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[Home]
[Up]
[Contents]
[Preface]
[Bibliographical Note]
[A Note on the Text]
[WHAT IS ART?]
I
II
III
IV
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VI
VII
VIII
IX
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XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
[CONCLUSION]
[Appendix I]
[Appendix II]
[Notes]
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WHAT IS ART?
¿¹¼úÀº ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡?
TRANSLATED BY RICHARD PEVEAR AND LARISSA VOLOKHONSKY
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¿¹¼úÀº ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡?
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¡¡ |
¡¡ |
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What then follows from all these definitions of beauty offered by the science of aesthetics? If we set aside those totally inaccurate definitions of beauty which do not cover the idea of art, and which place it now in usefulness, now in expediency, now in symmetry, or in order, or in proportionality, or in polish, or in harmony of parts, or in unity within diversity, or in various combinations of all these principles — if we set aside these unsatisfactory attempts at objective definition, all the aesthetic definitions of beauty come down to two fundamental views: one, that beauty is something existing in itself, a manifestation of the absolutely perfect — idea, spirit, will, God; the other, that beauty is a certain pleasure we experience, which does not have personal advantage as its aim. |
±×·¸´Ù¸é ¹ÌÇÐÀ̶õ Çй®¿¡ ÀÇÇØ Á¦°øµÇ´Â ÀÌ ¸ðµç Á¤Àǵé·ÎºÎÅÍ ¹«¾ùÀÌ ¿À´Â°¡? ¸¸ÀÏ ¿ì¸®°¡ ¿¹¼úÀÇ °³³äÀ» Æ÷°ý ÇÏÁö ¸øÇÏ´Â, ±×¸®°í ÇöÀç·Î
±×°ÍÀ» À¯¿ëÇÔ¿¡, ÇöÀç·Î Æí¸®ÇÔ¿¡, ÇöÀç·Î ±ÕÇü¿¡, ȤÀº Áú¼¿¡, ȤÀº Á¶È¿¡, ȤÀº ¼¼·ÃµÊ¿¡, ȤÀº ºÎºÐµéÀÇ Á¶È¿¡, ȤÀº ´Ù¾ç¼ºÀ» Áö´Ñ
ÅëÀϼº¿¡, ȤÀº ÀÌ ¸ðµç ¿ø¸®µéÀÇ ´Ù¾çÇÑ Á¶Çյ鿡 µÐ´Ù´Â, ±×·± ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡
´ëÇÑ ÀüÀûÀ¸·Î ºÎÁ¤È®ÇÑ Á¤ÀǵéÀ» ³»¹ö¸°´Ù¸é
— ¸¸ÀÏ ¿ì¸®°¡ °´°üÀû Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌ·± ºÒ¸¸Á·½º·± ½Ãµµµé ³»¹ö¸°´Ù¸é,
¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¸ðµç ¹ÌÇÐÀû Á¤ÀǵéÀº µÎ °¡Áö ±Ùº»Àû ½Ã°¢µé·Î ±Í°áµÈ´Ù: ±× Çϳª´Â, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº ±× ÀÚü·Î¼ Á¸ÀçÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² °Í, Àý´ëÀûÀ¸·Î
¿ÏÀüÇÑ
— °³³ä, Á¤½Å, ÀÇÁö — ÀÇ Ç¥ÇöÀ̶ó´Â °Í; ´Ù¸¥ Çϳª´Â, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº ¿ì¸®°¡ °æÇèÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² Äè¶ôÀ̸ç, ±×°ÍÀº °³ÀÎÀû ÀÌÀÍÀ»
¸ñÇ¥·Î ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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The first definition was adopted by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and by the philosophizing Frenchmen — Cousin, Jouffroy, Ravaisson et al., not to mention the second-rate aesthetic philosophers. The same objective-mystical definition of beauty is held by the greater portion of educated people in our time. It is a widely spread understanding of beauty, especially among people of the older generation. |
ù ¹øÂ° Á¤ÀÇ´Â ÇÇÈ÷Å×, ½©¸µ, Çì°Ö, ¼îÆæÇÏ¿ì¾î, ±×¸®°í öÇÐÀÚÀΠôÇÏ´Â ÇÁ¶û½ºÀεé
— ÀÌ·ù ¹ÌÇРöÇÐÀÚµéÀº ¸»ÇÒ °Íµµ ¾øÀÌ, Äí¼Ä, ÁÖÇÁ·ÎÀÌ, ¶óº£¼Û µîµî — ¿¡ ÀÇÇØ äÅõǾú´Ù. ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¶È°°Àº
°´°üÀû-½ÅºñÁÖÀÇÀû Á¤ÀÇ´Â ¿ì¸® ½Ã´ëÀÇ ´ë´Ù¼öÀÇ ±³À°¹ÞÀº »ç¶÷µé¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÁöÁöµÈ´Ù. ÀÌ´Â ³Î¸® ÆÛÁ® ÀÖ´Â, ƯÈ÷ ±¸ ¼¼´ë »ç¶÷µé
»çÀÌÀÇ,¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÇØÀÌ´Ù. |
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The second definition of beauty, as a certain pleasure we receive which has no personal advantage as its aim, is spread mostly among English aestheticians, and is shared by the other, mostly younger, portion of our society. |
¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ µÎ ¹øÂ°ÀÇ Á¤ÀÇ´Â, ±× ¸ñÇ¥·Î¼ ¾Æ¹«·± °³ÀÎÀû ÀÌÀÍÀ» ÃëÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù°í ¿ì¸®°¡ ¹Þ¾Æ µéÀÌ´Â ¾î¶² Äè¶ôÀ¸·Î¼, ÁÖ·Î ¿µ±¹ÀÇ
¹ÌÇÐÀڵ鿡°Ô ÆÛÁ® ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ±âŸ, ¿ì¸® »çȸÀÇ ÁÖ·Î ÀþÀº Ãþ¿¡°Ô °øÀ¯µÈ´Ù. |
