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Year 501

The Conquest Continues


By Noam Chomsky

Chapter Two

The Contours of World Order

1. The Logic of North-South Relations

2. After Colonialism

3. The Rich Men's Club

4. The End of the Affluent Alliance

5. The "Vile Maxim of the Masters"

6. The New Imperial Age

 

1. The Logic of North-South Relations

"Rounding out their natural boundaries" was the task of the colonists in their home territory, which, by the end of the 19th century, extended to the mid-Pacific. But the "natural boundaries" of the South also have to be defended. Hence the dedicated efforts to ensure that no sector of the South goes a separate way, and the trepidations, often near-hysteria, if some deviation is detected. All must be properly integrated into the global economy dominated by the state capitalist industrial societies.

The South is assigned a service role: to provide resources, cheap labor, markets, opportunities for investment and, lately, export of pollution. For the past half-century, the US has shouldered the responsibility for protecting the interests of the "satisfied nations" whose power places them "above the rest," the "rich men dwelling at peace within their habitations" to whom "the government of the world must be entrusted," as Winston Churchill put the matter after World War II.

US interests are therefore understood in global terms. The primary threat to these interests is depicted in high-level planning documents as "radical and nationalistic regimes" that are responsive to popular pressures for "immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses" and development for domestic needs. These tendencies conflict with the demand for "a political and economic climate conducive to private investment," with adequate repatriation of profits (NSC 5432/1, 1954) and "protection of our raw materials" (George Kennan). For such reasons, as was recognized in 1948 by the clear-sighted head of the State Department Policy Planning staff, "We should cease to talk about vague and...unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization," and must "deal in straight power concepts," not "hampered by idealistic slogans" about "altruism and world-benefaction," if we are to maintain the "position of disparity" that separates our enormous wealth from the poverty of others (Kennan).

The profoundly anti-democratic thrust of US policy in the Third World, with the recurrent resort to terror to eliminate "the political participation of the numerical majority," is readily understandable. It follows at once from the opposition to "economic nationalism," which is, quite commonly, an outgrowth of popular pressures and organization. Such heresies must therefore be extirpated. Entirely independent of the Cold War, these have been salient features of policy; notoriously, the savage and destructive policies of the past decade, which are, accordingly, hailed for bringing democracy and a new respect for human rights to the world, exactly as one would expect in a well-behaved intellectual culture.

The domestic analogue is apparent, though other devices are needed to tame the "bewildered herd" at home.1

As discussed earlier, "free trade" is highly regarded by those who expect to win the competition, though honored in the breach when interests so dictate. Correspondingly, opposition to economic nationalism (for others) is virtually a reflex among global planners. It became a primary theme of US policy after its own resort to protectionism, import substitution, and other such "ultranationalist" methods enabled the US to play the game successfully. By the mid-1940s, US dominance had reached extraordinary levels. The virtues of economic liberalism were therefore extolled with much fervor, in tandem with calls for extending the huge state subsidies for domestic enterprise. The only problem was how to help backward minds appreciate the merits of policies that would serve US interests so splendidly.

At the Chapultepec (Mexico) hemispheric conference in February 1945, the US called for "An Economic Charter of the Americas" that would eliminate economic nationalism "in all its forms." This policy stood in sharp conflict with the Latin American stand, which a State Department officer described as "The philosophy of the New Nationalism [that] embraces policies designed to bring about a broader distribution of wealth and to raise the standard of living of the masses." State Department Political Adviser Laurence Duggan wrote that "Economic nationalism is the common denominator of the new aspirations for industrialization. Latin Americans are convinced that the first beneficiaries of the development of a country's resources should be the people of that country." The US position, in contrast, was that the "first beneficiaries" should be US investors, while Latin America fulfills its service function. It should not undergo "excessive industrial development" that infringes on US interests, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations held.2

Given the power relations, the US position prevailed.

With regard to Asia, the principles were first given a definitive form in an August 1949 draft of NSC 48, Bruce Cumings observes. The basic principle it enunciated was "reciprocal exchange and mutual advantage." A corollary, again, is opposition to independent development: "none of [the Asian countries] alone has adequate resources as a base for general industrialization." India, China, and Japan may "approximate that condition," but no more. Japan's prospects were regarded as quite limited: it might produce "knick-knacks" and other products for the underdeveloped world, a US survey mission concluded in 1950, but nothing more. Though doubtless infused by racism, such conclusions were not entirely unrealistic before the Korean war revived Japan's stagnating economy. "General industrialization in individual countries could be achieved only at a high cost as a result of sacrificing production in fields of comparative advantage," the draft continued. The US must find ways of "exerting economic pressures" on countries that do not accept their role as suppliers of "strategic commodities and other basic materials," the germ of later policies of economic warfare, Cumings observes.

Prospects for development in Africa were never taken seriously, White Africa aside. For the Middle East, the major concern was that the energy system be in US hands, operating in the manner designed by the British: local management would be delegated to an "Arab Façade," with "absorption" of the colonies "veiled by constitutional fictions as a protectorate, a sphere of influence, a buffer State, and so on," a device more cost-effective than direct rule (Lord Curzon and the Eastern Committee, 1917-1918). But we must never run the risk of "losing control," as John Foster Dulles warned. The Façade would therefore consist of family dictatorships that keep pretty much to what they are told, and ensure the flow of profits to the US, its British client, and their energy corporations. They are to be protected by regional enforcers, preferably non-Arab (Turkey, Israel, Iran under the Shah, Pakistan), with British and US muscle in reserve. The system has operated with reasonable efficiency over a considerable period, and has new prospects today with secular nationalist forces in the Arab world in utter disarray, and the Soviet deterrent removed.3

The basic themes of internal planning sometimes reach the public, as when the editors of the applauding the overthrow of the parliamentary Mossadegh regime in Iran, observed that "Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism." The service areas must be protected from "Bolshevism" or "Communism," technical terms that refer to social transformation "in ways that reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the West," in the words of an important scholarly study of the 1950s. Most important, the historical record conforms very well to this commonly articulated understanding of the role of the South.4

"Radical and nationalistic regimes" are intolerable in themselves, even more so if they appear to be succeeding in terms that might be meaningful to oppressed and suffering people. In that case they become a "virus" that might "infect" others, a "rotten apple" that might "spoil the barrel." For the public, they are "dominoes" that will topple others by aggression and conquest; internally, the absurdity of this picture is often (not always) conceded, and the threat is recognized to be what Oxfam once called "the threat of a good example," referring to Nicaragua. When Henry Kissinger warned that the "contagious example" of Allende's Chile would "infect" not only Latin America but also southern Europe, sending to Italian voters the message that democratic social reform was a possible option, he did not anticipate that Allende's hordes would descend upon Rome. Although the Sandinista "Revolution without Borders" was a spectacularly successful government-media fraud, the propaganda images reflected an authentic concern: from the perspective of a hegemonic power and its intellectual servants, declaration of an intent to provide a model that will inspire others -- the actual source of the imagery -- amounts to aggression.5

When a virus is detected, it must be destroyed, and potential victims immunized. The Cuban virus called forth invasion, terror, and economic warfare, and a rash of National Security States to prevent the rot from spreading. The story was the same in Southeast Asia in the same years. The standard approach to the virus itself is a two-track policy, as in the case of Allende's Chile. The hard line called for a military coup, finally achieved. The soft line was explained by Ambassador Edward Korry, a Kennedy liberal: to "do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile." Hence even if the hard line did not succeed in introducing fascist killers to exterminate the virus, the vision of "utmost deprivation" would suffice to keep the rot from spreading, and ultimately demoralize the patient itself. And crucially, it would provide ample grist for the mill of the cultural managers, who can produce cries of anguish at "the hard features of a Communist society," pouring scorn on those "apologists" who describe what is happening. The point was made clearly by Bertrand Russell in his bitterly critical account of Bolshevik Russia in its early days:

Every failure of industry, every tyrannous regulation brought about by the desperate situation, is used by the Entente as a justification of its policy. If a man is deprived of food and drink, he will grow weak, lose his reason, and finally die. This is not usually considered a good reason for inflicting death by starvation. But where nations are concerned, the weakness and struggles are regarded as morally culpable, and are held to justify further punishment.

There is, evidently, much satisfaction to be gained by careful inspection of those who are writhing under our boot, to see if they are behaving properly; when they are not, as is often the case, indignation is unconstrained. Far worse atrocities of our own, or of our "moderate" and "improving" clients, are merely an aberration, soon to be overcome.6

To introduce further technical terminology, "rotten apples" constitute a threat to "stability." As Washington prepared to overthrow the first democratic government in Guatemala in 1954, a State Department official warned that Guatemala "has become an increasing threat to the stability of Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a powerful propaganda weapon; its broad social program of aiding the workers and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and large foreign enterprises has a strong appeal to the populations of Central American neighbors where similar conditions prevail." "Stability" means security for "the upper classes and large foreign enterprises,"and it must naturally be preserved. It is understandable, then, that Eisenhower and Dulles should have felt that the "self-defense and self-preservation" of the United States might be at stake when they were advised that "a strike situation" in Honduras might "have had inspiration and support from the Guatemalan side of the border.7

So important is "stability" that "desirable reforms" must not be implemented. In December 1967, Freedom House issued a statement by 14 noted scholars who declared themselves to be "the moderate segment of the academic community," praising US policies in Asia as "remarkably good," particularly in Indochina, where our courageous defense of freedom contributed greatly to "political equilibrium in Asia," improving "the morale -- and the policies -- of our Asian allies and the neutrals." The point is illustrated by what they cite as our greatest triumph, the "dramatic changes" that took place in Indonesia in 1965, when the army, encouraged by our stand in Indochina, took matters in hand and slaughtered several hundred thousand people, mostly landless peasants (see chapter 5). Quite generally, the moderate scholars explain, "many types of reform increase instability, however desirable and essential they may be in long-range terms. For people under siege, there is no substitute for security." The terms "people," "stability," etc., have their usual PC meanings.

