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The word communism,
a term of ancient origin, originally meant a system of society in which property
was owned by the community and all citizens shared in the enjoyment of the
common wealth, more or less according to their need. Many small communist
communities have existed at one time or another, most of them on a religious
basis, generally under the inspiration of a literal interpretation of Scripture.
The "utopian" socialists of the 19th
century also founded communities, though they replaced the religious emphasis
with a rational and philanthropic idealism. Best known among them were Robert
Owen, who founded New Harmony in Indiana (1825), and Charles Fourier, whose
disciples organized other settlements in the United States such as Brook Farm
(1841-47). In 1848 the word communism acquired a new meaning when it was used as
identical with socialism by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels in their famous Communist
Manifesto. They, and later their followers, used the term to mean a late stage
of socialism in which goods would become so abundant that they would be
distributed on the basis of need rather than of endeavour. The Bolshevik
wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which took power in Russia
in 1917, adopted the name All-Russian Communist Party
in 1918, and some of its allied parties in other countries also adopted the term
Communist. Consequently, the former Soviet Union
and other states that were governed by Soviet-type parties were commonly
referred to as "Communist" and their official doctrines were called
"Communism," although in none of these countries had a communist
society fully been established. The word communism is also applied to the
doctrines of Communist parties operating within states where they are not in
power. (For the ideological basis of Communism, see MARXISM,
MARX AND.)
Communism as it had evolved by 1917 was
an amalgam of 19th-century European Marxism, indigenous Russian revolutionary
tradition, and the organizational and revolutionary ideas of the Bolshevik
leader Lenin. Marxism held that history was
propelled by class struggles. Social
classes were determined by their relationship to the means of production;
feudal society, with its lords and vassals, had been succeeded in western Europe
by bourgeois society with its capitalists and workers. But bourgeois society,
according to Marxism, contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction:
the number of capitalists would diminish, while the ranks of the impoverished
proletariat would grow until finally there would be a breakdown and a Socialist revolution
in which the overwhelming majority, the proletariat, would dispossess the small
minority of capitalist exploiters. (see also Leninism)
Marxism had been known and studied in
Russia for at least 30 years before Lenin took it up at the end of the 19th
century. The first intellectual leader of the Russian Marxists was G.V.
Plekhanov. Implicit in the teachings of Plekhanov was an acceptance of
the fact that Russia had a long way to go before it would reach the stage at
which a proletarian revolution could occur, and a preliminary stage would
inevitably be a bourgeois democratic regime that would replace the autocratic
system of Tsarism.
Plekhanov, like most of the early
Russian Marxist leaders, had been reared in the traditional Russian
revolutionary movement broadly known as Populism, a basic tenet of which was
that the social revolution must be the work of the people themselves, and the
task of the revolutionaries was only to prepare them for it. But there were more
impatient elements within the movement, and it was under their influence that a
group called "People's Will" broke off
from the Populist organization "Land
and Freedom" in 1879. Both groups were characterized by strict
discipline and highly conspiratorial organization; "People's Will,"
however, refused to share the Populist aversion to political action, and in 1881
some of its members succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II.
During the period of reaction and
repression that followed, revolutionary activity virtually came to an end. By
the time Lenin emerged into revolutionary life in Kazan at the age of 17, small
revolutionary circles were beginning to form again. Lenin was a revolutionary in
the Russian tradition for some time before he was converted to Marxism (through
the study of the works of Marx) before he was yet 19. From the doctrines of the
Populists, notably P.N. Tkachev, he drew the idea of a strictly disciplined,
conspiratorial organization of full-time revolutionaries who would work among
important sections of the population to win support for the seizure of power
when the moment was ripe; this revolutionary organization would take over the
state and use it to introduce Socialism. Lenin added two Marxist elements that
were totally absent in Populist theory: the notion of the class struggle and the
acceptance of the need for Russia to pass through a stage of capitalism.
Lenin's most distinctive contributions
to Communist theory as formulated in What
Is To Be Done? (1902) and the articles that preceded it were, first,
that the workers have no revolutionary consciousness and that their spontaneous
actions will lead only to "trade union" demands and not to revolution;
second, the corollary that revolutionary consciousness must be brought to them
from outside by their intellectual leaders; and third, the conviction that the
party must consist of full-time, disciplined, centrally directed professionals,
capable of acting as one man.
Lenin's tactics led in 1903 to a split
in the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party.
With his left-wing faction, called the Bolsheviks, he strove to build a
disciplined party and to outwit and discredit his Social-Democratic opponents.
After the collapse of tsarism in February 1917, he pursued a policy of radical
opposition to the Socialists and Liberals who had come to power in the
provisional government, and he eventually succeeded in seizing power in October
1917. Thereafter he eliminated both the opposition of other parties and his
critics among the Bolsheviks, so that by the 10th party congress in March 1921
the Bolsheviks (or Communists) had become a monolithic, disciplined party
controlling all aspects of Russian life. It was this machine that Stalin
inherited when he became general secretary of the party in 1922. (see also social
democracy)
The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia
gave a new impetus to the more extreme left wings of the Socialist parties in
Europe. Lenin's relations with the European Socialist parties had been hostile
even before World War I. During the war he had endeavoured to assert his
influence over the dissident left wings of the Socialist parties of the
belligerent powers, and at two conferences in Switzerland, in 1915 and in 1916,
he had rallied these dissident groups to a policy of radical opposition to the
war efforts of their governments and to an effort to turn the war into a civil
war. He had already decided by 1914 that, after the war, a Third
International must be formed to take the place of the Second
International of Socialist parties, which had failed to oppose the war
despite its strong antiwar tradition. By 1919, when the new Soviet regime in
Russia was fighting for its survival, the intervention on the anti-Soviet side
by Britain, France, and the U.S. was a powerful and practical argument to be
used by Soviet Russia in its appeals for revolution in capitalist countries. It
early became clear the Third International would reflect the influence of Soviet
Russia and that it was likely to become subordinate to Soviet aims and needs.
The Third International, or Comintern,
had its first congress in 1919. This gathering of a very few parties in Moscow
was more symbolic than real; the main structure of the new International was not
hammered out until the second congress in July 1920, also in Moscow. Hopes of
world revolution ran high; the prestige of the new Soviet state was in the
ascendant, and the resolutions adopted at this congress reflected in the fullest
possible way Lenin's idea of what a Communist party should be. It was to be the
"main instrument for the liberation of the working class," highly
centralized and disciplined according to the formula of "democratic
centralism" on which the Bolshevik Party had been founded. Twenty-one
conditions were laid down by the congress as prerequisites for parties
affiliating with the Comintern. These conditions were designed to ensure a
complete break with the older Social Democratic parties from which the Communist
parties were splitting off. The new parties were required to adopt the name
Communist in their title, to urge open and persistent warfare against reformist
Social Democracy and the Second International, to maintain a centralized and
disciplined party press, to conduct periodic purges of their ranks, and to carry
on continuous and systematic propaganda in the army and among the workers and
peasants. Each constituent party was to support in every possible way the
struggle of "every Soviet republic" against counterrevolution.
Decisions of the Comintern and of its executive committee were to be binding on
all members, and the breach of any of these conditions was to be ground for
expelling individual members from their parties--a provision that in future
years was to be interpreted very broadly. (see also political
party)
The prestige of Soviet Russia, the rigid
discipline imposed by the 21 conditions, and certain other factors ensured the
predominance of Russian control and Russian interests over the Comintern. Though
the predominance increased during Stalin's time, it was clearly evident while
Lenin was still alive. At the third world congress in June and July 1921, the
Comintern was confronted by Lenin with his New Economic
Policy--a program encouraging small private enterprise, which several
months earlier he had put into effect inside Russia. Lenin wanted a temporary
halt to the revolutionary upsurge in Europe to give him time to develop stable
trade relations with capitalist countries, to whom the Soviet state was
preparing to grant trading and industrial concessions. Comintern members were
required to support this policy, and the expulsion of the German Communist
leader Paul Levi after the failure of a Communist uprising in Germany in March
1921 showed how determined the leaders of the Comintern were to put down
inconvenient left-wing "adventures." It was with the requirements of
the New Economic Policy in mind that the Comintern executive committee in
December 1921 launched the turnaround policy of the United Front and of trade
union unity. This policy of rapprochement with Socialists and liberals was
likewise designed to gain support for Lenin's policy of consolidation at home by
appealing to a broader spectrum of opinion in the capitalist countries.
Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, always
claimed to be his faithful follower, and this was to some extent true. Stalin's
doctrine that Socialism could be constructed in one country, the Soviet Union,
without waiting for revolution to occur in the main capitalist countries (a
position he had developed as an integral part of his struggle against Trotsky)
was not far removed from the line pursued by Lenin in 1921 when he introduced
the New Economic Policy. Both Lenin and Stalin accepted the primary importance
of the survival and strengthening of the Soviet state as the main bastion of the
future world revolution; both accepted the need for a period of coexistence and
trade with the capitalist countries as a means of strengthening socialism in
Soviet Russia. Nor did Stalin's later policy of industrialization
and collectivization, in theory at least,
represent a departure from Lenin's doctrine. Industrialization was central to
Lenin's plans, though he did not live to put them into practice. Stalin's view,
however, that the construction of socialism led inevitably to an intensification
of the class struggle, which in turn required a policy of internal repression
and terror, is nowhere to be found in Lenin's writings. On the contrary, Lenin
repeatedly emphasized in 1922 and 1923 the necessity of bringing about a
reconciliation of the classes and especially of the peasants and workers.
Stalin's internal policy was to have
wide repercussions in the Comintern and on Communism generally. From 1924 until
1928 his first concern was to defeat his main rival, Trotsky,
and this seems to have been one of the main factors determining his policy at
this time. As against the more internationalist and doctrinaire Trotsky, Stalin
pursued "socialism in one country" and continued to implement Lenin's
New Economic Policy with its limited freedom for business enterprise and peasant
individualism. In this he could still claim to be following Lenin's wishes. But
Stalin also worked with great skill to ensure his control over the party. By
1927 when Trotsky was expelled from the party, Stalin already controlled both
the network of party officials (the apparat) and the delegates to congresses and conferences. Debate had
been replaced by ritualized unanimity; dissent was permitted only when it served
the purposes of the leadership.
When Trotsky was exiled from the country
in 1929, he became the focal point for opposition to Stalin among dissident
Communists all over the world, although he was to be more a symbol than an
active political force. Having defeated Trotsky and his allies, Stalin next
switched policies, abandoning the New Economic Policy in favour of rapid
industrialization along with the collectivization of agriculture. The
collectivization policy ultimately produced a famine, costing the lives of
millions of peasants. The reversal of the New Economic Policy and of Lenin's
policy necessarily involved eliminating from the political scene Stalin's former
allies, headed by Nikolay Bukharin, who wanted
to go slower with industrialization and to cultivate support among the peasants.
The protracted conflict, first with Trotsky and his ally G.Y.
Zinovyev and then with Bukharin, was reflected in the Comintern and in
the world Communist movement, which became increasingly subordinated to Stalin's
policy concerns inside the Soviet Union.
The regimentation of the Comintern and
of the parties represented in it began at the fifth world congress in June 1924,
immediately after Lenin's death. The elimination of Trotsky and his supporters
within the Soviet party was followed by widespread expulsions of the
"left" from the other world parties. The control of the
Soviet-dominated Comintern apparatus was increasingly asserted over the tightly
disciplined governing bodies of the foreign parties, which in turn ruled over
their members with the instrument of the purge. Ideologically, this procedure
was carried out at first under the screen of the United Front, which called for
cooperation with Social Democrats and other moderate leftists. At the sixth
world congress in 1928, however, a further switch in policy was dictated by
Stalin's internal conflict: the United Front tactic was abandoned, and the
Social Democrats now became enemies along with Fascists. The sixth congress also
declared the main duty of the international working-class movement to be the
support of the U.S.S.R. by every means. The united front tactic was revived in
1935 at the seventh (and last) world congress of the Comintern under the name of
the Popular Front, calling for united action by
Communists and Socialists together against Fascism.