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Thus there exist (and it could not be otherwise) only two definitions of beauty: one the objective and mystical one, which merges this concept with the highest perfection, with God
— a fantastic definition, not based on anything; the other, on the contrary, a very simple and clear subjective one, which considers beauty to be that which is pleasing (I do not add ¡®without aim or advantage¡¯, because the word pleasing of itself implies this absence of any consideration of advantage). |
±×¸®ÇÏ¿© ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿À·ÎÁö µÎ °¡Áö Á¤ÀǵéÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÑ´Ù(¹°·Ð ´Ù¸¥ °æ¿ì´Â ÀÖÀ» ¼ö ¾ø´Ù): Çϳª´Â, °´°üÀû ¹× ½ÅºñÁÖÀÇÀûÀÎ °ÍÀ¸·Î, ÀÌ
°³³äÀ» ÃÖ°íÀÇ ¿ÏÀü¼º, Áï, ½Å°ú ¹¾îµÎ¸ç
— ȯ»óÀûÀÎ Á¤ÀÇ·Î, ¾Æ¹« °Í¿¡µµ ±âÃÊÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù; ´Ù¸¥ Çϳª´Â, ¹Ý´ë·Î, ¸Å¿ì ´Ü¼ø ¸í·áÇÑ ÁÖ°üÀûÀÎ °ÍÀ¸·Î, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀ» Áñ°Å¿î
°ÍÀÌ´Ù¶ó°í ¿©±ä´Ù ( ³ª´Â '¸ñÀû ¶Ç´Â ÀÌÀÍ ¾øÀÌ'¸¦ µ¡ºÙÀÌÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù, ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé Áñ°Å¿î'À̶õ ´Ü¾î´Â ÀÚ¿¬È÷ ÀÌÀÍ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¾î¶²
°í·ÁÀÇ °á¿©¸¦ ³»Æ÷Çϱ⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù). |
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On the one hand, beauty is understood as something mystical and very exalted, but unfortunately very indefinite and, therefore, inclusive of philosophy, religion, and life itself, as in Schelling, Hegel and their German and French followers; or, on the other hand, according to the definition of Kant and his followers, beauty is only a particular kind of disinterested pleasure that we receive. In this case the concept of beauty, though seemingly very clear, is unfortu¡©nately also imprecise, because it expands in the other direction — meaning that it includes the pleasure derived from drinking, eating, touching soft skin, etc., as is admitted in Guyau, Kralik et al. |
ÇÑÆíÀ¸·Î, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº ½ÅºñÇÏ°í ¸Å¿ì ¼þ°íÇÑ ¾î¶² °ÍÀ¸·Î ÀÌÇØµÇÁö¸¸, ºÒÇàÇϰԵµ ¸Å¿ì ºÒÈ®½ÇÇϰí, ±×·¯¹Ç·Î, ½©¸µ, Çì°Ö ±×¸®°í µ¶ÀÏ ¹×
ÇÁ¶û½ºÀÇ ±×µéÀÇ ÃßÁ¾Àڵ鿡¼Ã³·³, öÇÐ, Á¾±³, ±×¸®°í »î ÀÚü¸¦ Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ´Ù; ´Ù¸¥ ÇÑÆíÀ¸·Î, ÄÆ®¿Í ±×ÀÇ ÃßÁ¾Àڵ鿡 ÀÇÇϸé, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº ¿ÀÁ÷
¿ì¸®°¡ ¹Þ´Â ƯÁ¤ÇÑ Á¾·ùÀÇ »ç½É ¾ø´Â Äè¶ôÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ °æ¿ì ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ °³³äÀº, °Ñº¸±â¿¡ ¸Å¿ì ¸í·áÇÏÁö¸¸, ¿ª½Ã ºÒÇàÈ÷µµ ºÎÁ¤È®ÇÏ´Ù, ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé
±×°ÍÀº ´Ù¸¥ ¹æÇâ
— ±¸¾ß, Å©¶ó¸®Å© µî¿¡¼ ÀÎÁ¤µÇ´Â °Íó·³, ±×°ÍÀº ¸¶½Ã±â, ¸Ô±â, ºÎµå·¯¿î ÇǺθ¦ ¸¸Áö±â, µî¿¡¼ ÆÄ»ýµÇ´Â Äè¶ôÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â ÀÇ¹Ì — ·Î
ÆîÃÄÁö±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. |
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It is true that, in following the development of the teaching concerning beauty, one can observe that at first, from the time when aesthetics emerged as a science, the metaphysical definition of beauty prevailed, while the closer we come to our own time, the more there emerges a practical definition, recently acquiring a physiological character, so that one even comes upon aestheticians such as Véron and Sully, who attempt to do without the concept of beauty entirely. But such aestheticians have very little success, and the majority of the public, and of artists and scholars as well, firmly hold to the concept of beauty as defined in the majority of aesthetic systems
— that is, either as something mystical or metaphysical, or as a particular kind of pleasure. |
»ç½ÇÀÎ Áï, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ °üÇÑ °¡¸£Ä§ÀÇ ¹ßÀüÀ» µû¶ó°¨¿¡¼, ¹ÌÇÐÀÌ Çй®À¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³ óÀ½ºÎÅÍ, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇüÀÌ»óÇÐÀû Á¤Àǰ¡ Áö¹èÀûÀ̾úÀ¸¸ç,
¿ì¸® ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ½Ã´ë¿¡ °¡±î¿ö Áö¸é Áú¼ö·Ï, ´õ¿í ´õ ½Ç¿ëÀû Á¤Àǰ¡ ³ªÅ¸³ ÇÑÆí, ÃÖ±Ù¿¡´Â »ý¸®ÇÐÀûÀΠƯ¡±îÁö ¶ì°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ±×¸®ÇÏ¿© ¿ì¸®´Â
