은 공산주의를 국제적 차원의 운동으로 파악하고 있었다. 이른바 사회주의적 국제주의(프롤레타리아 국제주의)란 공산주의로의 이행이 모든 사회발전의 세계사적 필연성이라는 것, 각국 노동자의 이해(利害)는 지속적·궁극적으로 볼 때 동일하다는 것 등 마르크스주의의 본질을 이루는 내용이었다. 일찍이 제1차 세계대전이 발발했을 때, 제국주의 전쟁을 내전과 계급투쟁으로 전환시켜야 한다고 역설했던 레닌은 유럽의 사회주의 정당들로부터 기대한 만큼의 호응을 얻지는 못했었다. 레닌은 소비에트 정부 수립에 성공한 뒤 세계혁명에 관심을 돌렸다. 그는 반(反)식민주의가 팽배해 있던 인근 유럽 국가와 아시아 국가들을 1차 목표로 삼았으나 신생 조국 소련의 존립을 지나치게 의식한 결과 세계혁명운동을 소련의 국가이익 아래 종속시키고 말았다. 1920년 7월 코민테른(제3인터내셔널) 제2차 대회에서 채택된 소위 '21개 조건안'에는 레닌의 마르크스-레닌주의 당 이론이 그대로 반영되어 있다. 러시아 볼셰비키당의 모범과 같이 공산당은 민주 집중제 원칙에 따라 규율이 잡힌 '노동계급 해방의 핵심조직'인 것이다.

1921년 6~7월 코민테른 제3차 대회는 '신경제정책'(NEP)을 채택했다. 레닌은 10월혁명 후의 내란 기간 동안 도시 노동자들과 적군(赤軍)을 굶기지 않기 위해서 전시공산주의 정책을 실시했고 그 대가로 대부분의 농민들을 희생시켰다. 이러한 상황에서 사회민주주의 개혁세력이 공산당과 소비에트 정부의 타도를 내걸고 파업을 선동하자 정권유지의 차원에서 신경제정책이 도입된 것이다. 레닌은 마르크스의 원론을 근거로, 겨우 절반 정도 공업화를 달성한 프롤레타리아 러시아가 사회주의를 꽃피우려면, 정부 스스로 자본주의를 발전시키고 주도해야 한다고 해명했다. 신경제정책의 목적은 자본주의 국가들과의 경제관계를 발전시키기 위해 시간을 벌자는 것으로서, 유럽에서의 혁명전략을 잠정 유보한 상태로 소규모 기업활동이 권장되었다.

1924년 레닌이 죽자 요시프 V. 스탈린이 공산당 서기장에 취임했다. 레닌의 충실한 후계자임을 자처했던 그는 세계혁명의 보루(堡壘)가 될 소련 공산주의의 유지·강화를 주장했다. 레닌과 스탈린은 자본주의 국가와의 평화공존 및 교역의 필요성을 인정한 점에서 일치하고 있었으나 스탈린의 입장에는 레닌주의를 벗어난 면도 적지 않았다. 사회주의 건설과업에 계급투쟁이 필수적으로 요청된다고 추론한 그는 이를 토대로 대숙청과 같은 반대파 탄압정책을 전개하기 시작했다. 레닌은 과거 1922년과 1923년에 계급간의 화해, 특히 농민과 노동자계급의 조화를 거듭 역설했었다.

레닌이 남긴 유서를 보면 알 수 있듯이 적위대를 조직하여 10월혁명의 승리에 결정적인 역할을 수행했던 레온 트로츠키는 스탈린의 가장 어려운 경쟁자였다 (→ 색인 : 트로츠키). 이념적 측면에서 스탈린과 트로츠키의 반목은 일국사회주의론(一國社會主義論)과 세계혁명론의 대립이었지만 우선 지적해야 할 것은 이들의 논쟁이 권력투쟁의 원인이 된 것은 아니고 오히려 그 결과였다는 점이다. 사회주의가 특정 국가에서 완성될 수 있다는 것이 스탈린주의의 내용이라면 트로츠키주의세계혁명론의 요지는 유럽 프롤레타리아의 직접적 지원 없이는 러시아 노동자계급이 권력을 유지할 수 없다는 것이었다. 1924년부터 1928년까지 트로츠키를 제거하기 위한 면밀한 정치공작이 진행된 결과 이듬해 좌파 세력의 중추였던 트로츠키는 국외로 추방당했다.

스탈린은 트로츠키 문제가 해결되자 곧바로 신경제정책을 청산하고 급속한 공업화와 농업집산화를 추진했다. 신경제정책의 폐기가 순조롭기만 한 것은 아니었다. 수백만의 농민이 기근으로 사망했으며 니콜라이 부하린, 미하일 톰스키 등 당내 우파 세력들과는 마찰이 일어났다. 이들은 NEP가 국내 경제안정에 미친 영향을 긍정적으로 평가하고 점진적인 공업화를 통하여 농민계급의 지지를 유도해야 한다고 생각했다. 1929년 4월 스탈린은 '부하린 그룹과 우리 당에서의 우익 경향'이라는 연설을 통하여 부하린 등이 전세계적인 혁명 경향과 부농(富農)에 의해 제기되고 있는 위기상황을 간과해왔다고 비난했다. 트로츠키, G.Y. 지노비예프등의 좌파에 이어 부하린, 톰스키 등 당내 우파에 이르는 일련의 권력투쟁과정은 코민테른의 성격에 여실히 반영되었다.

