Ending 20 Years of Occupation:
East Timor and U.S. Foreign PolicyDecember 9, 1995
Miller Theater, Columbia University, New York City
Sponsors: East Timor Action Network, WBAI Radio, Modern Times. Transcript by the East Timor Action Network.
CONTENTS
MARGARET EBERLE, Moderator
CONSTANCIO PINTO
REED BRODY
ALLAN NAIRN
NOAM CHOMSKY
Selected Questions and Answers
MARGARET EBERLE, MODERATOR My name is Margaret Eberle. I work with WESPAC in White Plains and also a very willing drone for the East Timor Action Network, because I know how hard the people that I know work in it work. On behalf of the East Timor Action Network I would like to welcome you all here and say a special thank you to the co-sponsors of this event, which is WBAI Pacifica radio (that's why they were allowed to set this up) and the Modern Times magazine.
I'm trying to fill the shoes of Amy Goodman, which is no easy job. I'm not even fooling myself into thinking that I'm going to even come near that, but she's currently on assignment in Haiti. But we do have Allan Nairn here with us.
The first speaker I would like to introduce is Constancio Pinto. Constancio is the U.S. representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, the CNRM, which is the umbrella organization of the East Timor resistance. He was also the organizer of the demonstration which turned into a massacre on November 12, 1991.
CONSTANCIO PINTO Thank you very much for the opportunity. As I'm asked to talk for 12 minutes and so I'll do my best to condense my personal experience. I believe that my personal experience is linked with the situation in East Timor since Indonesia invaded in 1975.
My name is Constancio Pinto and I'm Timorese. My name is a Portuguese name, actually, but I am not Portuguese. I am Timorese, holding a Portuguese passport. In 1975, at this time, December 9, I was heading towards the mountain with my parents, all of my family, bombarded by Indonesian army with the United States M-16, F-16 fighters, tanks and warships. Two days before that, December 7, 1975, thousands of people were laid down in Dili, East Timor's capital, without [unclear]. Men and women, children were smashed into the rocks. Women were raped in front of their families, their husbands, their boyfriends. Men were killed in front of their family, their wives, and their children.
As a result of that, 90 percent of the population in East Timor fled into the jungle. For three years, we lived in the jungle, suffering for all kinds of suffering, perpetrated by Indonesian military. We were bombed by the Indonesian army every day. Almost every inch of East Timor's land was bombed by F-15 airplane, Bronco OV-10, tanks and warships. For three years, we suffered from diseases, hunger, and killings -- mass killings. I'm not talking about one or two people who were killed because [unclear] accidentally killed. I was talking about people who were killed deliberately by the Indonesian military, and not only thousands of them lie down every day, throughout the country. I saw with my eyes people killed in front of me, people who died of starvation, and I slept together with them.
For three years, in 1978, the Indonesian army launched a huge operation throughout the country and forced the population to surrender to the village, to the Indonesian army. So in 1978, I joined my family. We were arrested by Indonesian military. But for one year, 1977 to 1978, we ran up the mountains, down the hills, across the rivers, killings, and dying of starvation, every day, every night, we were just running nonstop.
So, in 1978, we were arrested and I found that the situation would be better than in the jungle. We were brought into the village and ended up at the concentration camp. I was in one of the concentration camps in [unclear] village. We were not allowed to circulate in order to get food to eat. Every Timorese received three cups of rice to eat for six days. And only rice; nothing else. And, as a result, thousands of people dies of starvation and disease -- died of diarrhea, dysentery, and other illnesses.
In addition to this, hundreds of people, thousands of people were arbitrarily arrested, disappear and killed. Again, men were killed in front of their families, their wives, their children. Women being raped in front of their husbands and their children. And all of this, the Indonesian army tried to terrorize the Timorese in order to be able to continue with the struggle for the self-determination and independence. However, in spite of all kinds of suffering, the Timorese, we never gave up the struggle. And today, it's 20 years of the struggle against Indonesian occupation.
In the village, from the concentration camp, I was able to go to Dili, the capital of East Timor, in order to work and to help my family and then go to school. At school, I felt [unclear] that I'd survive and think that I'd still be able to do something to help my people. I became involved in the underground movement.
In 1984, I became involved in the underground movement in order to help the resistance in the jungle and help the resistance abroad by sending information of human rights violations in East Timor to our people abroad in order to communicate, to inform international organizations, such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, International Red Cross, and also influence the public; and helping the resistance in the jungle by supplying food and medicine and clothes.
And, also in the underground, I tried to organize a small group in order to find out a way how to do more than just sending information abroad. So we began with demonstrations, peaceful demonstrations. The first demonstration was 1989 when the Pope, John Paul II, visited East Timor. We took that opportunity to tell the world, through the international journalists who were there, about the situation in East Timor -- about the continuous human rights violations in East Timor. And then we had follow [unclear] demonstration. And those peaceful demonstrations were with the purpose to tell the world and to tell you, the Americans.
In 1991 -- as a result of my activities in the underground movement -- I was arrested by the Indonesian army. I was sent to prison. I was tortured from nine o'clock in the morning until one in the morning, next day. Fortunately, it was my birthday, January 25, 1991. I couldn't believe how Indonesian army -- as a human being -- torture me. I saw them as a robot would torture me. That robot that can think, that can feel how painful is a torture. Even they saw my blood comes out from my nose and my eyes, my ears; they still punch me all the time -- in front and behind me and both sides. Every question; two, three punch.
And [unclear] interesting story. While I was interrogated, they asked me my bio data: where I was born and when. And I said I was born on January the 25th, 1963. And they were surprised -- said, "Oh! Today is your birthday!" And I said, "Yes, it's my birthday." And they asked me, "Why don't you tell your parents or your girlfriend bring you a present?" And I said, "Thank you. I won't need present from my parents or my girlfriend, because I got one." And they said, "How? Where? Where is the present?" And I said, "Look at me, you know, the blood that's coming out from my eyes and my nose -- this is a present. And I won't forget this in my life." They got very angry and punched me even harder and tried to kill me. [unclear]...punch me...[unclear]. They punched me in my face, you know, my head and my stomach, and kicked me with the boots and they tried to, like, to kill me at that time. So I felt very, very painful and I said, "Are you going to kill me?" And they said, "Yes, we are going to kill you, but, you know, later on." Well, they just tell this in front of me without hesitating.
I was, again, tortured during interrogation. Six days, I was held until. And, finally, after six days, they tried to release me on the condition to report to them every day. At that time, I was the secretary of the [underground] Committee. I thought they had some plan to release me in order to follow me, to see my activities in the underground movement. And, well, I knew that. And I said, "OK." But I did [unclear] another way. I continued to organize people in the underground movement and to prepare people for the 12 November demonstration in 1991, which proceeded by more than 271 people killed by the Indonesian military, in a peaceful demonstration. And those who were killed were my friends who we worked together, played together, studied together and who were helping me when I was underground. So, while I was in that condition to report [unclear] every day, I was working on this, and they found out.
On October the 29th, they killed one of the young boys at the Motael Church, a Catholic Church, and arrested 25 them -- those that were working with me underground, preparing banners and flags. And one of them, they were tortured with electrocution. He was forced to say, to mention my name: "Oh, Constancio Pinto, who told us to make these banners -- to make these banners for the demonstration." Then the army found out: "Wow, Constancio! He's working with us while he's still working with the underground movement!"
So, on November 1st, they had a meeting to say that we better, you know, get rid of Constancio and so the Indonesian officials had a meeting in a village called Vila Verde to discuss how to rearrest me and how to, you know, do whatever they do, so they kill me -- to kill me. But they didn't know that they had a friend of mine who worked there, worked with him, who was in the meeting. I was told by this friend, two hours before the actual hour that they're supposed to rearrest me. Then I went into hiding. In hiding, I managed to organize -- continued to organize a peaceful demonstration on November 12, 1991.
Today I spoke about torture. I described how they torture me. They kicked me and beat me and punched me. This is not only the strategy that the Indonesian army used in East Timor. There are many other types of torture, like slash people's faces and bodies with razor blades; people's fingernails pulled out; their toenails pulled out, and their ears were used as ashtray. This is kind of -- some kind of a torture. Some people were thrown into the water and pick up from the water and continuously electrocuted. Some people were thrown from the helicopter. This story -- maybe, if I tell you -- maybe you don't believe that -- how a human being can do certain strange things to other human being. But this is a reality; what's happened in East Timor. So this is kind of a torture.