½ÉÁö¾î º£·Ð ¹× ¼³¸® °°Àº ¹ÌÇÐÀڵ鿡 µµ´ÞÇϸç, ±×µéÀº ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ °³³äÀ» ÀüÀûÀ¸·Î ¾ø¾Ö·Á ½ÃµµÇÑ´Ù. ÇÏÁö¸¸ ±×·± ¹ÌÇеéÀº °ÅÀÇ ¼º°øÇÏÁö
¸øÇÑ´Ù, ±×¸®°í ´ë´Ù¼ö ´ëÁßÀº, ¿¹¼ú°¡µé°ú ÇÐÀڵ鵵 Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ¿©, ´ë´Ù¼ö ¹ÌÇРü°èµé
— Áï, ½ÅºñÁÖÀÇÀû ¶Ç´Â ÇüÀÌ»óÇÐÀûÀÎ ¾î¶² °ÍÀ¸·Î, ȤÀº ƯÁ¤ÇÑ Á¾·ùÀÇ Äè¶ôÀ¸·Î —
¿¡ Á¤ÀÇµÈ ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °³³äÀ» ±»°ÇÈ÷ ÁöÁöÇϰí ÀÖ´Ù. |
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What essentially is this concept of beauty, to which people of our circle and day hold so stubbornly for the defining of art? |
±Ùº»ÀûÀ¸·Î ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌ·± °³³äÀº ¹«¾ùÀ̸ç, ¿ì¸® ¹üÁÖ ¹× ½Ã´ëÀÇ »ç¶÷µéÀº ¿¹¼úÀÇ °³³äÀ¸·Î ±×Åä·Ï ¿Ï°È÷ ÁýÂøÇϴ°¡? |
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We call beauty in the subjective sense that which affords us a certain kind of pleasure. In the objective sense, we call beauty something absolutely perfect which exists outside us. But since we recognize the absolutely perfect which exists outside us and acknowledge it as such only because we receive a certain kind of pleasure from the manifestation of this absolutely perfect, it means that the objective definition is nothing but the subjective one differently expressed. In fact, both notions of beauty come down to a certain sort of pleasure that we receive, meaning that we recognize as beauty that which pleases us without awakening our lust. In such a situation, it would seem natural for the science of art not to content itself with a definition of art based on beauty — that is, on what is pleasing — and to seek a general definition, applicable to all works of art, on the basis of which it would be possible to resolve the question of what does or does not belong to art. But as the reader may see from the passages I have cited from works on aesthetics, and still more clearly from the works themselves, if he should take the trouble to read them, no such definition exists. All attempts to define absolute beauty in itself — as an imitation of nature, as purposefulness, as correspondence of parts, symmetry, harmony, unity in diversity and so on — either do not define anything, or define only certain features of certain works of art, and are far from embracing everything that all people have always regarded and still regard as art. |
¿ì¸®´Â ÁÖ°üÀû Àǹ̿¡¼ ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀ» ƯÁ¤ÇÑ Á¾·ùÀÇ Äè¶ôÀ» ÁÖ´Â °ÍÀ̶ó ÁöĪÇÑ´Ù. °´°üÀû Àǹ̿¡¼, ¿ì¸®´Â ¿ì¸® ¹Û¿¡ Á¸ÀçÇÏ´Â Àý´ëÀûÀ¸·Î ¿Ïº®ÇÑ
¾î¶² °ÍÀ» ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀ̶ó ºÎ¸¥´Ù.±×·¯³ª ¿ì¸®´Â ¿ì¸® ¹Û¿¡ Á¸ÀçÇÏ´Â Àý´ëÀûÀ¸·Î ¿Ïº®ÇÑ °ÍÀ» ÀνÄÇϸç ÀÌ·± Àý´ëÀû ¿Ïº®ÇÔÀÇ Ç¥ÇöÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ÀÏÁ¤ÇÑ
Á¾·ùÀÇ Äè¶ôÀ» ¾ò±â¿¡ ¿À·ÎÁö ±×·¯ÇÏ´Ù°í ÀÎÁ¤ÇϹǷÎ, ±×°ÍÀº °´°üÀû Á¤ÀÇ´Â ´ÜÁö ´Ù¸£°Ô Ç¥ÇöµÈ ÁÖ°üÀû Á¤ÀÇÀÓÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù. »ç½Ç»ó, µÎ °¡Áö
¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ °ßÇØµéÀº ¿ì¸®°¡ ¼ö¿ëÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² Á¾·ùÀÇ Äè¶ôÀ¸·Î ±Í°áµÇ¸ç, ÀÌ´Â ¿ì¸®°¡ ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀ» ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ¿å¸ÁÀ» Àϱú¿ò ¾øÀÌ ¿ì¸®¸¦ Áñ°Ì°Ô ÇÏ´Â
°ÍÀ¸·Î ÀνÄÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù. ±×·¯ÇÑ »óȲ¿¡¼, ¿¹¼úÀ̶õ Çй®Àº ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò
— Áï, Áñ°Å¿òÀ» ÁÖ´Â °Í —
¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ ½º½º·Î ¸¸Á·Çϰųª, ¸ðµç ¿¹¼ú ÀÛǰµé¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â ÀϹÝÀû Á¤ÀǸ¦ Ãß±¸ÇÏ¿©, ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ¼ÓÇÏ´ÂÁö ¾Æ´ÏÇÏ´ÂÁöÀÇ ¹®Á¦¸¦
ÇØ°áÇÏ·Á´Â Åä´ë·Î »ïÀ¸·Á ÇÏÁö ¾Êµµ·Ï ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ´ç¿¬ÇØ º¸ÀÏ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª µ¶ÀÚµéÀº ¹ÌÇп¡ °üÇÑ ÀÛǰµé·ÎºÎÅÍ ³»°¡ ÀοëÇÑ ±¸Àýµé¿¡¼,
±×¸®°í ±× ÀÛǰµé ÀÚü¿¡¼ ´õ¿í ¸íÈ®ÇÏ°Ô ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖµíÀÌ, ¸¸ÀÏ ±×°ÍµéÀ» ¾Ö½á ÀÐ¾î º»´Ù¸é, ±×·± Á¤ÀÇ´Â ÀüÇô Á¸ÀçÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù. º»ÁúÀûÀ¸·Î
Àý´ëÀû ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò
— ÀÚ¿¬ÀÇ ¸ð¹æÀ¸·Î¼, ¸ñÀûÀ» ÇÔÃàÇÔÀ¸·Î½á, ºÎºÐµéÀÇ ÀÏÄ¡, ±ÕÇü, Á¶È, ´Ù¾ç¼º ¾ÈÀÇ ÅëÀϼº, µîµî —