요시프 스탈린의 통치방식은 레닌처럼 공산당을 매개로 한 것이 아니라, 라브렌티 베리아, 안드레이 비신스키, 게오르기 말렌코프등 소장 측근들과 내무인민위원부(NKVD)로 알려진 비밀경찰에 의존한 것이었다. 진정한 마르크스-레닌주의 당으로서의 공산당의 지위는 현저히 약화되었고 1934년부터 1952년 사이에 오직 한 차례(1939)의 당대회가 열렸을 뿐이었다. 각국의 서기장들은 스탈린주의를 서둘러 모방하게 되었으며 위계질서에 따른 복종이 공산당의 기본성격으로 고착되어갔다.

아시아와 유럽의 공산주의

볼셰비키 혁명과 소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방의 활력에 힘입어 마르크스주의와 공산당은 유럽과 아시아에 급속도로 확산되기 시작했다. 독일·프랑스·영국 등지에서는 제2차 세계대전이 발발하기 훨씬 이전부터 강력한 공산주의 정당들이 성장하여 합법적인 의회활동을 벌이고 있었다. 프랑스 공산당은 파시즘에 대항하는 좌파 인민전선에서 주도적인 역할을 수행했다.

이와는 반대로 아시아의 공산주의 운동은 지하에서 이루어졌다. 1920년 인도네시아에서 최초의 공산당이 발족한 이래 1921년에 중국 공산당, 이듬해에는 일본 공산당이 창설되었다. 한국의 공산당은 1923년 서울에서 조직되었다. 코민테른 극동총국(極東總局) 고려부에 몸담고 있던 이동휘(李東輝), 정재달(鄭在達), 한명서(韓明瑞) 등 3명의 한인위원은 이르쿠츠크 군정학교를 졸업하고 당시 블라디보스토크에 와 있던 김재봉(金在鳳)과 신철(辛鐵)에게 국내에 잠입하여 공산당을 조직할 것을 지령했다. 4월과 5월에 각각 입경한 신철과 김재봉은 주로 북성회(北星會)와 접촉을 가졌으며, 김찬(金燦)의 집에서 이봉수(李鳳洙), 김약수(金若水), 원우관(元友觀), 신백우(申伯雨) 등과 함께 국내 고려부를 발족시켰다.

1922년에 결성된 미국 공산당은 비록 정치적으로 큰 영향력을 행사하지는 못했지만 1920, 1930년대를 통하여 노동조합운동에 공헌했다. 그결과 1940년대의 반공주의 노동운동가들은 미국 내 노동조합을 재정비하는 과정에서 상당한 곤란을 겪게 되었다.

1920년대부터 코민테른의 전문 혁명가들이 세계 각국에 파견되기 시작했는데, 인도네시아와 중국에서 활약한 네덜란드의 공산주의자 G.V. 스네블리에트(흔히 '마링'이라 불림)와 러시아계 미국인으로서 중국 공산당의 결성을 도운 마이클 그루첸버그(본명은 미하일 보로딘)는 특히 유명하다.

레닌은 후진지역 반제국주의 투쟁세력을 소비에트 정권과 서유럽 프롤레타리아트의 예비군으로 간주했고 처음부터 아시아 민족해방운동에 관여했다. 1926년 호치민[胡志明]에 의해서 베트남 사회주의 노동당이 설립되었다. 호치민은 1920년 프랑스 공산당 창설을 도왔으며 그뒤 모스크바에서 열린 제2, 3차 코민테른 대회에 참석한 바 있는 노련한 직업혁명가였다. 한편 일본의 공산주의자 노사카 산조[野坂參三]와 도쿠다 규이치[德田球一]는 경찰의 탄압 속에서도 꾸준히 노동조합운동을 추진했다.

제2차 세계대전 초에 체결된 독·소불가침조약이 독일군의 침공으로 파기되자 코민테른의 정책은 인민전선 쪽으로 선회했고, 아시아·유럽의 공산당은 연합국 편에서 전체주의 침략자들과 맞서 싸웠다. 중국과 한국의 공산주의자들은 중국 본토 및 만주 일대의 항일투쟁(抗日鬪爭)에서 공동보조를 취하고 있었으며, 중국 내 공산주의 세력과 민족주의자들은 때때로 마찰을 빚는 경우도 있었지만 전쟁이 종결될 때까지 연합전선(국공합작)을 유지했다. 말레이 반도에서는 중국 공산당의 분파가 항일 게릴라 전술에 성공함으로써 대전 말기에 말레이시아·싱가포르 정치를 좌우하기도 했다.

프랑스 공산당이 대(對) 독일 레지스탕스 운동에서 차지했던 비중은 대단한 것이었다. 전쟁이 끝난 후 프랑스 공산당은 드골파(派) 및 공화전선과 겨루면서 권력투쟁을 벌였으며 이탈리아의 상황도 이와 비슷했다. 일반적으로 소련의 대독항전은 전후 동유럽에 위성국가들을 들어앉히고 서유럽 각국의 공산당을 후원하는 데 길을 터준 셈이었다. 소련 점령군은 동유럽의 반공·반소운동을 불가능하게 만들었다.