So go back to escape: I was underground. I was hiding in underground for almost three months. And on November, after demonstration, I managed to escape to Jakarta, Indonesia, with a fake passport; fake I.D. And then, in Jakarta, I was able to buy a false passport for 200,000 dollars -- you know, just to give you an idea how corrupt is it in Indonesia -- and I got this for 12 hours and from Jakarta I left to Singapore to Hong Kong and Macao to Portugal. And, from Portugal, I came to U.S. for a speaking tour here and, then, apply for school. Currently I am studying at Brown University, actually. And working with [unclear] solidarity movements like East Timor Action Network, Amnesty International and any other solidarity movement's struggle for the right of self-determination and independence of East Timor.
As the invasion of East Timor -- to conclude -- as the invasion of East Timor is linked to the United States foreign policy (I'm not going to talk about U.S. foreign policy) but I'd like to urge you that even today, while I speak here, our people who are subjugated to torture -- they're tortured, they're electrocuted, their face sliced with razor blades and their bodies burned with cigarettes -- and I'd like to urge you that after this meeting, if you go home, please tell other people about the situation in East Timor and use your Congresspeople to help the Timorese people for the right of self-determination and independence which is, I believe, one of the United States principles. Thank you very much.
MARGARET EBERLE You get some indication of the interesting kind of folks we have up here speaking to us today. They're people that not only have, you know, given speeches like we're giving tonight, but they've kind of put their bodies and their jobs, you know, where their words are.
The next speaker is Reed Brody, a human rights attorney. He was expelled from East Timor in early November while taking part in an international delegation to commemorate the fourth anniversary of this 1991 massacre that you just heard about. He most recently served as the Human Rights Director for the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in El Salvador and is currently working in Haiti to bring members of the coup regime to justice.
REED BRODY Thank you very much. In November, I was part of a small delegation of parliamentarians, religious leaders and human rights advocates from eight countries which hoped to say a prayer on the anniversary at the site of the massacre that Constancio [Pinto] organized and that Allan [Nairn] was present at. Seven of us, including myself and Brian Brown from Freedom House, made it to East Timor but were expelled after 24 hours. The other eight people on the delegation, including a Bishop from Japan, were prevented from boarding a plane at Dili Airport.
I've been to 82 countries as an employee of the United Nations and of human rights organizations, yet I have never seen in 24 hours as much repression and as much resistance as I saw in 24 hours in East Timor. In our short time there, posing as tourists, we were subject to almost constant surveillance. When we went -- when we got to our hotel, men with walkie-talkies descended on the hotel, even though we were supposedly tourists. When we went to a restaurant, security men with video cameras and tape recorders came along.
The most frightening incident, probably, occurred when we went to the beach to plan our prayer vigil -- hopefully out of the earshot of the people who were following us. And two trucks pulled up and disgorged between 15 and 20 riot policemen who surrounded us wielding bamboo truncheons and masks. We were ordered off the beach and back to our hotel.
The next morning we were convoked by the head of immigration, Mr. Triswoyo; interesting concept that you have to actually pass immigration when you go from one part of Indonesia, supposedly, to another. He told us, and I quote, "Security is everywhere here." He warned us not to interview people, not to take pictures, and not to mix with crowds. If he did -- if we did, he said, and I quote, "we will pick you off, one by one." He told us that foreigners, by their mere presence, interest the local people and incite them to actions, such as throwing stones. But he let us go and two hour -- but two hours later we were in different parts of the capital, Dili, when we were all picked up and brought back to Mr. Triswoyo, who told us that he had received an order from Jakarta that we were to be expelled from the island for security reasons and that the island was being sealed off to all visitors until after the anniversary of the 12th of November.
Of course, what we saw and felt in one day is but a taste of the hell that East Timorese must live under every day under Indonesian occupation -- things that Constancio has spoken to much more eloquently than I can.
Despite the surveillance that we were subject to, we did have many meetings both chance and planned with East Timorese. They told us about an escalating wave of repression that began in the middle of October. Particularly, everyone told us how Indonesian riot police -- the same police that surrounded us on the beach -- were going house to house, beating up young Timorese men with bamboo truncheons; again, the same truncheons that were brandished at us on the beach. We were also told about a wave of arrests beginning in mid-October, which people variously put at between 150 and 400 people arrested. The purpose of this new wave of arrests and this spate of beatings, according to the people we met with, was to intimidate them or to just physically either incarcerate them or incapacitate them and prevent them from demonstrating on the two anniversaries -- the 12th of November and the 20th anniversary of the invasion of the seventh of December.
But one Timorese priest told us, quote, "The Indonesians think that we are animals, so they try to beat us into submission. But we are not animals, and when they beat us it only makes -- it only makes us hate them more." And, indeed, Mr. Triswoyo, the immigration officer, was right when he told us that the presence of foreigners incite Timorese to protest. Because everyone we had a chance to meet -- both in our private meetings as well as publicly: taxi drivers, people on the street -- used our presence to call for independence, to express their anger at the Indonesians, or just to thank us for being there. One boy came straight up to us and said, "Independence or death." A group of school children when we passed by said "Viva Timor Leste" -- Free East Timor. People -- in their eyes, as you looked at them -- were telling you how they felt.
That is the story of East Timor. After 20 years of Indonesian occupation, after one-third of the population has been killed by the Indonesians, the resistance is still everywhere. That is what the Indonesians don't want people to see and that is why we were expelled. Thank you very much. Viva Timor Leste.
MARGARET EBERLE A few words about the East Timor Action Network: the network was formed [unclear] after this 1991 massacre which had occurred. And I can certainly -- from working with Charlie Scheiner who's the Westchester -- and certainly one of the important organizers. This is the only man I know of -- that I know of, who I can call up at 2:30 in the morning and he's still up, he's still working on his computer, and it's probably got something to do with East Timor.
Our next speaker, Allan Nairn, has also been very active. I've seen him at numerous demonstrations and have been amazed at his patience, among other things. But the interesting thing about this network is that -- this is a network -- I was recently part of a demonstration they had out in front of the hotel near Grand Central Station there, and they had something like 25 students from Brown University who came down from Rhode Island to New York City to be part of a demonstration. Now, folks -- that's organizing!
Our next speaker is Allan Nairn, as I mentioned. Allan and Amy were -- if -- I assume most of you people are listeners of WBAI -- were part of that event that happened on November 12th and I guess we're really glad and happy that we still have Allan and Amy here; because they, too, were threatened and I guess it was an American passport that saved 'em.
Allan is an award-winning journalist who has done groundbreaking investigations of U.S. policy in Central America, Haiti, and East Timor. He's been to Timor three times and is banned by the Indonesian military as a threat to national security. That's something we all ought to be, you know, aiming for -- is to become a threat to national security! He recently -- twice -- when they attempted to return, they were turned back.
He also -- I heard him talking at the reception we had, where "60 Minutes" has been stealing his material and using it. And, though, I guess he felt angry about it -- but in another way was kind of glad that they were taking it! Certainly, it couldn't hurt their programming at all! So I'd like to introduce Allan Nairn.
ALLAN NAIRN Thank you. I first met Constancio [Pinto] in August of 1990-at the time I was there in Timor with Amy Goodman, and we were walking through a graveyard and a young man came up to us, recognized us because a photo of me had been smuggled in there through the underground -- because we were supposed to hook up -- and approached us and then took us off to a nearby meeting place where we met Constancio. And then there was a period from November of 91 for about six months after that where I didn't know whether Constancio was dead or alive. I'd last seen him at that time on the night of November 11th, 1991. We had gone to meet him under very tense conditions. It was the middle of the night; we were led into a hiding place. There were young men, his body guards all around him, unarmed but they were sitting in the trees, communicating with like bird whistles, indicating whether the INTEL was coming, the Indonesian secret police. Constancio was wanted at that time. There was a death warrant out for him. We went into a room where the blinds were drawn. There was a lit candle; that was the only light. Constancio was there, extremely tense, and also part of his face was immobilized -- it was like frozen -- the lingering results of the torture he described. He talked about the precession which would be happening the following day in the morning on November 12, 91. We could only talk for ten minutes. We left. We went out into the road and it so happens we eventually were able to get transportation. And the spot we left from was the spot where, the following morning, the Indonesian troops came face to face with the Timorese.
