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By the end of August, JFK and his most dovish advisers (Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, George Ball) agreed that the client government should be overthrown. On August 28, the President "asked the Defense Department to come up with ways of building up the anti-Diem forces in Saigon." He called for actions "which would maximize the chances of the rebel generals" and said, "We should ask Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins how we can build up military forces which would carry out a coup." Harriman said that without a coup, "we cannot win the war" and "must withdraw." Hilsman "agreed that we cannot win the war unless Diem is removed," as did Ball, while Robert Kennedy also called for efforts to strengthen the rebel generals. Secretary Rusk warned JFK that "Nhu might call on the North Vietnamese to help him throw out the Americans." Hilsman urged (August 30) that if Diem and Nhu make any "Political move toward the DRV (such as opening of neutralization negotiations)," or even hint at such moves, we should "Encourage the generals to move promptly with a coup," and undertake "military action" if the DRV tries to counter our actions, letting them "know unequivocally that we shall hit the DRV with all that is necessary to force it to desist," bringing in "U.S. combat forces to assist the coup group to achieve victory," if necessary. "The important thing is to win the war," Hilsman advised McGeorge Bundy; and that meant getting rid of the Saigon regime, which was dragging its feet and looking for ways out. The President concurred that "our primary objective remains winning war," Rusk cabled to the Saigon Embassy.
The CIA had been reporting for months "that Nhu policy was one of ultimate neutralization and unification of Vietnam," in accord with the 1954 Geneva agreements, and continued to warn that "the GVN, the DRV, and the French may have been engaged of late in exploring the possibilities of some kind of North-South rapprochement," which might lead to a GVN demand for US withdrawal (September 26). In a September 30 memorandum, William Sullivan reviewed a long discussion with the French Chargé in Saigon and the Canadian and Indian International Control Commission (ICC) officials. They discounted current rumors about North-South dealings, but "all of them insisted that we should not discount the possibility of such a deal in the future," perhaps "three or four months," the well-informed French Chargé felt. Such reports could only increase the alarm in Washington, intensifying the fear of a peaceful settlement.51
Particularly disquieting was a public statement of August 29 by French President Charles de Gaulle, expressing the hope that the Vietnamese "could go ahead with their activities independently of the outside, in internal peace and unity and in harmony with their neighbors." In a memorandum preparing the President for a September 2 TV interview with Walter Cronkite, McGeorge Bundy focused JFK's attention on de Gaulle's statement, while advising that he continue to "ignore Nosey Charlie." He warned against the "specter of neutralist solution," reviewing de Gaulle's apparent belief "in neutralizing Vietnam" and advising JFK to express incomprehension, calling instead for France "to share in the work of resisting Communist aggression in Vietnam." Kennedy followed Bundy's advice. When Cronkite asked about the de Gaulle statement, he responded that the US had "listened" but without interest, indeed, with irritation:
What, of course, makes Americans somewhat impatient is that after carrying this load for 18 years, we are glad to get counsel, but we would like a little more assistance, real assistance. But we are going to meet our responsibility anyway. It doesn't do us any good to say, "Well, why don't we all just go home and leave the world to those who are our enemies."
Kennedy reiterated his resentment in private. In a White House conference the next day (September 3), he asked "what the French are doing toward assisting the Vietnamese." After being shown a paper on the subject, "The President commented that the French were trying to get for Vietnam what had been done in Laos, i.e., neutralization," which "was not working in Laos" and was no model for Vietnam. He also wondered why Walter Lippmann proposed the Laotian model. Asked whether France would protest his comments about de Gaulle in the Cronkite interview, "the President said he doubted [French] Ambassador Alphand had the guts to protest." JFK remained adamant in his opposition to a diplomatic settlement that would entail withdrawal without victory.52
The consensus remained that "the war in the countryside is going well now" (Ambassador Lodge, September 11), though discordant notes were being sounded. There was substantial urban unrest, and the Diem government was not considered trustworthy. In a September 11 paper, Hilsman wrote that "The U.S. policy objective should continue to be the maintenance of a viable, strong and free area in South Viet-Nam capable of maintaining its independence, successfully resisting Communist aggression, and susceptible to U.S. influence." Accordingly, "we should tell Diem that we are ready to prosecute our program to annihilate the Viet Cong menace with renewed vigor and that we expect full cooperation from him in this endeavor" -- or else. Diem must "focus on winning the war," Hilsman added in a September 16 memorandum.