Comintern policy changed again in August
1939 when the Soviet Union and Germany concluded a 10-year treaty of
nonaggression. This had the effect of freeing Hitler to fight a war against
Britain and France. Anti-Fascism was now jettisoned, and the Communist parties
were required, up to the moment when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June
22, 1941, to denounce the allied war against Hitler and to recognize Nazism as
"the lesser evil" in comparison with Western imperialism. The Soviet
alliance with Germany is usually seen as proof that Stalin was primarily
concerned with what he considered to be the interests of the Soviet Union. A
secret protocol annexed to the treaty assigned the Baltic states (Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia), about half of Poland, and Bessarabia to the Soviet
sphere of influence. The evidence suggests that Stalin considered the deal with
Hitler to be based on mutual interests; the German invasion in 1941 took him by
surprise. After the defeat of Hitler, Soviet territorial demands were again
advanced. (see also German-Soviet
Nonaggression Pact)
The Communist parties of the world were
also called on to adopt official Soviet justifications for Stalin's internal
purges, which involved the extermination of a large proportion of the Soviet
party membership, including most of the leading cadres. The subservience of some
Communist parties to official assertions made by the Soviet authorities
sometimes earned them the reputation of being little more than agents of the
Soviet Union inside their own countries, though this did not necessarily
diminish their influence or importance in several countries of Europe or in the
United States. They found much support among sympathizers with Marxism, who were
prepared to overlook Soviet realities in the service of their ideals or of what
they considered to be the historical destiny of mankind--in which they saw
Stalinism as merely a transitory stage. The Communists and their parties and
their contacts provided a valuable recruiting ground for intelligence agents of
all kinds prepared to act against their own countries in the interests of Soviet
Russia. The effects of Stalin's internal policy on the Communist parties outside
the Soviet Union are of vital importance in understanding the attitude adopted
by these parties after 1956, when much of Stalin's policy was officially
repudiated. (see also purge
trials)
Stalin's method of rule came, by
imitation, to be the standard in all other parties. It hinged primarily upon the
dominance of his own personality. He ruled over the country in large measure not
through the party, as Lenin had, but through personal agents (like Lavrenty
Beria, Andrey Vyshinsky, or Georgy Malenkov) and also through the
security police (NKVD). The party as an institution declined under Stalin, and
between 1934 and 1952 there was only one party congress, in 1939. The general
secretaries of the Communist parties abroad imitated Stalin, and strict
hierarchical subordination became the way of party life.
The undeclared assault by Hitler on the
Soviet Union provoked a wave of sympathy for that country among both the open
and secret enemies of Hitler in Europe. The Soviet pact with Hitler, and even
the manifest blemishes of Stalin's regime, were forgotten: sympathy with the
newly emerged force of resistance to the Nazi scourge far outweighed past
memories. Many, it is true, expected the immediate defeat of the Soviet Union.
As time went on, however, and the Soviet struggle continued with enormous
sacrifice of life and with courage and skill that none could help but applaud,
admiration for Soviet military achievements grew even among those who had been
most critical and apprehensive of the Soviet political role before the war. The
Communists of other countries shared in the prestige won by Soviet military
prowess. This was particularly the case in occupied France
and Italy where the underground Communist
parties played a vital role in the resistance movements. In Yugoslavia,
too, the Communist partisan movement led by Tito (Josip
Broz) outstripped the nationalist guerrillas in effectiveness and won the
material support of Britain.
The policy pursued by Stalin accentuated
the nationalist side of the war and attempted in
every way to play down the Communist element. At home, tsarist history and the
rituals of the Eastern Orthodox Church were invoked in efforts to raise
patriotic sentiments to the highest possible pitch. Abroad, Communist aims and
ideals were replaced by anti-Nazi, liberal-democratic slogans. The dissolution
of the Comintern in 1943 was in line with this policy. It had long ceased to be
necessary as an instrument of Soviet control over the foreign Communist parties,
which was carried on through other channels; but the publicizing of its
dissolution added force to the growing persuasion abroad that the Soviet Union
had left its revolutionary past behind it and was now a great power with
traditional nationalist and security aims. Stalin himself emphasized that the
dissolution of the Comintern would "put an end to the lies spread by Hitler
that the Soviet Union wished to Bolshevize other countries" and that
Communist parties "followed foreign directives." Still another factor
promoting the influence of Communism during World War II was the enhanced
prestige of Stalin himself and the extent to which his personality influenced
the allied leaders Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
His growing military and political
prestige in turn influenced Stalin's policy towards his allies and determined
the future course of Communism after victory was won in 1945. Two main lines of
Soviet policy can be discerned in the wartime conferences at Tehran,
Yalta, and elsewhere: first, a determination by the Soviet Union that friendly
political regimes should be established in the countries on Russia's borders,
and second, that the Soviet Union's hard-won status as a great power should be
fully recognized in the postwar settlements. These demands were not in
themselves unreasonable, considering the enormous price that the Soviet people
had paid for victory. In pursuing the creation of a solid Soviet-dominated bloc
of Communist states in east-central Europe, Stalin was able to take advantage of
the presence of a victorious Soviet army in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
and East Germany. The cases of Yugoslavia and Albania were different, but the
regimes that emerged in all these countries were broadly similar forms of
Communist party domination based on the Soviet model, even though the ways in
which the Communists achieved power varied.
Broadly speaking, three phases could be
distinguished. In the first phase there was a genuine coalition of Communist and
Socialist parties. This lasted until the spring of 1945 in Romania and Bulgaria,
until the spring of 1947 in Hungary, and until February 1948 in Czechoslovakia.
Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland, and East Germany never knew this phase: the former
two started as "monolithic," while the latter two began their postwar
history in the second phase, an alleged coalition in which the Socialist parties
were nominally independent and had some share in power but in which their
leaders and policies were largely determined by the Communists. In the third
phase, the "monolithic" phase, the nominally independent Socialist
parties were required to fuse with the Communists, political opposition was
largely suppressed, and Socialist leaders went into exile or were dealt with by
staged treason trials. In Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania the third phase began in
the autumn of 1947; in Hungary, in the spring of 1948. In East Germany the third
phase was complete by 1949.
In his policy toward the countries which
were destined to form the Soviet bloc, Stalin was aided in part by the inability
or unwillingness of the Western allied powers to take steps during the first or
second phases described above to prevent the beginning of the third phase and in
part by the skillful infiltration of local Communists into key positions. The
peasant and Socialist parties, which had substantial support in their countries,
were attacked in various ways and demolished as independent political bodies.
Yugoslavia was an exception. There the
Communists under the leadership of Tito enjoyed a considerable measure of mass
support because of their wartime role as partisan fighters. The People's
Democracy they instituted in Yugoslavia was for some years little different in
character from that of other Communist-party-dominated states of eastern Europe.
An attempt to set up a People's Democracy in Greece
failed after three years of civil war, in which the Greek Communists were
supported by Yugoslav aid.
In the countries of Europe outside the
Soviet bloc, Communist parties proved unable to exploit the prestige that they
had acquired during the war. Both in France and in Italy they enjoyed
considerable support: in the parliamentary election of 1945 in France the
Communists received 26 percent of the vote, and in the general elections to the
Constituent Assembly in Italy in June 1946 they received 19 percent. Both
parties, however, failed to achieve real national power in the postwar period;
their role was confined to fomenting strikes and disorder in the interests of
Soviet policy. The detailed story of the Italian and French
Communist parties during the period 1945 to 1949 is complex, but, broadly
speaking, their attempts at insurrection foundered against the facts of the
power of the army and the police and a lack of revolutionary zeal among their
worker supporters. On the other hand, their attempts to win power by
parliamentary means were frustrated by the distrust that the Socialists felt for
them as colleagues in Parliament or in government and by their own evident lack
of interest in a viable parliamentary system. (see also Democratic
Party of the Left)
Powerful Communist parties emerged after
the war in various parts of Asia, in many cases largely as a result of the
resistance of the Western powers to growing nationalist movements. Communist-led
insurrections, allegedly coordinated by Moscow, broke out in the summer of 1948
in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. In Indochina, after the surrender of Japan, the
Communists under Ho Chi Minh seized power in the
three northern provinces of the country. French colonial policy helped drive the
nationalists into the arms of Ho Chi Minh, and by the end of 1946 a guerrilla
war had broken out in the country that was to last for nearly three decades
before the Communist victory of 1975. In Japan
democratic legislation imposed by the United States after its victory permitted
the Communists to operate legally. In the succeeding few years they made little
progress toward governmental power but won considerable gains in the trade
unions and an important measure of influence among university students. In India
the Communist Party supported the British war effort after June 1941 and gained
ground as a result; it switched to violent insurrection after Indian
independence but abandoned this policy in 1950. (see also Vietnam)
The most significant factor in the
postwar history of Communism in Asia may have been the victory in 1949 of the Chinese
Communist Party under the leadership of Mao
Tse-tung. China, rather than the Soviet
Union, seemed destined to play the leading role in Asian Communism. The victory
of the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, like that of
Tito's forces in Yugoslavia, owed little if anything to Soviet aid--save that
the Russians had handed over to the Chinese Communists the military stores
captured from the Japanese during the very short period when the U.S.S.R. was at
war with Japan in 1945. Although the Chinese Communist Party had developed under
the aegis of the Comintern and acknowledged the doctrinal authority of Lenin and
Stalin, its experience had been very different. Its victory had been preceded by
long guerrilla warfare. Mao's rise to power had, moreover, been achieved by
ignoring Soviet advice as much as by following it. Stalin showed quite clearly
from the outset that he intended to keep China in a position of subordination
not unlike that which he had successfully marked out for most of eastern
Europe--a status the Chinese Communist leaders were not likely to accept.
Culturally, economically, and geographically, China was in a strong position to
become the model for Communist revolution in Asia and to wrest the leadership of
Asian Communism from the Soviet Union. These and other factors were to produce
signs of a possible breach between China and the U.S.S.R. within less than 10
years of the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949.
The wartime alliance had given rise to
some hopes that Soviet-Western amity would continue. Stalin's relentless pursuit
of security through the domination of neighbouring countries shattered this
hope. At home Stalin returned to his prewar tactics: widespread arrests and
deportations occurred in the newly incorporated or reincorporated territories of
the Soviet Union; the restriction of cultural life was intensified; the
straitjacket was reimposed on the party, on the peasants, and on the industrial
workers. There is some evidence to suggest that at the time of his death in
March 1953 Stalin was planning a new purge on the scale of the 1936-38 purges.
(see also Cold
War)
Soviet expansion into eastern Europe led
to counteractions by the Western powers that Moscow interpreted as part of a
master plan to encircle and subjugate the Soviet Union. These included the Truman
Doctrine of containment of Soviet expansion proclaimed in March 1947; the
offer in June of that year by United States Secretary of State George Marshall
to underwrite the economic recovery of Europe; and the North
Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, which established a permanent defense
force for western Europe, including in its orbit West Germany. Another factor
that affected Soviet policy was the monopoly of the atomic bomb enjoyed by the
United States from 1945 until 1949. The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch
Plan put forward by the U.S. for the international control of atomic
weapons and made every effort to produce its own, succeeding in September
1949. The "Cold War" was on. (see also Marshall
Plan)
In September of 1947 a new international
organization, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform),
was established. Unlike the old Third International (Comintern), the Cominform
was limited in membership to the Communist parties of the Soviet-dominated
countries of east-central Europe and to the French and Italian Communist
parties. The aim of the Cominform was to consolidate and expand Communist rule
in Europe. Plans for the establishment of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia were
discussed, and the French and Italian parties were reproved for their failure to
win power in their own countries.