The plan for November 12th by the Timorese was extremely bold. They were going to have a religious procession from the Motael Catholic church to the cemetery in commemoration of Sebastiao Gomes -- a young man who had been killed two weeks before by the army. In itself, this was insurrectionary in Indonesia because public assembly is banned. Political speech is banned. But the Timorese went even farther than that. So, as the young people came out of the mass after taking communion -- and many of them were 13, 14, 18 years old -- they reached under their shirts and blouses and pulled out bedsheets on which with magic markers and embroidery they'd made banners -- political banners talking about the 200,000 murdered by the Indonesian occupation forces, a third of the population, calling for freedom. And, as they unfurled these banners on the seaside road, just an electric charge went through the crowd; 'bout a thousand people there. 'Cause you don't do this in East Timor. You just don't do this.
The army was lined up all along the route of march. Colonel Gatot Purwanto, the intelligence chief, was cruising in his vehicle speaking into his walkie-talkie. Nuns led the procession singing hymns. And, as we walked through the streets to the cemetery, thousands of people joined from their homes. The boldest of the young people would jog up to the front of the crowd, run up into the face of the Indonesian troops, give them the "V" sign, which stands for both victory and peace, shout "Viva East Timor," "Viva Independence," "Viva Xanana" -- the leader of the Timorese resistance; a Nelson Mandela-like figure, now jailed by the Indonesian forces.
People didn't know if they would live to see the cemetery. But they did. As we got to the cemetery there were no troops there. Some people filed in to lay flowers on Sebastiao's grave. Others remained outside in the street by the high cemetery walls. Some young people clambered up on top of the walls displaying the banners defending the church, defending independence, calling for the Indonesian troops to leave. There was a tremendous sense of exhilaration and accomplishment. And if from that moment people had simply gone home in peace, November 12th, 1991 would have gone down in history as a breakthrough day in the history of East Timor. Because this bold crowd of people which had now swelled to, perhaps, 5000 had walked across Dili in an act of open defiance and lived to tell about it. It would have shaken the system. They would have shaken the very political and psychological basis of the occupation. But it didn't end there.
We were talking to an old man in the street. He reached up and pointed -- said, "the Gestapo!" We saw that the army had arrived. They pulled up on trucks, got down holding American M-16's across their chest, sealing off the only exit route. Then we looked and saw, marching up the road -- the same route by which everyone had come -- a long column of Indonesian troops, dressed in brown, holding American M-16's in front of them. The Timorese were hemmed in by the cemetery walls, a few at the back could peel off, but most had no escape. I thought at the time: "Well, we'll just go stand between the soldiers and the Timorese; prevent any trouble. The soldiers will see us; obvious foreign journalists. The only choice would be to shoot us; stage a massacre in front of us. Either one would cause an international incident." So I thought that we could prevent it.
We went and stood there in the middle of the road -- the road about as wide as the middle rank of seats here. The soldiers came marching up. Never saw the end of the row of soldiers. The crowd was quiet. People were moving back. Had nowhere to go. Constancio's wife, Gabriela, was in the crowd. She was pregnant with their son, Tilson. The soldiers kept on coming. I thought, "My God, it looks like they're going to go through with this." I couldn't believe it. They marched up into our faces. They enveloped us. We were about fifteen yards in front of the Timorese. They took a step or two past us and raised their rifles to their shoulders all at once and opened fire on the crowd.
And at first -- you know, Constancio talked about "How can a human being torture, act like a robot?" -- people have these capacities, ordinary people have these depths of evil just as ordinary people have the depths of nobility and heroism that people like Constancio and so many Timorese are forced to exhibit every day. And that's the problem -- they're forced to exhibit it. You shouldn't have to be a hero to live -- to live your life. You shouldn't have to be willing to organize day after day in the face of terror and razor blades that'll slice your cheeks open just to live an ordinary life. But that's what this country's been imposing on Timor and so many dozens of other places.
I thought, "Oh, they must be firing blanks." I couldn't believe it -- even though I knew the whole history of the terror; painfully familiar with the massacres of Guatemala and Salvador, but just couldn't believe it, there, face to face. But then the people were falling; the blood was slicking the road. The soldiers leaped over the fallen bodies, picking people off. You could see parts of their limbs being torn. Few seconds later, soldiers grabbed us, beat us, fractured my skull with the butts of their M-16s. A group of seven or eight put us down on the ground, put their rifles to our heads. Were shouting at us, "Politik! Politik!" -- politics, a crime in East Timor. The Timorese were committing the crime of politics by marching. We were committing the crime of politics by being there.
Our answer was "America! We're from America!" They had asked, "You from Australia?" I wanted to make it very clear, "No, no. Not Australia." I knew they had already ma -- they had already executed six Australian journalists in the course of the occupation. It was when we convinced them that we were from the United States -- another soldier had stripped away my passport, but Amy still had hers -- that seemed to turn the tide. They took their rifles away from our heads. We were from the same country their weapons were from. They understood, I think, there might be a political price to pay if they executed us, even though they'd never paid a political price for executing Timorese and they were, at that moment, executing Timorese in the road, in front of us. And we also had to be very careful about where we looked because we could see that if we looked in certain directions they would somehow -- they would sometimes go after those people.
We were able to get up, escape from the scene, report the massacre to the outside world. The next day, General Try Sutrisno, National Commander of the Indonesian armed forces -- formal speech to a military gathering says, "These Timorese are disrupters. Such people must be shot and we will shoot them." He's since been promoted to Vice President of Indonesia. The U.S. State Department -- they had to condemn the massacre. It was out. But they said in the next breath they were going to double military aid to Indonesia. Why? Because it inculcates democratic ideals and humanitarian values [some groans from audience] in the Indonesian military.
I'm no defender of the Indonesian military but, in a sense, this is quite unfair to them. Whose democratic ideals and humanitarian values are they going to teach? Those of President Ford and Henry Kissinger who, 16 hours before the December 7, 1975 invasion, gave the green light to Suharto to go in and begin the slaughter, doubled U.S. military aid, worked behind the scenes at the UN to prevent the UN Security Council resolutions from being enforced? Those of Jimmy Carter who has, as Constancio described -- the Timorese were fleeing through the hills, the Indonesian army couldn't get their hands on them, Carter sent in the planes and helicopters which they used to bomb and strafe the Timorese down from the hills, put them in the prison and resettlement camps, implement the policy of enforced starvation, Pol Pot-style systematic massacres? Those of Reagan and Bush and Clinton, who have continued to arm the massacre, year after year? Those of Clinton's people who, just a couple weeks ago, as Suharto strolled into the Oval Office to be greeted by open arms by Clinton, Gore, Mickey Cantor, the trade representative, and others -- after being feted by CARE, the international humanitarian organization who praised Suharto as the elected president of Indonesia; by Asia Society, the academic organization which, likewise, praised Suharto -- and then, after that meeting, the Clinton official told the New York Times, Suharto, "he's our kind of guy"? Are these the democratic values the U.S. was going to teach to the Indonesian military?
Well, this is where the story gets quite significant. A battle: On the one side, the Indonesian army, their paid lobbyists in Washington, ATT, General Electric specifically called in for the deal by Suharto, the U.S. State Department led by Winston Lord -- Suharto -- one of Suharto's key men in Washington, the Pentagon, etc. On the other side, a few church groups, human rights groups, the nascent -- then nascent East Timor Action Network, a grassroots mobilization across the country. A big battle in Congress. Fall of 1992. Well, what happened? Well, the Indonesian military, the Pentagon, the lobbyists, the State Department lost. And the grassroots groups, the human rights groups won. Congress voted to cut off the IMET military training aid to Indonesia. Sent shock waves -- shock waves -- through Jakarta. They'd never seen anything like it throughout the decades of U.S. support for the Suharto regime -- a regime -- the author of two of the greatest mass murders of this century.