This memorandum outlined a plan that the President had requested in the light of Diem's recalcitrance. Delivered to the President on that day, Hilsman's plan stated that "Withdrawal by the U.S. would be immediately disastrous to the war effort." To attain our "overall objective," which is "to win the war against the Viet Cong," we must support "what helps win the war" and "oppose" what "interferes with the war effort," in accord with the "policy guideline" that the President had stated on September 12 (see page 46).53
The general assessment was that the war could not be won "if Nhu remains in power" (Joseph Mendenhall, also considered a dove). Worse yet, Nhu "has frequently claimed that the American presence must be reduced," the CIA reported, and was continuing his dealings with the North, which might lead to a peaceful settlement, undermining Kennedy's war policies.
The basic principle, unquestioned, is that we must "focus on winning the war." On September 14, Harriman wrote to Lodge, making the point unmistakeable: "I can assure you that from the President on down everybody is determined to support you and the country team in winning the war against the Viet Cong. There may be some differences in opinion or in emphasis as to how it is to be done, but there are no quitters here."54
In particular, JFK is no quitter. There is not a phrase in the internal record to suggest that this judgment by a trusted high-level Kennedy adviser, at the dovish extreme, should be qualified in any way.
We now approach the final weeks of JFK's presidency, the last opportunity to determine his intentions. We therefore pay close attention to his (limited) involvement in discussion and decision-making.
On September 17, after a meeting with his NSC advisers to discuss the plan for military victory that Hilsman had prepared, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador Lodge to pressure Diem to "get everyone back to work and get them to focus on winning the war," repeating his regular emphasis on victory. It was particularly important to show military progress because "of need to make effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort," the President added, expressing his constant concern that congressional support for his commitment to military victory was weak. "To meet these needs," he informed Lodge, he was sending his top aides McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam. Their mission was to appraise "the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong," JFK instructed McNamara, and to ensure "the progress of the contest," a matter of "the first importance." There have been "heartening results" until recently, but "future effectiveness" requires new actions by the GVN and Washington. The goal remains "the winning of the war," the President again emphasized, adding that "The way to confound the press is to win the war." Like Congress, the press was an enemy because of its lack of enthusiasm for a war to victory and its occasional calls for diplomacy.
Taylor proposed that he and McNamara present Diem with a fixed time scale within which "the war must be won." According to McGeorge Bundy's minutes, "The President did not say `yes' or `no' to this proposal," apparently unwilling to be bound by any commitment to withdraw.55
McNamara and Taylor were encouraged by what they found. Taylor informed Diem that he was "convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the end of 1964" and the war effort everywhere should be "completed by the end of 1965." On October 2, Taylor and McNamara presented this analysis to the President, noting that "The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress." On these assumptions, they presented a series of recommendations, three of which were later authorized (watered down a bit) in NSAM 263:
- "An increase in the military tempo" throughout the country so that the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas will be over by the end of 1964, and in the South (the Delta) by the end of 1965.
- Vietnamese should be trained to take over "essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel" by the end of 1965, so that "It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time."
- In accordance with point two, "the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort."
Their report stressed again that the "overriding objective" is victory, a matter "vital to United States security." They repeated that withdrawal could not be too long delayed: "any significant slowing in the rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S. effort." They expressed their belief "that the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965," at which time military victory would have been assured. The withdrawal plans were crucially qualified in the usual way: "No further reductions should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become firm," that is, until battlefield success is assured.56
Note that JFK and his advisers consistently regarded lack of popular support for the war and GVN initiatives toward political settlement not as an opportunity for withdrawal, but rather as a threat to victory.
The National Security Council met the same day to consider these proposals. The President's role was, as usual, marginal. He repeated that "the major problem was with U.S. public opinion" and again balked at the time scale. He opposed a commitment to withdraw some forces in 1963 because "if we were not able to take this action by the end of this year, we would be accused of being over optimistic." McNamara, in contrast, "saw great value in this sentence in order to meet the view of Senator Fulbright and others that we are bogged down forever in Vietnam." The phrase was left as "a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as predictions of the President," who thus remained uncommitted to withdrawal, at his insistence.