The Cominform did not prove a success.
Certainly one of its purposes was to hold Yugoslavia more securely within the
Communist fold, and for this reason Belgrade was chosen as the seat of the new
organization. But within a few months a quarrel broke out between the Soviet and
Yugoslav parties, and when the Cominform held its second meeting in June 1948,
it was for the purpose of denouncing the Yugoslav
Communist Party and expelling it from the organization. The quarrel with
Yugoslavia resulted largely from Tito's refusal to submit to domination by the
Soviet Union; there was also some suspicion on the Soviet side, possibly well
founded, that the Yugoslav party leader hoped to build up a bloc of Communist
states in southeastern Europe that would not be totally dependent on the Soviet
Union.
The effect of the Soviet-Yugoslav
quarrel, which has never completely healed, was momentous. First, it shattered
the doctrine that the Communist movement must be monolithic, since a Communist
party had challenged Moscow and survived. Second, Yugoslavia, having broken with
the U.S.S.R., was in a position to assume a role of considerable influence in
the world, especially toward states formed in formerly colonial territories. The
Yugoslavs could speak as Communists who, while opposed to the policy of the
imperialist powers, were no mere agents of Soviet policy. This position carried
a particularly strong appeal in India, but the impact of the Soviet quarrel with
Tito was much wider.
A third effect of the Yugoslav defection
was a tightening of the Soviet hold over the remaining members of the Communist
bloc. In Soviet-dominated lands "Titoism" became synonymous with
treason, much as "Trotskyism" had been in the '30s. Purges and public
trials ensued throughout eastern Europe. In some cases, like that of Wladyslaw
Gomulka in Poland (who was left alive), or Koci Xoxe in Albania, the
charge of sympathy with Yugoslavia may have been true; in others, like those of László
Rajk in Hungary or Traicho Kostov in
Bulgaria, the offense may have been only an attempt to resist Soviet domination;
in the trial of Rudolf Slánský; in
Czechoslovakia in 1952, a strong anti-Semitic element played a part. Countries
of the Communist bloc were seething with anti-Soviet and nationalist feeling by
the time Stalin died. Though Stalin's postwar policy was successful in extending
the boundaries of Soviet military and political control well into eastern and
central Europe, Communism did not win out in France or in Italy, where its
chances had appeared strongest. The policy of expansionism and of intransigence
founded on suspicion of the United States led to a kind of consolidation of the
West against the Soviet Union. In the Far East the Korean
War was probably not a success from the Communist point of view. Korea
had been divided after the defeat of Japan: in the northern
part a Communist government came to power in elections held in November 1946,
and in the south a non-Communist government was established. Each claimed to be
the legal government of the whole country. Invasion of the south by the north in
June 1950 was condemned by the Security Council
of the United Nations as aggression, and the Security Council approved military
assistance to South Korea under a unified
American command. (The absence of the Soviet representative from the Security
Council prevented the U.S.S.R. from vetoing this resolution.) The long war, in
which China intervened on the side of North Korea, brought heavy burdens and
few, if any, advantages, and the conflict between the major powers that it
involved led them in the fears of many to the verge of world war. In June 1951
the Soviet Union proposed discussions for an armistice, to which the Western
powers agreed. The negotiations were protracted and did not result in an
armistice until after Stalin's death in 1953.
Stalin died on March 5, 1953. For a
short time, until the beginning of 1955, power was nominally divided between Georgy
Malenkov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Nikita
Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party. Almost from the
beginning, Khrushchev was the dominant of the two; his victory over his rival
was only a matter of time. Malenkov, it would seem, decided quite early that the
Soviet Union could not maintain its hold over the Eastern bloc without
substantial economic relaxation. The difficulties that always beset the reform
of an oppressive regime were soon illustrated in East Germany. Within a week of
the announcement by East German leaders that "aberrations" of the past
would be rectified and some of the hardships of life alleviated, there was an
uprising in the streets of East Berlin; it spread to other parts of East
Germany and was quelled only by the use of Soviet armed forces. The blame
for this was laid on Lavrenty Beria (the Soviet
security chief, shortly to be deposed and executed) and by implication on
Malenkov. The new relaxed policy continued, however, in most of the Soviet-bloc
countries. Economic reforms were initiated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland, but the system of political rule remained unchanged.
Khrushchev, who by the beginning of 1955
had ousted Malenkov, had a comprehensive vision of how the Eastern bloc should
be run. He was determined to find a way out of the straitjacket in which Stalin
had confined Soviet life; the outcome was to have momentous consequences for
Soviet dependencies abroad, which Khrushchev probably did not at the time
foresee. His policy toward the Communist satellite countries may be summarized
as one of cooperative integration instead of exploitation, with some degree of
economic and political autonomy (under Communist Party leadership). A political
and military convention between the European Communist states and the U.S.S.R.
(the Warsaw Pact) was signed in May 1955.
Khrushchev also sought to redesign the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, the Communist counterpart of western Europe's
Common Market, which Stalin had set up in January 1949: he tried (though with
indifferent success) to transform the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
into a device for promoting the division of labour, economic specialization, and
technical and financial cooperation among the countries of the bloc.
In order to demonstrate that Stalin's
policy was a thing of the past, Khrushchev made substantial efforts to effect a
reconciliation with Tito and the Yugoslav Communists (against the opposition of
some of his colleagues, including Vyacheslav Molotov). An agreement with
Yugoslavia in June 1956 recognized that "the conditions of Socialist
development are different in different countries" and stated that no
Socialist country should impose its views on another. This was a momentous
change in policy, since it meant that a country could be described as
"Socialist" without being obliged to follow all the practices adopted
by the Soviet Union or every Soviet turn in foreign relations.
The reconciliation with Yugoslavia was
only one of several important events that made the year 1956 a watershed in the
history of Communism. In February, at the 20th congress of the Communist Party,
Khrushchev delivered a speech in secret session in which he attacked the period
of Stalin's rule in most forthright terms. The speech was not published within
the Soviet Union, but its text was widely circulated among Communists both
within and outside the Soviet Union and was published by the U.S. State
Department. Its effect was enormous. Although the disclosures were neither
complete nor entirely new, the fact that Khrushchev had uttered them caused a
ferment in the Communist movement that was to prove irreversible. It inaugurated
a period of freedom of debate and criticism that had been unknown for a quarter
of a century; despite efforts both by Khrushchev and by his successors to keep
criticism of the "cult of personality" (the accepted euphemism for
Stalin's misdeeds) within bounds, the ferment could not be contained. (see also secret
speech, de-Stalinization)
In the European Communist countries,
Khrushchev's disclosures opened the floodgates of pent-up criticism and
resentment against the local Stalin-type leaders. In Hungary,
Mátyás Rákosi was ousted as
party leader in July 1956 and replaced by Erno Gero.
But Gero was unable to contain the rising tide of unrest and discontent,
which broke out into active fighting late in October, and appealed for Soviet
help. The first phase of the Hungarian Revolution ended in victory for the
rebels: Imre Nagy became premier and agreed, in
response to popular demands, to establish a multiparty system; on November 1 he
declared Hungarian neutrality and appealed to the United Nations. On November 4
the Soviet Union, profiting from the lack of response to Nagy from the Western
powers, and from the British and French involvement in action against Egypt,
invaded Hungary in force and stopped the revolution. In Poland, where the
ferment was also reaching dangerous intensity, the Soviet Union accepted a new
party leadership headed by the more moderate Wladyslaw Gomulka.
There are believed to have been two reasons for this difference in Soviet
policy. One was that in Poland the Communist Party remained in control of the
situation. The other was that the invasion and subjugation of Poland would have
required a military force several times that required in Hungary.
Inside the Communist states, the
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution had a restraining effect. There was,
nevertheless, no return to the Stalinist type of domination and exploitation; a
slow evolution followed toward a degree of internal autonomy, even in Hungary.
The events of 1956 also had profound effects upon Communists outside the Soviet
bloc. There were many resignations after the Hungarian Revolution, and those who
remained in the fold began to question both Soviet leadership and the nature of
a system that had made the ascendancy of Stalin possible. The most trenchant
questioning came from the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro
Togliatti, who concluded that the Soviet pattern could no longer be the
model for all other countries and called in June 1956 for decentralization of
the Communist movement, a view that became known as "polycentrism."
"The whole system becomes polycentric, and . . . we cannot speak of a
single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which
are often different." Although the Italian Communist Party, or segments of
it, were still prepared to support the Soviet Union at times of crisis, at other
times it took positions different from those of the Soviet Union.
A gathering of Communist parties in
Moscow in November 1957, in which China played a leading role, attempted to
reassert a common doctrine while recognizing the need for differences in
national practice. At Chinese insistence it also retained the Stalinist emphasis
on the leadership of the Soviet Union. For a short time relations between the
Soviet Union and China were harmonious: after 1955 Khrushchev had put an end to
the humiliating terms that Stalin had imposed on China and inaugurated a policy
of substantial economic aid.
The differences between China and the
Soviet Union, which were to erupt into an open campaign of mutual abuse by 1962,
were discernible to most observers by 1959, when the Soviet Union failed to give
immediate political backing to Chinese military action against India and when
China, at the same time, showed suspicion of Soviet talks with the United States
in pursuit of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful
coexistence." In 1960 the differences widened, though they were
still unpublicized. The Soviet Union withdrew its technical advisers from China
as a preliminary to what was to prove an almost complete severing of economic
relations. A facade of agreement was maintained, and at a conference of
Communist parties held in Moscow in 1960 a series of resolutions was put forth
to show that unity prevailed as ever in the ranks of the world Communist
movement. News of serious disagreements, however, soon leaked out, for the
increasing number of dissident groups within the several parties had by now
rendered the maintenance of secrecy impossible. In the following year, 1961, the
Soviet Union began a public polemic against the Chinese viewpoint. This was
disguised as an attack on Albania, since 1959 a
client of China and increasingly critical of Khrushchev's foreign policy. By
1962 the quarrel had become open and very bitter. It was conducted as a dispute
over doctrine, but the practical issue underlying it was a basic rivalry for
leadership of the world revolutionary movement.
The Sino-Soviet dispute had three major
effects on this movement. It shattered the pretension that Marxism-Leninism
offered a single world view, since at least two radically different ways of
interpreting Marxism-Leninism were presented to Communists throughout the world,
each backed by a Communist party in power with the prestige of a victorious
revolution behind it. Second, it seriously impaired, if it did not destroy, the
Soviet claim to be the leader of the world revolutionary movement. Since 1960
nearly all Communist parties have split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese
portions, though outside Asia the Soviet portion has usually retained
predominance. In the important parts of Asia, with the possible exception of
India, where the party is divided into several warring factions, China has
become the predominant influence upon Communist parties. Third, the mere fact of
the dispute tended to create greater flexibility for individual parties within
the Communist movement as a whole, even in the case of parties that nominally
accepted Soviet leadership. The Romanians, for
example, were able to follow a nationalistic course by which they successfully
resisted Soviet attempts to integrate the Romanian economy into the bloc
pattern. The Romanians also took an independent line in their trade relations
with other countries, in refusing to participate in the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia, and in their policy toward Israel.
