| When Saddam Hussein barred U.N. inspectors from visiting alleged chemical and biological weapons sites in Iraq, the Clinton administration responded with a swift military build-up in the Persian Gulf. Although most of the international community strongly opposed a military solution to the crisis, the U.S. repeatedly stated that it would act unilaterally if necessary. Only Britain, which dispatched an aircraft carrier to the area, offered unwavering support for a military strike.
Tensions have eased since an agreement was reached between U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Saddam Hussein, but the U.S. military remains in the region to enforce the accord. This apparent willingness to use force against Iraq, despite international opposition, has angered many critics.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, American policy makers have spoken of a 'New World Order' in which international cooperation may replace ideological divisions. But critics have cited America's willingness to use force in the latest Iraq crisis as an example of the U.S. using its 'superpower' status to further its own policy objectives. Supporters counter that it was this display of military strength that enabled Kofi Annan and the Iraqi government to reach a diplomatic solution.
Recently, a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee held a meeting that discussed, among other things, ways to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Suggested ideas included recognizing an Iraq government-in-exile to establishing a "Radio Free Iraq".
Many in Congress, including Senate Majority leader Trent Lott (R- MS), have accused the Clinton administration of "subcontracting" American foreign policy to the U.N. while others have applauded the secretary-general's deal. But few have questioned whether the U.S. has the right to act unilaterally.
On March 2, 1998, the United Nations Security Council approved the latest agreement with Saddam Hussein. Shortly afterwards, the Clinton administration repeated its right to use force against Iraq and cited the Security Council's approval of the accord as its justification. But Russia, France and China, three of the five permanent security council members, have disagreed with the U.S.' assessment.
Answering your questions are Professor Noam Chomsky and James Woolsey.
Dr. Chomsky, a professor of linguistics at M.I.T, has written extensively on American foreign policy.
Mr. Woolsey served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1993-1995, and is one of the 18 prominent policy makers who called for Saddam Hussein's ouster.
| <Does the U.S. have a
moral obligation to intervene in international affairs?>
Kyle Fisher of Laurel, DE, asks:
Could you comment on whether or not you believe the U.S. has a moral obligation, because of its capabilities, to intervene in international affairs?
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
We should, I think, bear in mind that moral concepts apply at root to people.?States do have legal obligations, but they are not moral agents, though their citizens can influence them to act in morally responsible and legally admissible ways, or can allow them to act quite differently.
Individuals are responsible for the foreseeable consequences of what they do, hence for the course of international affairs to the extent that they can influence events by action, or inaction. We happen to be citizens of by far the most powerful state in the world.?Our action/inaction can therefore have unusual influence; and unlike many others, we are privileged to be able to act without undue fear of repression.?Accordingly, our moral responsibilities -- sometimes obligations -- reach far beyond those of others, in general.
Just what these responsibilities are, and whether they extend to the very serious matter of intervention, has to be determined case by case.?There are no formulas; each case has to be examined on its merits, with careful inquiry into the actual facts (which may not be easy to determine), the options available, the requirements of international law, and the likely consequences of action or inaction.
"First, do no harm."
The simplest cases are those that fall under a traditional medical doctrine: First, do no harm.?These include crucial examples of recent and current history.?Consider two.
One of the world's worst violators of human rights is Indonesian dictator General Suharto, who came to power with an army-led massacre that the CIA described as "one of the worst mass murders in the twentieth century," ranking it alongside the crimes of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao.?These crimes were carried out with US support, which has not wavered as Suharto compiled a shocking record of terror against his own population and invaded a small oil-rich country (East Timor), killing some 200,000 people and robbing its resources.?The invasion was in direct violation of a UN Security Council resolution to withdraw at once.?These crimes too have been carried out with the decisive military and diplomatic support of the United States.?Accordingly, it was -- and is -- our moral responsibility as citizens to terminate these crimes.?That would require no "intervention," only withdrawal of support, a far simpler matter.