It was the beginning of a string of grass roots victories. The IMET cutoff, stopping a shipment of F-5 fighter planes, reversing the U.S. position at the human rights commission, winning a ban on small arms sales to Indonesia. The corporations who fought back, outfits like Freeport-McMoRan, which is destroying the forests and the rivers and the indigenous peoples of Irian Jaya, whose head, Jim-Bob Moffett, introduced Suharto personally at the CARE session at the Asia Society session -- a corporation which is now, by the way, politically on the run, thanks to the work of grassroots activists in Indonesia, in Texas, in Louisiana; people like Eyal Press, who may be here today, who recently did an excellent piece in the Nation describing the predations of this company around the world. They had to place -- they felt compelled to place two full-page ads in the New York Times business section the other day. There was a demonstration outside the house by students in Louisiana, the house of Jim-Bob Moffett, the chairman. They were chanting, "Jim-Bob Moffett kills for profit." Moffett was so outraged by this lack of respect, he stormed into the University Loyola, where he had tried to endow a chair of corporate communications; yanked the money. This massive company, with Henry Kissinger sitting on its board of directors, by the way, [some audience hissing] now on the run. Just had their OPIC insurance yanked by Washington as a result of grassroots mobilization.
The battle has been joined in Washington. Many in the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon, are so totally loyal to Suharto. Others feel otherwise. But the only change happens because it's transmitted up through Congress through the grass roots. Now, Clinton is trying to sell 20 F-16s to Indonesia. But there's never been a battle before. It's the grassroots activism that's created this and it's actually possible to win Timor. It is actually possible to push this one over the edge. Admiral Macke, chief of the Pacific command, all U.S. forces in the Pacific until recently, actually told members of Congress, Indonesia should get out of Timor because the activism in the U.S. was creating so many headaches for the Pentagon that they figured it just wasn't worth it anymore. Give Timor back to the Timorese. It's cynical; it's self-interested; it's pragmatic. But it shows they're starting to feel the heat.
I'll just close with this. What you can do is you can sign the sign-up sheet for the East Timor Action Network; it'll be circulating through the audience; it'll be on the tables outside; it's on the form on the back of your program. Get that in. If half the people, if ha -- just half the people in this audience became mobilized, active, here in the New York area, able to target calls and letters, do demonstrations, actions, etc. it would make a tremendous difference. What's been accomplished up to now has been accomplished with far less.
Finally, people sometimes say, "Oh, you know, activism, getting involved, you know, you have to go to a lot of boring meetings, people might not listen to you, people are kind of apathetic, the other side, they're so powerful, this and that." Yeah. There's some truth to some of that. But consider; consider what the Timorese face. Consider the questions Constancio had to consider when, as a young boy, he had to decide whether to join up with the underground; every -- the questions every other Timorese has to ask themself: "OK, am I ready to be strapped to the torture table, with the INTEL colonel hovering over me with a razor blade? Worse than that, am I ready to have my brother or my father or my mother or my wife strapped to that table -- there, because of my actions?" Those are the questions they have to ask themselves. Those are the obstacles they're up against. The obstacles we face are trivial by comparison.
The Timorese are doing all they can -- just like the Guatemalans, the Haitians. But they can't vote in American elections. They can't demonstrate on the streets of the United States. They can't make life hell for Freeport-McMoRan and the U.S. State Department. Only we can do that. And not only is it the moral imperative -- something you just have to do as a decent person once you hear about these terrors -- there's also a chance to win; a chance to actually end this horror, the U.S. complicity in the slaughter of the Timorese. And so, practically speaking: sign the sign-up sheet; come to the next meeting of the East Timor Action Network. Let's put an end to this. Thank you.
MARGARET EBERLE A few years ago I was in the Managua airport and met a group with Noam Chomsky. He was coming back from Nicaragua and we got stuck at the airport. It was an interesting four hours. He's an activist-critic of U.S. foreign policy. That's putting it mildly! I'm sure he's down on that list of national security risks, too. They haven't thrown him out yet, but I'll bet you there some people thinking about it. Author and co-author of numerous books analyzing the media, the role of intellectuals in U.S. foreign policy. He's a dedicated supporter and defender of the rights of East Timorese -- since and before the Indonesian invasion. It's a great honor to introduce Noam Chomsky.
NOAM CHOMSKY 1995 has been a pretty unusual year in a number of respects. For one thing, it's been a year devoted to a whole series of memories and anniversaries at a level without any precedent that I can think of -- and that's not inappropriate. It, of course, marked the 50th anniversary of the end of the most horrible and final war among the great powers. That it was the most horrible war, we know. That it was the final war, we can predict with considerable confidence because if we turn out to be wrong there won't be anybody around to tell us about it.
From 1945 -- for that reason -- European civilization, which is now led by a former colony, has had to abandon one of its great historical vocations -- namely, mutual slaughter -- limiting itself to a second equally traditional vocation: slaughter of defenseless people; not hard for us, given our history. Nineteen ninety-five also marked the anniversary of other great wars that belong to the second historical vocation. It was the 20th anniversary of the end of the U.S. wars in Indochina, which left three countries devastated and three or four million people killed.
It was also a year of apologies and a lot of concern and thoughtful analysis about the failure of the guilty to apologize -- primarily the Japanese, who couldn't bring themselves to "Say That Word," as the New York Times headline put it; one of many. It's true that Japan had expressed, quote, "sincere repentance for our past...including aggression and colonial rule [that] caused unbearable suffering and sorrow..." But that expression of remorse was irrevocably tainted because Japan also made reference to the crimes of other imperial powers, which is plainly an absurdity and a cowardly evasion. The other imperial powers had not been defeated in Africa and Asia and Latin America and were, therefore, guiltless. Well, the US has never expressed a word of remorse or apology for what it did in Indochina, for example -- though, to be accurate, it's true that Robert McNamara's memoir, In Retrospect, did contain a sincere apology for which he was praised by some and denounced and ridiculed by others. He expressed regrets for what he had done to Americans. He asked whether the high costs that Americans had suffered were justified -- 58,000 dead, harm to the economy, loss of political unity. Apologies to the victims; that's for the likes of the Japanese.
Well, 1995 is also the 20th anniversary of war crimes and crimes against humanity that are actually far more important than any of these cases and that's 'cause they're still going on and -- as Allan [Nairn] just eloquently said, and correctly said -- can be brought to an end. That's the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion of East Timor. And, I think, we should stress the "U.S.-backed" part, because that's the part that primarily concerns us on December 7, 1975. That initiated the worst slaughter since the Holocaust, relative to population, which is the most significant measure and, in fact, even in absolute scale, despite the small size of the territory, in absolute scale, comparable to some of the great atrocities of the same period. Well, that 20th anniversary, as far as I can see, passed without regrets or apologies. There were opportunities, not only on the day itself, but shortly before, when "our kind of guy" showed up in Washington and was treated as Allan described.
He's been "our kind of guy" for a long time, actually. He's been a great hero in the United States and the West, generally, since he took power -- again, with U.S. support -- just thirty years ago. It's another memorable anniversary. He celebrated that takeover of power with what the New York Times described as a "staggering mass slaughter" of some half a million to a million Asians. Nobody counts much, but somewhere in that neighborhood -- number of people -- mostly landless peasants, in a couple of months. The CIA concurred with the Times judgment. It described this as, in its words, as "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century." Went on to compare it to Hitler and Stalin and it described Suharto's coup as certainly one of the most significant events of the 20th century. That's the 1965 coup that led instantly to the massacre.
Well, that "boiling bloodbath" -- as Time called it in a very exuberant 11-page cover story -- it elicited unrestrained euphoria in the West and praise for what the Times editors called the "moderates" who had just carried it out -- particularly their leader, "our kind of guy," who is "at heart benign," the London Economist said recently, dismissing charges of atrocities in East Timor as just fabrications of propagandists for the guerrillas; the standard Stalinist style. The Economist was, no doubt -- was accurate, in a sense, in what they were thinking about, no doubt, was Suharto's attitude to foreign investors which has, indeed, been very benign. He's opened up the rich resources of Indonesia to foreign plunder while instituting one of the most vicious regimes in the world with hundreds of thousands of political prisoners, horrible torture in Indonesia, not to speak of East Timor, extensive repression that helps keep wages down for foreign investors to about half the level of China which is not particularly munificent.