Many noted scholars agreed with MIT political scientist Ithiel Pool that throughout the Third World, "it is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilized strata to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism." The same lessons were soon to be drawn by the Trilateral Commission for the population of the West, who were undermining "democracy" by attempting to enter the arena of democratic politics instead of keeping to their "function" as "spectators," as their betters run the show.8

Such thinking is pervasive, and understandable. It will persist, as long as threats to order and stability remain. The continuities are apparent, and quite independent of the Cold War. After the Gulf War, when the Cold War was lost as a pretext beyond hope of resurrection, George Bush returned to support for his old friend and ally Saddam Hussein as he crushed the Shi'ites in the South and then the Kurds in the North. Western ideologues explained that although these atrocities offend our delicate sensibilities, we must nevertheless accept them in the name of "stability." The chief diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, Thomas Friedman, outlined Bush Administration reasoning: Washington seeks "the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein," a return to the days when Saddam's "iron fist held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not to speak of the boss in Washington. Saddam Hussein committed his first serious crime on August 2, 1990, when he disobeyed orders. Therefore he must be destroyed, but some clone must be found to ensure "stability." In accord with the same doctrines, the Iraqi democratic opposition was barred from contact with Washington, hence from the mainstream US media, throughout the crisis (and, indeed, before and after). It was not until summer 1992, in the context of electoral concerns, that the Bush Administration opened limited contacts with Iraqi democrats.9

These are leading features of the New World Order, as of the old, well-documented in the internal record, regularly illustrated in historical practice, bound to persist as contingencies change.

Official PC rhetoric includes a variety of other terms. Thus the aspiring intellectual must master the term "security threat," referring to anything that might infringe upon the rights of US investors. Another is "pragmatism," a term which, for us, means "doing what we want." For others, the meaning is: "doing what we want." In the case of the Arab-Israel conflict, for example, the US has stood virtually alone for many years in blocking any peace process that accords national rights to Palestinians, but of the two brands of Israeli rejectionism (Labor and Likud), it has preferred the former. Accordingly, Likud's Yitzhak Shamir was "ideological" but Labor's Yitzhak Rabin is "pragmatic." "Mr. Rabin's pragmatic, non-ideological approach fits in well with the Bush team," Times State Department spokesman Thomas Friedman writes, recognizing that the Bush team is pragmatic by definition, agreeing with itself. Jerusalem correspondent Clyde Haberman applauds Rabin's election in June 1992 as a victory for "pragmatism." Similarly, Palestinians are "pragmatic" if they accept the fact that the US sets the rules: they have no national rights, because the US has so decreed. They must therefore accept "the autonomy of a POW camp" described by Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein, an "autonomy" in which they will be free to collect their garbage in designated areas not taken over by Israel -- as long as the garbage cans do not display the colors of the Palestinian flag, a leading Israeli civil libertarian adds. The term "peace process" is another of those to be mastered: in PC rhetoric, it refers to whatever the US happens to be doing, perhaps blocking the peace process, as in this and many other cases.10

There are other skills to be learned, to some of which we return; but the task is not too onerous, as demonstrated by the ease with which they are mastered.

The "Communist" danger to "stability" is further enhanced by their unfair advantages. The Communists are able to "appeal directly to the masses," President Eisenhower complained. Our plans for "the masses" preclude any such appeal. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in private conversation with his brother Allen, who headed the CIA, deplored the Communist "ability to get control of mass movements," "something we have no capacity to duplicate." "The poor people are the ones they appeal to and they have always wanted to plunder the rich."11 The same concerns extend to "the preferential option for the poor" of the Latin American Church and other commitments to independent development or democracy -- and also to such friends as Mussolini, Trujillo, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein when they forget their assigned role.

2. After Colonialism

The United States had become the world's major industrial economy by the turn of the century, and its leading creditor by World War I, a position maintained until the Reaganites took command, quickly converting the US into the world's leading debtor. During World War II, quasi-totalitarian measures at last overcame the effects of the Great Depression, more than tripling US industrial production and teaching valuable lessons to the corporate managers who ran the wartime economy. There has been no serious challenge since to their conclusion that private wealth and power, which were nurtured by large-scale state intervention in the first place, can be sustained and enhanced only through the same means; only in rhetorical flourishes, or on the remote margins, is capitalism regarded as a viable system. With much of the world in ruins, the US had attained a historically unparalleled peak of economic and military dominance. State and corporate planners were well aware of their unprecedented power, and intent on using it to construct a global order to benefit the interests they serve.

The highest priority was to ensure that the industrial heartland, German-based Europe and Japan, would be firmly within the US-dominated world order, controlled by domestic financial-industrial sectors linked to US state-corporate power. The first order of business, then, was to undermine the antifascist resistance with its popular base in the "rascal multitude," to weaken labor, and to restore traditional conservative rule, often including fascist collaborators. This task was undertaken on a global scale in the late 1940s, with considerable violence when that proved necessary, notably in Greece and South Korea.

In this New World Order, North-South relations were reconstructed, though not in any fundamental way. The US sought a generally open world based on the principles of liberal internationalism, expecting to prevail in a competition that was "free and fair." These considerations led to a measure of support for the rising anti-colonial forces. But within limits. A 1948 CIA memorandum observed that a balance must be struck between "supporting local nationalist aspirations and maintaining the colonial economic interests of countries to whom aid has been pledged in Western Europe"; there could be little doubt as to the relative weights when serious US interests are at stake. Similarly, the imperial system that Japan had sought to construct had to be restored to it, under over-arching US control. These considerations led to tactical decisions to favor traditional colonial preference systems for rival/allies; temporarily, in the context of postwar reconstruction and reestablishment of trade patterns with the industrial powers on which the US economy relied.

Intending to organize the Far East pretty much on its own, Washington barred its allies from any role in determining the fate of Japan. The goal was "to guarantee U.S. security by insuring long-term American domination of Japan" and "to exclude the influence of all foreign governments" (Melvyn Leffler, expressing a scholarly consensus; "security" having its usual meaning). Given US power, that goal was easily attained, irrespective of wartime agreements. In the Middle East and Latin America, the ideological system confers on the United States the right to pursue its "needs" and "wants," respectively. The plan, therefore, was to restrict foreign interference, apart from an occasional subordinate role assigned to client powers, notably Britain in the Middle East. Britain serves as "our lieutenant (the fashionable word is partner)," as a senior Kennedy adviser put it; the British are to hear only the fashionable word.12

The character of planning is well-illustrated by the case of Italy. Like Greece, its importance extended to the Middle East. "U.S. strategic interests" required control over "the line of communications to the Near East outlets of the Saudi-Arabian oil fields" through the Mediterranean, a September 1945 interagency review observed. These interests would be threatened if Italy were to fall into "the hands of any great power" -- in translation: if it were to escape from the hands of the proper great power. Italy "could be used to guarantee -- or, in the wrong hands, impair -- oil supplies from the Near East," Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones observes.

It was expected that the Communist Party, with its strong labor support and the prestige conferred by its role in the struggle against Fascism and the Nazi occupiers, would win the 1948 elections. That result could have a "demoralizing effect throughout Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East," US policymakers warned. It would be the "first instance in history of a communist accession to power by popular suffrage and legal procedure," and "so unprecedented and portentous an event must produce a profound psychological effect in those countries threatened by the Soviets and...striving to retain their freedom." To translate again to English, it might influence popular movements that sought to pursue an independent and often radical democratic course, thus undermining the US policy of restoring the traditional order dominated by conservative business and often pro-fascist sectors ("freedom"). In short, Italy might become a "virus infecting others." The US planned military intervention if the election could not be controlled by other means. A combination of force, threats, control over desperately needed food, and other measures succeeded in overcoming the threat of a free election. Substantial US efforts to subvert Italian democracy continued at least to the mid-1970s. In later years, as noted, it was feared that Chile might be a "virus infecting" Italy.13

For similar reasons, after Washington failed to disrupt the 1984 election in Nicaragua by terror, its doctrinal system effaced the terrible event from history; the media rigorously excluded the approval voiced by international observers including hostile ones, US Latin American scholars who studied the election in depth, and the leading figure of Central American democracy, José Figueres.

The life of those responsible for world order is never easy, as Metternich and the Czar had recognized in their day.

Apart from subversion, policymakers sought other ways "to stabilize Italy," Sallie Pisani writes in her study of the early days of the CIA. Subversion to achieve stability is standard procedure, quite intelligible to those who have mastered PC rhetoric; it is even possible to "destabilize a freely elected Marxist government in Chile" because "we were determined to seek stability" (James Chace). One idea for Italy was to thin the disruptive population by inducing emigration. Marshall Plan money was used to rebuild the Italian merchant marine to "double the number of Italian emigrants who can be carried overseas each year," the chief of the ECA (Marshall Plan) mission for Italy reported. It was also used to retrain workers, "thereby making them more acceptable to other countries," he added. Europe had unemployment problems, and more "wops" was the last thing wanted in the US. Congress therefore authorized funds for the "purpose of transporting emigrants from Italy to parts of the world other than the United States." The ECA decided upon South America, with its "relatively less developed areas." It funded an emigration survey "to locate specific lands suitable for Italian settlement" in South America, and to help prepare the ground. The first recipient of such aid was Brazil, in 1950.