중일전쟁은 중국 공산당이 특히 농촌지역에서 조직의 근간을 형성할 수 있는 기회를 제공했다. 마오쩌둥 [毛澤東]이 이끄는 중국 공산당은 일본군과의 교전을 주저했던 장제스[蔣介石]의 소극적인 자세와 국민당 정부의 부패에 힘입어 1949년 10월 1일 중화인민공화국을 출범시켰다. 마오쩌둥은 정통 공산주의 이론을 받아들이기는 했지만 경험에 있어서는 전혀 판이한 길을 걸어왔다. "농촌에 의한 도시의 고립화"라는 그의 말에서도 드러나듯이 중국 혁명은 도시 프롤레타리아 계급이 아닌 가난한 농민세력에 바탕을 둔 것이었다.

소련은 제2차 세계대전 참전을 계기로 제정 러시아의 영토 대부분을 다시 얻고, 동유럽과 발트 3국 및 발칸 여러 나라에서 우세를 확보했으며 아시아에서는 조선민주주의인민공화국과 외몽골에 괴뢰정권을 세웠다. 전쟁이 끝난 뒤에도 레닌이 주창한 자본주의포위론·전쟁불가피론·양대진영론을 고수했던 요시프 스탈린은 전쟁이란 우연의 결과나 인간 의지의 산물이 아니며 그 원인은 자본주의 체제 자체에 있으므로 자본주의의 제거만이 전쟁을 근멸시킬 수 있다고 생각했다. 스탈린의 전후정책은 미국 및 서유럽과의 불가피한 갈등을 전제한 것이었다. 소련의 팽창정책이 노골화되고 있다고 판단한 미국은 주소(駐蘇) 대리대사 조지 F. 케넌이 제안한 봉쇄정책을 채택하고 1947년 3월 12일 트루먼 독트린에서 이를 구체화시켰다. 스탈린은 경제원조·방위조약·동맹체제를 포함하는 미국의 새로운 정책을 중대한 위협으로 간주했고 9월말 폴란드 바르샤바에서 코민포름(공산당정보국)을 발족시켰다. 당시 안드레이 알렉산드로비치 주다노프가 코민포름 회의에서 행한 연설은 서방에 대하여 영원한 냉전(冷戰)을 선언한 것으로 해석되었다.

공산권의 분열과 개혁조치

국제공산주의운동으로 각국 공산당 지부들은 일방적인 복종을 강요받아왔지만, 소련의 속박으로부터 벗어나려는 움직임 또한 꾸준히 맥을 잇고 있었다.

1948년 6월 전개된 소련과 유고슬라비아 간의 민족주의 공개 논쟁은 국제공산주의운동사상 처음 있는 항명사태였다. 한편 대(對) 독일 게릴라전을 통해 조국을 해방시키고 공로를 인정받아 대통령에 취임한 요시프 브로즈 티토는 소련 공산당의 오랜 지배에 반기를 들고 코민포름에서 탈퇴함으로써 독자노선을 걷기 시작했다.

1953년 5월 5일 스탈린이 죽자 소련 공산당의 통솔력에는 더 큰 어려움이 생기게 되었다. 특히 공산당 서기장직을 승계한 니키타 흐루시초프가 제20차 전당대회에서 스탈린을 격하시킨 뒤, 강력한 정치적 기반을 가지지 못한 공산체제 내부에서는 서서히 민중의 동요가 일기 시작했다 (→ 색인 : 흐루시초프). 동베를린의 노동자들은 반정부 운동으로부터 반레닌주의적·반소적 자유화운동의 기치를 올렸고, 폴란드에서는 포즈나인의 노동자들이 '빵과 자유'를 외치며 궐기한 이후 티토주의자로 몰려 은퇴했던 부아디수아프 고무우카가 복귀하면서 개혁파들이 정국을 장악하게 되었다. 1956년 헝가리 총리로 취임한 임레 노디는 격증하는 반소 감정에 의지하여 다당제를 도입하고 바르샤바 조약기구(WTO)에서 헝가리를 탈퇴시켰다. 인내의 한도를 넘어섰다고 판단한 모스크바는 11월 4일 헝가리 전역을 무력으로 침공하기 시작했고 수도 부다페스트에 1,000대의 탱크를 진주시켰다. 소련군의 개입으로 말미암아 공산주의 대의는 역사상 가장 큰 비난을 받게 되었으며 제2차 세계대전 이후 최대의 탈당사태가 빚어졌다. 스탈린주의적인 지배와 착취를 거부했던 헝가리 민중봉기는 어느 정도의 자치가 보장된 다원적 공산세계를 움트게 하는 촉매로 작용했다. 심지어 일인독재체제가 확고부동한 북한과 니콜라에 체아우셰스쿠가 이끄는 루마니아에서도 민족적 독립의 열망이 증대되고 있었다.

소위 민족공산주의경향과 훗날의 당내 민주화 운동은 인텔리겐차(지식인 계급)에 의하여 주도되었는데, 프롤레타리아트보다는 인텔리겐차가 혁명의 주체가 되어야 한다는 것이 레닌의 정론이었던 것을 생각하면 반전(反轉)된 진실을 보는 것 같아 흥미롭다. 인텔리겐차는 헝가리 봉기를 이끌어낸 페퇴피 당을 시작으로 동유럽 전체에 걸쳐 강요된 공산주의의 경직된 틀을 깨뜨리기 시작했다. 헝가리 민중을 고무한 폴란드의 '10월의 봄'도 스탈린주의와 일당독재체제를 비판한 급진파 지식인들이 주도한 것이었다.