The euphoria over the "staggering mass slaughter" and the praise for the "moderate" who conducted it was mixed with a good deal of self-praise -- that's an interesting fact -- notably in a column on the "Gleam of Light in Asia"; response to the staggering mass slaughter -- that was a headline -- by the leading liberal thinker of the New York Times, James Reston; recently died. He informed his readers that Washington's hand was much more prominent in these happy events then had so far been revealed. That was one of his leaks from his high government sources. And there's ample evidence, now, that he was right that Washington, in fact, encouraged the slaughter and provided arms and aid as it was proceeding, and quickly rewarded the Indonesian "moderates" who had carried it out -- crucially "our kind of guy," who was also rewarded by decisive U.S. support for his invasion of East Timor, ten years later, initiating another mass slaughter. And that's part of the relevant background for thinking about the Timorese invasion.
Well, McNamara actually refers to the 1965 "staggering mass slaughter" in his memoirs -- kind of an interesting way. It comes up when he's lamenting the stubborn and inexplicable refusal of the Vietnamese to accept the magnanimous negotiating terms that Washington was then offering. The terms were that they lay down their arms and trust their fate to the American invaders and to the client regime that they had imposed. And McNamara even offers a model, namely, the independent nationalists who had just -- as he calls them -- who had just taken over Indonesia in such gentle fashion. And he finds it inexplicable -- maybe another sign of the villainy of Communism -- that the Vietnamese were not willing to place their necks under the knives of such benign figures. And it's interesting that the vast number of reviewers of his book across the spectrum also apparently found nothing odd in this stance.
Well, in his memoirs, McNamara somehow forgot to recall his enthusiasm for the "staggering mass slaughter" which we know of from other sources -- remember, the worst since Hitler and Stalin and comparable to them according to the CIA -- and his pride in the -- in his own contribution to it. He reported to President Johnson in Congress at the time that U.S. military assistance had, as he put it, "encouraged the Indonesian army to act when the opportunity was presented." That's his words. U.S. military aid and training were particularly valuable, McNamara stressed, singling out the programs that brought Indonesian military officers to American universities, where they could be inculcated in our value system, as they had just shown, he was happy to report.
And this, bringing them to American universities and setting up good relations with them, also made it easier, he explained, to provide them with further material aid and support when they were, at last, able to act on their announced program. Their announced program was to exterminate the PKI -- PKI was the Indonesian Communist Party, the only mass party in the country -- along with hundreds of thousands of its supporters and unknown numbers of others. Well, that was a grand achievement and a very important one, which is why the CIA was -- said that it was one of the great events of the 20th century. The reason was because it was feared at the time that the PKI could not be defeated by any democratic means. If there were any democratic elections, they were going to win. And the reason for that was explained by one of the leading Indonesia scholars, Australian Harold Crouch -- very respected, very conservative. He wrote the standard scholarly work on Indonesia -- modern Indonesia -- and the Indonesian army. And he points out that the PKI had won widespread support -- not as a revolutionary party -- but as an organization defending the interests of the poor within the existing system, developing a mass base among the peasantry through its vigor in defending the interests of the poor. That's the comment from the conservative scholarship.
Well -- pretty clearly -- they had to be exterminated. And the unrestrained delight of American democrats is quite understandable -- particularly for a second reason, which was pointed out by leading American intellectuals -- liberal intellectuals and others -- and many political leaders, namely, the achievement of the "Indonesian moderates" in this "staggering mass slaughter" had offered a badly-needed justification for the U.S. wars in Vietnam which, as was explained, provided a "shield" that encouraged the Indonesian generals to carry out this necessary task of cleansing their own society. Incidentally, if you think I'm exaggerating I urge you to look at the original document [unclear] which are public, you know, and quite interesting and understandably have been pushed down the memory hole because these are not good things to remember.
In Vietnam, in fact, Washington had a similar problem at the time. It understood very well that its enemy was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam" -- I'm quoting the leading U.S. government scholar, Douglas Pike. He went on to say that it's hopeless, he wrote in 1965 at that time -- it's hopeless to enter into any political negotiations, any political settlement, because in any coalition that's set up will be like a coalition between a "minnow," namely our side, and a "whale," namely the other side -- and obviously that's pointless. So, therefore, the whale had to be exterminated, as it largely was, over many years of terror when it refused to accept McNamara's kind offer to lay down its arms and suffer the fate of the PKI.
Well, none of this -- and a lot more like it -- was remembered during this year of memory and apologies. And it's also not allowed to enter history or consciousness, which is a pretty remarkable achievement. It would impress any dictator. Well, all of this is part of the background for the invasion of East Timor -- ten years later, ten years after the "boiling bloodbath." And Washington's support for the invasion was, in a certain sense, just a reflex; part of the natural reward for our Indonesian allies. Although, in fact, more was involved, including even Timorese resources -- nowhere near the scale of Indonesia, of course, but still rich enough; rich enough to merit plunder.
If internal planning documents are ever released, which I'm not confident about -- given the record -- but if they ever are, we will very likely discover that the basic reason for Western support of the invasion was one that was expressed by the Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, in August 1975 -- that's a couple of months before the official invasion. But the invasion was already underway. Indonesia was, at that time, initiating the early steps of the planned invasion, which were perfectly well known to Western intelligence and everyone else, and reported; all completely known. He sent a secret cable from Jakarta to Australia which leaked a couple years later in Australia, and he advised support for the invasion that was being planned and was just about to come off because, he said, favorable arrangements to exploit East Timor's considerable oil resources "could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia...than with Portugal or" than an independent East Timor. So we can make a little more money -- I mean obviously they're going to sell the oil anyway -- they're not going to drink it -- but we can make a little more money if we would support the Indonesian invasion and not have to make a deal about this with an independent East Timor. And, in fact, Australia officially recognized the Indonesian invasion of East Timor shortly after the annexation -- officially recognized it de jure shortly after, and later signed a treaty with Indonesia to share the oil of what the treaty calls "the Indonesian Province of East Timor." If you read the treaty, there is a phrase in it about anything that might go to the indigenous population, whose oil is being robbed.
Well, the big feeding frenzy of the oil companies didn't really begin until immediately after the Dili massacre, which you've just heard about, graphically. Immediately after the massacre -- while the official protests were being made -- the oil companies initiated their large-scale operations, including Phillips Petroleum in Oklahoma, which announced a big find shortly after. You'll search in vain for any discussion of these matters in the mainstream press -- although it should be mentioned that one reporter in Oklahoma did write an excellent story about it, focusing on Phillips, which is based in Oklahoma. It was approved by the editors, but it was killed by the owners. That's another tribute to the "free press." The national media have kept a discrete silence about the whole matter.
Well, as for the invasion itself, the bare facts I think you know. As I just briefly review, the invasion had been in progress actually for several months, prior to the December 7th final invasion that, as you heard, was delayed a few hours to avoid embarrassing President Ford and Henry Kissinger, who were then visiting Indonesia. Ninety percent of Indonesia's arms at the time had come from the United States under a treaty requiring that they be used for self-defense. The United States did impose a six-month arms embargo, but in secret. In fact, it was so secret that the Indonesians never heard about it. They read about it later. However, they did know that Henry Kissinger, during the period of the six-month "embargo," initiated new sales of arms, including deadly counter-insurgency equipment for use in East Timor. The United Nations, at once, strongly condemned the invasion and ordered Indonesia to withdraw immediately -- but without any effect.
The reason for the UN's failure was explained in his memoirs by your Senator -- Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan -- who was, at that time, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In his memoirs, he says, the U.S. "wished things to turn out as they did and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the" UN "prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it" might undertake. "This task was given to me, and I carried it" out "with no inconsiderable success." He also knew how things turned out. He goes on to say that, in the next couple of weeks, about 60,000 people were killed -- the same proportion, he says, as the number of people killed by the Nazis on the eastern front. And -- having proudly compared himself to the Nazis -- he then goes on to some other topic. Ever since then, Moynihan has been lauded as one of the great champions of international law and morality; kind of a lone voice in the wilderness; another tribute to the humanity and high ideals of the educated classes among whom we live, here and elsewhere, and the leadership class.
Well, in 1977 and 1978, despite its huge military force, which we had provided to it, Indonesia was actually running out of arms in its attack on East Timor, and President Carter kind of took off a little time from his speeches about the soul of our -- human rights being the soul of our foreign policy to authorize new shipments of arms. And that enabled the attack to reach really near-genocidal levels in 1978 and the atrocities are going on until today -- always with enthusiastic Western support, though, as you heard -- and this is critically important -- popular protest here, in which ETAN [East Timor Action Network] has played a central role, has, indeed, been quite effective. Congress has limit -- legislated various limits on arms and training that's compelled the Clinton administration to resort to considerable trickery and subterfuge to evade the limits; denounced by Congress, but continued. Britain and Australia have eagerly stepped in to fill the gap, realizing that there's plenty of money to be made by participating in another "staggering mass slaughter."