During these years, Saddam Hussein has also carried out major crimes.?The worst by far were committed in the 1980s, including his gassing of Kurds at Halabja in 1988, chemical warfare against Iran, torture of dissidents, and numerous others.?His invasion of Kuwait, though a serious crime, in fact added little to his already horrendous record.?Throughout the period of his worst crimes, Saddam remained a favored ally and trading partner of the US and Britain, which furthermore abetted these crimes.?The Reagan Administration even sought to prevent congressional reaction to the the gassing of the Kurds, including the (failed) plea of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell that "we cannot be silent to genocide again" as the world was when Hitler exterminated Europe's Jews.?So extreme was Reaganite support for their friend that when ABC TV correspondent Charles Glass revealed the site of one of Saddam's biological warfare programs a few months after Halabja, Washington denied the facts, and the story died; the State Department "now issues briefings on the same site," Glass writes (in England).
There were no passionate calls for a military strike against this brutal killer and torturer.?Quite the contrary: much of what was known, including US support, was downplayed or not reported.
"In these and many other cases, the criterion that distinguishes friend from enemy is obedience, not crime."
After the Gulf War, the Senate Banking Committee found that the Commerce Department had traced shipment of "biological materials" of a kind later found and destroyed by UN inspectors, continuing at least until November 1989.?A month later, during his invasion of Panama, Bush authorized new loans for Saddam: to achieve the "goal of increasing U.S. exports and put us in a better position to deal with Iraq regarding its human rights record...," the State Department announced, facing no criticism in the mainstream (in fact, no report).?The Bush Administration continued to support the mass murderer up to his invasion of Kuwait, which shifted his status from ally to enemy, much as the Suharto coup and slaughters of 1965 shifted Indonesia from enemy to friend. In these and many other cases, the criterion that distinguishes friend from enemy is obedience, not crime.
Immediately after the Gulf war ended in March 1991, Washington returned to support for Saddam.?The State Department formally reiterated its refusal to have any dealings with the Iraqi democratic opposition: "Political meetings with them would not be appropriate for our policy at this time," the Department spokesman declared. "This time" was March 14 1991, while Saddam was decimating the southern opposition under the eyes of US forces, which refused even to grant rebelling Iraqi military officers access to captured Iraqi arms, to defend the population and perhaps overthrow the monster.?Had it not been for unexpected public reaction, Washington might not have extended even weak support to rebelling Kurds, subjected to the same treatment shortly after.
The official reason for protecting Saddam was the need to preserve "stability." Administration reasoning was outlined by New York Times chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman. While opposing a popular rebellion, he wrote, Washington did hope that a military coup might remove Saddam, "and then Washington would have the best of all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein," a return to the days when Saddam's "iron fist...held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not to speak of Washington.?Iraqi democrats did not regard this as "the best of all worlds." A leading figure of the opposition, Ahmed Chalabi, described the outcome as "the worst of all possible worlds" for the Iraqi people, whose tragedy is "awesome." The US, he said, was "waiting for Saddam to butcher the insurgents in the hope that he can be overthrown later by a suitable officer," an attitude rooted in the US policy of "supporting dictatorships to maintain stability."
Washington claims to have supported the democratic opposition in later years.?Their own picture is different, however.?Just last month, the British press reported Chalabi's observation that "everyone says Saddam is boxed in, but it is the Americans and British who are boxed in by their refusal to support the idea of political change."
"It was our responsibility, indeed obligation, to compel Washington to end its support for Saddam's worst crimes when they occurred, perhaps even to intervene to terminate them had that been necessary.?"
It was our responsibility, indeed obligation, to compel Washington to end its support for Saddam's worst crimes when they occurred, perhaps even to intervene to terminate them had that been necessary.?Quite possibly, as in the case of Suharto, withdrawal of support would have sufficed.?Currently the Iraqi Democratic opposition is advancing concrete proposals for overthrowing Saddam in favor of a popular-based alternative. They are requesting US support but not military intervention, which they have consistently opposed.?How realistic these proposals are it is hard to judge, but we have a responsibility, I think, to ensure that they receive serious and honest attention, and to ensure further that Washington abandon the "refusal to support the idea of political change," apparently still in force.