1956년 헝가리 봉기에 자극된 중국의 지식인들은 반공주의를 가라앉히기 위한 백화제방에 편승하여 공산당의 고위간부들을 규탄하기 시작했다. '가지각색의 사상이 논쟁을 벌이게 하자'(百花齊放 百家爭鳴)는 구호와 취지를 빌미삼아 쏟아져 나온 반정부 비판의 내용이 용인하기 어려운 수준에 이르자 공산당 지도부에서는 대대적인 반우파 투쟁을 전개했고 수많은 지식인들이 투옥되거나 국외로 추방되었다. 한편 체코슬로바키아의 신세대 지식인들은 1968년 두프체크 개혁정부를 지지하면서 민주주의를 향한 '프라하의 봄' 운동을 추진했다. 1956년의 헝가리에서와 마찬가지로 소련의 정치지도자들은 자유화 운동을 탄압했다.

공산권 내 인텔리겐차의 불만은 무엇보다도 경제문제에 결부되어 있었고 위기의 근원을 이루는 것은 경직된 마르크스주의 통제경제체제였다. 1965년 알렉세이 코시긴총리는 서유럽에서 자본주의 경제를 연구하고 돌아온 예브세이 리베르만의 도움을 받아 사태해결을 모색했다. 소위 ' 리베르만 방식'의 골자는 이윤을 생산의 주된 결정요인으로 삼고 통제경제의 틀을 유지하는 범위에서 중앙 경제부서의 과도한 규제를 완화시키자는 것이었다.

행정조직 내부의 개혁을 상징했던 리베르만 방식은 초기 단계의 여러 성과에도 불구하고 시장경제를 배격하는 마르크스-레닌주의적 본질에 억눌림으로써 점차 쇠미해가는 경향을 보였다. 당 위주의 관료주의에 사로잡혀 경제를 상투적으로 정치부분의 종속변수인 것 처럼 취급해온 중앙 행정기구는 사기업에 정책결정권을 위임하고 사기업이 보다 직접적인 형태로 소비자들과 거래관계를 유지한다는 사실에 당황하지 않을 수 없었으며, 특히 가격제도의 혁신과 관련해서는 어떠한 조치도 거부했다. 공산권의 경제문제는 개혁안이 백지화되면서 뿌리 깊은 만성질환이 되어갔고 장차 공산주의를 제도적으로 와해시키는 핵심 요인으로 나타난다.

중·소분쟁은 세계 공산주의 운동사상 특기할 만한 사건이었다. 스탈린이 죽은 뒤 중국 공산당은 마오쩌둥 사상을 바탕으로 발언권을 강화시켜나갔으며 평화공존을 표방한 흐루시초프가 '미국 제국주의'와 타협하는 사태를 관망하면서 이미 1950년대 후반부터 이념적 대결의 길에 들어섰다. 1960년 6월 부쿠레슈티에서 열린 루마니아 공산당 제3차 대회와 11월 모스크바에서 열린 81개 공산당대회 및 이듬해 10월의 소련 공산당 제22차 대회를 거치는 동안 소련의 수정주의·평화공존 노선과 중국의 교조주의·세계혁명 노선은 첨예화된 대립 양상을 보였다. 1962년 중국-인도 국경분쟁이 일어났을 때 겉으로는 중립을 표방하면서도 사실상 인도를 지지했던 소련의 처신은 중국을 격분시키기에 충분했으며, 그해말 쿠바 미사일 위기때 표출된 소련의 투항적 자세는 중국으로 하여금 흐루시초프를 비난하도록 만들었다. 공산주의 세계는 친중국계와 친소련계의 양대 진영으로 구조적인 개편을 이루게 되었고, 북한은 이른바 주체사상을 내세우며 두 초강대국 사이에서 신중한 균형외교정책을 폈다.

공산권의 대분열은 고도의 중앙집권적 지배구조라고 하는 마르크스-레닌주의 체제의 내재적 모순을 반영하는 것이었다. 소련 이론가들의 견해처럼 최선의 방도는 수정주의와 교조주의의 중용을 유지하는 일로 보인다. 과도한 자유주의는 공산당의 권위에 위협이 되고 지나친 보수주의는 민중의 봉기를 유발하기 쉽다. 흐루시초프는 정적인 게오르기 말렌코프를 축출하여 자신의 권력기반을 확보한 뒤 스탈린주의의 압제를 청산하기 시작했다. 주변 위성국가에 대한 그의 새로운 정책은 일정 한도의 정치적·경제적 자치를 전제로 상호협력적 결속을 도모한다는 요지로서 이전의 착취관계와는 차이가 있었다. 그러나 흐루시초프의 개혁노선은 당의 권력상실을 우려한 후계자들에 의해서 부인되었으며 브레주네프정권은 대내적인 억압통치와 아프가니스탄 침공 같은 대외 간섭정책을 추구했다.