However, one should not underestimate the success -- the importance, of popular protest here and what it's achieved. For one thing, what has been done encourages others to do the same and that's conversely: also we're encouraged by what they do. And there's a kind of mutually supportive effect which is very important. And, furthermore, although arms and training may continue -- 'cause there plenty other people happy to make money from killing people -- neither Indonesia, nor anyone else in the world, fails to notice when the chief Mafia don signals displeasure. I'll come back to that and it's a very important fact. But let's look a little more at the background and setting, which I think is quite significant and interesting.
So let's go back fifty years ago, when the United States took over most of the world, "assuming, out of self-interest, responsibility for the welfare of the world capitalist system." I'm now quoting the senior historian of the CIA, Gerald Haines, a highly respected diplomatic historian. Each region was assigned its role in this welfare project. Southeast Asia was crucial. It was supposed to fulfill its main function as a source of -- that 's a quote -- "as a source of raw materials and profits for the industrial societies." That was a quote from George Kennan's policy planning staff, parceling out parts of the world. In particular, for Southeast Asia, crucially it was Britain, but also Japan, which had to be given back its empire toward the south, as Kennan put it, but now safely under overall U.S. control.
Well, in this region, Indonesia was the major prize. In 1948, Kennan, who was then head of the State Department planning staff, described Indonesia as "the most crucial issue of the moment in our struggle with the Kremlin." Well, actually, there were no Russians in sight, but "struggle with the Kremlin" is the standard phrase for the struggle with independent nationalism. Now -- and the relation -- and this was the most crucial issue in the world in 1948. The relation to Indonesian nationalism was pretty tense. The reason is that the Indonesian nationalists, although they were properly anti-communist and anti-popular, were, nevertheless, carrying out kind of a balancing act between the army who, of course, the good guys, and the PKI, who are the bad guys, because they're the party of the poor -- and that's plenty of people, in Indonesia. The problem was the usual one: political success for the party of the poor might prevent Indonesia from fulfilling its main function, that is, providing "for the welfare of the world capitalist system" and its rulers. And it would also, as Kennan explained, be an infection that might spread through South and Southeast Asia. That's the dread demonstration effect of successful political action and independent development; major factor in what's called the Cold War. It has nothing to do with the Cold War.
In 1958, John Foster Dulles informed the National Security Council that Indonesia was one of three major world crises. The others were North Africa and the Middle East -- incidentally, all Muslim countries, for what that's worth. Dulles added -- this is a secret discussion, since declassified -- he added that there's no Soviet role in any of these major crises. In that, he was vociferously supported by President Eisenhower in that. The problem in Indonesia was reported by the U.S. embassy. They reported a growing recognition that the PKI -- the party of the poor -- "could not be beaten by ordinary democratic means and elections," quoting, "so it would be necessary to turn to the police and military to eliminate them."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the same time, advised overt measures, "if required" -- meaning U.S. aggression to -- "if required to suppress the Communists and to ensure the success of the dissidents." Well, who are the "dissidents"? The dissidents they were talking about were the rebels in outer islands. The -- if you look at Indonesia, the main resources and oil are in the outer islands. And that's where the U.S. investments were. And the U.S. was then mounting what's probably its biggest subversion operation, covert operation, ever -- up to Nicaragua, at least -- to try to break the outer islands off by military rebellion. The documentary record on this, incidentally, has been concealed to an extraordinary extent -- it's quite unusual. But a lot of the story has actually been kind of unearthed by Audrey and George Kahin -- two leading Indonesia scholars -- in quite an important recent book.
Well, the revolt failed despite the huge effort. And the concern over PKI electoral success increased. The revolt wasn't a total failure -- it had one good effect: it did put an end to the -- permanent end -- to the parliamentary system in Indonesia, so at least, you know, undermined the danger of a political victory by the party of the poor. But they were still around, and growing. So the United States then turned to increased support for the military as -- actually, in much of the world at the time during the Kennedy years; this was standard policy throughout the world -- until, finally, the time came to exterminate the PKI and landless peasants, generally, in this "staggering mass slaughter" that evoked such understandable enthusiasm and applause and self-praise in Washington.
Well, the support for Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, again, was pretty natural consequence that -- even apart from such special reasons as better terms for robbing Timorese oil. But, as the great power responsible "for the welfare of the world capitalist system," the U.S. has global concerns which extend far beyond Southeast Asia. And it's worth thinking about East Timor in that context, too. Remember, East Timor was a Portuguese colony, and it was attacked exactly when the Portuguese empire was collapsing. Now, Portuguese fascism had been a particular favorite of the United States, just as Franco's fascism was. And the collapse of the Portuguese empire was watched with a lot of concern in Washington, as were developments in Portugal, itself.
Of particular concern were Portugal's African colonies, particular Angola and Mozambique, which were both viciously attacked in 1975 at exactly just about the same time as East Timor -- in this case, by another client state, South Africa, with military and diplomatic support from the United States and its British junior partner. The parallels of this U.S.-British-backed South African attack on Angola and East -- and Mozambique and the Indonesian attack on East Timor, those parallels are very close, and one should really look at these in a global context. Remember, we're talking about the power that is responsible "for the welfare of the world capitalist system" -- meaning its rulers, not its people -- and, therefore, it does things globally. So the fact that the same thing happened in Africa that happened in Southeast Asia is perfectly natural and that's another crucial part of the context.
After World War II, when Kennan was assigning each region its function, he also mentioned Africa. Africa was to be offered to Europe, to "exploit," as he put it, for its reconstruction. "Exploiting" Africa, Kennan added, would give Europe a kind of a psychological lift -- they were sort of depressed in those days -- with the United States taking over European dependencies in Latin America, Middle East and Asia. But if we gave them this place to exploit, it could kind of help 'em out. Besides they needed it for their reconstruction.
Decolonization was then carried out, but in ways that pretty much main -- essentially maintained the relations of exploitation. However, the collapse of fascist Portugal was ominous and it was watched with great concern because of possible consequences in Africa. And -- as in East Timor -- the attack was brutal and very destructive. The UN Commission -- Economic Commission on Africa -- estimated that more than a million and a half people were killed and more than sixty billion dollars of damage was caused in the Reagan years alone. That's when we were following the policy of what was called "constructive engagement" in support of South Africa -- and that's pretty impressive, too.
In 1974 and 75, in the context of the end of Portuguese fascism, as I mentioned, was ringing plenty of alarm bells in Washington. And the result is that media coverage of East Timor, surprisingly, was quite high. You look at the New York Times index, you find plenty of references to East Timor in 1974 and 75. The -- as the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion proceeded, coverage declined. And, in fact, it declined just about as fast as corpses mounted. In 1978, when the atrocities peaked to near-genocidal level, and new arms supplies were being sent to expedite that, coverage reached absolute zero in the entire United States; also, in Canada -- another major supporter of Indonesian atrocities. Now, a couple of years later, coverage began to increase. In fact, that's largely a result of pressures from the public, which were very slight at the time, but enough to make a difference which, again, teaches some important lessons. By now, much of the press -- like Congress -- is critical of the invasion, although some subjects are still taboo, namely, the more important ones, like the actual role of the United States and the U.K. and other allies and, of course, the actual role of corporate interests -- particularly oil, in the case of East Timor.
Well, what are the prospects? That depends largely on public reactions in the great powers. The Timorese, whose resistance puts us all to shame, can do only so much -- just as the Haitians, and others. The real question, as Allan stressed, correctly, is what happens here, and in the United Kingdom and also, in this case, Australia, for obvious reasons. And that's mutually supportive. Well, these efforts are contagious and mutually supportive. That's very important. And, incidentally, that extends to Indonesia, as well, which we should not forget -- and quite dramatically.