Again, there are no simple general formulas.?Slogans are easy, sometimes policy choices too, particularly when we are carrying out or abetting crimes and can desist.?But choices are often hard and complex, with unpredictable and possibly extreme consequences.?There is no alternative to the careful evaluation of each case, on its merits.
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
All countries intervene, in one way or another, in one another's affairs -- the question is, it seems to me, whether there is anything uniqe about the United States, i.e. whether we have any special claim on the right, or the obligation, to conduct ourselves differently than any other country would -- to take action beyond doing such things as, say, fighting if we were directly attacked or using trade leverage to get another country to treat our exports fairly.
"But in some circumstances, I believe we do have an obligation to act, to intervene in international affairs, even if our direct interests are not immediately threatened."
The way I look at it is that we Americans really don't have any special claim as a matter of right -- Americans are not inherently better than anyone else. But in some circumstances, I believe we do have an obligation to act, to intervene in international affairs, even if our direct interests are not immediately threatened. This is hard to argue about -- it's one of those things that either you feel or you don't. But I believe that it should be true for countries, in this regard, just as it should be for individuals -- for those to whom much is given, much should be demanded. In those periods, such as the 1920's and 1930's when we withdrew from the world things didn't subsequently work out very well. In retrospect, for example, if we had led a coalition to stop Hitler as soon as he moved into the Rhineland, most historians agree that he would have been deposed as Chancellor -- we could have saved the world a lot of pain and death by intervening then instead of sitting here as we did, self-satisfied, behind our two oceans, until some six years later we ourselves were attacked more than two years after the beginning of World War II.
"But in great measure because of our interventions in the 20th century, our one-time enemies in the three great wars of the century (two hot, one cold) are on the ash-heap of history: Imperial Germany, the Axis powers, and the Soviet bloc are gone."
Of course we don't always intervene wisely -- we make mistakes, we get full of ourselves and try to do too much, and so on. But in great measure because of our interventions in the 20th century, our one-time enemies in the three great wars of the century (two hot, one cold) are on the ash-heap of history: Imperial Germany, the Axis powers, and the Soviet bloc are gone. Not only are these regimes now largely replaced by democracies, the same is true of most of the autocratic states that were at one time or another allied with us in the cold war and that we pushed to reform their governments -- e.g. almost all of Latin America, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, etc.
On the whole, if you look at results, our interventions in this century have left the world a much better place than it would have been if we had behaved during the rest of the century in the non-intervening way we did in the 20's and 30's.
| |
| <Is America's willingness to use force against Iraq just
a continuation of previous policies?>
Alexis Samuels of Miami, FL, asks
Considering U.S. interventions during the Cold War, i.e. Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, etc.,?is America's willingness to use force against Iraq just a continuation of previous policies? Or does it illustrate a fundamental shift in how the U.S. intervenes, from a covert model to more overt action?
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
The three countries you cite were very different cases.
In Iran in the early 1950's the CIA, under President Eisenhower's instructions, helped overthrow the Mossadeg government and re-install the Shah. Given what's happened in Iran since 1979, Mossadeg looks pretty good by comparison. In retrospect it would have probably been a better idea to let Iran take its own course then -- there might not be so much resentment against the U.S. there now if we had kept our hands off.
"I believe...that Castro's regime won't last much, if at all, beyond Fidel and that opening up to the Cuban people may, now, be the best way to weaken his regime's power. "
In Cuba, our Bay of Pigs operation early in the Kennedy Administration was botched both by President Kennedy and the CIA; the CIA's attempts to assassinate Castro -- I believe it's quite clear at the direction of Robert Kennedy and thus, almost certainly, of President Kennedy as well -- were both wrong and comically clumsy. But unlike the case of Mossadeg in Iran in the early 50's, the Kennedy Administration was, in Castro, dealing with a real tyrant. Furthermore, most of the histories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis show that Castro was dangerous beyond Cuba's shores, because he was an important player in pushing the Soviets toward the 1962 missile deployments and hence toward behavior that almost led to nuclear war. Since the end of the cold war, he has not been a threat beyond Cuba's shores. I think the best way to deal with him now is to trade with Cuba, send lots of visitors, broadcast to it, etc. I'll go with Pope John Paul II, in other words. I believe, by the way, that Castro's regime won't last much, if at all, beyond Fidel and that opening up to the Cuban people may, now, be the best way to weaken his regime's power.