개혁조치는 중국 공산당 내부에서도 끊임없이 분쟁의 씨가 되었다. 1960년대 중반 중국 사회의 부르주아적 경향이 당의 민주집중제를 훼손시킬지도 모른다고 우려한 마오쩌둥은 이른바 '문화대혁명'에 착수했다 (→ 색인 : 문화대혁명). 자신의 일인독재체제를 공고히 할 목적으로 구상된 이 운동은 10년간 지속되면서 엄청난 재난을 몰고왔다. 전국의 대학·중학교 학생들로 조직되어 마오쩌둥으로부터 혁명의 소용장(少勇將)이라는 영예칭호를 부여받은 홍위병(紅衛兵)들은 교내활동을 넘어 가두에까지 진출했고 부패한 당 관료의 축출을 부르짖으며 사형(私刑)·난동·무력투쟁을 일삼았다. 이결과 처형된 사람 수는 10만을 넘었고 2억에 가까운 인구가 추방되거나 투옥되었다.

1970년대말까지 자취를 감추었던 공산권의 개혁시도는 마오쩌둥이 죽고 덩샤오핑[鄧小平]이 권좌에 오르면서 재개된다 (→ 색인 : 덩샤오핑). 그가 추진한 '4개 현대화'계획은 일찍이 저우언라이[周恩來]에 의하여 제시된 이후 1978년 12월 공산당 제11기 제3차 중앙위원회 전체회의에서 재확인된 사업으로 농업·공업·국방·과학기술의 발전을 도모했다. 덩샤오핑의 지론이었던 ' 백묘흑묘론'(白猫黑猫論)은 정치·경제적으로 파국 일보직전에 와 있던 중국의 상황을 반증하는 것이었다. '흰 고양이든 검은 고양이든 쥐를 잘 잡기만 하면 좋은 고양이'라는 논리에 따라 이데올로기를 초월하여 경제적 문호개방을 선택한 중국은 어느 정도 공산주의 경제체제의 실패를 인정하는 것처럼 보였다. 개혁의 범위를 경제분야에 한정시키려는 당국의 의지에도 불구하고 인민들은 보다 큰 정치적 자유를 요구하게 되었으며 이후의 10년은 개혁파와 강경보수파 사이의 권력투쟁으로 점철된다.

공산주의의 쇠퇴

1970년대말 통제경제체제로 말미암은 중압감은 동유럽 전체를 통하여 뚜렷이 고조되어갔다. 1980년 폴란드의 그다이스크 조선소에서는 레흐 바웬사가 1만 7,000여 명의 노동자를 이끌고 파업을 주도, 정부의 경제정책에 항의하고 나섰다. '연대'(솔리다리노스크)라고 명명된 노동조합의 목소리는 그 어느 때보다도 강력한 힘을 가지고 있었다. 타협안 도출을 위한 공산당 지도부의 노력이 이렇다 할 성과를 얻어내지 못하자 야루젤스키국방장관은 계엄령을 선포했으며 군사평의회를 조직하여 권력의 정상에 올랐다. 정부는 노동조합 간부들을 검거하는 등 수많은 억압조치를 강행했지만 노동조합의 요구를 받아들이지 않고는 더이상 정국을 통제할 수 없는 지경에 이르게 되었다. 폴란드 자유노동조합운동을 꾸준히 뒷받침해온 배후세력은 40여 년 간의 모진 탄압에도 끝내 굴하지 않고 명맥을 유지해온 로마 가톨릭 교회였다.

한편 폴란드에 대한 소련군의 개입가능성은 소비에트 연방 내 여러 문제와 최고지도부의 불안정으로 말미암아 현저하게 줄어들었다. 1982년 브레즈네프가 통치하던 오랜 침체기가 끝이 나고 유리 안드로포프가 서기장으로 취임했다. 그러나 안드로포프는 취임 후 15개월이 지나기도 전에 사망했고 뒤를 이은 콘스탄틴 체르넨코역시 단명하고 말았다. 비교적 알려지지 않은 미하일 고르바초프가 소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방의 국가 원수가 된 것은 이러한 일련의 돌발적 사태에 힘입은 바 컸다. 고르바초프는 오랫동안 당내 아파라치키(안드로포프의 측근세력)로 일해왔음에도 불구하고 공산주의 경제체제의 기본 전제들에 관하여 공공연히 문제를 제기했으며 나중에는 소련의 억압적 메커니즘 전반에 관해서 의구심을 표명했다.

1985년 3월 미하일 고르바초프는 소련 공산당 서기장에 취임했다. 그가 야심을 가지고 제시한 페레스트로이카(perestroika:개혁)와 글라스노스트(glasnost:개방)는 3년 이내에 세계의 이목을 집중시켰고 러시아 국민들 사이에서도 광범위한 지지기반을 형성했다. 정치적인 자유에는 극히 인색하고 개혁의 초점이 경제분야에 놓여 있던 중국과는 정반대로 고르바초프의 개혁정책은 정치영역에서 출발했다. 그의 개혁노선에는 핵물리학자 안드레이 사하로프, 역사학자 로이 메드베데프 등 소비에트 정치체제를 비판하고 민주화를 요구했던 반체제 지식인들의 영향력도 적지 않았다. 1988년 소련 공산당 중앙위원회는 "국가 관료기구의 운영에 폭넓은 인민 계층을 참여시키고 사회주의 법규범에 바탕을 둔 국가체계를 완성하기 위하여 정치제도상의 일대변혁을 일으키자"고 역설했으며, 고르바초프는 한 달 후인 제19차 전연방 당대회에서 "정치체제의 근본적인 재건만이 소련이 직면한 경제적·사회적 문제를 해결할 수 있다"고 선언했다. 이렇게 사회주의 조국의 권력 핵심이 약화되자 동유럽 공산당들은 동요하기 시작했다. 체코슬로바키아의 경우 보다 신속한 개혁을 주장했던 루보미르 슈트로우갈 총리가 공산당 지도자 밀로스 야케스와의 의견 충돌로 인하여 사임했고 반체제운동은 공공연하게 목소리를 높여갔다. 그해 헝가리에서는 약 7만 5,000명의 시위대가 1848년 오스트리아 제국에 저항했던 2월 봉기를 기념했다. 폴란드에서도 파업과 소요사태가 증폭되어갔다. 1989년 바르샤바 법원은 '연대' 노동조합운동의 법적 지위를 복원시켰으며, 이와 동시에 소련 탱크 부대가 헝가리 국경을 빠져나감으로써 조만간 동유럽 전체에서 소련군의 철수가 이루어질 것임을 예고했다.