After the fall of Khrushchev in October
1964, his successors made efforts to reunite the world movement. They were only
moderately successful. Seventy-five parties met in Moscow in June 1969, but of
14 parties in power five did not attend, and Cuba sent only an observer; Asia
and Africa, the main areas of Chinese influence, were very poorly represented.
Little unity emerged from the conference; in particular, the efforts of the
Soviet Union to secure condemnation of China were unsuccessful. The resolution
finally adopted was couched in such general terms as scarcely to conceal that
the cracks had been merely pasted over. In the course of the 1970s, the hold of
the Soviet Communist party over Communist parties outside the bloc seemed for a
time to become weaker, with several parties (notably of France, Spain, and Italy) asserting
independence from Moscow and the right to criticize Soviet policy. This
movement, nicknamed "Eurocommunism,"
had lost much of its force by the end of the decade, however.
A continuing problem in the history of
Communist countries after the death of Stalin was the reform of their
overcentralized political and economic structures. The only country that may be
said to have achieved success was Yugoslavia, which had since 1948 asserted and
maintained its independence from Soviet interference. After initially collectivizing
much of its agriculture, Yugoslavia allowed the collective farms to dissolve. It
also established Workers' Councils in the
factories and publicized them in its foreign propaganda despite Soviet
disapproval. The Yugoslav party program of 1958 contained three points in
particular that were diametrically opposed to Soviet theory: that Socialism can
be achieved without a revolution, that the Communist Party need not have a
monopoly of leadership, and that danger of war arises from the existence of two
power blocs in the world and not (as the Soviet Union contended) from the
aggressive intentions of the United States. In January 1974, a new constitution
was adopted that, apart from making changes in the representational system,
provided for a collective presidency consisting of one member from each republic
and autonomous province. Tito was elected
president for life; after his death in 1980 this office rotated among the
several members of the collective presidency.
The most dramatic failure of an attempt
at reform was in Czechoslovakia. The resignation of the old Stalinist party
leader Antonín Novotný and his replacement by Alexander
Dubcek in January 1968 inaugurated a process of liberalization. The
reformers hoped to humanize Communist rule by introducing basic civil freedoms,
an independent judiciary, and other democratic institutions. The support of
leading economists for this program was particularly significant since it
indicated that they realized that the already accepted policy of economic
decentralization (which included giving a measure of initiative to individual
enterprises) would fail unless accompanied by political changes.
While the Czechoslovak Communists had
repeatedly declared their intention to remain within the existing system,
Moscow, possibly fearing that the developments they had set under way would
ultimately endanger the stability of eastern Europe, endeavoured to induce the
Czechoslovak party leaders to abandon their course. The Soviet effort failed,
possibly because there were no Czechoslovak Communist leaders prepared, with
Soviet help, to oust Dubcek. Finally a group of Warsaw Pact
forces--predominantly Soviet, but with token contributions from the other Warsaw
Pact members except Romania--invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of August
20-21, 1968, effectively killing the momentum of the reform movement in
Czechoslovakia. A Soviet-controlled security service was installed, and the Dubcek
leadership was gradually forced out of top posts and eventually expelled from
the party. Although the repression was thorough, there was no mass terror.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
came as a greater shock to many Communists than the invasion of Hungary because
it was directed against Communist leaders who strongly asserted their loyalty to
Moscow. The motives that prompted Soviet action were probably two: one was the
fear that the Soviet defense area created by Stalin after World War II might be
endangered if the Dubcek regime were allowed to continue; the other was
the fear that the entrenched and conservative Communist parties in other
European Communist countries, and in the Soviet Union itself, might not be equal
to the challenge posed by a reformed Communism in Czechoslovakia.
This concern that the power of the
Communist party might be diminished may also have acted as a brake on internal
reform. The reforms carried out by Khrushchev between 1953 and 1964 had been
extensive. The arbitrary powers of the security police were brought under
control; there were widespread reviews and rehabilitations (often posthumously)
of the sentences of those sent to labour camps under Stalin; and reforms (in
1958) removed the worst anomalies of Soviet criminal law and procedure. The
stringent controls over the lives of workers and farmers were relaxed.
Discussion and debate were tolerated among writers and intellectuals to a degree
that would have been inconceivable under Stalin. The whole system of
agricultural management was considerably relaxed, and a system of incentives for
the collective farmers was introduced. The limit of reform, as Khrushchev saw
it, was the point at which any threat appeared to the party's control over all
aspects of life. Under his successor, Leonid Brezhnev,
the brake on reform was applied more heavily. Criticism of Stalin decreased.
Freedom of opinion was considerably restricted by the introduction of penal
provisions against "slandering" the Soviet system: for the first time
since Stalin's death, there were trials of writers, and the courts ceased to
show any inclination to assert their independence as they had under Khrushchev.
The numbers of political prisoners steadily increased, although the Brezhnev
regime could not be compared to Stalin's. A movement toward economic reform had
started under Khrushchev, aiming at some decentralization of economic control
through greater freedom for enterprises to plan their own operations and through
more influence for market forces. This was continued and officially encouraged
after 1964 by Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin,
but it made little headway and was abandoned. The period of the 1970s was one of
economic stagnation and conservatism at home, coupled with expansion of military
power abroad.
The most far-reaching innovation in
Communist doctrine during the period 1953-70 was the Chinese interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism known as Maoism. In the Soviet sphere several profound changes
in doctrine took place after the death of Stalin. One change was the rise of
ideological dispute for the first time since the early 1920s. The Yugoslav ideas
were denounced as "revisionism," a
term that harked back to the turn of the century when it had been used to
characterize the views of Eduard Bernstein, who had argued that Socialism could
be achieved without a revolution. After 1957 the terms "revisionism"
and "dogmatism" became an integral part of Communist discourse. They
were applied in a variety of meanings. By the Chinese, "revisionism"
was used to mean, in effect, Khrushchevism--i.e.,
the policies that Khrushchev had introduced in both domestic and
international relations and that the Chinese opposed. On the Soviet side,
"revisionism" became a catchphrase to designate any political reform
that appeared to endanger the dominance of the Communist Party. As defined at
the Moscow conference of 1957 (with Chinese approval then), it was applied to
all reform movements within the Communist system that denied "the
historical necessity of the proletarian revolution," or the "Leninist
principles for the construction of the party." The term
"dogmatism," in Soviet usage, means a doctrinal conservatism that
ignores changing realities, a clinging to received ideas in a way
"calculated to alienate the party from the masses." In practice the
Soviets have sought a course between revisionism and dogmatism.
Important new elements in Soviet
doctrine were set out in the party program adopted by the 22nd congress in
October 1961 (which were, to some extent, embodied in the declarations of the
Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960). First, there was the concession that there
are different roads to Socialism. This may have been no more than a practical
recognition of the fact that since the breach with Yugoslavia
and the death of Stalin it had no longer been possible for the Soviet Union to
impose its own pattern on all Communist states. The invasion of Hungary
in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979 were not,
according to Moscow, inconsistent with this doctrine, since in each case the
Soviet Union acted out of a duty to assist a fraternal Socialist state in
putting down a counterrevolution. In the case of Czechoslovakia,
which had not asked for such assistance, a new tenet was added by Brezhnev in
November 1968. He contended that, when "internal and external" forces
hostile to Socialism attempted to restore capitalism in a Socialist country, it
became a matter of concern to the whole Socialist community. This tenet was used
to justify the action of the Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 and of the Soviet
forces in December 1979.
The second change in Soviet doctrine was
the view that war between the capitalist and Socialist powers was no longer
inevitable, as had always been asserted by both Lenin
and Stalin. This was a practical recognition of
the fact that a war waged with nuclear weapons would be more likely to lead to
mutual annihilation than to victory. Khrushchev emphasized the possibility of
"peaceful coexistence" between different social systems and the
achievement of Socialism by peaceful means. In the 1970s, "peaceful
coexistence" became known as "détente."
This doctrine raised hopes of real peace between Communist and non-Communist
states, but the Soviet leaders made it clear that détente would not
affect either political warfare against the West or military support for wars of
liberation. The massive invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December
1979 left détente seriously impaired.
The third doctrinal change after 1953
was also dictated by practical reality. The Comintern had rigidly applied
concepts drawn from Western history to revolutions in Africa and Asia:
industrialization, the emergence of a proletariat, and a Socialist revolution
carried out under the leadership of a Communist party. This Marxist analysis
proved to be totally unrealistic in the case of underdeveloped countries in
which the predominant force was nationalism.
This was increasingly recognized, after 1956, in Soviet doctrine that declared
the proper revolutionary aim in the developing countries to be "national
democracy." In Khrushchev's words this meant accepting a
"noncapitalist path of development," which would be in the interests
"not only of one class but of the broad strata of the people." (see
also Marxism)
In the late 20th century the Soviet
leadership faced two main problems: a slowing down in the rate of economic
growth, to which the party had tied its promises of an improved standard of
living, and a ferment of criticism among an intellectual minority, which
included an influential component of leading scientists. Two alternatives seemed
the most likely: either a return to more repressive measures or a reform of the
Soviet system. (L.B.S.)
Following the death of Brezhnev in 1982,
a new generation of less dogmatic party technocrats chose reform. Led by Mikhail
S. Gorbachev, who became general secretary in 1985 and president in 1988, Soviet
leaders spoke of basic structural reform (perestroika) and more openness (glasnost)
in Soviet society and in foreign policy. In what amounted to a fourth doctrinal
change, Soviet leaders declared that Communist revolution was no longer the
mission of the Soviet Union, nor would the country continue to serve as the
ideological model for world Communism. Underscoring this doctrinal reversal, the
Communist Party officially gave up its administrative monopoly at the 28th party
conference in 1990. The more relaxed attitude in Soviet society subsequently
encouraged Soviet-bloc countries in eastern Europe and Africa to develop a more
independent stance, and in fact many of them cast out their Communist leaders
altogether. The dramatic turnaround of the Polish trade-union movement, called
Solidarity, was a prime example. In the early 1980s, Solidarity had briefly
challenged the Communist Party's power and subsequently had been outlawed; but
by 1990 its leader, Lech Walesa, had become president of Poland.
As Communist parties in eastern Europe
and Africa were falling, those in Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and China seemed
all the more firmly entrenched. In China especially, the violence with which the
student-led "pro-democracy" demonstrations were crushed in May and
June 1989 seemed more a desperate attempt of party leaders to hold on to power
than a means of preventing anarchy in the midst of an overall economic
breakdown. China, like the Soviet Union, however, also had undergone fundamental
shifts in policy. Following the failures of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76),
it adopted a plan for modernization that included attracting foreign investment,
adopting the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology,
and defense) of Deng Xiaoping, reducing collectivization of agriculture,
allowing greater individual choice, and restricting political dogmatism to the
realm of politics. In 1989 China took a major
step when it normalized relations with the Soviet Union. Although the general
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party had called Gorbachev a
"traitor" to Communism, both groups recognized the importance of
developing economic ties and, furthermore, could agree that no longer did there
exist "compulsory models or stereotypes for realizing socialist ideas and
principles." (Ed.)
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공산주의 (共産主義, communism)
사유재산제(私有財産制) 대신에 재산의 공유를
실현시킴으로써 계급없는 평등사회를 이룩하려는 사상 및
운동.