Nicaragua was, for a time, essentially a communist dictatorship under the Sandinistas. The substantial majority of the Nicaraguan people turned against them for their dictatorial ways (although most probably af first welcomed their overthrow of Somoza). They have rejected Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas now twice in Presidential elections. Our support of the Contras in the early 1980's is a complicated subject because, although it was at first done legally by the Reagan Administration, Congress then legislated against it leading the Administration to support the Contras in a manner that was clearly illegal -- the Iran-Contra Affair. As long as our support for the Contras was being undertaken pursuant to law, I think it was justified because of the dictatorial nature of the regime. Once Congress legislated against it though, the support should have stopped.
"What I would support against Iraq is not covert action -- there is no reason, in my view, for the CIA to be involved."
What I would support against Iraq is not covert action -- there is no reason, in my view, for the CIA to be involved. We have, however, in Saddam, a killer and terrible tyrant who is doing everything possible to obtain weapons of mass destruction. I would, openly, recognize a democratic government in exile, give it the funds of Iraq's that have been frozen overseas, stop Saddam's smuggling of oil (while still permitting that which can legally be exported under UN oversight, since the proceeds go for food and medicine for civilians), protect (with air power) the Kurds in the North and the Shia in the South if Saddam attacks them again, establish a no-fly zone over the whole country, and broadcast into Iraq to counter Saddam's propaganda (Radio Free Iraq).
Is this a continuation of the policies we had with regard to Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua? Unlike those three cases, it would not be covert. Like Cuba and Nicaragua (and unlike the case of Iran), it would be directed against a totalitarian dictator. So there would be some continuity, some discontinuity.
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
The US has often resorted to overt action in past years.?To mention only one example, in 1961-1962 the Kennedy Administration moved from support for large-scale state terror in South Vietnam, which had already killed tens of thousands of people, to a direct attack, including US Air Force bombing, napalm, crop destruction, and numerous other crimes.?These assaults -- aggression by any reasonable standards -- laid the basis for further escalation from 1965, by then extended to the rest of Indochina.?Millions were killed in the ruined countries.?Unknown numbers more have suffered and died from the effects of chemical warfare and from unexploded ordnance, and still do.?Those were not covert actions.
There have been many other cases.?George Bush's invasion of Panama -- condemned by two UN Security Council resolutions that Washington vetoed -- was overt.?It is also worth recalling that when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait a few months later, the prime concern of the Bush Administration was that he would emulate what the US had just done in Panama.?Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell posed the problem sharply: "The next few days Iraq will withdraw," putting "his puppet in" and "Everyone in the Arab world will be happy."
If so, the outcome would have been much like the recent US invasion of Panama, though Latin America was far from happy; it was in an uproar, bitterly opposed to the US actions, particularly the Group of Eight Latin American democracies, which expelled Panama (already suspended) because it was under the rule of a puppet regime maintained by foreign force.
"Overt actions are nothing new.?In fact, because of internal changes in the US, Washington may be less likely to resort to overt action than in the past."
Overt actions are nothing new.?In fact, because of internal changes in the US, Washington may be less likely to resort to overt action than in the past.?The Reagan Administration sought to emulate in Central America what Kennedy had done in South Vietnam, but quickly retreated in the face of unanticipated popular reaction; it turned to clandestine and state terror throughout the region, rather than direct US assault, and was indeed condemned by the World Court for the "unlawful use of force" and ordered to desist, a judgment dismissed here with contempt; its crucial wording was not even reported in the mainstream press, nor was there any concern when the US vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international law, mentioning no one, though all understood what was intended.?A leaked National Security Policy Review in the first months of the Bush presidency concluded that "In cases where the U.S. confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly"; delay might "undercut political support," understood to be thin.?That is part of the reason why US doctrine shifted to "Low Intensity Conflict" or quick demolition of a "much weaker enemy."