1989년 3월 모스크바에서 실시된 인민대표회의 대의원 선거는 1917년 10월혁명 이후 가장 민주적인 선거로 기록되었다. 소련 역사 초유의 선거 결과는 공산당과 기성 질서의 패배였고 시민들은 놀라움을 금치 못했다. 널리 알려진 선거구일수록 개혁파들과 반체제 인사들이 당선되었으며 당의 정통성과 우위성을 주장한 후보자들이 대부분 낙선하고 말았다. 한 달 후 개최된 제1차 인민대표회의에서 당 중앙위원회 위원들은 거의 1/3에 육박하는 탈락사태를 빚었다.

이채롭게도 중국의 보수강경 관료주의는 반체제·민주화 운동을 분쇄하는 데 성공했다. 학생시위에 책임을 지고 사퇴했던 후야오방[胡耀邦]이 1989년 사망하자 베이징대학교 학생들은 당내 보수파를 공격하는 대자보(大字報)를 붙이기 시작했고 베이징[北京]과 상하이[上海] 등지에서는 가두시위가 벌어졌다. 베이징의 대학생들은 톈안먼[天安門] 광장에 집결, 연좌시위에 돌입했으며 5월이 되면서 반체제 지식인과 시민들이 합세하여 시위군중의 수가 100여 만명으로 불어났다. 6월 4일 중국 인민해방군은 덩샤오핑, 양상쿤[楊尙昆] 등 원로 보수파 지도자들의 명령을 받아 시위대 해산을 위한 무차별 살상에 들어갔다. '피의 일요일'로 불리는 군의 대학살 이후 강경보수파는 개혁파를 제압했고, 덩샤오핑의 후계자로 지목되면서 경제개혁과 아울러 정치개혁의 필요성을 주장해온 자오쯔양[趙紫陽] 총서기가 축출되었다.

중국과는 대조적으로 공산당 정치기구는 동유럽에서 차례로 붕괴되어갔다. 1989년 8월 24일 자유노조 출신의 타데우슈 마조비에츠키가 폴란드 총리로 확정되어 비(非)공산 연립정부를 구성했고 18년 동안 동독 공산당을 지도해온 에리히 호네커는 라이프치히와 동베를린에서 대규모 시위가 일어난 뒤 실각했다. 바로 다음 날 헝가리 의회는 324대 4라는 압도적인 표차로 야당에 법적 지위를 부여함으로써 40년 이상 지속되었던 일당독재체제를 종식시켰다. 1989년말 불가리아 및 루마니아의 공산당 지도부가 동요하기 시작했고 헝가리 국민들은 조각(組閣)을 위한 자유총선에 참여했다. 11월 체코슬로바키아에 선거에 의한 새 정부가 탄생했다. 연초에 반공산주의 시위를 선동했다는 죄목으로 체포된 바 있는 바츨라프 하벨은 체코슬로바키아 의회에서 대통령으로 선출되었다.

소련과 동유럽의 공산당은 1991년에 이르러 정치권력을 완전히 상실했다. 공산주의 체제에 대한 불만은 대변혁의 과정에서 민중의 직접행동으로 표출되어 나왔는데, 루마니아 독재자 니콜라에 체아우셰스쿠가 살해된 경우를 제외하면 대부분 평화적인 방법으로 이행되었다. 1991년 8월 모스크바에서 일어난 보수강경파 쿠데타가 대중의 지지를 얻지 못한 채 무위로 끝나자, 피델 카스트로가 일인독재체제를 형성하고 있는 쿠바와 김일성이 이끄는 북한, 그리고 베이징과 하노이에서 정권을 유지하고 있는 공산주의자들만이 마르크스주의에 대한 그들 나름의 해석을 고수하게 되었다.

경제문제가 공산권의 몰락을 초래했다는 것은 의심할 여지가 없는 사실이지만 정치적 요인도 이에 못지 않은 큰 역할을 담당했다. 〈공산당 선언〉에서 카를 마르크스가 구사했던 희망에 찬 말들이나 볼셰비키 앞에서 레닌이 토한 열변들은 사실상 단 한번도 실현된 적이 없었다. 결국 공산당 지도부란 유고슬라비아의 철학자 밀로반 드질라스의 평가처럼 정권유지를 최고의 목표로 삼고 결속한 관료와 정치 엘리트의 새로운 계급에 불과했다. 서방의 마르크스주의 이론가들은 공산주의 정부의 붕괴사태가 곧 마르크스주의의 실패를 의미하는 것은 아니라고 역설한다. 여기서 폴란드 학자 예세크 콜라코프스키의 해석은 그대로 타당하다. "정치 이데올로기로서의 마르크스주의와 인류역사를 조감하는 시각으로서의 마르크스주의는 구분되어야 할 필요가 있다. 인간 지성의 발달에 공헌한 역사적 유물론의 가치를 부인할 사람은 아무도 없다. 이데올로기로서의 공산주의는 집권층에 의하여 민족주의, 인종주의 혹은 제국주의적인 것으로 변질되어왔으며, 정치·경제 체제로서의 공산주의 실험은 '금세기 최대의 환상'으로 끝을 맺게 되었다."