For a long time, the invasion of East Timor was kept secret in Indonesia. It was a state secret. That, for the usual reasons why operations are kept secret, namely, in fear of the domestic population. That's why we carry out clandestine operations, too. Not -- everybody else knows about 'em, but the domestic population is not supposed to. Clandestine operations are just an attack on democracy; that's their function. Everybody else knows about 'em perfectly well. The -- and same in Indonesia. They kept the invasion secret. But, inevitably, it sort of leaked out. You know, somebody's brother came back wounded and somebody's uncle was killed and that sort of thing. And sooner or later, even in a kind of totalitarian state, the information got around and that has led to very significant protest in Indonesia. And remember: that takes a lot more courage than protest here or in London.
We hear from dignitaries like Henry Kissinger or his British colleague, Douglas Hurd, that we should not pressure Indonesia because the Indonesians are very sensitive souls and, besides, we have no right to export Western values to Third World countries; values that they've learned about pretty well, over the years. The question, when such discussions come up, always, is quite a simple one: Which Indonesians are we talking about? Are we talking about General Suharto and his rich family and his friends -- "our kind of guys" -- who understand Western values just fine, incidentally, which is why they have blood flowing from their hands and money pouring out of their pockets?
But there are plenty of other Indonesians. For example, there are Indonesians who are -- I'm quoting them -- "appealing to their friends in the West to join them in defending the right of self-determination of East Timor and not to be deceived by the sweet words of politicians who are only concerned with power and money"; leading Indonesian human rights activist. Or another courageous Indonesian scholar -- now a political exile in Australia -- who exposed Indonesia's crimes, and inside Indonesia did it, and he protested quite outspokenly against him. Or the student councils of the major universities who have issued very powerful statements calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces and full and free self-determination of East Timor, not to speak of labor activists, journalists, human rights workers; many others who are also combining these calls with a plea to the West to support their struggles for freedom and human rights, workers rights, freedom of speech, and so on in Indonesia. That includes, incidentally, the Indonesians who entered the two embassies -- a day or two ago -- we don't yet know the details -- with Timorese in Indonesia and, last I heard, were expelled and picked up by the Indonesian police. I hope that's false, but I don't know the current facts.
Well, we have to ask ourselves which -- we have to make a choice: Which Indonesia do we have in mind when we speak of support and respect for Indonesia? These public protests in Indonesia and the much more limited ones in the free countries of the West, they've created a situation in which "our kind of guys" in Indonesia might, indeed, decide to withdraw. That's, I think, correct. They might decide to remove the "piece of gravel" from the shoe, as the Foreign Minister put it, recently. The situation, in fact, is at quite an important turning point.
[At this point, Chomsky sees Margaret Eberle walk across the stage. He misinterprets this action, thinking he is being asked to finish his talk] Yeah, I'm finished. OK. I'm done. Yeah. I was waiting for that. She's a very ominous creature. You think Suharto is tough!
The best way to commemorate these twenty years of terrible atrocities and shameful and cowardly complicity is pretty obvious. It's to bring it -- bring the whole horror story to an end. That doesn't require bombing Jakarta; doesn't require sending peacekeeping forces. In fact, it doesn't require anything except following an old precept of the medical profession, namely, "first, do no harm." Then you worry about something else.
If we can pressure our own government and our own corporations to withdraw their active participation in the crimes, then there is, indeed, every likelihood that they will come to an end and that East Timor may, in fact, enjoy the right of self-determination that's repeatedly been confirmed by the United Nations, recently again by the World Court, and blocked by the unwillingness of Washington and its allies to accept it and -- if we're honest -- by our failure, so far, to compel them to do so. Thanks.
MARGARET EBERLE It's been said that one of the worst days that ever happened in -- for U.S. capitalism was December 7th, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and that was also the day that Noam Chomsky was born. So his birthday was just two days ago. So, what do you think? Besides applauding, maybe we could sing "Happy Birthday" to him.
I want to emphasize, once again, on the back of your program -- Allan [Nairn] has already mentioned it -- but I want to mention it again. Be sure that you leave this filled out, on the desk, before you leave here. But before you go any further, we have some time for questions. But while those questions are happening, you've heard about what -- and you know -- what these four people have contributed to this movement. I mean, unless somebody's willing to swear in blood right now that they're willing to go out and become a national security risk, I think the least we could do is sort of dig around, you know, in those pockets, and see if we can come up with some money to keep this network going because it's doing amazing stuff.
And while you're digging in there and taking the money out, we'll open up for some questions. Could I just ask one thing -- and I hear this asked every single time? We've already had four amazing speeches; I don't think you can reach that level. So let's just ask questions, and not make speeches. OK?
QUESTIONER I have a question for Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Nairn. I heard you speaking about Pat Moynihan before and I read what you've written about that. I don't know if this is true or not, but I was speaking yesterday with somebody about East Timor and Moynihan, and they said that over the past year or so that he has actually expressed some remorse for some of the things he did and I was just wondering if you have any idea about that.
ALLAN NAIRN In terms of Moynihan, starting a few years ago, very quietly, Moynihan started responding to constituency letters with this -- it's like a two-page single-spaced little essay which is extremely tortured and convoluted. But -- and it's impossible to summarize! But what it basically says is, "Yes, the U.S. policy on Timor was mistaken and that the U.S. should now change the policy." And, in recent years, Moynihan always signs the letters to change the policy. He always votes for those who are advocating, you know, an end to the slaughter in Timor. But he has never stood up and apologized and acknowledged his own role.
Specifically, two years ago, I was in Moynihan's office and sat down with his foreign policy people and was basically asking them to say, "Look" -- and the issue at the time there was a measure being pushed by Senator Feingold, Senator Leahy and others that would have prohibited the use of U.S.-supplied arms to Indonesia in East Timor. And it came up on the floor; it was shot down at the last minute by Senator Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, who is in the pocket of Freeport-McMoRan. But I said to Moynihan's people, "Look, if a Senator stood up on the floor of the Senate, renounced his past on East Timor and explained, 'I was there. I'm the one who stopped the UN from enforcing the Security Council Resolutions. I know -- I now, therefore, urge you to lead the United States in reversing course and getting out of East Timor.' It would have tremendous impact." They basically said, "no way"; he didn't do that. He did vote; he does vote the right way; he does sign the letters. But he won't come out and say it, and he will not apologize to those hundreds of thousands dead.
QUESTIONER Basically, Professor Chomsky, what exactly is your main source of information for everything you talk about? It's not funny because -- for me and for most people -- if it's not covered in Time or Newsweek or the New York Times it basically didn't happen. So what would you recommend -- because if I hadn't come here I wouldn't have found out about East Timor; not through the media. So what, exactly, are the ways we can find out more about it and what are the sources of information [unclear] -
NOAM CHOMSKY I mean, sign up for ETAN. They'll immediately put you on a mailing list and you'll be in touch with a lot of current information about what's going on -- all there is in the world.
Yeah, it takes a little effort -- I mean, they're not going to make it easy for you. But the information is there. There's nothing that I mentioned that isn't from a public source.
MARGARET EBERLE Excuse me. The other possibility is to tune in 99.5 FM every night at six o'clock and listen to the news on WBAI. You'll be very well-informed.
QUESTIONER This is a question for Professor Chomsky. I am a Sri Lankan Tamil, and I sympathize a lot with what is going on in East Timor today. But I also want to point out that, as of now, there is more than 90 percent of the population of the north [of Sri Lanka] -- civilian population have been pushed out or they've fled a military invasion with 100 percent [unclear]. That, being the example I wanted to bring out, what I want to ask is that, as a result of this massive refugee problem, there was a hearing and they brought three academics. One of them was Marsha Singer from Pittsburgh. They were fantastically informed with the ground level situation and they could answer all the questions that were put to them; very balanced.
On the other hand, when the State Department came on the floor -- it's incredible, their view of the same problem. This, to me, is what you said before, that is, that there's a big gap between what the public opinion is and what the U.S. policy and the people who are connected with the policy is. And my general question to you -- this not only would help Timor -- but any [unclear; word may be "reasonable"] ethnic problem across world is that how the U.S. citizens -- educated people who are assembled today, here -- I think this is enough to make us change this type of disparities. What is there really to do, other than grassroots organization? To me, observing that is very fulfilling but, still, not very efficient to the kind of power where it gets projected down to us. So could you help us that, structurally, what changes that are reasonable to look for and work for to make this change happen in a very spontaneous way? People want to separate -- live...