A public statement was released to the press, presenting the McNamara-Taylor judgment that "the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel," and that the training program "should have progressed to the point" where 1000 men can be withdrawn by the end of the year. The statement repeated the standard position that the US will work with the GVN "to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible," continuing with "Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort," which "is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it."57
At a White House conference on October 5, the President directed that the decision to remove 1000 US advisers "should not be raised formally with Diem. Instead the action should be carried out routinely as part of our general posture of withdrawing people when they are no longer needed."
The results of this meeting were formalized as NSAM 263 (October 11), a brief statement in which "The President approved the three military recommendations cited above...," weakened by one change: that "no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963." The final provision of NSAM 263 is JFK's personal approval of a telegram instructing Ambassador Lodge to "increase effectiveness of war effort" along with training and arming of new forces, so as to enhance the prospects for victory, on which withdrawal was conditioned. It is necessary, the telegram adds, to overcome the "crisis of confidence among Vietnamese people which is eroding popular support for GVN that is vital for victory," and the "crisis of confidence on the part of the American public and Government," who also do not see how "our actions are related to our fundamental objective of victory."58
Note that read literally, NSAM 263 says very little. It approves the McNamara-Taylor recommendations to intensify the war and military training so that "It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel" by the end of 1965, and includes JFK's personal instructions to Lodge to intensify military action to achieve "our fundamental objective of victory." It does not call for implementing a 1,000 man withdrawal, but rather endorses the third point of the McNamara-Taylor proposal concerning plans for such withdrawal "as an initial step in a long-term program" to be conducted "without impairment of the war effort," deleting their call for formal announcement of these plans.
Presumably, the intent was to implement the withdrawal plans if military conditions allow, but that intent is unstated. The fact might be borne in mind in light of elaborate later efforts to read great significance into nuances of phrasing so as to demonstrate a dramatic change in policy with the Kennedy-Johnson transition. Adopting these interpretive techniques, we would conclude that NSAM 263 is almost vacuous. I stress that is not my interpretation; I assume the obvious unstated intention, only suggesting that other documents be treated in the same reasonable manner -- in which case, widely-held beliefs will quickly evaporate.
As noted, the basic decisions were made public at once. The picture presented then requires no significant modification in light of the huge mass of documents now available, though these make much more clear the President's unwillingness to commit himself to the withdrawal recommended by his war managers, his concern that domestic opinion might not stay the course, his insistence that withdrawal be conditioned on military victory, and his orders to step up the military effort and to "maximize the chances of the rebel generals" to replace the Diem regime by one that will "focus on winning" and not entertain thoughts of US withdrawal and peaceful settlement.
Robert Kennedy also had reservations about making the withdrawal plan public. He felt that we were "so deeply committed to the support of the effort in Vietnam that Diem will not be greatly influenced" by the announced plan (one of its purposes being to press Diem onwards with the war effort). At a White House Staff meeting on October 7, Bundy noted that reservations had been voiced about the withdrawal, expressing his surprise that "some people were taking as `pollyanna-ish' the `McNamara-Taylor' statement that we could pull out of Vietnam in two years." He stated that the "general line" for a forthcoming presidential press conference "will be that in two years the Vietnamese will be able to finish the job without US military forces on the scene -- a position considered reasonable by everyone around the table" (Bundy, Forrestal, Generals Taylor and Clifton [JFK's military aide] are mentioned).59
Through October, problems with the GVN continued to mount. Nhu openly called for the Americans to depart, saying that he and his brother had opposed the American intervention at "the time of greatest danger" in 1961-1962, and now wanted US troops out completely. The US should only provide aid, he demanded. Ambassador Lodge warned that "we should consider a request to withdraw as a growing possibility."