The project was considered highly sensitive, and concealed from Italians completely. "Propaganda to stabilize the remaining Italians was equally important," Pisani writes, and a "sophisticated campaign" was conducted in Italy, as in France, another potential "virus." A problem in France, the ECA mission noted, was that "The French are allergic to propaganda. They often confuse what we call information with what they call propaganda." Washington policymakers agreed that "overt American propaganda" would not be a good idea for Europeans, because of their experiences with the Nazis. The ECA therefore adopted the concept of "indirection," defined as the ability to "get across the ECA and U.S. Government foreign policy point of view, without either ECA or the U.S. Government being identified as the source of the material." At home, where the population is better trained, "information" suffices.14

In the Western hemisphere, the US had largely displaced its European rivals by World War II, and therefore rejected the principles of the new world order for "our little region over here which never has bothered anybody," as Secretary of War Henry Stimson described the hemisphere when explaining why all regional systems must be dismantled apart from our own, which are to be extended. The US insisted that hemispheric affairs be handled by regional organizations, which it is sure to dominate; very much the principle for which Saddam Hussein was roundly condemned in 1990, when he proposed that the problems of the Gulf be dealt with by the Arab League. But here too there are limits. If the Latin Americans "attempt irresponsible use of their numerical strength in the O.A.S.," John Dreier explains in his study of the organization, "if they carry to extremes the doctrine of nonintervention, if they leave the United States no alternative but to act unilaterally to protect itself, they will have destroyed not only the basis of hemispheric cooperation for progress but all hope of a secure future for themselves." The guardians of world order must be ever alert for signs of irresponsibility.

The same had been true of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, which carried an "implicit obligation of reciprocity," State Department Latin America official Robert Woodward pointed out: "the admittance into an American government of an alien ideology" would "compel the United States to take defensive measures," unilaterally. Others, needless to say, have no such right, in particular, no right to defend themselves from the US and its "ideology," which are not "alien": indeed, the US has no ideology, apart from "pragmatism," in the technical sense. The general point was clarified by Carter's Latin America adviser Robert Pastor, at the critical extreme: the US wants other nations "to act independently, except when doing so would affect U.S. interests adversely"; the US has never wanted "to control them," as long as developments do not "get out of control." Others can be quite free, as long as they are "pragmatic."15

To assist "countries striving to retain their freedom," the US has been forced regularly to launch terrorist attacks against them or invade them outright, and to use its unparalleled capacities for economic warfare and subversion. The mission requires a cooperative class of intellectuals to shape "information" properly for the rascal multitude, rarely a problem.

After World War II, the importance of the traditional service role of the South was enhanced by "the realization that the food and fuel of Eastern Europe were no longer available to Western Europe at prewar levels" (Leffler). Each region was assigned its status and "function" by the planners. The US would take charge of Latin America and the Middle East, in the latter, with the help of its lieutenant. Africa was to be "exploited" for the reconstruction of Europe, while Southeast Asia would "fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials for Japan and Western Europe" (George Kennan and his State Department Policy Planning Staff, 1948-1949). The US too would purchase raw materials from the former colonies, thus reconstructing the triangular trade patterns whereby the industrial societies purchase US manufacturing exports by earning dollars from raw materials exports by their traditional colonies. The "dollar gap" that impeded export of US manufactures to Europe was considered an extremely serious problem by Dean Acheson and other top planners; overcoming it was taken to be a critical necessity for the US economy, which, it was assumed, would otherwise sink back into deep depression or face state intervention of the kind that would interfere with corporate prerogatives rather than enhancing them. By this reasoning, sophisticated and extensively articulated, former colonies could be granted nominal self-government, but often little more.16

The framework of postwar global planning entailed that colonial relations must be reestablished in new forms and "ultranationalist" tendencies suppressed, particularly if they threaten "stability" elsewhere; the destiny of the South remains much as before. Both the industrial core and its subservient periphery were to be guarded against association with the "Sino-Soviet bloc" (or its components, when the bitter antagonism internal to the "bloc" could no longer be denied). The latter "bloc," a huge segment of the former Third World that had departed from its traditional role, had to be "contained" or, if possible, restored to the service function by "rollback." A significant factor in the Cold War was the imposition of Soviet rule over traditional service areas, separating them from the US-dominated state capitalist world, and the threat that Soviet power might contribute to the breakaway of other areas, even influencing popular sectors within the industrial core itself, a threat considered particularly severe in the early postwar period.

North-South relations vary somewhat over the years, but rarely beyond these basic limits. The realities are described in a 1990 report by the South Commission, chaired by Julius Nyerere and consisting of leading Third World economists, government planners, religious leaders, and others. The Commission observes that there were some gestures to Third World concerns in the 1970s, "undoubtedly spurred" by concern over "the newly found assertiveness of the South after the rise in oil prices in 1973" -- incidentally, not entirely unwelcome to the US and UK. As the threat of Southern assertiveness abated, the report continues, the industrial societies lost interest and turned to "a new form of neo-colonialism," monopolizing control over the world economy, undermining the more democratic elements of the United Nations, and in general proceeding to institutionalize "the South's second class status" through the 1980s.

The pattern is consistent; it would be remarkable if it were otherwise.

Reviewing the miserable state of the traditional Western domains, the South Commission called for a "new world order" that will respond to "the South's plea for justice, equity, and democracy in the global society." The prospects for this plea are revealed by the attention granted it; the study was ignored, as are Third World voices generally. They are of slight interest to the rich men to whom "the government of the world must be entrusted."17

Several months later, George Bush appropriated the phrase "New World Order" as a cover for his war in the Gulf. In this case, word got out, and Bush-Baker rhetoric inspired much elevated discourse about the prospects opening before us. In the South, in contrast, the "New World Order" imposed by the powerful is perceived, not unrealistically, as a bitter international class war, with the advanced state capitalist economies and their transnational corporations monopolizing the means of violence and controlling investment, capital, technology, and planning and management decisions, at the expense of the huge mass of the population. Local elites in the Southern dependencies can share in the spoils. The US and UK, which wield the whip, may well continue their decline toward societies with notable Third World characteristics, dramatically obvious in the inner cities and rural areas; it is likely that continental Europe will not lag far behind, despite the impediment of a labor movement that has not yet been entirely restored to its proper place.

3. The Rich Men's Club

The US-designed global system required that order must reign within the rich men's club as well. Its lesser members are to pursue their "regional interests" within the "overall framework of order" managed by the United States, the only power with "global interests and responsibilities," Kissinger informed Europe in 1973 ("the Year of Europe"). In the early postwar years, a European third force could not be tolerated. The formation of NATO was in large part motivated by the need "to integrate Western Europe and England into an orbit amenable to American leadership," Leffler observes: "Neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force or a neutral bloc." Neutralism would be "a shortcut to suicide," Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated. The same was true outside the core industrial societies. While recognizing that the Russians were not responsible for conflicts in the Third World, Acheson warned in 1952 that the Russians might exploit such conflicts in an effort to "force the maximum number of non-Communist countries to pursue a neutral policy and to deny their resources to the principal Western powers" -- that is, to deny them on the terms the West demanded. General Omar Bradley also warned of "the suicide of neutralism," with Japan in mind.18

Western planners "did not expect and were not worried about Soviet aggression," Leffler writes, summarizing a well-established scholarly consensus: "The Truman administration supported the Atlantic alliance primarily because it was indispensable to the promotion of European stability through German integration." This was the basic motivation for the North Atlantic treaty signed in Washington in April 1949, which led to the establishment of NATO, and in response, the Warsaw Pact. Preparing for the April meeting, US policymakers "became convinced that the Soviets might really be interested in striking a deal, unifying Germany, and ending the division of Europe." This was regarded not as an opportunity, but as a threat to the "primary national security goal": "to harness Germany's economic and military potential for the Atlantic community" -- and to block "the suicide of neutralism."19

Note that "national security" is used here in its technical sense, unrelated to the security of the nation, which could only be endangered by these conscious steps toward superpower confrontation. Similarly, the phrase "Atlantic community" refers to its ruling elements, not its populations, whose interests are readily sacrificed if power and profits so dictate; by shifting production overseas to labor that is kept docile and cheap by state violence, for example.

"The real issue," the CIA concluded in 1949, "is not the settlement of Germany," which, it was believed -- and feared -- might be reached by an accord with the Kremlin. Rather, it is "the long-term control of German power." This "great workshop" must be controlled by the US and its clients, with no participation from the Soviet Union, despite the well-understood security interests of the country that had just been virtually destroyed by Germany for the second time in 30 years, and had borne the brunt of the war against the Nazis; and in violation of the wartime agreements on the Soviet role in Germany, which the US had already violated by March 1946, Leffler observes. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany might be a desirable goal, Acheson held, but "the withdrawal of American and British troops from Germany would be too high a price." The "trend of our thinking," George Kennan recognized, "means...that we do not really want to see Germany reunified at this time, and that there are no conditions on which we would really find such a solution satisfactory." Unification of Germany might be a long-term desideratum, but "only if the circumstances are right," the State Department emphasized. US troops would therefore remain in Germany even if the Soviets proposed a mutual withdrawal; Germany would be integrated as a subsidiary part of the US-dominated global economy; and the Russians would have no significant voice in the outcome, would not receive reparations, and would not influence German industrial (or military) development.20

That outcome would serve two crucial goals: weakening the Soviet rival, and reinforcing US dominance over its allies. Moves to end the Cold War, in contrast, would serve neither of these goals, and hence were never a serious option.