Macropaedia| 金德千 글

10 Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Useful works include SHLOMO AVINERI, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (1968, reissued 1990; originally published in Hebrew, 1967); TOM BOTTOMORE (ed.), Interpretations of Marx (1988); LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, Main Currents of Marxism, 3 vol. (1978; originally published in Polish, 1976-78); H.B. ACTON, The Illusion of the Epoch (1962, reissued 1972); ROBERT C. TUCKER, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed. (1972); ISAIAH BERLIN, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 4th ed. (1978); R.N. CAREW HUNT, The Theory and Practice of Communism, 5th rev. ed. (1957, reissued 1977); J.L.H. KEEP, The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia (1963), an outstanding history of the subject up to 1906; LEONARD SCHAPIRO, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State: First Phase, 1917-1922, 2nd ed. (1977); ADAM B. ULAM, The Bolsheviks (1965; also published as Lenin and the Bolsheviks, 1966); FRANCO VENTURI, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia (1960, reprinted 1983; originally published in Italian, 1952); and BERTRAM D. WOLFE, Three Who Made a Revolution, 4th rev. ed. (1964, reissued 1984), a readable, stimulating history of Bolshevism in its formative years.

Works on Stalinism include IAN GREY, The First Fifty Years: Soviet Russia, 1917-67 (1967); LEONARD SCHAPIRO, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd rev. and enlarged ed. (1970), a detailed history of the Communist Party in theory and in practice up to 1968; ROBERT CONQUEST, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, rev. ed. (1973); IVO BANAC, With Stalin Against Tito (1988); GRAEME GILL, Stalinism (1990); and ROBERT V. DANIELS, Trotsky, Stalin, and Socialism (1991).

The phenomenon of totalitarianism is treated well in HANNAH ARENDT, The Burden of Our Time (1951; also published as The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed., 1973, reprinted 1986); and ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL (ed.), Totalitarianism at the Crossroads (1990).

The world movement up to Stalin's death is treated in HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, Tito and Goliath (1951), an excellent study of the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union; ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged ed. (1967), and Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (1993); CONRAD BRANDT, BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, and JOHN K. FAIRBANK, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (1952, reissued 1971); LIU KANG and XIAOBING TANG (eds.), Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse in Modern China (1993); VLADIMIR DEDIJER, Tito Speaks (1953); JANE DEGRAS (ed.), Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, 3 vol. (1956-65, reprinted 1971), a collection of documents with commentary; HERBERT FEIS, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, 2nd ed. (1967), a well-documented study of wartime diplomacy; GUNTHER NOLLAU, International Communism and World Revolution (1961, reissued 1975; originally published in German, 1959); EUGENIO REALE, Avec Jacques Duclos: au banc des accusés à la réunion constitutive du Kominform à Szklarska Poreba (22-27 septembre 1947), trans. from Italian (1958); DAVID REES, Korea: The Limited War (1964); and HUGH SETON-WATSON, From Lenin to Khrushchev (1960, reissued 1985; also published as The Pattern of Communist Revolution, rev. and enlarged ed., 1960), a study of the rise of Communism in eastern Europe.

Developments after Stalin are surveyed in TARIQ ALI (ed.), The Stalinist Legacy (1984); ADAM BROMKE (ed.), The Communist States at the Crossroads Between Moscow and Peking (1965); ALEXANDER DALLIN (ed.), Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-63 (1963); HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE and STUART R. SCHRAM, Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings (1969; originally published in French, 1965); EDWARD CRANKSHAW, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (1963); GHITA IONESCU, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe (1965, reprinted 1984); WALTER LAQUEUR and LEOPOLD LABEDZ (eds.), Polycentrism (1962), a valuable collection of essays on dissent in the Communist parties; WOLFGANG LEONHARD, The Kremlin Since Stalin (1962, reprinted 1975; originally published in German, 1959); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism, rev. ed. (1956), an annotated text of Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, with some other documents; HUGH SETON-WATSON, The Imperialist Revolutionaries (1978); H. GORDON SKILLING, The Governments of Communist East Europe (1966); MICHEL TATU, Power in the Kremlin (1969; originally published in French, 1967); DONALD S. ZAGORIA, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (1962, reissued 1973); MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH (ed.), Fifty Years of Communism in Russia (1968), a symposium by a number of experts on changes in Communist doctrine; LEONARD SCHAPIRO (ed.), The USSR and the Future (1962), essays by specialists on various aspects of the party program of 1961; PETER FERDINAND, Communist Regimes in Comparative Perspective (1991); and GALE STOKES, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (1993). Three important sources for studies of regime change are DANIEL CHIROT, Social Change in the Modern Era, ed. by ROBERT K. MERTON (1986); JACK A. GOLDSTONE (ed.), Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, 2nd ed. (1994); and JOHN DUNN, Modern Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1989). (Ed.)