US military doctrine is unusual in that US casualties are not tolerated and overwhelming force must be available.?That is why the US has so rarely taken part in difficult peacekeeping operations, which involve interactions with civilians that require restraint and carry risks; these are left to Canada, Ireland, Norway, Fiji, and others.?In Somalia, for example, US forces were sent only after the worst fighting had declined, and recovery from famine was underway.?The intervention turned into a disaster because US forces resorted to massive force, following Pentagon doctrine, as soon as problems arose.?The US command estimated 6-10,000 Somali casualties in the summer of 1993 alone, two-thirds women and children.?What happened was later attributed to UN incompetence, but that is an evasion.
"The patterns of US intervention depend ultimately on decisions by American citizens, including the decision to stay quiet or even not to know.?
The patterns of US intervention depend ultimately on decisions by American citizens, including the decision to stay quiet or even not to know.?In principle such actions are under popular control; in fact too, if we so choose.
Click to continue...
| <Do you think the U.S. government, including Congress, is
overstepping its limits?>
Devi Mohanty of Chicago, IL, asks:
What do you think about the hearings being held in the U.S. Congress on assassinating Saddam? Do you think the U.S. government, including Congress, is overstepping its limits?
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
Assassination of Saddam is, in my opinion, a minor issue.?Even attempts to assassinate Castro, criminal no doubt, are marginal in the context of the terror attacks against Cuba from 1959.
There is, however, no doubt that "the U.S. government, including Congress, is overstepping its limits" in the matter of Iraq. Those limits are clear and explicit.?They are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, a "solemn treaty" recognized as the foundation of international law and world order, and also "the supreme law of the land" under the Constitution.?The Charter declares unambiguously that the UN Security Council alone "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken...." The one exception is the right of self-defense against "armed attack" until the Security Council acts (Article 51).?The fundamental principle is that member states "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." These are the "limits" that bind law-abiding states.
"Outlaw states reject these conditions: Suharto's Indonesia and Saddam's Iraq, for example.?Washington too rejects them."
Outlaw states reject these conditions: Suharto's Indonesia and Saddam's Iraq, for example.?Washington too rejects them.?Its position was forthrightly articulated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook his February 1998 diplomatic mission: "We wish him well," she stated, "and when he comes back we will see what he has brought and how it fits with our national interest," which will determine how we respond.?When the Security Council endorsed Annan's agreement, President Clinton announced that if Iraq fails the test of conformity (as determined by Washington), "everyone would understand that then the United States and hopefully all of our allies would have the unilateral right to respond at a time, place and manner of our own choosing." UN Ambassador Bill Richardson added that the US retains the right of "unilateral use of force." Other officials too stated clearly and unambiguously that the US will resort to the threat or use of force as it chooses, whatever the UN Security Council decides; and in this case, in the face of opposition in the region so extreme that only Kuwait was willing to give even tepid support for the planned military strikes, while other client states condemned US threats as "bad and loathsome" and reacted by moves to improve relations with Iran (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia).
The reaction here to Washington's stand was instructive.?At one extreme, doves praised the Administration for its violation of international and domestic law; at the other, hawks denounced it for weak gestures towards our explicit legal obligations. Congressional leaders warned that the US was "subcontracting" its foreign policy to the UN Security Council and "subordinating its power to the United Nations," obligations for all law-abiding states.?No less remarkable was the fact that the fundamental issues of adherence to "the supreme law of the land" were off the agenda for the media and commentators.?In the US, that is; elsewhere they were discussed.?Accordingly, though many words flowed, we can hardly say that in this country there was a meaningful "debate" over the current Iraq crisis.
"The sanctions are a major factor in the rapid increase in disease, malnutrition, and early death, including 567,000 children by 1995."