À» Á¤ÀÇÇÏ·Á´Â ¸ðµç ½ÃµµµéÀº ¾Æ¹« °Íµµ Á¤ÀÇÇÏÁöµµ ¾ÊÀ¸¸ç, ´ÜÁö ƯÁ¤ ¿¹¼ú ÀÛǰµéÀÇ Æ¯Â¡µéÀ» Á¤ÀÇÇÒ »ÓÀ̸ç, ¸ðµç »ç¶÷µéÀÌ ¾ðÁ¦³ª ¿¹¼ú·Î
¿©°Ü ¿Ô°í ¾ÆÁ÷µµ ¿©±â°í ÀÖ´Â ¸ðµç °ÍÀ» ¸Á¶óÇÏ´Â °Í°ú´Â °Å¸®°¡ ¸Ö´Ù. |
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An objective definition of art does not exist; the existing definitions, metaphysical as well as practical, come down to one and the same subjective definition, which, strange as it is to say, is the view of art as the manifestation of beauty, and of beauty as that which pleases (without awakening lust). Many aestheticians have felt the inadequacy and instability of such a definition, and, in order to give it substance, have asked themselves what is pleasing and why, thus shifting the question of beauty to the question of taste, as did Hutcheson, Voltaire, Diderot et al. But (as the reader can see both from the history of aesthetics and from experience) no attempts to define taste can lead anywhere, and there is not and can never be any explanation of why something is pleasing to one man and not to another, or vice versa. Thus, existing aesthetics as a whole consists not in something such as might be expected of an intellectual activity calling itself a science — namely, in a definition of the properties and laws of art, or of the beautiful, if it is the content of art, or in a definition of the properties of taste, if it is taste that decides the question of art and its worth, and then, on the basis of these laws, the recognition as art of those works that fit them, and the rejection of those that do not fit them — but instead it consists in first recognizing a certain kind of work as good because it pleases us, and then in constructing such a theory of art as will include all works found pleasing by a certain circle of people. There exists an artistic canon according to which the
favorite works of our circle are recognized as art (Phidias, Sophocles, Homer, Titian, Raphael, Bach, Beethoven, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe et al.), and aesthetic
judgments must be such as can embrace all these works. One has no difficulty finding in aesthetic literature
judgments of the worth and significance of art based not on known laws, according to which we regard this or that object as good or bad, but on whether it conforms to the artistic canon we have established. The other day I was reading a very nice book by Volkelt. [38] Discussing the requirement of morality in works of art, the author says straight out that it is wrong to bring any moral requirements to art, and as proof he points out that if such requirements were admitted, Shakespeare¡¯s Romeo and Juliet and Goethe¡¯s Wilhelm Meister would not fall under the definition of good art. Since both works belong to the artistic canon, the requirement would be incorrect. And therefore one must find a definition of art that would allow these works of art to fit into it, and, instead of the requirement of morality, Volkelt posits as the basis of art the requirement of significance (Bedeutungsvoiles). |
¿¹¼ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °´°üÀû Á¤ÀÇ´Â Á¸ÀçÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù; ±âÁ¸ÀÇ Á¤ÀǵéÀº, ÇüÀÌ»óÇÐÀûÀÌµç ½Ç¿ëÀûÀ̵ç, ÇϳªÀÇ µ¿ÀÏÇÑ µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ÁÖ°üÀû Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ µµ´ÞÇϸç,
±×°ÍÀº, ÀÌ»óÇÑ ¸»ÀÌÁö¸¸, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ Ç¥ÇöÀ¸·Î¼ ¿¹¼úÀÇ ½Ã°¢, ±×¸®°í (¿å¸ÁÀ» Àϱú¿ò ¾øÀÌ) Áñ°Ì°Ô ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î¼ ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ ½Ã°¢ÀÌ´Ù. ¸¹Àº
¹ÌÇÐÀÚµéÀº ±×·¯ÇÑ Á¤ÀÇÀÇ ºÎÀûÀýÇÔ ¹× ºÒ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀ» ´À²¼À¸¸ç, ±×°Í¿¡ Àǹ̸¦ ºÎ¿©ÇϰíÀÚ, Áñ°Å¿òÀ̶õ ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡ ±×¸®°í ¿Ö ±×·±°¡¸¦ ½º½º·Î
Áú¹®ÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç, ÇãÄ¡½¼, º¼Å׸£, µðµ¥·Î µî°ú °°ÀÌ, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ÃëÇâÀÇ ¹®Á¦·Î ¿Å°Ü °¬´Ù. ±×·¯³ª (µ¶ÀÚµéÀº ¹ÌÇÐÀÇ ¿ª»ç·ÎºÎÅÍ ±×¸®°í
°æÇèÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ °øÈ÷ ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖµíÀÌ) ÃëÇâÀ» Á¤ÀÇÇÏ·Á´Â ¾î¶² ½Ãµµµéµµ ¾î¶² ¹æ¹ýÀÌ µÉ ¼ö ¾øÀ¸¸ç, ¿Ö ¾î¶² °ÍÀÌ ÇÑ »ç¶÷¿¡°Ô Áñ°Ì°í ´Ù¸¥