A third reason for opposing unification, Leffler observes, was concern over the "appeal of the left," reinforced by "the more vigorous recovery and political activism in the Soviet zone," including the space allowed for works councils with some managerial authority in denazified enterprises, and trade union organization. Washington feared that a unified labor movement and other popular organizations might interfere with US plans to restore traditional business rule. The British Foreign Office also feared "economic and ideological infiltration" from the East, which it perceived as "something very like aggression"; political successes by the wrong people are commonly described as "aggression" in the internal record. In a united Germany, the British Foreign Office warned, "the balance of advantage seems to lie with the Russians," who could exercise "the stronger pull." Division of Germany was therefore to be preferred, with the Soviet Union excluded from any voice over the heartland of German industry in the wealthy Ruhr/Rhine industrial complex.21

For many reasons, confrontation seemed preferable to accommodation. Whether that might have been possible is a matter for speculation. Throughout, a major concern was integration of the core industrial societies in a world order dominated by the US state-corporate nexus.

A decade later, Europe had substantially recovered, thanks in large measure to the policies of "international military Keynesianism" undertaken by Washington from shortly before the Korean war -- which served as a pretext on the assumption, too convenient to require evidence, that the Russians were setting forth on world conquest. As recovery proceeded, fears of European independence and neutralist tendencies increased. Kennedy's Ambassador to London, David Bruce, saw "dangers" if Europe "struck off on its own, seeking to play a role independent of the US"; like others, he wanted "partnership -- with the United States in a superior position," Frank Costigliola comments. Kennedy's "Grand Design" was an effort to manage the allies, but with mixed results. France was a particular annoyance. Kennedy feared that President Charles de Gaulle might make a deal with the Russians that "would be acceptable to the Germans," and was "extremely concerned" about intelligence reports suggesting a Franco-Russian deal to shut the US out of Europe, close associates recalled. Another concern was the gold drain, taken to be French-inspired. A still further irritant was de Gaulle's position on Indochina. His advocacy of diplomacy and neutralization was completely unacceptable to the Kennedy Administration, which was committed to military victory and, at the time, was struggling to undermine and deflect Vietnamese initiatives on all sides to settle that conflict without a major international war. In Indochina, as in Europe and throughout the Third World, neutralism was anathema to US planners, "a shortcut to suicide."22

Mounting difficulties in controlling the allies led to Kissinger's 1973 admonitions. The "major problem" in the Western alliance, he felt, was "the domestic evolution in many European countries," which might lead to an independent course. The development of Eurocommunism aroused new concerns -- which Kissinger shared with Brezhnev, who also was not pleased by the call for a "democratic path to socialism" that opposed "all foreign intervention." Kissinger cited post-fascist Portugal and Italy as situations that, "while not the result of détente or of Soviet policy," posed political problems for the US: "We cannot encourage dialogue with Communist parties within NATO nations," he informed US Embassies, whether or not they follow "the Moscow line": "The impact of an Italian Communist Party that seemed to be governing effectively would be devastating -- on France, and on NATO, too." Consequently, the US must oppose the rise of the Communist party in Portugal after the collapse of the fascist dictatorship (which had posed no problem), even if it were to follow the Italian Eurocommunist model. "It was feared that Eurocommunism would make Western communist parties more palatable and attractive to the publics of Western countries," Raymond Garthoff writes in his comprehensive study of the period: the US "gave a higher priority to...protecting the Western alliance and American influence in it" than to "weakening Soviet influence in the East."23

Again, we see the dual problem: the combination of democratic developments that escape corporate control, and decline of US power. Neither is acceptable; jointly, they pose a grave danger to "security" and "stability."

By the 1970s, the problems were becoming unmanageable, and a sharply different course was initiated, to which we return in the next section. They persist into the 1990s. An illustration is the controversy over a secret February 1992 Pentagon draft of Defense Planning Guidance, leaked to the press, which describes itself as "definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense" for budgetary policy to the year 2000. The draft develops standard reasoning. The US must hold "global power" and a monopoly of force. It will then "protect" the "new order" while allowing others to pursue "their legitimate interests," as Washington defines them. The US "must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order," or even "aspiring to a larger regional or global role." There must be no independent European security system; rather, US-dominated NATO must remain the "primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs." "We will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but also those of our allies or friends"; the United States alone will determine what are "wrongs" and when they are to be selectively "righted." As in the past, the Middle East is a particular concern. Here "our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil" while deterring aggression (selectively), maintaining strategic control and "regional stability" (in the technical sense), and protecting "U.S. nationals and property." In Latin America, the primary threat is Cuban "military provocation against the U.S. or an American ally," the standard Orwellian reference to the escalating US war against Cuban independence.

"Western European and third world diplomats here were sharply critical of some of the language in the document," Patrick Tyler reported from Washington. "Senior White House and State Department officials have harshly criticized" it as well, claiming that it "in no way or shape represents U.S. policy." The Pentagon spokesman "pointedly disavowed some of the central policy statements" of the document, noting, however, that "its basic thrust mirrors the public statements and testimony of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney." This constitutes a "tactical withdrawal" by the Pentagon, Tyler suggests, prompted by the "reaction in Congress and from senior Administration officials." Quite possibly Administration criticisms also reflect concerns over the alarms that the document set off in many capitals, and their harsh criticism too is a tactical withdrawal. Cheney and Undersecretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz "endorsed [the] principal views" of the document, senior officials acknowledged. There was also criticism in the press, notably from Times foreign policy specialist Leslie Gelb, who objected to the "daydreaming about being the world's policeman" and one "disturbing omission": "the document seems to be silent about any American role in insuring Israeli security."24

To what extent the other members of the club will accept the suzerainty of the enforcer who pledges to "account sufficiently for their interests" is an unsettled question. In the present case, protests and concerns over cost led the Administration to revise the plan a few months later, replacing traditional themes by tepid clichés -- at least for public consumption. Meanwhile France and Germany moved to implement a Franco-German military corps independent of NATO, over intense US opposition. France also blocked US efforts to extend the NATO alliance (including the related North Atlantic Cooperation Council) to include Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. US officials allege that "the French don't want an American-led NATO to take on further responsibilities in Eastern Europe" and perpetuate the alliance, the Wall Street Journal reported.25

The debates reflect a real foreign policy dilemma. With its economy in relative decline and its social base in serious disrepair, particularly after a decade of Reaganite borrow-and-spend abandon, is the US in a position to maintain the hegemonic role it has played for half a century? And will others accept a subordinate role? Will they be willing to pay the costs, as the US exploits its comparative advantage in military force to maintain the particular version of global order demanded by the domestic power interests, costs that the US is no longer in a position to sustain itself? It is not clear that the other rich men will agree to employ the US as their "Hessians," as widely advocated in the business press during the build-up to the Gulf war, perhaps along with its British lieutenant. The latter is also in social and economic decline but "well qualified, motivated, and likely to have a high military profile as the mercenary of the international community," the military correspondent of the London Independent comments -- again, a regular theme during the Gulf war, accompanied by much triumphant breast-beating among British jingoists, dreaming of the good old days when they had "the right to bomb niggers" with no whining from the left-fascists.26

To understand the discussion, it is necessary to decode the conventional euphemisms in which it is framed ("responsibility," "security," "defense," etc.). The code words disguise a basic question: Who is going to run the show?

4. The End of the Affluent Alliance

The basic framework of policy formation tends to remain in place as long as the institutions of power and domination are stable, with the capacity to deflect challenges and accommodate or displace competing forces. That has been true of the United States in the postwar period, indeed long before. Nevertheless, policies have to be adapted to changing contingencies.

A change in world order of lasting importance was recognized officially in August 1971, when Richard Nixon announced his "New Economic Policy," dismantling the international economic order established after World War II (the Bretton Woods system), in which the US served, in effect, as international banker, with the dollar as the world's sole international currency, convertible to gold at $35 an ounce. By that time, "the affluent alliance had come to the end of the road" and "the disorder was getting too serious for aspirins," international economist Susan Strange observed. German-led Europe and Japan had recovered from wartime destruction, and the US was facing the unanticipated costs of the Vietnam war. The world economy was entering an era of "tripolarity" -- and also, crucially, of stagnation and declining profitability of capital.27

The predictable reaction was a rapid intensification of the class war that is waged with unceasing dedication by the corporate sector, its political agents, and ideological servants. The years that followed saw an attack on real wages, social services, and unions -- indeed any kind of functioning democratic structure -- so as to overcome the troublesome "crisis of democracy" brought about by the illegitimate efforts of the public to bring their interests into the political arena. The ideological component of the offensive sought to strengthen authority and habits of obedience, to diminish social consciousness and such human frailties as concern for others, and to instruct young people that they are confirmed narcissists. Another objective has been to establish a de facto world government insulated from popular awareness or interference, devoted to the task of ensuring that the world's human and material resources are freely available to the transnational corporations (TNCs) and international banks that are to control the global system.