어원인 '콤무네'(commune)는 다른 사람과의 나눔, 사귐을
뜻하는 라틴어로서 공동체의 재산이 구성원들 모두에게
속하는 사회제도를 일컬었다. 재산의 사유가 빚어내는
도덕성의 흠결(欠缺)을 간파하고 공유재산제를 바탕으로
보다 합리적이고 정의로운 사회공동체를 일구려는 소박한
공산주의의 이상은 인간이 정치적·사회적 사색을 시작한
때부터 싹튼 것으로 볼 수 있다. 공산주의 사상의 기원은 플라톤의
〈국가 The Republic〉, 고대 유대인들의 에세네파(派),
초대교회의 교리, 근대 초 토머스 모어의
〈유토피아 Utopia〉, 요한 안드레에의 〈그리스도의 도시
Christianopolis〉 등에까지 소급된다.
공산주의 개념이 가지는 다양한 용법은 대체로 다음과
같이 분류될 수 있다. 첫째, 19세기 초반 '사회주의'
개념이 등장할 때까지 공산주의는 고대 이래 맥을 이어온
재산공유제 원칙을 가리켰으며 이는 곧 사유재산제도의
비판을 의미했다. 둘째, 마르크스주의에
따르면 공산주의란 인류 역사 최후의 단계인데, 민중들은
계급이 소멸하고 생산력이 극도로 확대된 이상사회에서
의욕에 따라 일하고 필요한 만큼 소비할 수 있게 된다. 셋째,
20세기에 새로이 첨가된 의미 내용으로 수정주의적
마르크스주의 내지 페이비언 사회주의에 대하여 특히 '혁명적'
마르크스주의 또는 마르크스-레닌주의를 공산주의라고 한다.
넷째, 마르크스 이전의 프루동주의처럼 혁명적 성격이
미미한 것을 사회주의라 하고 블랑키주의 등 정치적·혁명적
성향이 짙은 사상을 공산주의로 부르기도 한다.
공산주의 이론
현대의 공산주의는 카를 마르크스와
프리드리히 엥겔스에
의하여 체계화되고 블라디미르 일리치 레닌,
요시프 스탈린등이
계승한 '프롤레타리아 혁명이론'을 가리키지만 처음부터
유물론(唯物論)이나 무신론(無神論)의 토양에서 발아한 것은
아니었다 (→ 색인
: 마르크스). 오히려 인류사의 곳곳에서 나타나는
공산주의적 공동체는 성서의 영감을 받아 이루어진 예가
많았고 다분히 종교적인 특성을 지니고 있었다. 현대
공산주의는 시민혁명과 산업혁명의 여파가 정치·사회를
통하여 격심한 파동을 일으키고 있던 변혁기의 산물이었다.
프랑스 혁명은 봉건적 전제군주제를 무너뜨리고 시민적
자유와 권리를 천명하는 데는 성공했으나 천명된 자유를
제도화하지는 못했으며 결국 나폴레옹 보나파르트의 제정(帝政)을
초래함으로써 '부르주아 민주주의혁명'으로 남게 되었다.
프랑스 혁명을 배태시킨 사회사상 속에는 계몽주의와
더불어 법 앞에서의 평등뿐 아니라 경제·사회적 평등을
부르짖는 혁명적 공산주의 및 사회주의적 제반 경향도
포함되어 있었다. 이들은 정치상의 모순이나 산업혁명 이후
노정된 여러 사회악의 원인이 궁극적인 진리와 자연법칙에
반하는 사회제도에 있다고 보고 이상사회가 도래하려면
인간의 도의심(道義心)에 각성이 이루어져야 한다고
생각했다. 고전적 공산주의의 신앙적 영적(靈的) 색채는
여기서 이성적·인류애적 이상주의로 대체되었으며,
가브리엘 보노 드 마블리, 프랑수아 노엘 바뵈프,
오귀스트 블랑키
등의 공산주의자와 생
시몽, 푸리에,
로버트 오언등
이른바 공상적 사회주의자들은 모두 프랑스 혁명의
평등사상에 힘입은 사람들이었다.
1848년 2월혁명 직후 마르크스와 엥겔스가
발표한 〈공산당 선언 Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei〉으로
공산주의는 새로운 차원을 맞이하게 된다. 마르크스주의는
19세기 중반 서유럽에 만연된 인간소외현상(人間疏外現象)을
극복하여 인간의 해방을 성취하려는 의도에서 출발했으므로
크게는 사회주의와 같은 범주에 드는 것이었다. G.W.F. 헤겔의
관념론적 변증법(辨證法)과
L .A. 포이어바흐의
인간학적 유물론을
비판 수용하는 과정에서 공산주의 이론을 발전시킨
마르크스는, 1845년 엥겔스와 〈신성가족(神性家族) Die heilige
Familie〉을 공동집필한 이래 죽을 때까지 친분관계를
유지했고, 엥겔스는 유물변증법과 프롤레타리아의 세계사적
사명에 이르는 공산주의 이론 전반에 대하여 과학성과
체계성을 부여했다.
마르크스주의는 인식론(認識論)에 있어서 일체의 선험적(先驗的)
관념을 거부하고 감각과 경험에 의존했다. 이와 같은
유물론적 인식에 따르면 인간이란 온전히 자연의 일부이며
행위는 외부의 자극에 반응함으로써 이루어진다. 행위에는
물론 정신의 작용이 주요한 역할을 담당하지만, 1차적으로
정신을 좌우하는 것은 감각을 통한 외계(外界)의 인식이며
이러한 인식의 축적으로부터 더욱 복잡하고 추상적인 언표(言表)나
개념들이 형성된다. 유물론의 시각으로 사회구성체를
조명할 때, 그 하부구조(下部構造)를 이루는 것은 생산력과
생산관계라는 경제적인 요인이고 정치제도·법률·종교·사상·문화
등은 경제적 토대 위에서 상부구조를 구축한다. 인간·사회공동체·자연의
변화와 운동은 변증법 원리에 따라 이행된다. 정(正 These)·반(反
Antithese)·합(合 Synthese)의 변증법 도식은 혼돈과 투쟁의
기제인 동시에 발전의 기제이기도 한데 예컨대 '정'의
내면에는 '반'을 싹트게 할 모순의 씨가 들어 있다. 어떤
사회의 생산력은 정지해 있는 것이 아니라 인간의 지능,
과학 기술의 진보에 따라 증가한다. 그때 새로운 생산력과
낡은 생산관계 사이에는 양립할 수 없는 모순이 일어나며 이
모순은 계급관계로 전이된다. 다시 말해서 낡은 생산관계를
유지함으로써 이득을 보는 유산계급(지배계급, 자본가계급)과
새로운 생산관계의 정립을 통하여 이득을 보게 될 무산계급(피지배계급,
프롤레타리아트) 사이에는 투쟁이 불가피하다. 새로운
생산관계는 정치제도를 비롯한 상부구조의 변화를
이끌어낸다.
〈공산당 선언〉에서 마르크스와 엥겔스는 인류역사를
원시 공산주의 사회, 고대 노예제 사회, 중세 봉건사회, 근대
자본주의 사회로 설명한 뒤, 프롤레타리아 혁명과 공산주의
사회의 도래를 예언했다. 계급투쟁은 자본주의가
무르익어감에 따라 중대한 국면으로 접어든다. 자본주의는
세계 전역의 경제체제를 서로 의존하게 만들어 노동자들의
공동이해를 깨닫게 하기 때문에 프롤레타리아 계급을
결속시키는 결과를 낳고, 인간과 사회에 대한 환상을
제거하여 노동자계급으로 하여금 자본가들에게 억압당하고
있다는 사실을 깨닫게 한다. 한편 자본가계급은 치열한
경쟁과 시장의 고갈로 인하여 점차 약화되어 간다.
마르크스는 이 무렵까지만 해도 자본주의 경제체제의
모순과 붕괴 원인에 관하여 충분한 이론적 근거를 갖추지는
못했는데, 1867년에 제1권의 출간을 본 〈자본론 Das Kapital〉은
이러한 의미에서 쓰여진 비판 경제학 이론서였다. 애덤 스미스,
데이비드 리카도
등 고전경제학의 여러 분야를 검토한 마르크스는
노동가치설에 기초하여 ' 잉여가치이론'(剩餘價値理論)을
도출해냈다. 사회적 약자인 노동자는 자기의 노동력을
재생산하는 데 필요한 시간 이상의 노동을 하게 되고 이
지불받지 못하는 잉여노동시간에 창출된 가치, 곧
잉여가치는 자본가의 수중에 들어가 이윤(利潤)을 형성한다.
이윤은 곧 노동력 착취의 결과이다. 그런데 자본가들이
자유경쟁에서 살아남기 위해서는 노동자계급에 대한 착취를
강화해야만 하기 때문에 여기서 부르주아지(자본가계급)와
프롤레타리아트는 이해의 근원적인 대립으로 말미암아
투쟁이 불가피해진다. 프리드리히 엥겔스는 사회주의가
역사적 유물론과 잉여가치이론으로 인하여 하나의 과학으로
정초되었다고 평가했으며, 마르크스주의를 '과학적
사회주의'로 명명한 반면 생 시몽, 푸리에, 오언 등 선대의
사회주의에는 '공상적
사회주의'라는 딱지를 붙였다.
1848년 2월혁명이 실패로 끝나고 노동자계급이 마르크스가
예견한 역사발전 과정에 충심으로 참여하기를 망설이자
사회주의자들은 자신들의 입장을 재검토하게 되었다.
마르크스는 〈고타
강령 비판 Kritik des Gothaer Programms〉(1875)에서 혁명이
이상사회를 당장 가져다주지는 않는다고 전제한 뒤,
자본주의 사회로부터 공산사회가 잉태되려면 기나긴 진통이
수반되며 그 과도기에는 '프롤레타리아 독재'가 필요하다고
역설했다. 마르크스는 이 과도기를 공산사회의 제1단계라고
말했지만 다른 저서에서는 대개 사회주의라는 용어를
구사하고 사회주의가 무르익어 사유재산과 계급 및 국가가
완전히 소멸된 보다 높은 단계에 도달한 경우에만
공산주의라는 용어를 사용한다. 사회주의의 제2단계, 즉
보다 높은 단계는 고도의 생산력을 기반으로 한다. 여기서는
분업체계에 노예처럼 예속되는 상태가 불식되며 육체노동과
정신노동의 차이가 없어지고 노동이 단지 생활의 방편이
아니라 생활의 제1욕구로 되어 개인은 능력에 따라 일하고
필요에 따라 분배받게 된다.
'공산주의'라는 어휘의 사용법은 일찍부터 혼선을 빚기
시작했다. 1847년 '공산주의자 동맹'을 직접 창설한 바 있는
카를 마르크스는 기존의 정당들이 사회주의라는 명칭을
붙일 자격도 없으면서 그렇게 자처하고 있기 때문에
공산주의라는 용어를 채택한 것이라고 설명했다. 그후
공산주의는 그 궁극적인 목표가 아니라 특정한 강령을 가진
특정 정당을 지칭하게 된다. 공산주의 정당을 통합하고
공산당의 강령을 세우는 데 크게 이바지한 인물은 러시아의
마르크스주의자 블라디미르 일리치 레닌이었다.
소련의 공산주의
공산주의가 마르크스에 의하여 전혀 새로운 해석을 얻게
되자 '공산주의'라는 용어는 다양한 정치조직의 이름으로
널리 유포되었다. 특히 1917년 레닌의
지도 아래 러시아 제정을 전복시킨 사회민주노동당 다수파(볼셰비키)는
이듬해 '러시아공산당'이라는 당 명칭을 채택했다.
러시아의 마르크스주의는 레닌과 볼셰비키 이전에 이미 30년의
전통을 가지고 있었다. 그 가운데 러시아 마르크스주의의
아버지라 불리는 G.V. 플레하노프는
'인민주의'로 알려진 토착 혁명운동 속에서 성장한
인물이었는데, 차르 체제를 대체하는 부르주아 민주정권이
프롤레타리아 혁명의 전(前)단계를 이루어야 한다고 믿고
있었다 (→ 색인
: 플레하노프).