»ç¶÷¿¡°Ô ±×·¸Áö ¾ÊÀºÁö ¶Ç´Â ±× ¹Ý´ëÀÇ °æ¿ì¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¾î¶² ¼³¸íµµ ¾øÀ¸¸ç °áÄÚ ÀÖÀ» ¼öµµ ¾ø´Ù. ±×¸®ÇÏ¿© ÀϹÝÀûÀ¸·Î ±âÁ¸ÀÇ ¹ÌÇÐÀº ½º½º·Î¸¦
Çй®
— Áï, ¸¸ÀÏ ±×°ÍÀÌ ¿¹¼úÀûÀÎ ³»¿ëÀ̶ó¸é, ¿¹¼úÀÇ, ¶Ç´Â ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ, ¼Ó¼ºµé ¹× ¹ýÄ¢µéÀÇ Á¤ÀÇ¿¡¼; ¸¸ÀÏ ±×°ÍÀÌ ¿¹¼úÀÇ ¹®Á¦ ¹× ±× °¡Ä¡¸¦
°áÁ¤ÇÏ´Â ÃëÇâÀÇ ¹®Á¦¶ó¸é, ÃëÇâÀÇ ¼Ó¼ºµé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤ÀÇ¿¡¼, ±×¸®°í ÀÌµé ¹ýÄ¢µéÀÇ Åä´ë À§¿¡¼ ±×°Íµé¿¡ ÀûÇÕÇÑ ÀÛǰµéÀ» ¿¹¼ú·Î ÀÎÁ¤, ±×¸®°í
ÀûÇÕÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀº °ÍÀÇ °ÅºÎ —
À̶ó ĪÇÏ´Â ÁöÀûÀΠȰµ¿À¸·Î ¿¹°ßµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °Í °°Àº ¾î¶² °ÍÀ¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÇ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ¸ÕÀú ¾î¶² ÀÛǰÀÌ ¿ì¸®¸¦ Áñ°Ì°Ô Çϱ⿡ À¯ÀÍÇÏ´Ù°í
ÀνÄÇϰí, ´ÙÀ½À¸·Î ¾î¶² ¹üÁÖÀÇ »ç¶÷µé¿¡ ÀÇÇØ Áñ°Ì´Ù°í ¾Ë·ÁÁø ¸ðµç ÀÛǰµéÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â °Í °°Àº ¿¹¼ú ÀÌ·ÐÀ» Á¤¸³ÇÔ¿¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ¿ì¸® ÁÖÀ§ÀÇ Àαâ
ÀÖ´Â ÀÛǰµéÀÌ ¿¹¼ú (ÇÇµð¾Æ½º, ´Üü, ½¦ÀͽºÇǾî, ±«Å× µî)·Î ÀÎÁ¤µÇ´Â ±×·± ¿¹¼úÀû ±âÁØÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÑ´Ù, ±×¸®°í ¹ÌÇÐÀû ÆÇ´ÜµéÀº ¹Ýµå½Ã ÀÌ
¸ðµç ÀÛǰµéÀ» ¸Á¶óÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ̾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¹ÌÇÐÀû ÀÛǰ¿¡¼ ¿ì¸®°¡ ÀÌ·± ¶Ç´Â Àú·± ³»¿ëÀÌ À¯ÀÍÇÏ´Ù ³ª»Ú´Ù°í ¿©±â´Â ¾Ë·ÁÁø ¹ýÄ¢µéÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó,
¿ì¸®°¡ È®¸³ÇÑ ¿¹¼úÀû ±âÁØ¿¡ ÀÏÄ¡Çϴ°¡¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÏ´Â ¿¹¼úÀû °¡Ä¡ ¹× Á߿伺ÀÇ ÆÇ´ÜµéÀ» ã±â¶õ ¾î·ÆÁö ¾Ê´Ù. ¸çÄ¥ Àü ³ª´Â º¸ÄÌÆ®°¡ ¾´ ¾ÆÁÖ
ÈǸ¢ÇÑ Ã¥À» Àаí ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ¿¹¼ú ÀÛǰµé¿¡¼ µµ´ö¼ºÀÇ Àǹ«¸¦ ³íÇϸé¼, ÀÛ°¡´Â ¿¹¼ú¿¡ µµ´öÀû Àǹ«¸¦ ºÎ°úÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ³ª»Ú´Ù°í ´ÜµµÁ÷ÀÔÀûÀ¸·Î
¸»Çϸç, ±× Áõ°Å·Î¼ ¸¸ÀÏ ±×·± Àǹ«µéÀÌ ÀÎÁ¤µÈ´Ù¸é, ½¦ÀͽºÇǾîÀÇ ·Î¹Ì¿À¿Í ÁÙ¸®¿§ ¹× ±«Å×ÀÇ ºôÇ︧ ¸¶À̽ºÅÍ´Â
ÈǸ¢ÇÑ ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ µéÁö ¸øÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÁöÀûÇÑ´Ù. µÎ ÀÛǰ °øÈ÷ ¿¹¼úÀû ±âÁØ¿¡ ¼ÓÇϹǷΠÀǹ«´Â ¿ÇÁö ¾Ê´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯¹Ç·Î, ¿ì¸®´Â À̵é
¿¹¼ú ÀÛǰµéÀÌ ±×°Í¿¡ °É¸Âµµ·Ï Çã¿ëÇÏ´Â ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀǸ¦ ¹Ýµå½Ã ¹ß°ßÇØ¾ß Çϸç, µµ´ö¼ºÀÇ Àǹ« ´ë½Å¿¡, º¸ÄÌÆ®´Â ¿¹¼úÀÇ ±âÃʷμ, Á߿伺(Bedeutungsvoiles)ÀÇ
Àǹ«¸¦ ´ÜÁ¤ÇÑ´Ù. ¡¡ |
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All existing aesthetic systems are constructed on this plan. Instead of giving a definition of true art and then, depending on whether a work fits or does not fit this definition, judging what is and what is not art, a certain series of works found pleasing for some reason by people of a certain circle is recognized as art, and a definition of art such as will include all these works is then invented. Recently I came across a remarkable confirmation of this method in a very good book, Muther¡¯s History of Nineteenth Century Art. [39] Setting out to describe the pre-Raphaelites, the decadents and the symbolists, who have already been received into the canon of art, he not only does not dare to denounce this tendency, but makes a great effort to expand his framework so as to include in it the pre-Raphaelites, the decadents and the symbolists, who seem to him to be a legitimate reaction against the excesses of naturalism. Whatever follies may be committed in art, once they are accepted among the upper classes of our society, a theory is at once elaborated to explain and legitimize these follies, as if there had ever been epochs in history when certain exceptional circles of people had not accepted and approved of false, ugly, meaningless art, which left no traces and was completely forgotten afterwards. And we can see by what is going on now in the art of our circle what degree of meaninglessness and ugliness art can attain to, especially when, as in our time, it knows it is regarded as infallible. |
±âÁ¸ÀÇ ¸ðµç ¹ÌÇРü°èµéÀº ÀÌ·± ±¸»ó À§¿¡ ¸¸µé¾î Áø´Ù. ÂüµÈ ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀǸ¦ ºÎ¿©ÇÏ´Â ´ë½Å¿¡, ¾î¶² ÀÛǰÀÌ ÀÌ·± Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ ÀûÇÕÇÑÁö ¾ÊÀºÁö¿¡