Returning to the matter of assassination, we should not forget that far more serious crimes are being committed daily against the Iraqi people.?The harsh sanctions policy pursued under US pressure "enhances the leadership" and "diminishes the people," a UN administrator observed, reflecting the common view of diplomats and aid officials in Iraq, and many analysts elsewhere. The sanctions are a major factor in the rapid increase in disease, malnutrition, and early death, including 567,000 children by 1995.?UNICEF reports 4500 children dying a month in 1996.?In a bitter condemnation of the sanctions in January 1998, 54 Catholic Bishops quoted the Archbishop of the southern region of Iraq, who reports that "epidemics rage, taking away infants and the sick by the thousands" while "those children who survive disease succumb to malnutrition." The UN Food and Agriculture Administration warns further that the epidemics may lead to "biological disaster" in the region, noting the spread of screw worm infection, raging in Iraq and now detected in Kuwait. Senior UN and other international relief officials in Iraq warned that the planned bombing could have a "catastrophic" effect on people already suffering miserably.?The head of CARE (Australia) warned that a military strike "will produce a massive humanitarian disaster." There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that such factors were a factor in US planning.
By comparison, assassination of Saddam would be at worst a very minor crime.
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
Several congressional hearings have been held recently on what to do about Iraq in general. The only way the issue of assassination has come up, to the best of my knowledge, is in occasional questions -- this wasn't the main theme of any of the hearings. I testified in one of those hearings recently, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and suggested the course of action regarding Iraq set out in answer to question number 2 above. At one point I noted that the only person I know of who has actually advocated that the United States should assassinate Saddam Hussein is George Stephanopolous, in a column in Newsweek early last December.
"In my view, in ascending order of importance, Mr. Stephanopolous's proposal that the United States should adopt political murder as a tool of statecraft is impractical, ineffective, illegal, and immoral."
I wrote a response to Mr. Stephanopolous which was published in the Washington Times on December 23. Essentially my column made the points that I made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In my view, in ascending order of importance, Mr. Stephanopolous's proposal that the United States should adopt political murder as a tool of statecraft is impractical, ineffective, illegal, and immoral. It would be impractical because finding Saddam inside the thoroughly totalitarian Iraq would be essentially impossible -- he moves daily, has doubles, etc. It would be ineffective because he would likely be succeeded by another Ba'athist Nationalist of his own stripe, possibly his quite terrible son, and the Iraqi people and Iraq's neighbors would be no better off. It would be illegal because President Ford issued an Executive Order barring such assassinations over two decades ago, and each subsequent President has affirmed it. It would be immoral because the United States stands for some values in the world; if today we made assassination a tool of national policy it would not only tend to undermine others' confidence that we really cleave to those values but also encourage other countries to adopt the same tool.
One post-script. In World War II we essentially assassinated Admiral Yamamoto, the Admiral who had been in command of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. We did it with fighter planes, having broken the Japanese codes and knowing his whereabouts. If we had had an opportunity we probably would have helped the brave German officers and their colleagues who attempted to assassinate Hitler (one of these men survived the War and is a friend of mine). But that War was a world-wide struggle between democracy and totalitarianism -- a fight to the death for the survival of everything we cherish. In a case like that, it seems justifiable to me for us to fight with everything we have. We aren't to that point yet with Saddam, by a long shot.
| <Do you believe that the U.S. public has an adequate
opportunity to form rational opinions about U.S. policy given the quality of media coverage?>
David Witbrodt of Saginaw, MI, asks:
Do you believe that the U.S. public has an adequate opportunity to form rational opinions about U.S. policy given the quality of media coverage?
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
Yes, but it's difficult.
I think it is hard to get balanced and thought-provoking information from television. One major exception is The Lehrer News Hour, which is a national treasure, and from time to time there are excellent in-depth looks at issues on Nightline or one of the news magazine shows, such as Sixty Minutes.
"But the general rule for tv is "if it bleeds, it leads"....
But the general rule for tv is "if it bleeds, it leads", and there is so much focus on visual excitement, conflict, and sound bites that anyone who routinely gets news only from television will have a pretty bizarre idea of the world.
Radio is a little better. Last night for example, NPR had a lengthy presentation by four experts on what's going on in Kosovo with call-ins afterward. Some NPR programs and some talk shows get into issues in depth.