블라디미르 일리치 레닌 역시 카잔에서 혁명가 생활을
시작할 때까지는 인민주의의 영향을 입고 있었다. 1889년
마르크스주의로 전향한 그는 P.N. 트카체프 등의 인민주의
이론으로부터 규율잡힌 직업혁명가 조직의 필요성을 느끼게
되었다. 프롤레타리아트에 혁명적 계급의식을 고취하고
이들을 선도하는 공산당은 국가를 전복하고 사회주의를
정착시키는 과정에서 주어진 몫을 다할 것으로 기대되었다.
농노해방(1861) 이후 자치공동체에 의하여 생산이
이루어지는 당시 사정과 농업사회의 전통에 근거하여
인민주의자(나로드니키)들이
프롤레타리아 계급의 존재성을 부인했고, 플레하노프가
산업발전의 추세를 들어 노동자계급의 성장에 주목했다면,
레닌은 자치공동체의 급속한 와해로 말미암아 러시아
농민계급의 상당 부분이 새로운 프롤레타리아트로 개편되고
있음을 지적했다. 레닌은 부르주아 민주주의혁명과
프롤레타리아 혁명의 2단계를 설정하고 있던 플레하노프
등과는 달리 부르주아 혁명을 뛰어넘어 곧바로
프롤레타리아 혁명을 수행해야 한다고 주장했다. 1903년 이와
같은 전술적 차이에 따라서 사회민주노동당은 볼셰비키와
멘셰비키로 분열되었고, 레닌은 인민주의자 및
사회주의자들에 대항하면서 볼셰비키를 프롤레타리아
전위대(前衛隊)로 키워나갔다.
1917년 2월 페트로그라드의 노동자와 군인들이 차르
니콜라이 2세를 축출했다. 사회주의 성향의 케렌스키임시정부와
레닌의 혁명노선 사이에는 타협의 여지가 없었고 10월이
되자 볼셰비키 적위대는 임시정부를 타도, 프롤레타리아
혁명을 완수했다. 레닌의 교조주의는 소비에트 정부가
구성된 이후에도 견지되었다. 사회혁명당 우파세력과
멘셰비키는 비난을 면치 못했고 볼셰비키 내부에서도 이설(異說)은
금지되었다. 1921년 3월의 전국공산당대회에서 볼셰비키(공산당)는
'소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방'의 생활 전반을 통제할
일사불란한 단일정당으로 확립되었다.
레닌은 공산주의를 국제적 차원의 운동으로 파악하고
있었다. 이른바 사회주의적 국제주의(프롤레타리아
국제주의)란 공산주의로의 이행이 모든 사회발전의
세계사적 필연성이라는 것, 각국 노동자의 이해(利害)는
지속적·궁극적으로 볼 때 동일하다는 것 등 마르크스주의의
본질을 이루는 내용이었다. 일찍이 제1차 세계대전이
발발했을 때, 제국주의 전쟁을 내전과 계급투쟁으로
전환시켜야 한다고 역설했던 레닌은 유럽의 사회주의
정당들로부터 기대한 만큼의 호응을 얻지는 못했었다.
레닌은 소비에트 정부 수립에 성공한 뒤 세계혁명에 관심을
돌렸다. 그는 반(反)식민주의가 팽배해 있던 인근 유럽
국가와 아시아 국가들을 1차 목표로 삼았으나 신생 조국
소련의 존립을 지나치게 의식한 결과 세계혁명운동을
소련의 국가이익 아래 종속시키고 말았다. 1920년 7월
코민테른(제3인터내셔널)
제2차 대회에서 채택된 소위 '21개 조건안'에는 레닌의
마르크스-레닌주의 당 이론이 그대로 반영되어 있다. 러시아
볼셰비키당의 모범과 같이 공산당은 민주 집중제 원칙에
따라 규율이 잡힌 '노동계급 해방의 핵심조직'인 것이다.
1921년 6~7월 코민테른 제3차 대회는 '신경제정책'(NEP)을
채택했다. 레닌은 10월혁명 후의 내란 기간 동안 도시
노동자들과 적군(赤軍)을 굶기지 않기 위해서 전시공산주의
정책을 실시했고 그 대가로 대부분의 농민들을 희생시켰다.
이러한 상황에서 사회민주주의 개혁세력이 공산당과
소비에트 정부의 타도를 내걸고 파업을 선동하자
정권유지의 차원에서 신경제정책이 도입된 것이다. 레닌은
마르크스의 원론을 근거로, 겨우 절반 정도 공업화를 달성한
프롤레타리아 러시아가 사회주의를 꽃피우려면, 정부
스스로 자본주의를 발전시키고 주도해야 한다고 해명했다.
신경제정책의 목적은 자본주의 국가들과의 경제관계를
발전시키기 위해 시간을 벌자는 것으로서, 유럽에서의
혁명전략을 잠정 유보한 상태로 소규모 기업활동이
권장되었다.
1924년 레닌이 죽자 요시프 V. 스탈린이
공산당 서기장에 취임했다. 레닌의 충실한 후계자임을
자처했던 그는 세계혁명의 보루(堡壘)가 될 소련 공산주의의
유지·강화를 주장했다. 레닌과 스탈린은 자본주의 국가와의
평화공존 및 교역의 필요성을 인정한 점에서 일치하고
있었으나 스탈린의 입장에는 레닌주의를 벗어난 면도 적지
않았다. 사회주의 건설과업에 계급투쟁이 필수적으로
요청된다고 추론한 그는 이를 토대로 대숙청과 같은 반대파
탄압정책을 전개하기 시작했다. 레닌은 과거 1922년과 1923년에
계급간의 화해, 특히 농민과 노동자계급의 조화를 거듭
역설했었다.
레닌이 남긴 유서를 보면 알 수 있듯이 적위대를 조직하여
10월혁명의 승리에 결정적인 역할을 수행했던 레온 트로츠키는
스탈린의 가장 어려운 경쟁자였다 (→
색인 : 트로츠키). 이념적 측면에서 스탈린과 트로츠키의
반목은 일국사회주의론(一國社會主義論)과 세계혁명론의
대립이었지만 우선 지적해야 할 것은 이들의 논쟁이
권력투쟁의 원인이 된 것은 아니고 오히려 그 결과였다는
점이다. 사회주의가 특정 국가에서 완성될 수 있다는 것이 스탈린주의의
내용이라면 트로츠키주의세계혁명론의
요지는 유럽 프롤레타리아의 직접적 지원 없이는 러시아
노동자계급이 권력을 유지할 수 없다는 것이었다. 1924년부터
1928년까지 트로츠키를 제거하기 위한 면밀한 정치공작이
진행된 결과 이듬해 좌파 세력의 중추였던 트로츠키는
국외로 추방당했다.
스탈린은 트로츠키 문제가 해결되자 곧바로 신경제정책을
청산하고 급속한 공업화와 농업집산화를 추진했다.
신경제정책의 폐기가 순조롭기만 한 것은 아니었다.
수백만의 농민이 기근으로 사망했으며 니콜라이 부하린,
미하일 톰스키 등 당내 우파 세력들과는 마찰이 일어났다.
이들은 NEP가 국내 경제안정에 미친 영향을 긍정적으로
평가하고 점진적인 공업화를 통하여 농민계급의 지지를
유도해야 한다고 생각했다. 1929년 4월 스탈린은 '부하린
그룹과 우리 당에서의 우익 경향'이라는 연설을 통하여
부하린 등이 전세계적인 혁명 경향과 부농(富農)에 의해
제기되고 있는 위기상황을 간과해왔다고 비난했다.
트로츠키, G.Y. 지노비예프등의
좌파에 이어 부하린, 톰스키 등 당내 우파에 이르는 일련의
권력투쟁과정은 코민테른의 성격에 여실히 반영되었다.
요시프 스탈린의 통치방식은 레닌처럼 공산당을 매개로
한 것이 아니라, 라브렌티 베리아,
안드레이 비신스키,
게오르기 말렌코프등
소장 측근들과 내무인민위원부(NKVD)로 알려진 비밀경찰에
의존한 것이었다. 진정한 마르크스-레닌주의 당으로서의
공산당의 지위는 현저히 약화되었고 1934년부터 1952년 사이에
오직 한 차례(1939)의 당대회가 열렸을 뿐이었다. 각국의
서기장들은 스탈린주의를 서둘러 모방하게 되었으며
위계질서에 따른 복종이 공산당의 기본성격으로
고착되어갔다.
아시아와 유럽의 공산주의
볼셰비키 혁명과 소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방의
활력에 힘입어 마르크스주의와 공산당은 유럽과 아시아에
급속도로 확산되기 시작했다. 독일·프랑스·영국
등지에서는 제2차 세계대전이 발발하기 훨씬 이전부터
강력한 공산주의 정당들이 성장하여 합법적인 의회활동을
벌이고 있었다. 프랑스 공산당은 파시즘에 대항하는 좌파
인민전선에서 주도적인 역할을 수행했다.
이와는 반대로 아시아의 공산주의 운동은 지하에서
이루어졌다. 1920년 인도네시아에서 최초의 공산당이 발족한
이래 1921년에 중국 공산당, 이듬해에는 일본 공산당이
창설되었다. 한국의 공산당은 1923년 서울에서 조직되었다.
코민테른 극동총국(極東總局) 고려부에 몸담고 있던 이동휘(李東輝),
정재달(鄭在達), 한명서(韓明瑞) 등 3명의 한인위원은
이르쿠츠크 군정학교를 졸업하고 당시 블라디보스토크에 와
있던 김재봉(金在鳳)과
신철(辛鐵)에게 국내에 잠입하여 공산당을 조직할 것을
지령했다. 4월과 5월에 각각 입경한 신철과 김재봉은 주로 북성회(北星會)와
접촉을 가졌으며, 김찬(金燦)의
집에서 이봉수(李鳳洙), 김약수(金若水), 원우관(元友觀),
신백우(申伯雨) 등과 함께 국내 고려부를 발족시켰다.
1922년에 결성된 미국 공산당은 비록
정치적으로 큰 영향력을 행사하지는 못했지만 1920, 1930년대를
통하여 노동조합운동에 공헌했다. 그결과 1940년대의
반공주의 노동운동가들은 미국 내 노동조합을 재정비하는
과정에서 상당한 곤란을 겪게 되었다.
1920년대부터 코민테른의 전문 혁명가들이 세계 각국에
파견되기 시작했는데, 인도네시아와 중국에서 활약한
네덜란드의 공산주의자 G.V. 스네블리에트(흔히 '마링'이라
불림)와 러시아계 미국인으로서 중국 공산당의 결성을 도운
마이클 그루첸버그(본명은 미하일 보로딘)는
특히 유명하다.
레닌은 후진지역 반제국주의 투쟁세력을 소비에트 정권과
서유럽 프롤레타리아트의 예비군으로 간주했고 처음부터
아시아 민족해방운동에 관여했다. 1926년 호치민[胡志明]에
의해서 베트남 사회주의 노동당이 설립되었다. 호치민은
1920년 프랑스 공산당 창설을 도왔으며 그뒤 모스크바에서
열린 제2, 3차 코민테른 대회에 참석한 바 있는 노련한
직업혁명가였다. 한편 일본의 공산주의자 노사카
산조[野坂參三]와 도쿠다
규이치[德田球一]는 경찰의 탄압 속에서도 꾸준히
노동조합운동을 추진했다.