The US remains the largest single economy, though declining relative to its major rivals, which are not without their own problems. Those faced by the US are also too serious for aspirins, though little more is available thanks to doctrinal and policy triumphs that have diminished the capacity for constructive social action directed to the needs of the irrelevant majority, one happy consequence of Reaganite debt-creation.

Nixon's response to the decline of US economic hegemony was forthright: "when you're losing, change the rules of the game," economist Richard Du Boff observes. Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold, overturning the international monetary system, imposed temporary wage-price controls and a general import surcharge, and initiated fiscal measures that directed state power, beyond the previous norm, to welfare for the rich: reduction of federal taxes and domestic expenditures, apart from the required subsidies to the corporate sector. These have been the guiding policies since. They were accelerated during the Reagan years, largely following Carter Administration prescriptions that were reshaped by the more doctrinaire Reaganites to bring about a huge growth in debt at every level (federal, state, local, household, corporate), with little to show in the way of productive investment. One crucial element is the incalculable debt of unmet social needs, a mounting burden imposed upon the large majority of the population and future generations.

Nixon's initiatives constituted "a sort of mercantilist revolution in domestic and foreign policy," political economist David Calleo observed a few years later. The international system grew more disorderly, "with rules eroded and power more significant." There was less "rational control over national economic life," hence great advantages to internationalist business and banking, freed from capital controls and official restraint and secure in the expectation of a state-organized public bail-out if something goes wrong. International capital markets rapidly expanded as a consequence of the decline of regulation and control, the huge flow of petrodollars after the 1973-1974 oil price rise, and the information-telecommunications revolution, which greatly facilitated capital transfers. Vigorous bank initiatives to stimulate new borrowing contributed to the Third World debt crisis and the current instability of the banks themselves.28

The rise in oil prices (preceded by a comparable increase in price of US coal, uranium, and agricultural exports) yielded temporary advantages for the US and British economies, providing windfall profits for the energy corporations, primarily US and British, and inducing them to bring into production high-cost oil (Alaska, North Sea) that had been withheld from the market. For the US, rising energy costs were substantially offset by military and other exports to the Middle East oil producers and huge construction projects for them. Their profits also flowed to Treasury securities and investment; support for the economies of the US and UK has long been the primary responsibility of the Arab Facade of local managers.29

The same years saw the stagnation and collapse of the Soviet empire, which had interfered with the planned global order in crucial ways (chapter 3). The power of the state capitalist industrial societies was enhanced further by the economic catastrophe that swept through most of their domains in the 1980s. The sense of foreboding throughout the Third World is readily understandable.

Japan and continental Europe recovered from the recession of the early 1980s, though without resuming earlier growth rates. US recovery involved massive borrowing and state stimulation of the economy, mainly through the Pentagon-based public subsidy to high technology industry, along with a sharp increase in protectionist measures and a rise in interest rates. This contributed to the crisis of the South as interest payments on the debt rose while investment and aid declined, and the wealthy classes invested their riches in the West. There was a huge capital flow from South to North, with effects that were generally disastrous, apart from the NICs (newly industrialized countries) of East Asia, where the state is powerful enough to control capital flight and direct the economy efficiently. The catastrophe of capitalism in the 1980s also had an impact on Eastern Europe, contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the virtual disappearance of Russia from the world scene.30

In earlier years, the nonaligned countries had sought to gain some control over their fate. Initiatives were taken through UNCTAD (the UN Conference on Trade and Development) to create a "new international economic order" with support and stabilization programs for primary commodities, in the hope of stemming the deterioration in terms of trade and controlling the sharp price fluctuations that have a devastating impact on economies that rely on few primary exports. UNESCO undertook parallel efforts to provide Third World countries with access to international communications, a virtual monopoly of the advanced industrial societies.

These initiatives naturally elicited enormous hostility on the part of the world rulers, and were turned back decisively in the 1980s. The US led a fierce attack on the United Nations that effectively eliminated it as an independent force in world affairs. UNESCO inspired particular hatred, because of its Third World orientation and the threat to ideological domination. The demolition operation and the return of the UN to US control have been lauded here as a restoration of the ideals of the founders, not without justice. Extraordinary deceit has been required to conceal the fact that it has been primarily the US, secondarily Britain, that have vetoed Security Council resolutions and generally undermined the UN for over 20 years, and to sustain the standard pretense that "Soviet obstructionism" and "shrill Third World anti-Americanism" are what rendered the UN ineffective. The no less extraordinary levels of deceit that accompanied the government-media campaign to eliminate UNESCO heresies are documented in an important study, which, needless to say, had no effect whatsoever on the flow of necessary lies.31

The hysteria about "political correctness" is an interesting domestic analogue. Its extent is truly something to behold, including a stream of best-sellers with anecdotes, many concocted, about alleged horrors in the universities, angry speeches, and a flood of articles from the news columns to the sports pages and journals of opinion that gushed forth suddenly, as if on command; a study of one six-month period found over a mention per day in the Los Angeles Times. The outrage has a basis in reality. There really are a great many people who oppose racist and sexist oppression, have respect for other cultures, and do not look kindly upon atrocities in a "good cause," and the abuses that so horrify the faithful are not entirely fanciful; even the clumsiest propaganda usually takes off from something real. But as in the case of official enemies abroad, the real abuses, whatever they may be, have little relation to the drama constructed around them.

The phenomenon did not emerge from nowhere. One crucial component of the post-affluence class war has been a far-reaching takeover of the ideological system by the right, with a proliferation of right-wing think tanks, a campaign to extend conservative control still further over ideologically significant sectors of the colleges and universities, now replete with professorships of free enterprise, lavishly funded far-right student journals, and so on; and an array of other devices to restrict the framework of discussion and thought, as much as possible, to the reactionary end of the already narrow spectrum. Things actually reached such a point that a respected liberal foreign policy analyst could describe the statist-conservative New York Times, without irony, as the "establishment left" (Charles Maynes). In the political system, "liberal" joined "socialist" as a scare word; by 1992, the Democratic Party scarcely needed to make a gesture to popular constituencies it had once professed to represent. Gore Vidal hardly exaggerates when he describes US politics as a one-party system with two right wings. One aspect of this ideological triumph has been the deeper implantation of Orwellian rhetoric and standards of Political Correctness to which one must adhere to join respectable discussion, a number of examples already illustrated. Departure from these conventions of belief and rhetoric is virtually unthinkable, in the mainstream.32

The next chapter comes as no surprise to students of cultural management. After a period of intense and one-sided ideological struggle, in which business interests and the right-wing have won a remarkable victory in the doctrinal and political institutions, what could be more natural than a propaganda campaign claiming that it is left-fascists who have taken the commanding heights and control the entire culture, imposing their harsh standards everywhere? The situation is even more dire than 25 years ago, when calls for destroying the university "rang across every campus in the United States, and libraries were burned, and universities wrecked" and "it was impossible to imagine anything more slimy, sickly and stifling than the moral climate" in universities where black students were "a curse" until at last "the pus" was "squeezed out of the university," to quote some of the imagery that entrances the British right.33 We hear heartfelt pleas for succor for the fading remnants who still resist the relentless left-wing onslaught, courageously upholding the banner of historical truth and Western culture in some embattled newspaper or isolated state college in central Idaho. What could be better designed to suppress the serious questions about doctrinal control, or a look at the hand that firmly holds the rod?

The complaints of those who continue to maintain their iron control with little challenge are not without their comic aspects. For every 100 articles berating the left-fascists who control everything, there might be one responding weakly that the takeover is not so complete as claimed, and none telling the truth -- which is obvious enough, if only from the distribution of views allowed to surface. But restricting thought is a serious matter, and respected figures do not crack a smile as they march in the parade, bewailing the fact that they may have lost some comparative literature department (perhaps to a right-wing "deconstructionist" or liberal "relativist" denounced as left-fascists).

To the totalitarian mentality, even the slightest deviation is an awesome tragedy, and evokes the most impressive frenzy. And the spectacle makes a useful contribution to entrenching further the ideological controls that prevent the rascal multitude from attending to what is happening around them.

5. The "Vile Maxim of the Masters"

The world economy has not returned to the growth rates of the Bretton Woods era. The decline of the South was particularly severe in Africa and Latin America, where it was accompanied by rampant state terror. It was accelerated by the neoliberal economic doctrines dictated by the world rulers. The UN Economic Commission for Africa found that countries pursuing the recommended IMF programs had lower growth rates than those that relied on the public sector for basic human needs. The disastrous impact of neoliberal policies in Latin America was particularly striking.34

On occasion, developed societies take their own rhetoric semi-seriously and fail to protect themselves from the destructive impact of unregulated markets. The consequences are much the same as in the traditional colonial domains, if not so lethal. Australia in the 1980s is a case in point. Free market experiments carried by the Labor government succeeded in reducing national income by over 5 percent a year by the end of the decade. Real wages declined, Australian enterprises fell under foreign control, and the country advanced towards the status of a resource base for the Japan-centered state capitalist region, which maintained its dynamic growth thanks to the radical departures from neoliberal dogma that had spurred development in the first place. In Britain after a decade of Thatcherism, "prospects remain bleak because of insufficient reinvestment in the physical UK economy," the director of a US investment firm observes, echoing a Japanese counterpart who says, "We think it will take a long time for the UK economy to recover."35

As noted, the rich industrial societies themselves are taking on something of a Third World cast, with islands of extreme wealth and privilege amidst a rising sea of poverty and despair. This is particularly true of the US and Britain, subjected to Reagan-Thatcher discipline. Continental Europe is not too far behind, despite the residual power of labor and the social contract it has defended, and Europe's ability to export its slums through the device of "guest workers." The collapse of the Soviet empire offers new means to establish the North-South divide more firmly within the rich societies. During the May 1992 strike of public workers in Germany, the chairman of Daimler-Benz warned that the corporation might respond to strikes by transferring manufacturing facilities for its Mercedes cars elsewhere, perhaps to Russia, with its ample supply of trained, educated, healthy and (it is hoped) docile workers. The chairman of General Motors can wield similar threats with regard to Mexico and other sectors of the Third World. And East Europe. While GM plans to close 21 plants in the US and Canada, it has opened a $690 million assembly plant in East Germany with great expectations, heightened by the fact that, thanks to 43 percent unofficial unemployment, workers are willing to "work longer hours than their pampered colleagues in western Germany" at 40 percent of the wage and with few benefits, the Financial Times reports. Capital can readily move; people cannot, or are not permitted to by those who applaud Adam Smith's doctrines when it suits their needs.