Following issues in the print media, or on-line, is essential in order to get behind the electronic media's sound bites. The major dailies sometimes have their problems -- if a reporter who covers a specific subject leans toward flair rather than accuracy, you can go for a very long time with readers getting an extremely biased view of an issue. The dailies feel themselves to be in competition with tv -- I wish they would compete more with the Lehrer News Hour and less with A Current Affair. On most issues, though, reading a major daily (or the weekly summary of news that several of them distribute nationwide) is essential. Also, weekly journals of news and opinion -- e.g. The Economist, The New Republic, The Weekly Standard -- can be a great help in getting behind the breathless tv 30-second report and finding out what's really going on.
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
No, I do not.?As noted, the central and most important issue was simply excluded: namely, the question of Washington's authority to violate international law and its own laws by the unilateral threat and use of force.
There were many distortions, though none as striking as this omission, in my view.?One example was strikingly illustrated at the televised "Town meeting" on February 18.?Defending US plans to attack Iraq, Secretaries Albright and Cohen repeatedly invoked Saddam's ultimate atrocity: he was guilty of "using weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors as well as his own people," his most awesome crime. "It is very important for us to make clear that the United States and the civilized world cannot deal with somebody who is willing to use those weapons of mass destruction on his own people, not to speak of his neighbors," Albright emphasized in an angry response to a questioner who asked about US support for Suharto.?Putting aside the evasion of the question raised, Albright and Cohen only forgot to mention that Washington supported and continued to abet the crimes that are now belatedly condemned.?Reporters and commentators refrained from mentioning these not insignificant facts, let alone stressing that it was not Saddam's crimes that turned him into the new Hitler; rather his disobedience.
There are many other examples.?Thus, the New York Times reported that "Israel is not demonstrably in violation of Security Council decrees." That is clearly false.?Israel has violated dozens of Security Council resolutions, and there would be many more examples if the US did not routinely veto them.?Of particular relevance here is Resolution 425 of March 1978, which orders Israel to withdraw forthwith and unconditionally from Lebanon. It remains in Lebanon with US support.?Its most recent proposals continue to violate the Security Council Resolution.
Indonesia's extraordinary crimes and the strong US support for them have also been largely suppressed or distorted, and still are, often in scandalous ways.
"...the US public has a moral responsibility to monitor its government's actions...."
It is easy to go on with a long list.?To return to question (1), while the US public has a moral responsibility to monitor its government's actions, quite often only those who undertake or have access to independent research are in a position to act in a sensible and informed manner, a serious departure from functioning democracy.
| <What does the recent crisis tell us about
the direction US foreign policy is headed in the post-Cold War world?>
David Whitman of Boston, MA, asks:
What does the recent crisis, namely the US' insistence that it reserves the "right" to use force against Iraq, tell us about the direction US foreign policy is headed in the post-Cold War world? Doesn't this set a dangerous precedent, if not for US policy, but for the future of the international system?
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
My only reservations have to do with the phrases "post-Cold War world" and "precedent." The US has always insisted on its right to use force, whatever international law requires, and whatever international institutions decide: the United Nations, the World Court, the Organization of American States, or others.?While the World Court was reaching its (expected) judgment in April 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz declared that "Negotiations are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table," condemning those who advocate "utopian, legalistic means like outside mediation, the United Nations, and the World Court, while ignoring the power element of the equation." Saddam would surely agree, along with many others in modern history.
Such rejection of the rule of law has often been dramatically explicit.?Thus, immediately after the 1954 Geneva Accords on a peaceful settlement for Indochina, which Washington refused to accept, the National Security Council secretly decreed that even in the case of "local Communist subversion or rebellion NOT CONSTITUTING ARMED ATTACK" (my emphasis) the US would consider the use of military force, including an attack on China if it is "determined to be the source" of the "subversion"; the NSC also called for converting Thailand into "the focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia," undertaking "covert operations on a large and effective scale" throughout Indochina, and in general, acting forcefully to undermine the Accords and the UN Charter.?The wording, repeated verbatim annually in planning documents, was chosen so as to make explicit the US right to violate Article 51 of the Charter, which permits the use of force only in immediate self-defense against "armed attack."