제2차 세계대전 초에 체결된 독·소불가침조약이
독일군의 침공으로 파기되자 코민테른의 정책은 인민전선
쪽으로 선회했고, 아시아·유럽의 공산당은 연합국 편에서
전체주의 침략자들과 맞서 싸웠다. 중국과 한국의
공산주의자들은 중국 본토 및 만주 일대의 항일투쟁(抗日鬪爭)에서
공동보조를 취하고 있었으며, 중국 내 공산주의 세력과
민족주의자들은 때때로 마찰을 빚는 경우도 있었지만
전쟁이 종결될 때까지 연합전선(국공합작)을 유지했다.
말레이 반도에서는 중국 공산당의 분파가 항일 게릴라
전술에 성공함으로써 대전 말기에 말레이시아·싱가포르
정치를 좌우하기도 했다.
프랑스 공산당이 대(對) 독일 레지스탕스 운동에서
차지했던 비중은 대단한 것이었다. 전쟁이 끝난 후 프랑스
공산당은 드골파(派) 및 공화전선과 겨루면서 권력투쟁을
벌였으며 이탈리아의 상황도 이와 비슷했다. 일반적으로
소련의 대독항전은 전후 동유럽에 위성국가들을 들어앉히고
서유럽 각국의 공산당을 후원하는 데 길을 터준 셈이었다.
소련 점령군은 동유럽의 반공·반소운동을 불가능하게
만들었다.
중일전쟁은 중국
공산당이 특히 농촌지역에서 조직의 근간을 형성할 수 있는
기회를 제공했다. 마오쩌둥
[毛澤東]이 이끄는 중국 공산당은 일본군과의 교전을
주저했던 장제스[蔣介石]의
소극적인 자세와 국민당 정부의 부패에 힘입어 1949년 10월 1일
중화인민공화국을 출범시켰다. 마오쩌둥은
정통 공산주의 이론을 받아들이기는 했지만 경험에
있어서는 전혀 판이한 길을 걸어왔다. "농촌에 의한
도시의 고립화"라는 그의 말에서도 드러나듯이 중국
혁명은 도시 프롤레타리아 계급이 아닌 가난한 농민세력에
바탕을 둔 것이었다.
소련은 제2차 세계대전 참전을 계기로 제정 러시아의 영토
대부분을 다시 얻고, 동유럽과 발트 3국 및 발칸 여러
나라에서 우세를 확보했으며 아시아에서는
조선민주주의인민공화국과 외몽골에 괴뢰정권을 세웠다.
전쟁이 끝난 뒤에도 레닌이 주창한 자본주의포위론·전쟁불가피론·양대진영론을
고수했던 요시프 스탈린은
전쟁이란 우연의 결과나 인간 의지의 산물이 아니며 그
원인은 자본주의 체제 자체에 있으므로 자본주의의
제거만이 전쟁을 근멸시킬 수 있다고 생각했다. 스탈린의
전후정책은 미국 및 서유럽과의 불가피한 갈등을 전제한
것이었다. 소련의 팽창정책이 노골화되고 있다고 판단한
미국은 주소(駐蘇) 대리대사 조지 F. 케넌이
제안한 봉쇄정책을 채택하고 1947년 3월 12일 트루먼
독트린에서 이를 구체화시켰다. 스탈린은 경제원조·방위조약·동맹체제를
포함하는 미국의 새로운 정책을 중대한 위협으로 간주했고 9월말
폴란드 바르샤바에서 코민포름(공산당정보국)을
발족시켰다. 당시 안드레이 알렉산드로비치 주다노프가
코민포름 회의에서 행한 연설은 서방에 대하여 영원한 냉전(冷戰)을
선언한 것으로 해석되었다.
공산권의 분열과 개혁조치
국제공산주의운동으로 각국 공산당 지부들은 일방적인
복종을 강요받아왔지만, 소련의 속박으로부터 벗어나려는
움직임 또한 꾸준히 맥을 잇고 있었다.
1948년 6월 전개된 소련과 유고슬라비아 간의 민족주의
공개 논쟁은 국제공산주의운동사상 처음 있는 항명사태였다.
한편 대(對) 독일 게릴라전을 통해 조국을 해방시키고
공로를 인정받아 대통령에 취임한 요시프 브로즈 티토는
소련 공산당의 오랜 지배에 반기를 들고 코민포름에서
탈퇴함으로써 독자노선을 걷기 시작했다.
1953년 5월 5일 스탈린이 죽자 소련 공산당의 통솔력에는 더
큰 어려움이 생기게 되었다. 특히 공산당 서기장직을 승계한
니키타 흐루시초프가
제20차 전당대회에서 스탈린을 격하시킨 뒤, 강력한 정치적
기반을 가지지 못한 공산체제 내부에서는 서서히 민중의
동요가 일기 시작했다 (→
색인 : 흐루시초프). 동베를린의 노동자들은 반정부
운동으로부터 반레닌주의적·반소적 자유화운동의 기치를
올렸고, 폴란드에서는 포즈나인의 노동자들이 '빵과 자유'를
외치며 궐기한 이후 티토주의자로 몰려 은퇴했던
부아디수아프 고무우카가
복귀하면서 개혁파들이 정국을 장악하게 되었다. 1956년
헝가리 총리로 취임한 임레 노디는
격증하는 반소 감정에 의지하여 다당제를 도입하고
바르샤바 조약기구(WTO)에서 헝가리를 탈퇴시켰다. 인내의
한도를 넘어섰다고 판단한 모스크바는 11월 4일 헝가리
전역을 무력으로 침공하기 시작했고 수도 부다페스트에 1,000대의
탱크를 진주시켰다. 소련군의 개입으로 말미암아 공산주의
대의는 역사상 가장 큰 비난을 받게 되었으며 제2차
세계대전 이후 최대의 탈당사태가 빚어졌다.
스탈린주의적인 지배와 착취를 거부했던 헝가리 민중봉기는
어느 정도의 자치가 보장된 다원적 공산세계를 움트게 하는
촉매로 작용했다. 심지어 일인독재체제가 확고부동한
북한과 니콜라에 체아우셰스쿠가
이끄는 루마니아에서도 민족적 독립의 열망이 증대되고
있었다.
소위 민족공산주의경향과
훗날의 당내 민주화 운동은 인텔리겐차(지식인 계급)에
의하여 주도되었는데, 프롤레타리아트보다는 인텔리겐차가
혁명의 주체가 되어야 한다는 것이 레닌의 정론이었던 것을
생각하면 반전(反轉)된 진실을 보는 것 같아 흥미롭다.
인텔리겐차는 헝가리 봉기를 이끌어낸 페퇴피 당을
시작으로 동유럽 전체에 걸쳐 강요된 공산주의의 경직된
틀을 깨뜨리기 시작했다. 헝가리 민중을 고무한 폴란드의 '10월의
봄'도 스탈린주의와 일당독재체제를 비판한 급진파
지식인들이 주도한 것이었다.
1956년 헝가리 봉기에 자극된 중국의 지식인들은
반공주의를 가라앉히기 위한 백화제방에
편승하여 공산당의 고위간부들을 규탄하기 시작했다. '가지각색의
사상이 논쟁을 벌이게 하자'(百花齊放 百家爭鳴)는 구호와
취지를 빌미삼아 쏟아져 나온 반정부 비판의 내용이
용인하기 어려운 수준에 이르자 공산당 지도부에서는
대대적인 반우파 투쟁을 전개했고 수많은 지식인들이
투옥되거나 국외로 추방되었다. 한편 체코슬로바키아의
신세대 지식인들은 1968년 두프체크
개혁정부를 지지하면서 민주주의를 향한 '프라하의 봄'
운동을 추진했다. 1956년의 헝가리에서와 마찬가지로 소련의
정치지도자들은 자유화 운동을 탄압했다.
공산권 내 인텔리겐차의 불만은 무엇보다도 경제문제에
결부되어 있었고 위기의 근원을 이루는 것은 경직된
마르크스주의 통제경제체제였다. 1965년 알렉세이 코시긴총리는
서유럽에서 자본주의 경제를 연구하고 돌아온 예브세이
리베르만의 도움을 받아 사태해결을 모색했다. 소위 '
리베르만 방식'의 골자는
이윤을 생산의 주된 결정요인으로 삼고 통제경제의 틀을
유지하는 범위에서 중앙 경제부서의 과도한 규제를
완화시키자는 것이었다.
행정조직 내부의 개혁을 상징했던 리베르만 방식은 초기
단계의 여러 성과에도 불구하고 시장경제를 배격하는
마르크스-레닌주의적 본질에 억눌림으로써 점차 쇠미해가는
경향을 보였다. 당 위주의 관료주의에 사로잡혀 경제를
상투적으로 정치부분의 종속변수인 것 처럼 취급해온 중앙
행정기구는 사기업에 정책결정권을 위임하고 사기업이 보다
직접적인 형태로 소비자들과 거래관계를 유지한다는 사실에
당황하지 않을 수 없었으며, 특히 가격제도의 혁신과
관련해서는 어떠한 조치도 거부했다. 공산권의 경제문제는
개혁안이 백지화되면서 뿌리 깊은 만성질환이 되어갔고
장차 공산주의를 제도적으로 와해시키는 핵심 요인으로
나타난다.
중·소분쟁은
세계 공산주의 운동사상 특기할 만한 사건이었다. 스탈린이
죽은 뒤 중국 공산당은 마오쩌둥
사상을 바탕으로 발언권을 강화시켜나갔으며 평화공존을
표방한 흐루시초프가 '미국 제국주의'와 타협하는 사태를
관망하면서 이미 1950년대 후반부터 이념적 대결의 길에
들어섰다. 1960년 6월 부쿠레슈티에서 열린 루마니아 공산당
제3차 대회와 11월 모스크바에서 열린 81개 공산당대회 및
이듬해 10월의 소련 공산당 제22차 대회를 거치는 동안
소련의 수정주의·평화공존 노선과 중국의 교조주의·세계혁명
노선은 첨예화된 대립 양상을 보였다. 1962년 중국-인도
국경분쟁이 일어났을 때 겉으로는 중립을 표방하면서도
사실상 인도를 지지했던 소련의 처신은 중국을
격분시키기에 충분했으며, 그해말 쿠바
미사일 위기때 표출된 소련의 투항적 자세는 중국으로
하여금 흐루시초프를 비난하도록 만들었다. 공산주의
세계는 친중국계와 친소련계의 양대 진영으로 구조적인
개편을 이루게 되었고, 북한은 이른바 주체사상을
내세우며 두 초강대국 사이에서 신중한 균형외교정책을
폈다.
공산권의 대분열은 고도의 중앙집권적 지배구조라고 하는
마르크스-레닌주의 체제의 내재적 모순을 반영하는
것이었다. 소련 이론가들의 견해처럼 최선의 방도는
수정주의와 교조주의의 중용을 유지하는 일로 보인다.
과도한 자유주의는 공산당의 권위에 위협이 되고 지나친
보수주의는 민중의 봉기를 유발하기 쉽다. 흐루시초프는
정적인 게오르기 말렌코프를 축출하여 자신의 권력기반을
확보한 뒤 스탈린주의의 압제를 청산하기 시작했다. 주변
위성국가에 대한 그의 새로운 정책은 일정 한도의 정치적·경제적
자치를 전제로 상호협력적 결속을 도모한다는 요지로서
이전의 착취관계와는 차이가 있었다. 그러나 흐루시초프의
개혁노선은 당의 권력상실을 우려한 후계자들에 의해서
부인되었으며 브레주네프정권은
대내적인 억압통치와 아프가니스탄 침공 같은 대외
간섭정책을 추구했다.