µû¶ó¼, ¹«¾ùÀÌ ¿¹¼úÀÎÁö ¾Æ´ÑÁö ÆÇ´ÜÇϸé¼, ¾î¶² ¹üÁÖÀÇ »ç¶÷µé¿¡°Ô ¾î¶² ÀÌÀ¯·Î Áñ°Ì´Ù°í º¸À̴ ƯÁ¤ÇÑ ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ ÀÛǰµéÀÌ ¿¹¼ú·Î ÀνĵǸç, ÀÌ
¸ðµç ÀÛǰµéÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â °Í°ú °°Àº ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤Àǰ¡ ±×¸®ÇÏ¿© °í¾ÈµÈ´Ù. ÃÖ±Ù ³ª´Â ¸ÓÅÍÀÇ ½Ê±¸ ¼¼±â ¿¹¼úÀÇ ¿ª»ç¶ó´Â ¸Å¿ì
ÈǸ¢ÇÑ Ã¥¿¡¼ ÀÌ·± ¹æ¹ý¿¡ ´ëÇÑ µÎµå·¯Áø È®ÁõÀ» ¿ì¿¬È÷ ¹ß°ßÇÏ¿´´Ù. ÀÌ¹Ì ¿¹¼úÀÇ ±âÁØÀ¸·Î ¼ö¿ëµÇ¾îÁø Àü-¶óÆÄ¿¤ÆÄµé, µ¥Ä«´çÆÄµé ¹× »ó¡ÆÄµéÀÇ
¹¦»ç¸¦ ½ÃÀÛÇϸé¼, ±×´Â ÀÌ·± °æÇâÀ» °¨È÷ ºÎÀÎÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» »Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, Àü-¶óÆÄ¿¤ÆÄµé, µ¥Ä«´çÆÄµé ¹× »ó¡ÆÄµéÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇϵµ·Ï ±×ÀÇ Ã¼°è¸¦
È®ÀåÇϰíÀÚ ¾öû³ ÈûÀ» ½ñ´Â´Ù. ±×µéÀº ±×¿¡°Ô´Â °úµµÇÑ ÀÚ¿¬ÁÖÀÇ¿¡ ´ëÇ×ÇÏ´Â Á¤´çÇÑ ¹ÝÀÀó·³ º¸ÀÌ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿¹¼ú¿¡¼ ¾î¶°ÇÑ ¿ìµÐÇÔ µéÀÌ
ÀÚÇàµÇµçÁö, ¿ì¸® »çȸÀÇ »ó·ù°è±Þµé »çÀÌ¿¡ ¼ö¿ëµÈ´Ù¸é, ±× ÀÌ·ÐÀº ÀÏ´Ü ÀÌ·± ¿ìµÐÇÔ µéÀ» °øµé¿©¼ ¼³¸íÇϰí ÇÕ¹ýȽÃ۴µ¥, ¸¶Ä¡ ƯÁ¤ÇÑ
¿¹¿ÜÀû ¹üÁÖÀÇ »ç¶÷µéÀÌ À§¼±ÀûÀ̸ç ÃßÇϰí ÀÇ¹Ì ¾ø´Â ¿¹¼úÀ» ¼ö¿ëÇÏ¿© ¿ëÀÎÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Ò¾úÀ¸¸ç, ±× ÈÄ¿¡ ±× ¿¹¼úÀº ¾Æ¹«·± ÈçÀûµéÀ» ³²±âÁö ¾Ê°í
¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ÀØÇôÁ³´ø ½ÃÀýµéÀÌ¶óµµ ÀÖ¾ú´ø °Íó·³ ÇÑ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¿ì¸®´Â ¿ì¸® ¹üÁÖÀÇ ¿¹¼ú¿¡¼ Áö±Ý ÁøÇàµÇ°í ÀÖ´Â °Í¿¡ ÀÇÇØ¼ ¿¹¼úÀÌ ¾î´À Á¤µµÀÇ
¹«ÀǹÌÇÔ ¹× ÃßÇÔ±îÁö µµ´ÞÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö
—
ƯÈ÷ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ ½Ã´ë¿¡¼Ã³·³ ±×°ÍÀÌ ¹«·ùÇÏ´Ù°í ¿©°ÜÁø´Ù°í ¾Ë°í ÀÖ´Â ¶§¿¡´Â
—
¸¦ ±ú´ÞÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. |
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Thus the theory of art based on beauty, expounded by aesthetics and professed in vague outlines by the public, is nothing other than the recognition as good of what has been and is found pleasing by us — that is, by a certain circle of people. |
±×·¯¹Ç·Î ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀ» ¹ÙÅÁÀ¸·Î ÇÑ ¿¹¼ú ÀÌ·ÐÀº, ¹ÌÇп¡ ÀÇÇØ ÇØ¼®µÇ°í ´ëÁß¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¸ðÈ£ÇÑ ¿äÁ¡µé·Î °ø¾ðµÇ¾î, ¿ÀÁ÷ ¿ì¸®¿¡°Ô
— Áï, ƯÁ¤ÇÑ ¹üÁÖÀÇ »ç¶÷µé¿¡°Ô —
°ú°Å ¹× ÇöÀç¿¡ Áñ°Ì°Ô º¸ÀÌ´Â °Í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ À¯ÀÍÇÏ´Ù´Â ÀνÄÀÏ »ÓÀÌ´Ù. |
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In order to define any human activity, one must understand its meaning and significance. And in order to understand the meaning and significance of any human activity, it is necessary first of all to examine this activity in itself, as dependent on its own causes and effects, and not with regard to the pleasure we receive from it. |
¾î¶² Àΰ£Àû Ȱµ¿À» Á¤ÀÇÇϱâ À§ÇØ, ¿ì¸®´Â ±× ÀÇ¹Ì¿Í Á߿伺À» ±ú´Þ¾Æ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¾î¶² Àΰ£Àû Ȱµ¿ÀÇ ÀÇ¹Ì¿Í Á߿伺À» ±ú´Ý±â À§ÇØ,
¿ì¸®°¡ ±×·ÎºÎÅÍ ¹Þ´Â Äè¶ô¿¡ µû¶ó¼°¡ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ±× ÀÚüÀÇ ¿øÀÎµé ¹× °á°úµé¿¡ µû¶ó¼, ¹«¾ùº¸´Ù ÀÌ·± Ȱµ¿ ÀÚü¸¦ °ËÅäÇÔÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù. |
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But if we accept that the aim of any activity is merely our own pleasure, and define it merely by that pleasure, then this definition will obviously be false. That is what has happened with the definition of art. For, in analysing the question of food, it would not occur to anyone to see the significance of food in the pleasure we derive from eating it. Everyone understands that the satisfaction of our taste can in no way serve as a basis for defining the merits of food, and that we therefore have no right to suppose that dinners with cayenne pepper, Limburger cheese, alcohol and so on, to which we are accustomed and which we like, represent the best human food. |
±×·¯³ª ¸¸ÀÏ ¿ì¸®°¡ ¾î¶² Ȱµ¿ÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀÌ ´Ü¼øÈ÷ ¿ì¸® ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ Äè¶ôÀÓÀ» ¹Þ¾ÆµéÀ̸ç, ´Ü¼øÈ÷ ±× °°Àº Äè¶ô¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ±×°ÍÀ» Á¤ÀÇÇÑ´Ù¸é, ÀÌ·± Á¤ÀÇ´Â