Another problem was the lack of "effectiveness of GVN in its relation to its own people." Asked about this, Lodge responded in an "Eyes only for the President" communication that "Viet-Nam is not a thoroughly strong police state...because, unlike Hitler's Germany, it is not efficient" and is thus unable to suppress the "large and well-organized underground opponent strongly and ever-freshly motivated by vigorous hatred." The Vietnamese "appear to be more than ever anxious to be left alone," and though they "are said to be capable of great violence on occasion," "there is no sight of it at the present time," another impediment to US efforts. The same concerns were expressed about the Indonesian Generals at the same time, though they proved equal to the task, gaining much esteem for their Nazi-style ruthlessness. The Saigon Generals, however, were never able to meet Washington standards.60
Small wonder that JFK was unwilling to commit himself to the McNamara-Taylor withdrawal proposal. Note that the same defects of the US clients underlie the critique of the strategic hamlet program by Kennedy doves (see page 54).
Intelligence continued to report that the optimistic projections were dubious while pressures for unification and neutralization remained strong. Paul Kattenburg, at the dovish fringe, reported yet another problem: "Chemical defoliation and crop destruction operations are effective weapons against the VC," but "Present approval procedures are too cumbersome" and "The psychological and civic action aspects of the operation are not particularly good." The need is for more efficiency and better PR.61
Washington's coup plans continued, with Ambassador Lodge in operational command. The only hesitation was fear of failure. JFK thought that we "could lose our entire position in Southeast Asia overnight" if the coup plans failed. When the coup finally took place on November 1, replacing Diem and Nhu (who were killed) by a military regime, the President praised Lodge effusively for his "fine job" and "leadership," an "achievement...of the greatest importance" that "is recognized here throughout the Government." With the generals now in power, "our primary emphasis should be on effectiveness rather than upon external appearances," the President added. We must help the coup regime to confront "the real problems of winning the contest against the Communists and holding the confidence of its own people." The "ineffectiveness, loss of popular confidence, and the prospect of defeat that were decisive in shaping our relations to the Diem regime" are now a thing of the past, the President hoped, thanks to Lodge's inspired leadership and coup-management, with its gratifying outcome (November 6).62
Two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, there is not a phrase in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal without victory. JFK urges that everyone "focus on winning the war"; withdrawal is conditioned on victory, and motivated by domestic discontent with Kennedy's war. The stakes are considered enormous. Nothing substantial changes as the mantle passes to LBJ.
The post-coup situation had positive and negative aspects from the point of view of the President and his advisers. On the positive side, they hoped that the ruling generals would now at last focus on victory as the President had demanded, gain popular support, and end the irritating calls for US withdrawal and moves towards a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, there was disarray at all levels, while at home, advocacy of diplomacy was not stilled. The dovish advisers stressed the need to counter these tendencies. Mendenhall warned Hilsman about the danger posed by suggestions in the New York Times (November 6, 10) "that the U.S. should undertake international negotiations for settlement of the Vietnam problem." He proposed a private meeting with the editors "to try to set them straight on the situation in Vietnam and on U.S. policy regarding Vietnam." On November 13, Forrestal informed Times editor Robert Kleiman that "it would be folly" to consider a negotiated settlement: "South Vietnam was still not strong enough to approach the bargaining table with any hope of coming away whole," and "responsible Vietnamese in Vietnam" would probably view such prospects as "a complete sellout by the U.S." He advised Bundy that we should prepare "to counter" further efforts "to peddle" this idea in the media.63
Meanwhile, evidence that undermined the optimistic assessments was becoming harder to ignore. A week after the coup, State Department Intelligence, with the concurrence of the CIA, reported that by late October the military situation had sharply deteriorated, predicting "unfavorable end-1963 values" for its statistical factors. The new government confirmed that the GVN "had been losing the war against the VC in the Delta for some time because it had been losing the population." A top-level meeting was held in Honolulu on November 20 to consider the next steps. The US mission in Vietnam recommended that the withdrawal plans be maintained, the new government being "warmly disposed toward the U.S." and offering "opportunities to exploit that we never had before." Kennedy's plans to escalate the assault against the southern resistance could now be implemented, with a stable regime finally in place. McNamara, ever cautious, stressed that "South Vietnam is under tremendous pressure from the VC," noting a sharp increase in VC incidents after the coup, and urged that "We must be prepared to devote enough resources to this job of winning the war to be certain of accomplishing it..." At an 8
AM
White House meeting on November 22, Bundy was informed that "for the first time" military reporting was "realistic about the situation in the Delta."64
Before proceeding, let us have a look at what was publicly available in the press at once. The topic merits a brief review, in the light of later allegations about media suppression. That distortion and suppression by the media are common is not in doubt. But not in this case, it turns out. I will keep to the New York Times.