개혁조치는 중국 공산당 내부에서도 끊임없이 분쟁의
씨가 되었다. 1960년대 중반 중국 사회의 부르주아적 경향이
당의 민주집중제를 훼손시킬지도 모른다고 우려한
마오쩌둥은 이른바 '문화대혁명'에
착수했다 (→
색인 : 문화대혁명). 자신의 일인독재체제를 공고히 할
목적으로 구상된 이 운동은 10년간 지속되면서 엄청난
재난을 몰고왔다. 전국의 대학·중학교 학생들로 조직되어
마오쩌둥으로부터 혁명의 소용장(少勇將)이라는 영예칭호를
부여받은 홍위병(紅衛兵)들은
교내활동을 넘어 가두에까지 진출했고 부패한 당 관료의
축출을 부르짖으며 사형(私刑)·난동·무력투쟁을 일삼았다.
이결과 처형된 사람 수는 10만을 넘었고 2억에 가까운 인구가
추방되거나 투옥되었다.
1970년대말까지 자취를 감추었던 공산권의 개혁시도는
마오쩌둥이 죽고 덩샤오핑[鄧小平]이
권좌에 오르면서 재개된다 (→
색인 : 덩샤오핑). 그가 추진한 '4개 현대화'계획은 일찍이
저우언라이[周恩來]에
의하여 제시된 이후 1978년 12월 공산당 제11기 제3차
중앙위원회 전체회의에서 재확인된 사업으로 농업·공업·국방·과학기술의
발전을 도모했다. 덩샤오핑의 지론이었던 ' 백묘흑묘론'(白猫黑猫論)은
정치·경제적으로 파국 일보직전에 와 있던 중국의 상황을
반증하는 것이었다. '흰 고양이든 검은 고양이든 쥐를 잘
잡기만 하면 좋은 고양이'라는 논리에 따라 이데올로기를
초월하여 경제적 문호개방을 선택한 중국은 어느 정도
공산주의 경제체제의 실패를 인정하는 것처럼 보였다.
개혁의 범위를 경제분야에 한정시키려는 당국의 의지에도
불구하고 인민들은 보다 큰 정치적 자유를 요구하게
되었으며 이후의 10년은 개혁파와 강경보수파 사이의
권력투쟁으로 점철된다.
공산주의의 쇠퇴
1970년대말 통제경제체제로 말미암은 중압감은 동유럽
전체를 통하여 뚜렷이 고조되어갔다. 1980년 폴란드의
그다이스크 조선소에서는 레흐 바웬사가
1만 7,000여 명의 노동자를 이끌고 파업을 주도, 정부의
경제정책에 항의하고 나섰다. '연대'(솔리다리노스크)라고
명명된 노동조합의 목소리는 그 어느 때보다도 강력한 힘을
가지고 있었다. 타협안 도출을 위한 공산당 지도부의 노력이
이렇다 할 성과를 얻어내지 못하자 야루젤스키국방장관은
계엄령을 선포했으며 군사평의회를 조직하여 권력의 정상에
올랐다. 정부는 노동조합 간부들을 검거하는 등 수많은
억압조치를 강행했지만 노동조합의 요구를 받아들이지
않고는 더이상 정국을 통제할 수 없는 지경에 이르게 되었다.
폴란드 자유노동조합운동을 꾸준히 뒷받침해온 배후세력은
40여 년 간의 모진 탄압에도 끝내 굴하지 않고 명맥을
유지해온 로마 가톨릭 교회였다.
한편 폴란드에 대한 소련군의 개입가능성은 소비에트
연방 내 여러 문제와 최고지도부의 불안정으로 말미암아
현저하게 줄어들었다. 1982년 브레즈네프가 통치하던 오랜
침체기가 끝이 나고 유리 안드로포프가
서기장으로 취임했다. 그러나 안드로포프는 취임 후 15개월이
지나기도 전에 사망했고 뒤를 이은 콘스탄틴 체르넨코역시
단명하고 말았다. 비교적 알려지지 않은 미하일 고르바초프가
소비에트 사회주의 공화국 연방의 국가 원수가 된 것은
이러한 일련의 돌발적 사태에 힘입은 바 컸다. 고르바초프는
오랫동안 당내 아파라치키(안드로포프의 측근세력)로
일해왔음에도 불구하고 공산주의 경제체제의 기본 전제들에
관하여 공공연히 문제를 제기했으며 나중에는 소련의
억압적 메커니즘 전반에 관해서 의구심을 표명했다.
1985년 3월 미하일 고르바초프는 소련 공산당 서기장에
취임했다. 그가 야심을 가지고 제시한 페레스트로이카(perestroika：개혁)와
글라스노스트(glasnost：개방)는
3년 이내에 세계의 이목을 집중시켰고 러시아 국민들
사이에서도 광범위한 지지기반을 형성했다. 정치적인
자유에는 극히 인색하고 개혁의 초점이 경제분야에 놓여
있던 중국과는 정반대로 고르바초프의 개혁정책은
정치영역에서 출발했다. 그의 개혁노선에는 핵물리학자
안드레이 사하로프,
역사학자 로이 메드베데프 등 소비에트 정치체제를
비판하고 민주화를 요구했던 반체제 지식인들의 영향력도
적지 않았다. 1988년 소련 공산당 중앙위원회는 "국가
관료기구의 운영에 폭넓은 인민 계층을 참여시키고
사회주의 법규범에 바탕을 둔 국가체계를 완성하기 위하여
정치제도상의 일대변혁을 일으키자"고 역설했으며,
고르바초프는 한 달 후인 제19차 전연방 당대회에서 "정치체제의
근본적인 재건만이 소련이 직면한 경제적·사회적 문제를
해결할 수 있다"고 선언했다. 이렇게 사회주의 조국의
권력 핵심이 약화되자 동유럽 공산당들은 동요하기
시작했다. 체코슬로바키아의
경우 보다 신속한 개혁을 주장했던 루보미르 슈트로우갈
총리가 공산당 지도자 밀로스 야케스와의 의견 충돌로
인하여 사임했고 반체제운동은 공공연하게 목소리를
높여갔다. 그해 헝가리에서는 약 7만 5,000명의 시위대가 1848년
오스트리아 제국에 저항했던 2월 봉기를 기념했다.
폴란드에서도 파업과 소요사태가 증폭되어갔다. 1989년
바르샤바 법원은 '연대' 노동조합운동의 법적 지위를
복원시켰으며, 이와 동시에 소련 탱크 부대가 헝가리 국경을
빠져나감으로써 조만간 동유럽 전체에서 소련군의 철수가
이루어질 것임을 예고했다.
1989년 3월 모스크바에서 실시된 인민대표회의 대의원
선거는 1917년 10월혁명 이후 가장 민주적인 선거로
기록되었다. 소련 역사 초유의 선거 결과는 공산당과 기성
질서의 패배였고 시민들은 놀라움을 금치 못했다. 널리
알려진 선거구일수록 개혁파들과 반체제 인사들이
당선되었으며 당의 정통성과 우위성을 주장한 후보자들이
대부분 낙선하고 말았다. 한 달 후 개최된 제1차
인민대표회의에서 당 중앙위원회 위원들은 거의 1/3에
육박하는 탈락사태를 빚었다.
이채롭게도 중국의 보수강경 관료주의는 반체제·민주화
운동을 분쇄하는 데 성공했다. 학생시위에 책임을 지고
사퇴했던 후야오방[胡耀邦]이
1989년 사망하자 베이징대학교 학생들은 당내 보수파를
공격하는 대자보(大字報)를 붙이기 시작했고 베이징[北京]과
상하이[上海] 등지에서는 가두시위가 벌어졌다. 베이징의
대학생들은 톈안먼[天安門]
광장에 집결, 연좌시위에 돌입했으며 5월이 되면서
반체제 지식인과 시민들이 합세하여 시위군중의 수가 100여
만명으로 불어났다. 6월 4일 중국 인민해방군은 덩샤오핑, 양상쿤[楊尙昆]
등 원로 보수파 지도자들의 명령을 받아 시위대 해산을 위한
무차별 살상에 들어갔다. '피의 일요일'로 불리는 군의
대학살 이후 강경보수파는 개혁파를 제압했고, 덩샤오핑의
후계자로 지목되면서 경제개혁과 아울러 정치개혁의
필요성을 주장해온 자오쯔양[趙紫陽]
총서기가 축출되었다.
중국과는 대조적으로 공산당 정치기구는 동유럽에서
차례로 붕괴되어갔다. 1989년 8월 24일 자유노조 출신의
타데우슈 마조비에츠키가
폴란드 총리로 확정되어 비(非)공산 연립정부를 구성했고 18년
동안 동독 공산당을 지도해온 에리히 호네커는
라이프치히와 동베를린에서 대규모 시위가 일어난 뒤
실각했다. 바로 다음 날 헝가리
의회는 324대 4라는 압도적인 표차로 야당에 법적 지위를
부여함으로써 40년 이상 지속되었던 일당독재체제를
종식시켰다. 1989년말 불가리아 및 루마니아의 공산당
지도부가 동요하기 시작했고 헝가리 국민들은 조각(組閣)을
위한 자유총선에 참여했다. 11월 체코슬로바키아에 선거에
의한 새 정부가 탄생했다. 연초에 반공산주의 시위를
선동했다는 죄목으로 체포된 바 있는 바츨라프 하벨은
체코슬로바키아 의회에서 대통령으로 선출되었다.
소련과 동유럽의 공산당은 1991년에 이르러 정치권력을
완전히 상실했다. 공산주의 체제에 대한 불만은 대변혁의
과정에서 민중의 직접행동으로 표출되어 나왔는데,
루마니아 독재자 니콜라에 체아우셰스쿠가 살해된 경우를
제외하면 대부분 평화적인 방법으로 이행되었다. 1991년 8월
모스크바에서 일어난 보수강경파 쿠데타가 대중의 지지를
얻지 못한 채 무위로 끝나자, 피델 카스트로가
일인독재체제를 형성하고 있는 쿠바와 김일성이
이끄는 북한, 그리고 베이징과 하노이에서 정권을 유지하고
있는 공산주의자들만이 마르크스주의에 대한 그들 나름의
해석을 고수하게 되었다.
경제문제가 공산권의 몰락을 초래했다는 것은 의심할
여지가 없는 사실이지만 정치적 요인도 이에 못지 않은 큰
역할을 담당했다. 〈공산당 선언〉에서 카를 마르크스가
구사했던 희망에 찬 말들이나 볼셰비키 앞에서 레닌이 토한
열변들은 사실상 단 한번도 실현된 적이 없었다. 결국
공산당 지도부란 유고슬라비아의 철학자 밀로반 드질라스의
평가처럼 정권유지를 최고의 목표로 삼고 결속한 관료와
정치 엘리트의 새로운 계급에 불과했다. 서방의
마르크스주의 이론가들은 공산주의 정부의 붕괴사태가 곧
마르크스주의의 실패를 의미하는 것은 아니라고 역설한다.
여기서 폴란드 학자 예세크 콜라코프스키의 해석은 그대로
타당하다. "정치 이데올로기로서의 마르크스주의와
인류역사를 조감하는 시각으로서의 마르크스주의는
구분되어야 할 필요가 있다. 인간 지성의 발달에 공헌한
역사적 유물론의 가치를 부인할 사람은 아무도 없다.
이데올로기로서의 공산주의는 집권층에 의하여 민족주의,
인종주의 혹은 제국주의적인 것으로 변질되어왔으며, 정치·경제
체제로서의 공산주의 실험은 '금세기 최대의 환상'으로 끝을
맺게 되었다."
Macropaedia| 金德千 글
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