¸í¹éÈ÷ À§¼±ÀÏ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. À̰ÍÀÌ ¹Ù·Î ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀÇ¿¡ ¹ß»ýÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé, À½½Ä¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇÔ¿¡¼, ¿ì¸®°¡ ±×°ÍÀ» ¸ÔÀ½À¸·Î½á
¾ò¾î³»´Â Äè¶ô ¾È¿¡¼ À½½ÄÀÇ Á߿伺À» ±ú´Ý´Â ÀÏÀº ¾Æ¹«¿¡°Ôµµ ÀϾÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀ̱⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ¿ì¸® ÃëÇâÀÇ ¸¸Á·ÀÌ °áÄÚ À½½ÄÀÇ °¡Ä¡µéÀ»
Á¤ÀÇÇÔ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±âÁØÀ¸·Î ÀÛ¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù´Â °Í, ±×¸®°í ¿ì¸®´Â ±×·¯¹Ç·Î °íÃß°¡ µç À½½Ä, ¸²¹ö°Å Ä¡Áî, ¼ú µîÀÌ, À̰͵éÀº ¿ì¸®°¡ Àͼ÷Çϸç
ÁÁ¾ÆÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î, Àΰ£¿¡°Ô °¡Àå ÁÁÀº À½½ÄÀ» ´ëÇ¥ÇÑ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¾î¶² ±Ç¸®µµ ¾ø´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀÌÇØÇÑ´Ù. |
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In just the same way, beauty, or that which pleases us, can in no way serve as the basis for defining art, and a series of objects that give us pleasure can in no way be an example of what art should be. |
¶È°°Àº ¹æ¹ýÀ¸·Î, ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº, ȤÀº ¿ì¸®¸¦ Áñ°Ì°Ô ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº, °áÄÚ ¿¹¼úÀ» Á¤ÀÇÇÔ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±Ù°Å·Î ÀÛ¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ¾øÀ¸¸ç, ¿ì¸®¿¡°Ô Äè¶ôÀ» ÁÖ´Â
ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ ¹°Ã¼µéÀÌ °áÄÚ ¿¹¼úÀÌ ¹«¾ùÀ̾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â ÀϷʰ¡ µÉ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù. |
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To see the aim and purpose of art in the pleasure we derive from it is the
same as to ascribe the aim and significance of food to the pleasure we derive
from eating it, as is done by people who stand at the lowest level of moral
development (savages, for instance). |
¿¹¼úÀÇ ¸ñÀû°ú ¸ñÇ¥¸¦ ¿ì¸®°¡ ¾ò´Â Äè¶ô¿¡¼ ±ú´Ý°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº À½½ÄÀÇ ¸ñÀû°ú Á߿伺À» ¿ì¸®°¡ ±×°ÍÀ» ¸ÔÀ½À¸·Î½á ¾ò´Â Äè¶ôÀ¸·Î µ¹¸®´Â °Í°ú
¸¶Âù°¡Áö¸ç, ÀÌ´Â °¡Àå ³·Àº µµ´öÀû ¹ßÀü ´Ü°è¿¡ ¼ÀÖ´Â »ç¶÷µé(¿¹¸¦ µé¸é, ¾ß¸¸Àεé)¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÇàÇØÁø´Ù. |
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Just as people who think that the aim and purpose of food is pleasure cannot perceive the true meaning of eating, so people who think that the aim of art is pleasure cannot know its meaning and purpose, because they ascribe to an activity which has meaning in connection with other phenomena of life the false and exclusive aim of pleasure. People understand that the meaning of eating is the nourishment of the body only when they cease to consider pleasure the aim of this activity. So it is with art. People will understand the meaning of art only when they cease to regard beauty — that is, pleasure — as the aim of this activity. To recognize beauty, or the certain kind of pleasure to be derived from art, as the aim of art, not only does not contribute to defining what art is, but, on the contrary, by transferring the question to a realm quite alien to art — to metaphysical, psychological, physiological, and even historical discussions of why such-and-such a work is pleasing to some, and such-and-such is not pleasing, or is pleasing to others — makes that definition impossible. And just as discussing why one person likes pears and another meat in no way helps to define what the essence of nourishment is, so, too, the resolution of questions of taste in art (to which all discussions of art involuntarily come down) not only does not contribute to understanding what makes up that particular human activity which we call art, but makes that understanding completely impossible. |
À½½ÄÀÇ ¸ñÀû°ú ¸ñÇ¥°¡ Äè¶ôÀ̶ó°í »ý°¢ÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷µéÀº ÁøÁ¤ÇÑ Ãë½ÄÀÇ Àǹ̸¦ ±ú´ÝÁö ¸øÇÏ´Â °Íó·³, ¿¹¼úÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀÌ Äè¶ôÀ̶ó°í »ý°¢ÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷µéÀº ±×
ÀÇ¹Ì¿Í ¸ñÇ¥¸¦ ¸ð¸¥´Ù, ¿Ö³ÄÇÏ¸é ±×µéÀº »îÀÇ ´Ù¸¥ Çö»óµé¿¡ °ü°èµÈ Àǹ̸¦ Áö´Ï´Â Ȱµ¿¿¡ Äè¶ôÀ̶ó´Â À§¼±Àû ¹èŸÀû ¸ñÀûÀ» ºÎ¿©Çϱ⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù.