NOAM CHOMSKY ...you can't get a quick fix -- something you have to work on. And there's no secrets. These -- goes right back through history. I mean, the reason we don't live in slavery and feudalism and, you know, mass terror and so on is that people were willing to struggle against oppression. And it's slow and hard and you get -- it takes time and there's no quick fixes and there's no simple answers and everybody knows the answers. I don't have to repeat 'em: you have to educate, you have to learn, you have to organize, you have to find ways of acting and so on. That's all there's ever been in history, and nobody's going to find another magic answer -- and there's no magic answer on this.
In the case of Sri Lanka, you know, you gotta start by telling -- letting people know that it's not in Central Africa or in Antarctica, or something like that. And if you ask around, those are probably the -- you know, anything with a funny name, people will say, "probably in Africa." So -- in fact, that's where people thought Timor was, until pretty recently. The -- so the first thing you gotta do is bring about a level of awareness. And then you have to get people to see that they've a reason for caring about it. And then they have to try to do something about it. And that's all there is. There's no other answer.
It's -- you know -- the look -- the search for magic solutions and the -- even worse -- the conclusion, "OK, if you can't give me a magic solution, I'm gonna go home and watch television," -- that's just a way of guaranteeing that these things go on. And that's true across the board.
QUESTIONER [first words missing from tape]...something that might be related to East Timor, I'm not sure, but I was reading a book called -- by Professor Alfred McCoy, called The Politics of Heroin. And I wanted to know if you guys -- I've read books similar to that and want to know if you knew about how much heroin and drugs, in general, of that area played in the U.S. involvement in that area, in the Vietnam War and maybe today. And I'm not sure if East Timor falls anywhere within the Golden Triangle or any of those politics. But could you comment on that?
NOAM CHOMSKY Yeah. Well, in the case of Indonesia, I don't think it was much. But in Southeast Asia it was very substantial. Al McCoy's book is a very good book -- especially if you read the new edition of it. It's a very good and important book. He starts by talking about how the drug racket was reconstituted after World War II.
The basic story is that -- I mean, the fascists, whatever you thought about 'em, they ran a very tight ship, you know. And they don't have any competition. So they wiped out the Mafia, basically, 'cause they don't fool -- you don't fool around. When the Americans moved in, first in Sicily and, then, in southern France and so on, it was basically reconstituted. [unclear] reconstituted largely as a weapon against the resistance -- the anti-fascist resistance -- and against the labor movement. 'Cause there was the same problem in Europe that there was in Indonesia and Vietnam and everywhere else. There were mass popular movements that were radical democratic and were not committed to "the welfare of the world capitalist system." They wanted it to change. And the traditional conservatives -- you know, institution had been discredited by their association with fascism. So, all over the world, first step after World War II was destroy the resistance and reinstate the supporters of the fascist system. That's basically chapter one of the postwar world.
In France and Italy it involved reconstituting the Mafia. That was the way -- you know, you needed strikebreakers to work on the Marseilles docks and so on and who's going to do it for you? Who are going to be the goons? Well, you know, these guys. And they don't do it for free. So you give 'em the heroin racket in exchange. And, from then on, the trail of drugs has followed clandestine activities pretty closely. So, France -- that's the famous "French connection" -- got started that way. Then it goes to Southeast Asia where big U.S. operations are going on, but not in Indonesia, as far as I know. Only around the Golden Triangle, as it's called -- you know, Burma, Laos, so on and, yeah, that became the big center of the drug traffic and, of course, the U.S. was up to its neck in it. They -- what was called the clandestine army -- the highlands army -- in Laos was financed by opium production, quite openly. And, of course, that -- and then huge explosion of drugs.
Afghanistan has recently been the -- a major center of the drug trade for exactly the same reasons. And, in fact -- you know, it's not perfect -- but it goes this way pretty closely and for quite good reasons. You have to -- if you're involved in clandestine operations, first of all, you need a lot of thugs and gangsters and they got to be paid. And they have to be paid with untraceable money, which means you got to have a lot of money around that's going to get these guys to do what you want, and there aren't a lot of choices. Drugs is the natural one. So it's not in the least surprising that in -- what McCoy describes is true -- that the trail of drugs follows pretty closely the major trail of underground clandestine operations. However, as far as I know, that was not the case in Indonesia.
QUESTIONER I am a Indonesian citizen. Before anybody of you decide what you are going to do today, I want you all to know that Indonesia consists of about almost 300 ethnic groups. They might think they are different from each other. And what happened -- the killing fields that happened in East Timor -- may happen, and have happened, in other parts of Indonesia. I come from Aceh. That's the northern part of Sumatra. In the last 50 years, Aceh tried twice to found an independent Islamic nation and the killing fields also happened there. So I know what you feel. I have relatives that have to flee out also to Malaysia.
But if you decide to prevent what is happening in Indonesia, make it generally. Because if you're only going to prevent what is happening in East Timor, what will happen -- if this succeed, then you are making -- creating a new Yugoslavia. You're tearing Indonesia apart. Because, after East Timor, there will be Aceh, and there will be South Maluku, and there will be Irian Jaya. There will be many other nations in Indonesia. Thank you.
NOAM CHOMSKY Well, I think there's a lot of validity to what you say. Aceh had suffered bitterly and, as I sort of ended up saying, there are plenty of people in Indonesia who, very courageously, are pleading with us to help them in their own struggle for freedom and justice in Indonesia -- and this is part of it.
However -- that aside -- the argument that independence for East Timor would lead to the breakup of Indonesia doesn't really make any sense. This is a recent conquest of a region that was never historically part of Indonesia. There was never even a claim to this on the part of Indonesia. In fact, just shortly before the invasion, the Foreign Minister made it explicit that Indonesia had no claims on this territory which had never been part of the Dutch empire, which, then, Indonesia took over. And whatever one thinks about the questions of separatism and independence in Indonesia -- and there are interesting and important and serious questions -- this has nothing to do with them. This is different. This is straight foreign aggression and conquest.
The next one that's closest to it is, in fact, Irian Jaya -- which was handed over to Indonesia in a pretty cowardly fashion, in my opinion, by the West. But, at least, they could claim that it had been part of the Dutch empire. And, then, further questions arise of the kind you're talking about which certainly merit thought and consideration. But they're different questions.
ALLAN NAIRN And just to add one thing, for people in this country, in terms of U.S. policy: The actions that are demanded to end the illegal occupation of East Timor and, also, to support people within Indonesia itself, who are fighting for their lives and fighting for democracy -- they're the same actions. It's the exact same set of actions. And that is to cut off the U.S. support for the Suharto dictatorship. Specifically, right now, stop that transfer of F-16 fighter planes to Indonesia.
As Professor Chomsky mentioned, the heightened visibility of the Timor issue as a result of the grassroots mobilization since the massacre has been quite heartening to activists throughout Indonesia. There was a demonstration in front of the Indonesian Parliament not long ago, where very courageous young students actually -- and this is mind-boggling in Indonesia -- they held up placards for Suharto to be tried by the Parliament for massacres. And they listed a series of massacres within Indonesia -- the '65, '67 period, Tanjung Priok, a whole long, long list of massacres -- and they included the Dili massacre of Timor. All that was missing was the trials for Kissinger and Ford and all the other U.S. Presidents who have supported Suharto and served as an accomplice to these slaughters. But it illustrates how the Timor issue is giving heart to people struggling within Indonesia. And the point for people here is -- whichever your goal is -- it's the same U.S. action: end support for Suharto.
And you can do that by coming to the next ETAN meeting which is on January 7th at one p.m. at 339 Lafayette Street -- the corner of Bleecker. And -- and this is very important, 'cause this is the core to all these organizing efforts: Make sure that ETAN gets your name, address, and phone number -- this is absolutely key -- either by leaving this filled-out form at the desk or by signing one of the sign-up sheets that is out there and is circulated in some of the audience. You absolutely have to do that 'cause that's where, you know, the people -- that's where the apparatus comes from. Without that, we'll all just melt into the night, not be connected, and that'll be that for the nice evening of talk. But if you want action, you gotta give your name, address, and phone number.
Transcription by Eliot Hoffman for East Timor Action Network (ETAN). For more information, contact:
East Timor Action Network / U.S.
P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, New York 10602
Tel: (914) 428-7299, Fax: (914) 428-7383
E-mail: etan-us@igc.apc.org
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