It is not that Daimler-Benz is greatly suffering from the labor costs that management deplores. Two weeks after issuing the threat to move Mercedes production to Russia, the same chief executive, Edzard Reuter, announced the "excellent result" of an exceptionally strong first-quarter performance for 1992, with a profit rise of 14 percent and a 17 percent increase in sales, largely abroad; German workers are not quite the intended market for the Mercedes division, the chief profit earner for this huge conglomerate, which will slash up to 10,000 jobs in 1992, Reuter added, with another 10,000 to follow. Such facts, however, do not impress the US press, where the news columns bitterly assailed striking German workers for their "soft life," long vacations, and general lack of understanding of their proper place as tools of production for the rich and powerful. They should learn the lessons taught to American workers by the Caterpillar corporation at the same time: profits and productivity up, wages down, the right to strike effectively eliminated by the free resort to scabs ("permanent replacement workers").36

These are the fruits of the fierce corporate campaign undertaken as soon as American workers finally won the right to organize in the mid-1930s, after long years of bitter struggle and violent repression unmatched in the industrial world. Perhaps we may even return to the days when the admired philanthropist Andrew Carnegie could preach the virtues of "honest, industrious, self-denying poverty" to the victims of the great depression of 1896, shortly after he had brutally crushed the steel workers union at Homestead, while announcing that the defeated workers had sent him a wire saying, "Kind master, tell us what you wish us to do and we will do it for you." It was because he knew "how sweet and happy and pure the home of honest poverty is" that Carnegie sympathized with the rich, he explained, meanwhile sharing their grim fate in his lavishly appointed mansions.37

So a well-ordered society should run, according to the "vile maxim of the masters."

It is therefore only natural that when the battered unions finally recognize the reality of the ceaseless class war waged against them by the highly class-conscious corporate sector, the business press should react with wonder at the fact that some unions still cling to outdated "class-warfare ideology" and the "battered Marxist view" that "workers form a class of citizens with shared interests separate from those who own and control business"; and even exhibit such "quirks" as low pay for union leaders, who are treated like other members. The masters, in contrast, keep firmly to this "battered Marxist view," often expressing it in vulgar Marxist rhetoric -- with values reversed, of course.38

Under existing conditions of social organization and concentration of power, (selective) free trade is hardly likely to increase the general welfare, as it could under other social arrangements. Those who declare their allegiance to Adam Smith are careful not to attend to his words: the principles of economic liberalism can have favorable consequences when implemented with appreciation for fundamental human rights. When shaped by "the savage injustice of the Europeans" and blind obedience to "the vile maxim," the consequences may favor "the architects" of policy, but others only by accident.

The experience of the US-Canada free trade agreement illustrates the process. In two years, Canada lost hundreds of thousands of jobs, many to industrialized regions of the US where government regulations virtually bar unions (the Orwellian term is "right to work," meaning "effectively illegal to organize"). These government policies, natural in a business-run society with the public largely marginalized, leave workers unprotected and much easier to exploit than in Canada, with its more vigorous union movement and its cultural climate of solidarity. The agreement has also been used to require Canada to abandon measures to protect the Pacific salmon, to bring pesticide regulations in line with more lax US standards, to refrain from steps to reduce emissions from lead, zinc and copper smelters, to end subsidies for replanting of forests after logging, and to bar a single-payer auto insurance plan in Ontario modeled on Canada's health insurance system, which would cost US insurance companies hundreds of millions of dollars in profits, if enacted. All such practices have been judged illegal barriers to free trade. By similar reasoning, the US objects to a GATT provision that allows countries to restrict food exports in times of need, demanding that US agribusiness must control raw materials no matter what the human cost.

At the same time, Canada, an asbestos exporter, is bringing charges against the US for imposing EPA standards on asbestos use in violation of trade commitments and the "international scientific evidence" about health risks of asbestos: the EPA has improperly gone beyond the "least burdensome requirements" for the corporations, Canada claims. At the GATT negotiations, the US is backing corporate proposals to restrict environmental and consumer protection to cases supported by "scientific evidence," to be judged by an agency made up of government officials and executives from chemical and food corporations.39

Perhaps the most dramatic current examples of the cynical pursuit of the "vile maxim" in international trade are Washington pressures to force Third World countries to accept US exports of tobacco, the world champion killer among lethal narcotics by a substantial margin. The Bush Administration launched its hypocritical "drug war" (timed nicely to produce the proper mood for the invasion of Panama) simultaneously with steps to force Third World countries to import this leading killer, and to allow advertising aimed at new markets, women and children particularly. GATT backed these efforts. The media, while climbing aboard the "drug war" bandwagon with appropriate fanfare, obliged the Administration further by completely suppressing the major drug story of the day. There were no headlines reading "US Demands to be World's Leading Narcotrafficker," or even a line in the back pages (statistically insignificant dissidents aside).

With Eastern Europe rejoining the Third World, drug pushers are leading the way in investment. "Cigarette makers flock to E. Europe," an upbeat front-page story is headlined in the Boston Globe : "While many American companies have been criticized for not being aggressive in investing in Eastern Europe, American cigarette companies have been trail-blazers." A tobacco executive explains: "There is little awareness of health and environmental problems in Hungary. We have about 10 years of an open playing field" -- ten years of profits, before PC left-fascists begin to interfere with lucrative mass murder. "Of 30 developed countries," the news report reads, "life expectancy is shortest in Eastern Europe." US corporations will try to improve the statistics further, "trail-blazers for capitalism," basking in applause.

Note that Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, the former Yugoslavia, etc., are "developed countries," to be compared with Western Europe so as to demonstrate the evils of Communism -- but not with Brazil, Guatemala, the Philippines, and other quasi-colonial domains that they resembled before they separated from the traditional Third World. That practice is an ineradicable feature of contemporary ideology. Honesty on this crucial issue is strictly verboten.40

Another story in the same issue illustrates how flexible an instrument economic doctrine can be. It celebrates the achievements of New Hampshire in dealing with its fiscal problems. The method was to encourage a successful enterprise that has become "the largest retail volume outlet for wine and liquor in the world, according to state officials," with $62 million in profits from sales of over $200 million in 1991, a $5 million increase in profit in a year. The increase is attributed in part to doubling of the advertising budget for alcohol, which ranks second to tobacco as a killer. The enterprise is a state monopoly. Hence its profits allow the most conservative state in the union to keep to the free market doctrines its leaders revere and to avoid taxes that would rob the wealthy to enrich welfare mothers. Another free market triumph, unnoticed.41

In theory, free trade arrangements should lower wages in high-wage countries and raise them in the poorer areas to which capital shifts, increasing global equity. But under prevailing conditions, a different outcome is likely. The senior economist at the Environment Department of the World Bank, Herman Daly, points out that the vast and growing supply of underemployed people in the Third World will "keep the supply of labor very large, and will make it impossible for wages worldwide to be bid up very much." Repression and terror lend their assistance. The outcome will be huge profits and chipping away at high wages and social gains, including laws against child labor, limits on working hours, and protection of the environment. "Anything that raises costs [is] going to tend to be competed down to the lowest common denominator in free international trade," Daly predicts -- precisely as intended.42

Under current conditions of power and control, selective free trade will tend to drive the level of existence to the lowest grade for people who are spectators, not participants in the decisions that affect their lives. The basic thrust is well-described by Andrew Reding: "Unable to impose its agenda on a `gridlocked' Congress that, however imperfectly, still responds to civil society (`special interest groups'), the Bush administration is linking up with like-minded elites abroad in an effort to legislate from without, ...constructing what amounts to international government, though a peculiar form thereof in which only business and trade representatives have any voice"; "Under cover of free trade, foreign governments and businesses are gaining an effective veto over national, state, and provincial legislation that elevates human welfare." There is, however, nothing in the least "peculiar" about this pursuit of the vile maxim of the masters, adapted to the current age.43

The maxim requires a slight amendment: "all for themselves now." The longer term is as irrelevant as other people. Thus in a lead news story, the Wall Street Journal hails George Bush's "extraordinary coup" in compelling the entire world to abandon plans for a meaningful agreement on greenhouse gases at the June 1992 Rio conference. Someone more clever than I could pen a wonderful story or cartoon on the final edition of the Journal, going to press with a passionate editorial demonstrating that global warming is a left-wing fraud just as the rising sea level engulfs the corporate headquarters.44

Overall, the 1980s accelerated a global rift between a small sector enjoying great privilege, and a growing mass of people suffering deprivation and misery. Though superfluous for wealth production or consumption, the only human functions recognized in the dominant institutions and their ideology, these people must be dealt with somehow. Current social policy in the US is to coop them up in urban centers where they can prey upon one another; or to lock them in jail, a useful concomitant of the drug war (see chapter 4.3).