»ç¶÷µéÀº ¿ÀÁ÷ Äè¶ôÀÌ ÀÌ·± Ȱµ¿ÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀ̶ó°í ¿©±èÀ» ¸ØÃâ ¶§¿¡ Ãë½ÄÀÇ Àǹ̰¡ ½Åü¸¦ À§ÇÑ ¾çºÐÀÓÀ» ±ú´Ý´Â´Ù. ¿¹¼ú¿¡¼µµ ¸¶Âù°¡Áö´Ù. »ç¶÷µéÀº
¿ÀÁ÷ ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò
— Áï, Äè¶ô — À» ÀÌ·± Ȱµ¿ÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î ¿©±èÀ» ¸ØÃâ ¶§¿¡ ¿¹¼úÀÇ Àǹ̸¦ ±ú´ÞÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿ò, ¶Ç´Â ¾î¶² Á¾·ùÀÇ Äè¶ôÀÌ, ¿¹¼úÀÇ
¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î¼, ¿¹¼ú¿¡¼ ºñ·ÔµÈ´Ù°í ÀνÄÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ¿¹¼úÀº ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡¸¦ Á¤ÀÇÇÔ¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» »Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ÀÌ¿Í ¹Ý´ë·Î, ¹®Á¦¸¦ ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ¸Å¿ì
ÀÌÁúÀûÀÎ ¿µ¿ª — ¿Ö ±×·¸°í ±×·± ÀÛǰÀÌ ¾î¶² »ç¶÷¿¡°Ô Áñ°Å¿î °ÍÀÎÁö, ±×¸®°í ±×·¸°í ±×·± °ÍÀº Áñ°ÌÁö ¾ÊÀºÁö, ȤÀº ´Ù¸¥
»ç¶÷µé¿¡°Ô Áñ°Å¿îÁö¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇüÀÌ»óÇÐÀû, ½É¸®ÇÐÀû, »ý¸®ÇÐÀû, ¹× ½ÉÁö¾î ¿ª»çÀû ³íÀÇµé — À¸·Î Àüµµ½ÃÅ´À¸·Î½á ±× °°Àº Á¤ÀǸ¦ ºÒ°¡´ÉÇϰÔ
¸¸µç´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¿Ö ÇÑ »ç¶÷Àº ¹è¸¦ ÁÁ¾ÆÇÏ°í ´Ù¸¥ »ç¶÷Àº °í±â¸¦ ÁÁ¾ÆÇϴ°¡¸¦ ³íÀÇÇÔÀÌ ¾çºÐÀÇ º»ÁúÀÌ ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡¸¦ Á¤ÀÇÇϴµ¥ ¾Æ¹«·± µµ¿òÀÌ µÇÁö
¾Ê´Â °Í°ú ¸¶Âù°¡Áö·Î, ¿¹¼ú¿¡¼ (ÀǵµÇÏÁö ¾Ê°Ô ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¸ðµç °ÍµéÀÌ ±Í°áµÇ´Â) ÃëÇâÀÇ ¹®Á¦µé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇØ´äÀÌ ¹«¾ùÀÌ ¿ì¸®°¡ ¿¹¼úÀ̶ó°í ºÎ¸£´Â Àΰ£ÀÇ
ƯÁ¤ÇÑ È°µ¿À» ±¸¼ºÇÏ´ÂÁö ÀÌÇØÇÔ¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» »Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ±×·± ÀÌÇØ¸¦ ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ºÒ°¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µç´Ù. |
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To the question, what is this art to which are offered in sacrifice the
labors of millions of people, the very lives of people, and even morality, the existing aesthetic systems give answers all of which come down to saying that the aim of art is beauty, and that beauty is known by the pleasure it gives, and that the pleasure given by art is a good and important thing. That is, that pleasure is good because it is pleasure. So that what is considered the definition of art is not a definition of art at all, but is only a ruse to justify those sacrifices which are offered by people in the name of this supposed art, as well as the egoistic pleasure and immorality of existing art. And therefore, strange as it is to say, despite the mountains of books written on art, no precise definition of art has yet been made. The reason for this is that the concept of beauty has been placed at the foundation of the concept of art. |
¿¹¼úÀÌ ¹«¾ùÀ̱⿡ ¼ö¹é¸¸ »ç¶÷µéÀÇ ³ëµ¿µéÀÌ, »ç¶÷µéÀÇ »îµé ¸¶Àú, ±×¸®°í ½ÉÁö¾î »ý¸í±îÁö ¹ÙÃÄÁö´Â°¡¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Áú¹®¿¡, ±âÁ¸ÀÇ ¹ÌÇÐÀû ü°èµéÀÌ
ÁÖ´Â ´ë´äµéÀº ¸ðµÎ ÀÌ·¸°Ô ¸»Çϰí ÀÖ´Ù: ¿¹¼úÀÇ ¸ñÀûÀº ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÌ´Ù, ±×¸®°í ±× ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀº ±×°ÍÀÌ ÁÖ´Â Äè¶ôÀ¸·Î ¾Ë·ÁÁö¸ç, ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ÀÇÇØ
ÁÖ¾îÁø Äè¶ôÀº À¯ÀÍÇϸç Áß¿äÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Áï, Äè¶ôÀº À¯ÀÍÇÏ´Ù ¿Ö³ÄÇÏ¸é ±×°ÍÀÌ Äè¶ôÀ̱⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®ÇÏ¿© ¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤ÀǶó°í ¿©°ÜÁö´Â °ÍÀº ÀüÇô
¿¹¼úÀÇ Á¤Àǰ¡ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó, ÀÌ °°Àº ¼ÒÀ§ ¿¹¼úÀ̶ó´Â À̸§À¸·Î »ç¶÷µé¿¡ ÀÇÇØ Á¦°øµÇ´Â ±× °°Àº Èñ»ýµéÀ» ÇÕ¸®ÈÇÏ´Â °è·«ÀÏ »ÓÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í
±×·¯¹Ç·Î, ÀÌ»óÇÑ ¸»ÀÌÁö¸¸, ¿¹¼ú¿¡ °üÇØ ¾²¿©Áø »ê´õ¹Ì ¸¸ÅÀÇ Ã¥µé¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸Çϰí, ¾ÆÁ÷µµ ¿¹¼ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤È®ÇÑ Á¤Àǰ¡ ³»·ÁÁöÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. À̰Ϳ¡
´ëÇÑ ÀÌÀ¯´Â ¹Ù·Î ¾Æ¸§´Ù¿òÀÇ °³³äÀÌ ¿¹¼úÀÇ °³³äÀ̶ó´Â Åä´ë À§¿¡ ³õ¿©Á³´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. |
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[Home]
[Up]
[Contents]
[Preface]
[Bibliographical Note]
[A Note on the Text]
[WHAT IS ART?]
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
[CONCLUSION]
[Appendix I]
[Appendix II]
[Notes]
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¡¡ |
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