The US proceeded to define "aggression" to include "political warfare, or subversion," what UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson called "internal aggression" while defending JFK's escalation in South Vietnam.?US attacks were therefore transmuted into "self-defense" against "internal aggression." When the US bombed Libyan cities in 1986, the official justification was "self defense against future attack," a ludicrous distortion of the Charter applauded by legal specialists in the national press. The US invasion of Panama was defended in the Security Council by appeal to Article 51, which, US Ambassador Pickering declared, "provides for the use of armed force to defend a country, to defend our interests and our people," and permits the U.S. to invade Panama to prevent its "territory from being used as a base for smuggling drugs into the United States" -- an astonishing concept of "armed attack," which passed without criticism.?In June 1993, when Clinton launched a missile attack on Baghdad, killing civilians, UN Ambassador Albright appealed to Article 51, explaining that the bombing was in "self-defense against armed attack" -- namely, an alleged attempt to assassinate former president Bush two months earlier.?The claim would have been remarkable even if the US had had credible evidence of Iraqi involvement, which, officials conceded, they did not.
"The US has always relied on the rule of force in international affairs."?
These and innumerable other examples illustrate far-reaching contempt for the rule of law.?The US has always relied on the rule of force in international affairs.?International law, treaties, the World Court, War Crimes Tribunals, moral judgment, etc., are regularly invoked against enemies, often quite accurately.?But the precedent to which Mr. Whitman refers has long been established.
The US, of course, is not alone in these practices.?Other states commonly act in much the same way, if not constrained by external or internal forces.?Hence the enormous moral responsibility of citizens, particularly in more powerful and free societies.?We may decide to disregard the historical and documentary record, but it seems to me hardly wise or honorable to succumb to illusions about it.
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
My answer to question 2 is relevant here. But some added points should be considered.
"Saddam's regime is unique in the world today in its demonstrated capacity for aggression and tyranny."?
Saddam's regime is unique in the world today in its demonstrated capacity for aggression and tyranny. It has started two major wars, against Iran and against Kuwait. It has used weapons of mass destruction on a number of occasions, against Iran and against its own people. It's probably in a tie with North Korea for being the most repressive and tyrannical regime in today's world. And it is in a strategically important location. When Saddam stopped in August of 1990 at the Kuwait-Saudi border, he was about 100 miles from controlling half the world's oil reserves.
The regime has lied on numerous occasions about its programs for chemical and bacteriological weapons and the ballistic missiles that can carry them. It is under UN sanctions, voted by the Security Council, that should not be lifted unless it complies with all Security Council Resolutions, including its violations of the 1991 cease-fire. These sanctions are there not because the Security Council wants to pick on Iraq for some random reason, but because the Iraqi regime's behavior has been so uniqely execrable and so blatantly in violation of international law.
I think that under these circumstances Iraq is clearly in a position such that use of force against it, in some circumstances, is warranted. That use should not be indiscriminate. But if (one might as well say when) Saddam's regime next violates a Security Council mandate by blocking inspections or by other behavior, I believe force would be justified and that the use of force (air power, I would think) should focus on those entities, such as his Republican Guard, that support the regime's power.
I don't think that such use of force sets any precedent that we, or any other member of the Security Council or, for that matter, any other country will go dashing about the world randomly attacking people. Indeed I think that the risk is quite the reverse -- it is more likely that no one will act in time and thus we will fail to stop a dictator, such as Saddam, from extending his power the way we failed to stop Hitler in the 1930's.
As discussed in the answer to question 1, I see this set of issues as involving not some uniquely American right, but rather an obligation.
"It's a question whether you believe that this country's wealth and many blessings give it such an obligation to take action on occasion in order to preserve peace in the world ... even if we have to do it alone."?
Sometimes someone has to do the job of dealing with the killers. It's a question whether you believe that this country's wealth and many blessings give it such an obligation to take action on occasion in order to preserve peace in the world and, what often amounts to the same thing, to stop dictators from going on rampages -- even if we have to do it alone. There's no better characterization of the difficulties of working through this kind of duty than the agonies, decisions, and actions of the sheriff played by Gary Cooper in High Noon. Some would say that this means I'm saying we should act like a nation of cowboys. Like him, yes. Exactly.
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Former CIA Director
Professor Noam