The internationalization of capital that has accelerated since 1971 gives a somewhat new character to competition among national states. To cite one indication, while the US share in world exports of manufactures declined 3.5 percent from 1966 to 1984, the share of US-based TNCs slightly increased. And international trade patterns yield a very different picture if imports from overseas subsidiaries are counted as domestic production. Foreign affiliates increased their share of total exports of manufactures by US-based firms from under 18 percent in 1957 to 41 percent in 1984. "If such foreign production could be brought back to the United States," Richard Du Boff observes, "the nation's exports would double, according to some Commerce Department projections." A 1992 World Bank study reports that "intra-firm trade within the largest 350 [TNCs] contributed about 40% of total trade. More than a third of U.S. trade is between foreign affiliates and their U.S.-based parents." Over half of Malaysia's exports to the US were from US affiliates, Taiwan's five leading electronics exporters are US firms, 47 percent of Singapore's exports in 1982 were by US-owned firms. "Similarly, exports of electrical goods by Japanese producers in Korea had much to do with the rise of Korea in world electronics." "So all the textbook trade theory about comparative advantage and the virtues of frictionless open trading systems is nonsense," Doug Henwood observes, noting that the current estimates are probably higher than these figures, from the early 1980s: "Several hundred economically and politically powerful corporations with global networks dominate trade largely on their own terms, and then serve as their governments' advisors on trade strategy."

Commercial products reflect these tendencies; to take one example, almost a third of the market price of a GM Pontiac LeMans goes to producers in South Korea, over a sixth to Japan, about the same to a combination of Germany, Singapore, Britain, Barbados, and others. As a social entity, the country and most of its population may decline; the corporate empires are playing a different game, based on the theological doctrine that the masters have the right to make investment decisions, unencumbered by concerns of their servants in workplace and community. With somewhere between one-quarter and one-half of world trade already conducted within North-based TNCs, these are factors of growing importance as we look towards Year 501.45

6. The New Imperial Age

The realities are often presented with admirable frankness by the rulers and their ideologists. The London Financial Times features a lead article by the economic correspondent of the BBC World Service, James Morgan, under the heading: "The fall of the Soviet bloc has left the IMF and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age." We can, at last, approach the fulfillment of Churchill's vision, no longer troubled by the "hungry nations" who "seek more" and thus endanger the tranquility of the rich men who rule by right.

In the current version, "The construction of a new global system is orchestrated by the Group of Seven, the IMF, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)," in "a system of indirect rule that has involved the integration of leaders of developing countries into the network of the new ruling class" -- who, not surprisingly, turn out to be the old ruling class. Local managers can share the wealth, as long as they properly serve the rulers.

Morgan takes note of "the hypocrisy of the rich nations in demanding open markets in the Third World while closing their own." He might have added the World Bank report that the protectionist measures of the industrial countries reduce national income in the South by about twice the amount provided by official aid, largely export-promotion, most of it to the richer sectors of the "developing countries" (less needy, but better consumers). Or the UNCTAD estimate that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) of the industrial countries reduce Third World exports by almost 20 percent in affected categories, which include textiles, steel, seafood, animal feed and other agricultural products, with billions of dollars a year in losses. Or the World Bank estimate that 31 percent of the South's manufacturing exports are subject to NTBs as compared with the North's 18 percent. Or the 1992 report of the UN Human Development Program, reviewing the increasing gap between the rich and the poor (by now, 83 percent of the world's wealth in the hands of the richest billion, with 1.4 percent for the billion at the bottom of the heap); the doubling of the gap since 1960 is attributed to policies of the IMF and World Bank, and the fact that 20 of 24 industrial countries are more protectionist today than they were a decade ago, including the US, which celebrated the Reagan revolution by doubling the proportion of imports subject to restrictive measures. "And the upshot of decades of lending for development is that poor countries have lately been transferring more than $21 billion a year into the coffers of the rich," the Economist observes, summarizing the gloomy picture.

Individual cases fill out the details: for example, the quotas imposed by the US, UK, and France on their commercial rival Bangladesh, on grounds that its textiles threatened local industry; as the Financial Times puts it, "The Bangladesh government has been particularly stung by a US decision to impose anti-dumping duties of up to 42 percent on shop towels," imports that "amounted to a princely $2.46 [million]" from "one of the poorest of nations." Or the dumping of highly subsidized US and EC wheat and beef surpluses in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo, undermining native producers in such powerful competitors as the Sahel. Or US concerns over the threat to the US steel industry posed by imports from Trinidad-Tobago.46

"Third world [finance] ministers who have painfully dragged their own budgets out of persistent deficit have been particularly galled by the failure of industrial nations" to observe the rules, the Financial Times reports. "Echoing the gloom felt " in the South, World Bank president Lewis Preston deplored the practices of the industrial societies, who demand that the Third World "bear the burden of [structural] adjustment in the rich countries as well as in their own" and repeatedly fail to live up to their promises to reduce protection and provide aid. After a meeting of high-level officials of the donor countries, "World Bank officials say openly" that "they will back away from" their promises once again. Even "once-generous donors such as Sweden" are cutting back, while "less generous countries, such as the UK and US, ...are expected to cut still further" their minuscule contributions. A meeting of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) meanwhile concluded that "Structural adjustment imposed by the World Bank and [IMF] have brought disaster to the working poor of as many as 100 countries," forced "to open their markets to a flood of cheap imports" while the rich refuse "to abandon their subsidies, quotas and high tariffs." The result is "`brutal' suppression of wages and living standards" and elimination of social programs, the effects increasing as the programs are implemented over the past decade or more.47

The institutions of "the new ruling class," which now "run large parts of the developing world and eastern Europe," "encourage" their clients to follow "the right kind of reform policy," Morgan continues. They must scrupulously avoid the policies that have led to successful development from 17th century England to East Asia's "little dragons" today, keeping to "the right kind" that have been highly beneficial to the international ruling class, if to few others. And when economic controls do not suffice to "encourage" proper behavior, we can resort once again to the security forces.

The simmering economic crisis does not, of course, leave the rulers unburdened. But they can call upon state power to come to the rescue. When Continental Illinois Bank and Trust faced collapse in 1984, the government was expected to respond, and did, with "the largest nationalization in American history" (Howard Wachtel). The director who presided over the financial disaster, Roger Anderson, was punished by appointment to the Federal Advisory Council, where he became an official adviser to director Paul Volker of the Federal Reserve, which had refused to use its disciplinary and control authority as it observed the growing crisis. If the collapse of the Olympia and York real estate empire indeed causes the $3 billion of losses that the banks initially feared, taxpayers will again be called upon to render the proper services. Austerity may be the right remedy for Latin American peasants, Polish workers, and the forgotten people of South-Central Los Angeles; but not for the people who count.48

The government also has the duty of raising protectionist barriers when needed: for example, to allow the US steel industry, which arose in the first place behind protectionist walls, to recapitalize by effectively restricting steel imports to 20 percent of the market since 1982. At the same time, it has the parallel responsibility of undermining unions, so that new "low-cost, non-union producers" can pay their labor force between one-half and one-third of what steel workers had gained after a century of bloody struggle, and thus become "exemplars of the lean and mean" in the admiring words of the London Economist, echoed by the New York Times, which also lauds the success of the "decade of protection from imported steel" and the resort to "nonunion work forces" for lowering costs.49

One important achievement of the new imperial age is that it further marginalizes the general population, clearing the way to uplifting rhetoric about our democratic ideals without fear that the wrong people might take it seriously. The global rulers can now operate with fewer constraints, more coordination and central management, and less interference from the rabble, who not only have no influence over the decisions of the rulers (the basic principle of capitalist autocracy), but also lack any awareness of them. Who follows the crucial decisions of the GATT negotiators or the IMF, with their enormous impact on global society? Or of the TNCs and international banks and investment firms that dominate production, commerce, and the conditions of life worldwide? The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will have large-scale consequences (a bonanza for investors, very likely a disaster for workers and the environment). Its contents are unknown. The text was withheld even from the Labor Advisory Committee, which is required by law to review such measures, until one day before its report was due. Congress abdicated responsibility. Citizens know nothing.50

For the past several hundred years, elite democratic theory has tended to range within a narrow spectrum. At one extreme, we have the libertarian thinker John Locke, who held that citizens have no right to discuss public affairs, though they may know about them; the modern variant is a bit more forthcoming (see p.18). At the other extreme we have statist reactionaries of the Reaganite variety ("conservatives"), who reject the right of the public even to know what their leaders are doing and therefore establish illegal state propaganda agencies, favor large-scale clandestine operations, block release of information about the government even from the distant past, and in other ways protect state power from scrutiny. Reagan-era censorship reached unprecedented heights, including suppression of the documentary record so extreme that the chairman of the academic advisory board for the State Department resigned in protest. The new imperial age marks a further move towards the authoritarian extreme of formal democratic practice.51

The public is not unaware of what is happening, though with the success of the policies of isolation and breakdown of organizational structure, the response is erratic and self-destructive: faith in ridiculous billionaire saviors, myths of past innocence and noble leaders, religious and jingoist fanaticism, conspiracy cults, unfocused skepticism and disillusionment -- a mixture that has not had happy consequences in the past.