  • 공산주의
  • 개론서
    • 공산주의의 종언 : A. 야코블레프, 김병린 역, 나남, 1992
    • 공산혁명 또 다른 배후 : 프랭크 L. 프리톤, 송용구 역, 생명의 서신, 1991
    • 공산주의 이렇게 무너지다 : B. 그베르츠만 M.T. 카우프만 공저, 강호성 역, 을유문화사, 1991
    • 비교공산주의와 현대국제질서 : 안병준, 나남, 1991
    • 민주집중제-레닌·스탈린 페레스트로이카 (녹두신서 49) : 방해란 편, 녹두, 1991
    • 볼셰비키 전통 : 로버트 맥닐, 이병규 역, 사계절, 1990
    • 자본주의와 공산주의의 공존 : J.K. 갤브레이스, 배연수 역, 영남대학교 출판부, 1990
    • 공산주의란무엇인가 : 하리스 사비로프, 백산서당 편집부 역, 백산서당, 1990
    • 공산주의와 세계혁명 상· : 문명사 편집부 편, 문명사, 1990
    • 공산당선언(청년문고 1) : K. 마르크스 F. 엥겔스 공저, 박재희 역, 청년사, 1989
    • 마르크스 레닌주의의 실천논쟁(거름신서 44) :, 이선일 편역, 거름, 1989
    • 사회주의와 공산주의 : 쿠시넨, 동녘 편집부 역, 동녘, 1989
    • 프롤레타리아 독재에 대하여(고전신서 7) : V.I. 레닌, 앎과 함 편집부 역, 앎과 함, 1989
    • 프롤레타리아 국제주의에 대하여(고전신서 8) : V.I. 레닌, 앎과 함 편집부 역, 앎과 함, 1989
    • 볼셰비키혁명-이상과 현실(공산권 연구논총 9) : 송복·김달중 공편, 법문사, 1989
    • 마르크스 레닌주의 고전입문 : 안넬리제 그리제 외, 윤정윤 편역, 거름, 1988
    • 공산주의와 급진주의 : 한용원, 박영사, 1988
    • 현대공산주의론 : 김우태·한점수·엄재호 공저, 대왕사, 1987
    • 공산주의 연구 : 윤원구, 명지대학교 출판부, 1987
    • 공산주의의 이론과 실제 : 박영석, 민족문화문고간행회, 1987
    • 공산주의 이데올로기 : 이용필, 화학사, 1987
    • 레닌주의의 이론구조 : 에른스트 피셔, 노승우 역, 전예원, 1986
    • 마르크스에서 소비에트 이데올로기로(중원문화신서 28) : 이링 페처, 황태연 역, 중원문화, 1986
    • 민주주의와 공산주의 : 백경남, 법지사, 1985
    • 원전 공산주의 대계 상· : 극동문제연구소 편, 극동문제연구소, 1985
    • 공산주의 이데올로기 비판 : M. 윌러, 이용필 역, 법문사, 1984
    • 공산주의 이념의 변질 : 볼프강 레온하르트, 김광수 역, 종로서적, 1983
    • 다섯개의 공산주의 : 질 마르티네, 서동만 역, 종로서적, 1983
    • 칼 마르크스의 사회사상과 정치사상 : 쉴로모 아비네리, 이홍구 역, 까치, 1983
    • 공산주의 : A.M. 스콧트, 정태섭 역, 문명사, 1983
    • 문명사 :, 편집부 편역, 문명사, 1982
    • 볼쉐비즘의 이론 : H. 켈젠, 이동화 역, 문명사, 1982
    • 비교공산주의 정치론 : 노흥길, 박영사, 1978
    • 공산주의의 비판 : 국토통일원 편·발행, 1972
    • 공산주의의 이론과 실천 : 앤드루 엠 스카트, 정태섭 역, 사상계사, 1953
  • 각국의 공산주의
    • 소련공산당사 전10 : B.N. 포모말료프 편, 거름편집부 역, 거름, 1992
    • 동남아공산권연구-베트남·캄푸치아·라오스 : 이범준 외, 박영사, 1991
    • 중국공산당역사결의와 중국현대사 : 허원, 사계절, 1990
    • 베트남공산당사 : 김종욱, 소나무, 1989
    • ·소대립과 북한 : 나라사랑 편집부 편, 나라사랑, 1988
    • 중국 공산주의 운동사-1919-1987 : 신상초, 집문당, 1987
    • 한국공산주의운동사 전 5 : 김창순·김준엽 공저, 청계연구소 출판국, 1986
    • ·소관계 : 김기우, 유풍출판사, 1986
    • 동유럽공산정치론 : 리처드 F. 스타아, 김영래 외 역, 민음사, 1985
    • 베트남공산주의운동사 : D. 파이크, 녹두 편집부 역, 녹두, 1985
    • 세계 각국의 공산당 : 서울신문사 편집부 편, 서울신문사 출판국, 1985
    • 일본공산당사 : 립화륭, 박충석 역, 고려원, 1985
    • 소련 및 동구공산주의 : 김학준 전인영 공저, 서울대학교 출판부, 1984
    • 아시아의 민족주의와 공산주의 : 맥마흔 볼, 손중기 역, 학문과 사상사, 1982
    • 동구공산주의의 변질과정연구 : 국토통일원조사연구실 편·발행, 1977
    • 중국공산당사 : 김준엽, 사상계사, 1961
   


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