The October 2 McNamara-Taylor military recommendations that are (largely) authorized in NSAM 263 were outlined in the lead story in the New York Times the next day. The story correctly describes the National Security Council decisions, and is accompanied by the text of the White House statement. In conformity to the internal record, the withdrawal plans are attributed to McNamara and Taylor, not JFK.
In a news conference of October 31, published the next day, JFK maintained the caution he showed in internal discussion, distancing himself from the withdrawal plans:
As you know, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor came back, they announced that we would expect to withdraw 1,000 men from South Vietnam before the end of the year... If we are able to do that, that will be our schedule. I think the first unit, the first contingent, would be 250 men who are not involved in what might be called frontline operations. It would be our hope to lessen the number of Americans there by 1,000 as the training intensified and is carried on in South Vietnam... As far as other units, we will have to make that judgment based on what the military correlation of forces may be.
He went on to laud his military build-up, which would soon permit the armed forces to deploy seven divisions quickly, a crucial factor in the "military correlation of forces."
On the same day, a front-page story reported JFK's hopes to withdraw 1000 men by the end of the year as the training of South Vietnamese is intensified. On November 13, Jack Raymond reported that Defense Officials say that the 1000-man withdrawal plans remain unchanged. Two days later, he reported that at a news conference, while keeping the "official objectives announced on October 2 to withdraw most of the troops by the end of 1965," Kennedy weakened the withdrawal plans, reducing the estimate for 1963 to "several hundred," pending the outcome of the Honolulu meeting. JFK again emphasized the need to "intensify the struggle." A front-page story the next day reported the announcement by Major-General Charles Timmes that "The withdrawal of 1,000 United States servicemen from South Vietnam will start December 3." On November 21, the official statement from the Honolulu meeting was reported, reaffirming the plan to withdraw 1000 men by January 1. A December 2 item reported General Harkins's announcement that 300 would leave the next day. On December 4, a front-page story announced the withdrawal of 220 GI's, the first step in withdrawal of 1000 troops by Christmas.65
In short, what was public at once accurately and prominently reflects the internal record that has now been revealed, including some indication of JFK's personal hesitations over the withdrawal plans recommended by his advisers.
51 FRUSV, IV 1ff., 27, 50f., 75-8, 89, 295f., 325. On Hilsman's later interpretation of his Aug. 30 memorandum, see next chapter, n. 21.
52 Ibid., 55n, 81f., 94, 100.
53 Ibid., 171, 177-9, 221ff. Also Gibbons, US Government, 177f., with additional detail (and slightly different wording, used here).
54 FRUSV, IV 248, 213, 209. For extensive discussion of the concerns in Washington over neutralization and forced withdrawal, see Kahin, Intervention.
55 Gibbons, US Government, 180f.; FRUSV, IV 252f., 278-81.
56 Ibid., 330, 336ff. PP, II 751-66; 187, 756.
57 FRUSV, IV 350f. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1963, 759-60.
58 FRUSV, IV 370, 395-6, 371ff.
59 Ibid., 359, 387.
60 Ibid., 385-6, 402. Ch. 5.
61 FRUSV, IV418-20, 448.
62 Ibid., 472, 579-80.
63 Ibid., 581ff., 592ff.
64 Ibid., 582f., 596, 608ff.
65 Tad Szulc, "Vietnam Victory by the End of '65 Envisaged by U.S.," NYT, Oct. 3; transcript of press conference, NYT, Nov. 1; Joseph Loftus, NYT, Nov. 1. Jack Raymond, NYT, Nov. 13; "G.I. Return Waits on Vietnam Talk," Nov. 15, with transcript of News Conference. AP, "1,000 U.S. Troops to Leave Vietnam," NYT, Nov. 16; David Halberstam, NYT, Nov. 21; AP, NYT, Dec. 2;Hedrick Smith, NYT, Dec. 4, 1963.
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