1 For details and sources, see TTT, PI, DD. Kennan and other documents, TTT, ch. 2.2, PI, Lect. I.

2 Green, Containment, VII.2. See ch. 7.1, below.

3 Cumings, Origins, 172-3. On the contempt for Japan's prospects, see DD, 337-8. Ibid., ch. 6 and "Afterword," on the Middle East; and TNCW, ch. 8. British and Dulles, Stivers, Supremacy, 28, 34; America's Confrontation, 20f.

4 DD, 49-51, 27; and generally.

5 Ibid., 259; TTT, 270; COT, 219-221; NI, 71-2. Kissinger, TTT, 67-8.

6 DD, 395. Russell, Practice and Theory, 68.

7 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 365. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. IV, 1131ff.; no other evidence was cited. The Attorney-General invoked "self-defense and self-preservation" to justify the blockade imposed in violation of international law. Memorandum of NSC discussion, May 27, 1954.

 

8 APNM, 33ff.; TNCW, 67-9, 89-90.

9 Friedman, NYT, July 7, 1991. Iraqi democrats, DD, ch. 6.4, "Afterword," sec. 4, and earlier articles in Z magazine.

10 Friedman, NYT, June 24; Haberman, NYT, June 28, 1992; see Nabeel Abraham, Lies of Our Times, Sept. 1992. On US-vs.-peace process, and background, see DD, "Afterword"; for an ongoing record, TNCW, FTR, NI. On official PC, see Herman, Decoding Democracy.

11 Eisenhower quoted by Richard Immerman, Diplomatic History (Summer 1990). John Foster Dulles, Telephone Call to Allen Dulles, June 19, 1958, "Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter," Eisenhower Library, Abilene KA.

12 Leffler, Preponderance, 258, 90-1. TNCW, chs. 8, 11; DD, chs. 1, 6, 8, 11. Frank Costigliola, in Paterson, Kennedy's Quest. On Japan, see Schaller, American Occupation. See references of n. 16.

13 Leffler, Preponderance, 71. Jeffrey-Jones, CIA, 51. Pisani, CIA, 106-7. See ch. 1.2, above. Nicaraguan election, MC, NI, DD. DD, ch. 11, on US and Italy, in the context of the broader struggle to deter the threat of democracy in the industrial societies after World War II.

14 Pisani, CIA, 114f., 91f. Chace, NYT Magazine, May 22, 1977. On racist attitudes towards the "wops" in both the internal and public record, see DD, chs. 1.4, 11.5.

 15 Stimson; Kolko, Politics, 471. Wood, Dismantling, 193, 197 (citing Woodward, personal letter; Dreier, The Organization of the American States (1962)). Pastor, Condemned, 32, his emphasis.

16 Leffler, Preponderance, 165. For earlier discussion of these matters, see among others AWWA, introduction; essays by Gabriel Kolko, Richard Du Boff, and John Dower in PP V; FRS, 31ff. Important recent studies include Borden, Pacific Alliance; Schaller, American Occupation; Rotter, Path to Vietnam. Leffler's very useful study, summarizing much recent work and adding significant new information, places this thinking within the general matrix of Truman era planning. Recent scholarship largely confirms and extends the pioneering work of Gabriel and Joyce Kolko 20-25 years ago. For a partial update, see Kolko, Confronting. See also DD, chs. 1, 11, and sources cited.

17 South Commission, Challenge, 216ff., 71f., 287.

18 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy; Leffler, Preponderance, 17, 449, 463.

19 Ibid., 282f.

20 Ibid., 284, 156. Acheson, Kennan, cited by Gaddis, Strategies, 76.

21 Leffler, Preponderance, 117, 119. DD, ch. 11. On "aggression," see FRS, 114f.

22 Costigliola, in Paterson, Kennedy's Quest, quoting Theodore Sorenson; also George Ball. Wachtel, Money Mandarins, 64f. On Kennedy and Vietnam, see RC. On the impact of "international military Keynesianism" after the failure of the aid programs, see particularly Borden, Pacific Alliance; DD, ch. 1, for other sources and comment.

 23 Garthoff, Détente, 487f.

24 Excerpts, NYT, March 8; Patrick Tyler, NYT, March 8, 11; Barton Gellman, WP Weekly, March 16-22, 1992.

25 Patrick Tyler, NYT, May 24, 1992. Frederick Kempe, "U.S., Bonn Clash Over Pact with France," WSJ, May 27, 1992.

26 See DD, introduction. Christopher Bellamy, International Affairs, July 1992.

27 Strange, International Economic Relations of the Western World (1976), cited in Wachtel, Money Mandarins, 79; 137, on profitability.

28 Ibid. Du Boff, Accumulation, 153f.; Calleo, Imperious Economy, 63, 116, 75.

29 See particularly Rand, Making Democracy Safe; and on the effects, my 1977 article reprinted in TNCW, ch. 11; also ch. 2. DD, ch. 6.1. See also Yergin, Prize.

 30 See DD, 98, on capital flow.

31 NI, 84f., App. IV.4. DD, ch. 6, "Afterword," sec. 5; my essay in Peters, Collateral. UNESCO, Preston et al., Hope & Folly.

32 TTT, ch. 5, and sources cited; NI, ch. 1. LAT, Extra! (FAIR), July/August 1992, the six months before the April 1992 Rodney King verdict. Maynes, editor, Foreign Policy, Summer 1990.

33 G. Rees, Alain Besançon, Encounter, Dec. 1976, June 1980.

34 See below, ch. 7; DD, ch. 7. Nancy Wright, Multinational Monitor, April 1990, cited in Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, Diplomatic History, Spring 1992. See also James Petras, Monthly Review, May 1992.

35 Fitzgerald, Between. Foreign staff, "US and Japan shy from investing in UK," FT, Sept. 25, 1992.

36 Marc Fisher, "Why Are German Workers Striking? To Preserve Their Soft Life," WP service, IHT, May 4; Andrew Fisher, FT, May 20; Christopher Parkes, FT; Kevin Done, FT, Sept. 24 (GM); FT, June 4, 1992. Elaine Bernard, "The Defeat at Caterpillar," ms. Harvard Trade Union Program, May 1992.

37 Sexton, War on Labor, 83f. See ch. 11, below.

38 Barnaby Feder, NYT, May 25, 1992.

 39 Jim Stanford, "Going South: Cheap Labour as an Unfair Subsidy in North American Free Trade," Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Dec. 1991; Andrew Reding, World Policy Journal, Summer 1992. Edward Goldsmith, Mark Ritchie, The Ecologist, Nov./Dec. 1990; Watkins, Fixing, 103-4. Brief amicus curiae of Government of Canada, US Court of Appeals, "Corrosion Proof Fittings, et al., vs. EPA and William K. Riley," May 22, 1990. See ch. 3, n. 43.

40 "Drug war" and media, DD, ch. 4; ch. 7, on comparative study. Jonathan Kaufman, BG, May 26, 1992.

41 Bob Hohler, BG, May 26, 1992.

42 "Interview," Multinational Monitor, May 1992.

43 Reding, op. cit.

44 Rose Gutfeld, WSJ, May 27, 1992.

45 Arthur MacEwan, Socialist Review, July-Dec. 1991; Du Boff, Accumulation; World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1992, cited by Doug Henwood, Left Business Observer, No. 54, Aug. 4, 1992; Watkins, Fixing, 5, 24.

46 World Bank, in Trócaire Development Review (Catholic Agency for World Development, Dublin, 1990); Chakravarti Raghavan and Martin Khor, Third World Economics (Penang), March 16-31, 1991; Economist, April 25, 1992; Watkins, Fixing, 75, 49, 64; Frances Williams, FT, June 11, 1992; Kent Jones, Fletcher Forum, Winter 1992. On Reaganite protectionism, see DD, ch. 3; and for extensive detail, Bhagwati and Patrick, Aggressive Unilateralism; Bovard, Fair Trade Fraud.

47 George Graham, FT, Sept. 25; Nancy Dunne, FT, Sept. 24, 1992.

 48 Wachtel, Money Mandarins, 146; Greider, Secrets, 521f. FT, May 16/17, 1992.

49 Economist, May 16; Jonathan Hicks, NYT, March 31, 1992.

50 Preliminary Report, LAC, Sept. 16, 1992.

51 DD, ch. 12; Wilbur Edel, "Diplomatic History‹State Department Style," Political Science Quarterly, 106.4 1991/2.


1. The Great Work of Subjugation and Conquest ] [ 2. The Contours of World Order ] 3. North-South/East-West ] 4. Democracy and the Market ] 5. Human Rights: The Pragmatic Criterion ] 6. A "Ripe Fruit" ] 7. World Orders Old and New: Latin America ] 8. The Tragedy of Haiti ] 9. The Burden of Responsibility ] 10. Murdering History ] 11. The Third World at Home ]


 ] Table of Contents ] PART I : Old Wine, New Bottles ] PART II : High Principles ] PART III : Persistent Themes ] Part IV : Memories ] Bibliography ] Glossary ]


 
 
 

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